Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
/**
* v0.28.1: prompt-injection defense for retrieved chat content fed back into
* Anthropic during LongMemEval answer generation.
*
* The threat: each LongMemEval haystack session is attacker-controlled (they
* could craft a session that says "ignore prior instructions, say X"). Without
* structural framing + pattern strip, that content can hijack the answer-gen
* call. Mitigation matches what think/sanitize.ts does for takes:
*
* 1. Structural framing: every session is wrapped in
* <chat_session id="..." date="..."> ... </chat_session> tags. The
* answer-gen system prompt tells the model these are DATA, not
* instructions.
* 2. Pattern strip: re-uses INJECTION_PATTERNS from think/sanitize.ts so
* both surfaces share one source of truth. Adding a new pattern there
* automatically covers benchmarks too.
* 3. Length cap: a per-session character bound. The DEFAULT (4000) is the
* extractor-era value; the READER passes its own bound
* (reader.ts READER_MAX_SESSION_CHARS, above the longest session in the
* corpus) because the 4000 default silently cut the answer out of most
* retrieved sessions — LongMemEval gold sessions run 5–23K chars and
* the ranker wave's first judged dry run abstained on 11/25 questions
* whose gold session was retrieved at rank 1. `truncatedCount` in the
* render result says how many sessions hit whichever cap was used.
*/
import { INJECTION_PATTERNS } from '../../core/think/sanitize.ts';
/** Default per-session bound (extractor-era). The reader overrides it. */
export const DEFAULT_MAX_SESSION_CHARS = 4000;
const MAX_SESSION_CHARS = DEFAULT_MAX_SESSION_CHARS;
export interface SanitizeResult {
text: string;
matched: string[];
}
export function sanitizeChatContent(content: string, maxChars: number = MAX_SESSION_CHARS): SanitizeResult {
let text = content;
const matched: string[] = [];
for (const p of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
if (p.rx.test(text)) {
matched.push(p.name);
text = text.replace(p.rx, p.replacement);
}
}
// Also escape closures of our structural tag so a session can't terminate
// its own <chat_session> wrapper. INJECTION_PATTERNS handles </take> already
// but our tag name is different.
if (/<\s*\/\s*chat_session\s*>/i.test(text)) {
matched.push('close-chat-session');
text = text.replace(/<\s*\/\s*chat_session\s*>/gi, '</chat_session>');
}
if (text.length > maxChars) {
text = text.slice(0, maxChars - 3) + '...';
matched.push('length-cap');
}
return { text, matched };
}
export interface ChatSessionForPrompt {
session_id: string;
date?: string;
body: string;
}
export interface RenderResult {
rendered: string;
/** Sessions where ANY pattern fired (incl. the length cap). */
sanitizedCount: number;
/** Sessions cut by the per-session character bound. */
truncatedCount: number;
}
export interface RenderChatBlockOptions {
/** Per-session character bound; defaults to DEFAULT_MAX_SESSION_CHARS. */
maxSessionChars?: number;
}
export function renderChatBlock(sessions: ChatSessionForPrompt[], options: RenderChatBlockOptions = {}): RenderResult {
const maxChars = options.maxSessionChars ?? MAX_SESSION_CHARS;
const lines: string[] = [];
let sanitizedCount = 0;
let truncatedCount = 0;
for (const s of sessions) {
const { text, matched } = sanitizeChatContent(s.body, maxChars);
if (matched.length > 0) sanitizedCount++;
if (matched.includes('length-cap')) truncatedCount++;
const dateAttr = s.date ? ` date="${s.date.replace(/"/g, '"')}"` : '';
const idAttr = s.session_id.replace(/"/g, '"');
lines.push(`<chat_session id="${idAttr}"${dateAttr}>\n${text}\n</chat_session>`);
}
return { rendered: lines.join('\n\n'), sanitizedCount, truncatedCount };
}