Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
/**
* scripts/check-privacy.sh behavior: name/path violations, allowlists, staged
* mode and batching.
*
* CLAUDE.md bans the private OpenClaw fork name from public artifacts, and this
* script is the enforcement mechanism. Its verify wiring is owned generically:
* test/scripts/run-verify-parallel.test.ts requires every manifest guard to be
* executed by verify, and test/scripts/ci-gates.test.ts requires the CI verify
* job to run `bun run verify`.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'bun:test';
import { readFileSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'fs';
import { join, resolve } from 'path';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { spawnSync } from 'child_process';
const REPO_ROOT = resolve(import.meta.dir, '..');
const PRIVACY_SCRIPT = resolve(REPO_ROOT, 'scripts/check-privacy.sh');
const guardSource = readFileSync(PRIVACY_SCRIPT, 'utf8');
const bannedName = guardSource.match(/^BANNED_NAME='([^']+)'/m)![1]!;
const bannedPath = guardSource.match(/BANNED_PATHS=\(\s*'([^']+)'/)![1]!;
function privacyFixture(files: Record<string, string>) {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'privacy-guard-'));
for (const [file, contents] of Object.entries(files)) {
const target = join(root, file);
mkdirSync(resolve(target, '..'), { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(target, contents);
}
const init = spawnSync('git', ['init', '-q', root]);
expect(init.status).toBe(0);
const add = spawnSync('git', ['add', '.'], { cwd: root });
expect(add.status).toBe(0);
return root;
}
function runPrivacy(root: string, args: string[] = [], env: Record<string, string> = {}) {
return spawnSync('bash', [PRIVACY_SCRIPT, ...args], { cwd: root, encoding: 'utf8', env: { ...process.env, ...env } });
}
describe('check-privacy.sh', () => {
it('reports every name and path violation with its original line number', () => {
const root = privacyFixture({
'docs/a file.md': `safe\n${bannedName.toUpperCase()}\n${bannedPath}\n`,
'src/b.ts': `${bannedName}\n`,
'ignored.bin': bannedName,
});
try {
const r = runPrivacy(root);
expect(r.status).toBe(1);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('BANNED NAME in docs/a file.md');
expect(r.stderr).toContain(`2:${bannedName.toUpperCase()}`);
expect(r.stderr).toContain(`BANNED PATH '${bannedPath}' in docs/a file.md`);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('BANNED NAME in src/b.ts');
expect(r.stderr).not.toContain('ignored.bin');
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('preserves exact allowlist paths, case-sensitive path rules, and the changelog name check', () => {
const root = privacyFixture({
'CLAUDE.md': `${bannedName}\n${bannedPath}\n`,
'CHANGELOG.md': `${bannedPath}\n`,
'docs/case.md': `${bannedPath.toUpperCase()}\n`,
});
try {
expect(runPrivacy(root).status).toBe(0);
writeFileSync(join(root, 'CHANGELOG.md'), `${bannedName}\n`);
const r = runPrivacy(root);
expect(r.status).toBe(1);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('BANNED NAME in CHANGELOG.md');
expect(r.stderr).not.toContain('BANNED PATH');
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('staged mode keeps its selected-file scope and scans their current working contents', () => {
const root = privacyFixture({ 'selected.md': 'safe\n' });
try {
writeFileSync(join(root, 'intent.md'), `${bannedName}\n`);
expect(spawnSync('git', ['add', '-N', 'intent.md'], { cwd: root }).status).toBe(0);
expect(runPrivacy(root, ['--staged']).status).toBe(0);
expect(runPrivacy(root).status).toBe(1);
writeFileSync(join(root, 'selected.md'), `${bannedName}\n`);
const r = runPrivacy(root, ['--staged']);
expect(r.status).toBe(1);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('BANNED NAME in selected.md');
expect(r.stderr).not.toContain('intent.md');
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('batches clean files while still checking matches beyond the first batch', () => {
const root = privacyFixture(Object.fromEntries(Array.from({ length: 260 }, (_, i) => [`docs/clean ${i}.md`, 'safe\n'])));
const bin = join(root, 'bin');
mkdirSync(bin);
const log = join(root, 'grep-calls');
writeFileSync(join(bin, 'grep'), `#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf 'grep\\n' >> "$GREP_CALL_LOG"\nexec "$REAL_GREP" "$@"\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
const env = { PATH: `${bin}:${process.env.PATH}`, GREP_CALL_LOG: log, REAL_GREP: Bun.which('grep')! };
try {
expect(runPrivacy(root, [], env).status).toBe(0);
expect(readFileSync(log, 'utf8').trim().split('\n').length).toBeLessThan(10);
writeFileSync(join(root, 'docs', 'clean 99.md'), `${bannedName}\n`);
const r = runPrivacy(root, [], env);
expect(r.status).toBe(1);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('BANNED NAME in docs/clean 99.md');
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('fails closed when a later candidate batch cannot be scanned', () => {
const root = privacyFixture(Object.fromEntries(Array.from({ length: 260 }, (_, i) => [`docs/file ${i}.md`, `${bannedName}\n`])));
const bin = join(root, 'bin');
mkdirSync(bin);
const marker = join(root, 'first-batch');
writeFileSync(join(bin, 'grep'), `#!/usr/bin/env bash\nif [ -f "$BATCH_MARKER" ]; then\n echo 'candidate scan failed' >&2\n exit 2\nfi\nprintf done > "$BATCH_MARKER"\nexec "$REAL_GREP" "$@"\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
try {
const r = runPrivacy(root, [], { PATH: `${bin}:${process.env.PATH}`, BATCH_MARKER: marker, REAL_GREP: Bun.which('grep')! });
expect(r.status).toBe(2);
expect(r.stderr).toContain('candidate scan failed');
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});