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Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain

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/**
 * E2E tests for src/mcp/http-transport.ts against real Postgres.
 *
 * Catches schema drift (column-name typos that would slip past the unit suite's
 * stubbed engine.sql) and proves the F1+F2+F3 dispatch pipeline works against a
 * real handler doing real DB work. Also exercises the SQL-level last_used_at
 * debounce against real Postgres semantics.
 *
 * Run: DATABASE_URL=... bun test test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts
 */

import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'crypto';
import { startHttpTransport } from '../../src/mcp/http-transport.ts';
import { hasDatabase, setupDB, teardownDB, getEngine, getConn } from './helpers.ts';
import { fenceTranscriptText } from '../../src/core/search/transcript-quote.ts';

const skip = !hasDatabase();
const describeE2E = skip ? describe.skip : describe;

if (skip) {
  console.log('Skipping E2E http-transport tests (DATABASE_URL not set)');
}

interface ServerHandle {
  port: number;
  stop: () => Promise<void>;
}

function generateToken(): string {
  return 'gbrain_test_' + randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
}

function hashToken(token: string): string {
  return createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex');
}

async function startServer(): Promise<ServerHandle> {
  const engine = getEngine();
  const server = await startHttpTransport({ port: 0, engine: engine as any });
  return {
    port: (server as any).port,
    stop: async () => { (server as any).stop(true); },
  };
}

function rpc(method: string, params?: unknown, id: number = 1) {
  return JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id, method, ...(params !== undefined ? { params } : {}) });
}

describeE2E('http-transport E2E (real Postgres)', () => {
  let srv: ServerHandle;
  let validToken: string;
  let revokedToken: string;
  let validTokenName: string;
  // v0.45.7 ambient recall: two tokens with DISTINCT clientIds (the auth
  // clientId is the access_tokens row id) for the delta session-cursor test.
  let tokenA: string;
  let tokenB: string;
  let tokenAId: string;
  let tokenBId: string;

  beforeAll(async () => {
    await setupDB();
    const conn = getConn();

    // Seed a valid + revoked token directly via SQL (mirrors auth.ts's create path).
    validToken = generateToken();
    validTokenName = 'e2e-valid-' + randomBytes(4).toString('hex');
    await conn.unsafe(
      'INSERT INTO access_tokens (name, token_hash) VALUES ($1, $2)',
      [validTokenName, hashToken(validToken)],
    );
    revokedToken = generateToken();
    await conn.unsafe(
      'INSERT INTO access_tokens (name, token_hash, revoked_at) VALUES ($1, $2, now())',
      ['e2e-revoked-' + randomBytes(4).toString('hex'), hashToken(revokedToken)],
    );
    // Two more valid tokens — RETURNING id captures each token's clientId
    // (http-transport sets auth.clientId to the access_tokens row id).
    tokenA = generateToken();
    const [rowA] = await conn.unsafe(
      'INSERT INTO access_tokens (name, token_hash) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id',
      ['e2e-client-a-' + randomBytes(4).toString('hex'), hashToken(tokenA)],
    ) as { id: string }[];
    tokenAId = rowA.id;
    tokenB = generateToken();
    const [rowB] = await conn.unsafe(
      'INSERT INTO access_tokens (name, token_hash) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id',
      ['e2e-client-b-' + randomBytes(4).toString('hex'), hashToken(tokenB)],
    ) as { id: string }[];
    tokenBId = rowB.id;

    srv = await startServer();
  }, 30_000);

  afterAll(async () => {
    if (srv) await srv.stop();
    await teardownDB();
  });

  test('1. /health → 200 with expected JSON shape', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/health`);
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    expect(body.status).toBe('ok');
    expect(body.transport).toBe('http');
    expect(body.version).toBeString();
  });

  test('2. /mcp tools/list with valid Bearer → 200 + ops list', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    expect(body.result.tools).toBeArray();
    expect(body.result.tools.length).toBeGreaterThan(5);
    expect(r.headers.get('content-type')).toContain('application/json');
  });

  test('3. /mcp tools/call (real op: list_pages) round-trips successfully — F1+F2+F3 guard', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/call', { name: 'list_pages', arguments: { limit: 5 } }),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    expect(body.jsonrpc).toBe('2.0');
    expect(body.result.content).toBeArray();
    // Should NOT be an error — handler ran successfully against the real engine.
    expect(body.result.isError).toBeUndefined();
    // Result text should parse as JSON (list_pages returns an object/array)
    const resultText = body.result.content[0].text;
    const parsed = JSON.parse(resultText);
    expect(parsed).toBeDefined();
  });

  test('4. revoked token → 401', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${revokedToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
  });

  test('5. last_used_at debounce: two consecutive valid calls → only one UPDATE within 60s', async () => {
    const conn = getConn();

    // Reset last_used_at to NULL so the first call definitely updates
    await conn.unsafe('UPDATE access_tokens SET last_used_at = NULL WHERE name = $1', [validTokenName]);

    // First request — should update last_used_at
    await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    // Give the fire-and-forget UPDATE a moment to land
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));

    const [row1] = await conn.unsafe(
      'SELECT last_used_at FROM access_tokens WHERE name = $1',
      [validTokenName],
    ) as { last_used_at: Date | null }[];
    expect(row1.last_used_at).not.toBeNull();
    const firstUpdate = row1.last_used_at;

    // Second request immediately — should NOT trigger another UPDATE (debounced by SQL WHERE)
    await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));

    const [row2] = await conn.unsafe(
      'SELECT last_used_at FROM access_tokens WHERE name = $1',
      [validTokenName],
    ) as { last_used_at: Date | null }[];
    // Same timestamp = same UPDATE = debounce held
    expect(row2.last_used_at?.getTime()).toBe(firstUpdate?.getTime());
  });

  test('6. last_used_at debounce: simulating 65s gap → second request DOES update', async () => {
    const conn = getConn();

    // Set last_used_at to 65 seconds ago — simulates the time gap without waiting in real time
    await conn.unsafe(
      `UPDATE access_tokens SET last_used_at = now() - interval '65 seconds' WHERE name = $1`,
      [validTokenName],
    );
    const [before] = await conn.unsafe(
      'SELECT last_used_at FROM access_tokens WHERE name = $1',
      [validTokenName],
    ) as { last_used_at: Date | null }[];

    await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));

    const [after] = await conn.unsafe(
      'SELECT last_used_at FROM access_tokens WHERE name = $1',
      [validTokenName],
    ) as { last_used_at: Date | null }[];
    expect(after.last_used_at?.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(before.last_used_at!.getTime());
  });

  test('7. mcp_request_log gets a row per request', async () => {
    const conn = getConn();
    const beforeRows = await conn.unsafe('SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_request_log') as { n: number }[];
    const beforeN = beforeRows[0].n;

    await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    // Fire-and-forget audit insert — give it a tick
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 100));

    const afterRows = await conn.unsafe('SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_request_log') as { n: number }[];
    expect(afterRows[0].n).toBeGreaterThan(beforeN);

    const [row] = await conn.unsafe(
      `SELECT token_name, operation, status, latency_ms FROM mcp_request_log
       WHERE token_name = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1`,
      [validTokenName],
    ) as { token_name: string; operation: string; status: string; latency_ms: number }[];
    expect(row.token_name).toBe(validTokenName);
    expect(row.operation).toBe('tools/list');
    expect(row.status).toBe('success');
    expect(row.latency_ms).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
  });

  test('8. tools/call with malformed params → isError result with invalid_params', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/call', { name: 'get_page', arguments: { slug: 42 } }),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    expect(body.result.isError).toBe(true);
    expect(body.result.content[0].text).toContain('invalid_params');
  });

  // ── v0.45.7 ambient recall: the two boundary verbs over real HTTP ─────────

  test('9. tools/list on the default surface includes the boundary verbs (context_pack + delta)', async () => {
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/list'),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    const names = body.result.tools.map((t: { name: string }) => t.name);
    expect(names).toContain('context_pack');
    expect(names).toContain('delta');
  });

  test('10. delta keys the session cursor by auth clientId — two tokens, same session_id → two rows, neither "local"', async () => {
    const conn = getConn();
    const sessionId = 'e2e-delta-' + randomBytes(6).toString('hex');

    // First wake per (client, session): establishes the cursor, empty delta.
    // Same session_id under BOTH tokens — the auth clientId must namespace the
    // cursor rows or the two harnesses would stomp each other's state.
    for (const token of [tokenA, tokenB]) {
      const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
        body: rpc('tools/call', { name: 'delta', arguments: { session_id: sessionId } }),
      });
      expect(r.status).toBe(200);
      const body = await r.json();
      expect(body.result.isError).toBeUndefined();
      const parsed = JSON.parse(body.result.content[0].text);
      expect(parsed.protocol_version).toBe(1);
      expect(parsed.pages).toEqual([]);
    }

    // Query the engine directly: one row per clientId, keyed by the tokens'
    // access_tokens row ids — and never the 'local' trusted-CLI sentinel.
    const rows = await conn.unsafe(
      'SELECT client_id, source_id FROM session_context_state WHERE session_id = $1 ORDER BY client_id',
      [sessionId],
    ) as { client_id: string; source_id: string }[];
    expect(rows.length).toBe(2);
    expect(rows.map(row => row.client_id).sort()).toEqual([tokenAId, tokenBId].sort());
    for (const row of rows) {
      expect(row.client_id).not.toBe('local');
      expect(row.source_id).toBe('default');
    }
  });

  test('11. context_pack with include_private:true over HTTP is fail-closed — no private fact in facts[] or text', async () => {
    const conn = getConn();
    const marker = randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
    const worldFact = `E2E world fact ${marker}`;
    const privateFact = `E2E private fact SECRET-${marker}`;
    const inserted = await conn.unsafe(
      `INSERT INTO facts (source_id, fact, kind, visibility, source) VALUES
         ('default', $1, 'fact', 'world', 'e2e-http'),
         ('default', $2, 'fact', 'private', 'e2e-http') RETURNING id, visibility`,
      [worldFact, privateFact],
    );
    const worldId = inserted.find(row => row.visibility === 'world')!.id;

    // include_private only widens for trusted-local callers (ctx.remote ===
    // false); this transport always dispatches remote:true, so the flag must
    // be a no-op over real HTTP.
    const r = await fetch(`http://localhost:${srv.port}/mcp`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${validToken}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: rpc('tools/call', {
        name: 'context_pack',
        arguments: {
          entities: 'nonexistent-entity-' + marker,
          include_private: true,
          // Fresh session id → fresh hot-memory cache key (no cross-test reuse).
          session_id: 'e2e-pack-' + marker,
        },
      }),
    });
    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
    const body = await r.json();
    expect(body.result.isError).toBeUndefined();
    const rawText = body.result.content[0].text;
    const parsed = JSON.parse(rawText);
    expect(parsed.protocol_version).toBe(1);
    // World fact present — proves the facts arm actually ran (non-vacuous). A raw insert carries no
    // owner tier, so this remote reader gets it quoted (GST-687).
    const factTexts = parsed.facts.map((f: { fact: string }) => f.fact);
    expect(factTexts).toContain(fenceTranscriptText(worldFact, `fact ${worldId}`));
    // Private fact absent from facts[], from the injectable text, and from
    // the entire serialized payload (covers every additive field at once).
    expect(factTexts).not.toContain(privateFact);
    expect(parsed.text).not.toContain('SECRET-' + marker);
    expect(rawText).not.toContain('SECRET-' + marker);
  });
});