Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
Merge commit '7f1ddfac0ad4da4e86d4c33b96cb932f6709fa53' into HEAD
garrytan4995199d9386
diff --cc CHANGELOG.mdindex 83b6dfaeda,da4f1038b6..e9f46eb3fa--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@@ -10,39 -10,120 +10,153 @@@ credits are retained; no result has beeidentifiers and attribution are available in the pre-removal Git revision`6040075c6cb95be5881cc2e1b76ef7d71f4e5d29` (retained on 2026-09-23).+## [Unreleased]++### A page purge removes the page's name from the volunteer log and the mention gazetteer++**Purging a page now also deletes the rows that kept its name next to its slug.** Before, `delete_page purge:true` and the retention purge left two stores behind, because neither has a foreign key to `pages`: `context_volunteer_events` kept the slug with a rationale that quotes the matched name (`alias match "<name>"`) for up to 90 days, and `mention_gazetteer_entries` kept the page's normalized title and aliases until that source's next mention pass. The purge receipt called the page gone while both were still readable. Reported and first fixed by @alanshurafa (#9072).++| What you did | Before | Now |+|---|---|---|+| `delete_page purge:true`, the expired-tombstone purge, or a restore that replays a page purge | the slug and name stayed in the volunteer log and the mention gazetteer | removed in the purge transaction, and the page receipt checks both stores |+| `purge_fact` on a claim that is also another page's name or quoted in a volunteer rationale | the gazetteer was not checked | both stores are probed and a match is listed as a residual |++- `src/core/persistence/purge-name-stores.ts` (new): `scrubPurgedNameStores` deletes the source's rows for the purged slugs from both stores. `purgePageInTransaction`, `purgeDeletedPages`, `expireRecordedTombstones` and the restore-time purge replay call it beside the retrieval-feedback scrub. A soft delete keeps both, so `restore_page` still brings the page back whole.+- `src/core/deletion-inventory.ts`: both tables are `swept` (`page_names`); the fact receipt still probes them, since a fact purge sweeps neither.+- Tests: `test/purge-name-stores-9068.test.ts` (PGLite, and Postgres through `test/postgres-unit-arms.txt`).++### Removing a source, a connector delete and a late eval capture no longer leave a deleted page's slug behind++**Four more ways a deleted page's slug outlived the page are closed, and the federation warning stops counting private pages.** Before, only a page purge scrubbed the stores that name a page without a foreign key to it.++| What you did | Before | Now |+|---|---|---|+| A query or search with eval capture on, whose capture runs after the response, racing a page purge | the capture could write the purged slug back into `eval_candidates.retrieved_slugs` | the insert keeps only slugs whose page still exists, checked under the same row lock the feedback writers take |+| A volunteered-context answer whose background volunteer-log write lands after a page purge (or while it is open) | the write put the purged slug and its name-quoting rationale back into `context_volunteer_events` | the write keeps only rows whose page still exists, under the same row lock |+| A connector, GitHub or Google sync deletes a page (`deletePages`), or a transcript re-ingest deletes a stale part | retrieval logs, ratings, weights, the volunteer log, the gazetteer and captured eval slugs kept naming it | scrubbed in the delete's transaction |+| `gbrain sources remove`, `sources purge`, the expired-archive sweep, or a managed `remove`/`purge` | the source's retrieval logs, ratings, volunteer rows and captured eval slugs stayed | deleted in the statement that deletes the source, and swept again right after for a write that raced it, unless a source with the same id was created in between |+| `gbrain sources federate` or `sources restore` on a source with a remote-written `visibility: private` page and no readers | the warning named that page, though no-grant connections still cannot read it | the warning applies the read paths' privacy rules, unless `search.remote_private_pages` or `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES` relaxes them |++- `src/core/feedback/store.ts`: `insertEvalCandidate` is the one eval capture insert both engines run. A facts-arm result (`facts/<id>`) names a fact, not a page, so it stays while that fact exists.+- `src/core/context/volunteer-events.ts`: `insertVolunteerEvents`, behind the fire-and-forget volunteer-log sink, inserts only rows whose page exists, probed the same way.+- `src/core/engine-sql/pages.ts`: `deletePages` runs `scrubPurgedSlugs` and `scrubPurgedNameStores` after the delete, in one transaction. The transcript importer's stale-part delete now calls `deletePages`. `deletePage` is unchanged: the page purge, its main caller, scrubs and records the stores in its receipt.+- `src/core/source-delete.ts`: `removedSourceScrubCtes` runs inside `deleteSourceRow` and the managed lifecycle's source delete, then once more after it. `deleteSourceRow` skips that second pass when a source with the same id exists again, so a re-created source keeps its rows. `retrieval_weights` and `mention_gazetteer_entries` already cascaded from `sources`.+- `src/core/access/federation-exposure.ts`: the exposure read adds `privacyPartSql` unless `remotePrivacyRelaxed`.+- Tests: `test/purge-scrub-followups-9068.test.ts` and `test/federation-exposure-private-9068.test.ts` (PGLite, and Postgres through `test/postgres-unit-arms.txt`). `test/eval-candidates.test.ts`, the volunteer round-trip in `test/migrate.test.ts` and the fact-purge case in `test/purge-name-stores-9068.test.ts` now create the pages they log, since a capture or volunteer write keeps only live pages.+ ## [0.60.658.0] - 2026-11-11++ **Pull requests now run the tests that check gbrain's lists, in about 4 minutes, instead of finding those failures in the 30-minute full run.** Some tests fail whenever a change adds an operation, command, `--flag`, error code, doctor check or repair kind without updating the list that tracks it, or changes output a golden file pins. Before this release, pull requests skipped those tests and their first failure came in the full-ci run. A new check, `enumeration and census tests`, runs them on every pull request that changes more than docs. It is advisory: no merge rule reads it. `bash scripts/ci-census-tests.sh --run` runs the same tests on your own machine without Postgres.++ ### Itemized changes++ - `scripts/ci-census-tests.sh` (new) prints the one file list: tests marked `test-reads-source-ok[structural]`, every test that imports `test/helpers/golden`, the tests whose names match its enumeration pattern, and the consumer idle-pass bounds (`test/persistence-consumer-*` files that mention idle). It leaves out `test/e2e/`, serial and slow files, and `test/setup.test.ts`. On master that is 128 files. `--run` runs them all and `--run <k> <n>` runs one weight-balanced shard (`scripts/sharding.ts`).+ - `.github/workflows/test.yml`: the `enumeration-census-tests` job runs the list in two shards on 2-vCPU runners, only on pull requests. Trunk Dynamic CI gates it like the other cheap-tier lanes. The `changes` job adds a `census` output that skips a doc-only diff (`scripts/select-e2e.ts --classify-only`), and an unreadable diff still runs the job. `cheap-tier`, `test-status`, `full-suite`, the remote pregate and master-push reuse don't read the job, and `contributor-gate` stays the only required check. On this change's own run the shards took 3 min 40 s and 2 min 47 s, about 6.5 runner-minutes per push.+ - `docs/ci-event-parity.md`: new section "Enumeration and census tests" and a classification row.+ - Tests: `test/scripts/ci-census-tests.test.ts` (new) pins the list's shape and coverage. `full-ci-workflow` and `native-only-workflow` cover the new job's events and its doc-only skip. The PGLite snapshot cache-key census counts the job's key (16 keys).++ ## [0.60.657.0] - 2026-11-11++ **A running `gbrain serve`, worker or autopilot no longer fails writes after another process changes a table's columns (GST-2260).** When `gbrain apply-migrations` or an upgrade in another process added, renamed or dropped a column, every pooled connection that had already prepared a `SELECT *` or `RETURNING *` on that table failed its next run with "cached plan must not change result type". Outside a transaction the driver quietly prepared the statement again, but inside one the error had already aborted the transaction, so the caller saw it. A `put_page` came back `internal_error`, or was accepted and then failed at publication, once for each statement on each pooled connection. Version 0.60.646.0 made the write paths re-run the transaction it aborted. Now the first such error also makes every connection in the process prepare its statements again before its next query, and an OAuth token grant whose client read meets it and a minion job's completion or failure record are re-run too. Pools that do not prepare statements (transaction-mode pooler URLs, `prepare: false`) and PGLite are unchanged.++ ### Itemized changes++ - `vendor/postgres` (`patches/[email protected]`): the first `RevalidateCachedQuery` error on a statement a connection had cached starts a process-wide plan generation; each connection drops its prepared statements before it builds its next query, and a statement described under an older generation is not cached in the new one.+ - `src/core/retry-matcher.ts`: `retryOnStalePlan`, one more run, on 0.60.646.0's `isStalePlanError`, for a transaction that does only database work.+ - `src/core/oauth-grants.ts`: the client-locked OAuth grant transaction runs once more when a stale plan fails its opening client read, before the callback writes anything.+ - `src/core/minions/queue.ts`: `completeJob` and `failJob`, whose transactions do only database work, run once more after a stale plan.+ - Tests: `test/stale-plan-heal.test.ts` (Postgres; listed in `test/postgres-unit-arms.txt`).++ ## [0.60.656.0] - 2026-11-11++ **`gbrain upgrade` finishes on hosts where autopilot runs outside launchd and systemd, instead of refusing every time.**++ The upgrade restarted autopilot only through an installed launchd or systemd service, and refused (`restart_refused`, exit 3) for any other autopilot. That included gbrain's own Linux cron install (`gbrain autopilot --install` on a host without a user systemd bus), so a scheduled stable upgrade on such a host failed on every run. An autopilot whose launcher starts it again is now handed to that launcher. The upgrade stops it (only while `ps` still shows the same process; SIGTERM drains it) and waits up to six minutes for the launcher to start the installed build.++ | Situation | Before | Now |+ |---|---|---|+ | Autopilot started by this brain's gbrain cron line | `restart_refused` | handed to the cron line and verified back on the new build |+ | Autopilot started by your own cron entry or wrapper | `restart_refused`, fix `kill <pid>` | still refuses, naming `gbrain autopilot --install` or `gbrain config set self_upgrade.autopilot_launcher external` (declare it only when the launcher starts autopilot again within 5 minutes); declared, it is handed over like the cron line |+ | doctor `self_upgrade_health` | silent until an upgrade failed | runs the same pre-swap plan read-only: warns while `gbrain upgrade` would refuse, naming each process and its step (autopilot outside gbrain's service, a process from another install), and names a hand-off or a second Bun global install the upgrade replaces itself; a harness MCP server does not warn (`--stop-mcp` stops it), and a held or failed auto-upgrade is reported first |++ On a host whose autopilot runs from gbrain's cron line, the old binary still refuses with `restart_refused` on the way to this release, because it checks the restart before it installs. Run `gbrain upgrade --no-restart`, then `gbrain upgrade --restart-only`, so the new build does the hand-off.++ **The daily stable check no longer sticks on a rolled-back release.** A release that was stable before (its `stable-v<version>` record tag exists) or that `stable.json` lists in `known_bad` is skipped and logged, so the newest release gets its soak instead of a refused promotion on every scheduled run (#8792).++ **A release can be marked not promotable when it soaked clean but is known bad from outside evidence.** Dispatch `promote-stable.yml` for the current stable with `not_promotable`, `not_promotable_reason` and `not_promotable_fixed_in`. The stable record gains a `not_promotable` list, and no tag moves. The daily check never soaks or promotes a release on it, on the important path and the weekly floor alike, and a manual promotion of one is refused. Clients ignore the list, so unlike `withdraw` it moves no install to another release. `not_promotable_remove` takes a release off the list. A reason over 500 characters is refused, and so is a record larger than clients accept; nothing is pushed in either case.++ ## [0.60.655.0] - 2026-11-10++ **QM, the AI helper that uses gbrain as one of its memories, can now read a person's own brain safely, read shared rooms only as the room's audience, and suggest edits that wait for the brain owner's yes.** This lands the QM internal-provider chain (#8475, #8480, #8557, #8477, #8483, #8479, #8466) as one release. Nothing changes for a brain with no attested (`x-qm-actor`) client: unattested calls and member-bound credentials behave as before, and every new table is database state, so a repo-less brain works the same.++ ### What changed++ | Area | Before | Now |+ |---|---|---|+ | Direct page writes from QM | an attested call could run `add_timeline_entry`, `add_link`, `put_page` and `edit_page` | refused (`actor_not_attested`, reason `op_not_attested`); `--attest-ops` refuses a list that names one, and a queued attested write of one fails when it publishes |+ | Reads that name sources | only `memory_recall` read named sources as their audience | `get_page`, `entity`, `whois`, `get_backlinks`, `get_timeline`, `find_experts`, `volunteer_context` and `query` do too: restricted pages and member pages read as missing, and `__all__` or `all_sources` is refused; an agent job submitted for the person reads the same way, and `context_pack` naming sources is refused on a client that reads them as the scope |+ | How a client reads named sources | always as the audience | `gbrain auth rescope --attest-read person\|scope\|none`; `scope` also refuses any call that names no person; `gbrain doctor` warns (`attest_read_shared_scope`) when a person client reads a source a scope client reads |+ | A person's own DM sources | every attested caller with the grant read every DM source in it | `gbrain access member source add\|remove\|list` binds a source to its member; an attested call reads its grant minus other members' personal sources, and a scope read reads no personal source at all |+ | QM contract | v1 and v2 | v3 (`docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v3.json`) adds the person's own-DM tools with frozen result shapes, `structuredContent` on attested personal reads (re-measured against the result cap), an `arm` (`own`/`ranked`) on each `memory_recall` fact, and an opt-in `memory_recall` `query_keep` (`head`/`tail`) that adds `query_truncated`; v1 is byte-identical, and v2 changes only its `deferred_ops` list and its `unknown_arguments` wording |+ | Suggested edits | none | `memory_propose` holds one timeline entry or one link for the owner; `gbrain memory-proposals list\|show\|approve\|deny` on the brain host decides it, and approval publishes through the normal writer door with the member's id in its provenance |+ | Members | id and name | an operator-declared email (`gbrain access member add\|set --email`), and `gbrain access member link --email <addr> --qm <id>` |+ | Remote owner administration | a shell on the brain host | `gbrain mcp admin attest`, `member-add\|member-set\|member-disable\|member-enable\|members` and `link\|unlink\|links` over the owner-session routes `/admin/api/access/attest`, `/members` and `/member-links`; no OAuth token or MCP tool reaches them |++ ### Itemized changes++ - `src/core/access/actor-model.ts`: the four page writes join `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS`; `docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v2.json` lists them in `deferred_ops` (a published-contract amendment).+ - `src/core/access/scope-read.ts` (new), `src/mcp/dispatch.ts`: `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS`, `SCOPE_READ_OPS`, `attestedReadMode`, also applied to agent job tool calls (`src/core/minions/tools/brain-allowlist.ts`); `attest_read` on `access_tokens` and `oauth_clients` (migration v298).+ - `src/core/access/member-sources.ts` (new): `access_member_sources` (migration v299) and `attestedReadScope`, also applied to agent jobs submitted for an attested actor.+ - `scripts/build-qm-memory-contract.ts`: v2 and v3 `transport.unknown_arguments` now say what every MCP read has done since v0.60.635.0: an undeclared argument named like a source scope or a filter (`source` for `source_id`) is refused with `invalid_params` and nothing is read, and any other undeclared read argument is only reported in `_meta.warnings`. Wording only; `test/qm-memory-contract.test.ts` pins it against the refusal check.+ - `src/core/ops/qm-memory.ts`, `scripts/build-qm-memory-contract.ts`: contract v3, `qmMemoryToolResult` for personal tools, recall arms, `query_keep`, and `boundRecallChars` trimming `facts_groups` and `entity_unspecified` to the facts it delivers.+ - `src/core/persistence/memory-proposals.ts` (new), `src/commands/memory-proposals.ts` (new): `memory_proposals` (migration v300), owner review, TTL and retention; a proposal's request id is scoped to its credential and member, and a proposed link re-checks its target and the approved page revision when it publishes.+ - `src/core/access/members.ts`, `src/core/access/actor.ts`, `src/commands/access.ts`, `src/commands/serve-http-access.ts`, `src/commands/mcp-admin.ts`: member email (migration v301), `linkMemberByEmail`, and the owner HTTP routes with an `access_admin` request-log row per applied change.+ - Inventories: `access_member_sources`, `memory_proposals` and the email column join the deletion and graduation inventories.+ - Docs: `docs/guides/qm.md` (reads that name sources, each person's own sources, proposed writes), `docs/mcp/ADMIN.md`, `docs/architecture/key-files/access.md`.+ - Tests: `test/qm-scope-read.test.ts`, `test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts`, `test/qm-personal-tools.test.ts`, `test/qm-memory-propose.test.ts`, `test/access-members.test.ts`, `test/serve-http-access.test.ts`, `test/mcp-admin-cli.serial.test.ts` (PGLite and Postgres where they touch the database).++ ## [0.60.654.0] - 2026-11-10++ **A managed sync no longer fetches Git objects in a partial clone (`git clone --filter`).** Every Git read a managed sync makes now runs with Git's transports and lazy fetching switched off. A file whose blob the clone never fetched is imported from your checkout when the checkout holds exactly that blob, and otherwise held alone as `git_object_missing`, with a message that names the partial clone and the `git cat-file -p <blob>` that fetches it. A blobless clone with a normal checkout syncs every file as before; an older object it never fetched (an earlier version of a renamed file or of the folder rules) is read only once you fetch it. A treeless clone (`--filter=tree:0`) that lacks a tree of the commit being synced stops the run with `git_object_missing`, naming the partial clone and the `git ls-tree -r -d <commit>` that fetches the trees; nothing is synced or deleted until then. The folder rules in `.gbrain/access.yml` are read the same way. A rule file or rule history the clone has not fetched makes the source read as nobody to remote members, as a shallow checkout already does, with a message that names the exact `git` command that fetches it. Run that command in the checkout and the next sync applies the rules and clears the mark.++ ### Itemized changes++ - `src/core/hardened-git.ts`: `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV` is what a managed-sync read that runs under `gitChildEnv` adds beside `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS`: `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH=1` (Git 2.45+) and an empty `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`, which allows no transport on any Git version.+ - `syncGit` and `syncGitAsync` (`sync-discovery.ts`), every read in `sync-blobs.ts` (`ls-tree`, `cat-file --batch`), the `git show` fallback, the delta and working-tree diff (`sync-delta.ts`), the rename-identity `cat-file` stream, the metafile head reads, the origin-evidence history walk and ignore check, the held-deletion read, the unindexed-file listing and the pending-import checks now run with both.+ - `src/core/persistence/sync-entry-fault.ts`: in a partial clone the `git_object_missing` hold names the partial clone and its fix is `git cat-file -p <blob>`; in any other checkout it still names `git fsck --connectivity-only`.+ - A partial clone with no checkout (`--no-checkout`) holds every committed file `git_object_missing`. When rename detection needs an older blob the partial clone lacks, the sync compares the whole tree instead, so the new path imports as a new page and the old page is deleted, and that rename does not keep its page.+ - `src/core/access/policy-git.ts`: the folder-rule reads every managed pass makes (`git show` and `git log` of `.gbrain/access.yml` and `.gbrain/access.approved`, and a rebuild's history replay) now run under `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV` too; before, they were a managed-sync read that could still fetch in a partial clone. A policy file the commit names that the clone never fetched, or a history the replay cannot read, makes the source read as nobody, as a shallow checkout already does; the next sync that can read it clears that.+ - `src/core/persistence/sync-discovery.ts`: `syncPartialClone` and `partialCloneTreeRefusal`. The full tree walk and the reconcile level read (`sync-pass-run.ts`) stop with `git_object_missing` when a partial clone lacks a tree of the synced commit; any other listing failure is unchanged.+ - Git 2.40 to 2.44 ignore `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`. There the empty `GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` refuses the fetch instead, so a missing object reads as missing and nothing is fetched, the same outcome as on 2.45 and newer.+ - Tests: `test/sync-partial-clone-2331.test.ts` on PGLite and Postgres, with a marker on the partial clone's object fetches and a check that it never ran: a blobless clone that syncs a second commit after a pull, both blob read paths with and without `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` (also with the file transport allowed in the environment), two treeless clones, the history walk that dates deletions, and folder rules whose committed file or history the clone lacks, which read as nobody until the command the problem names runs and then clear on the next plain sync.++ ## [0.60.653.0] - 2026-11-10++ **Postgres connections to a database that isn't on your machine now use TLS unless the URL opts out.** Before this release gbrain's Postgres driver connected in plaintext whenever the database URL had no `sslmode`, so the password and every page crossed the network unencrypted, even to a hosted database that supports TLS. Now every connection pool requires TLS (`sslmode=require`) for any host other than `localhost`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `::1` or a Unix socket; private addresses and Docker service names count as remote. An sslmode in the URL is always honored, so `?sslmode=disable` keeps a plaintext connection on a network you trust. A server that has no TLS no longer connects silently: it fails with `postgres_tls_required`, which says to turn TLS on at the server or add `sslmode=disable`. `sslmode=require` encrypts but does not verify the server certificate; `sslmode=verify-full`, with the provider's CA in `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, verifies it too. A new doctor check, `postgres_tls`, warns when a brain on a remote host is connected without TLS. PGLite has no network connection and is unchanged.++ **If you self-host Postgres without TLS on another machine:** after upgrading, gbrain refuses to connect with `postgres_tls_required`. Either enable TLS on the server (`ssl = on` with a certificate), or add `?sslmode=disable` (or `&sslmode=disable`) to your database URL in `~/.gbrain/config.json` or `GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL`/`DATABASE_URL`.++ ### Itemized changes++ - `src/core/pg-tls.ts` (new): `resolvePgTls` / `withPgTls`, the one TLS resolver every `postgres()` call site in `src/` uses (the module pool in `db.ts`, worker instance pools in `postgres-engine.ts`, the read and direct pools in `connection-manager.ts`, the graduation target probe and the schema-lock diagnostic connection). An `ssl` option, `sslmode` / `ssl` / `sslrootcert=system` in the URL, or the driver's `PGSSL` variable is explicit and left alone; a loopback host or socket keeps the driver default; anything else gets `ssl: 'require'`. After a failed default-required connect, `tlsRequiredDefaultError` sends the protocol's SSLRequest to the server and turns a "no" into `postgres_tls_required` (DNS, refused and timeout failures are not probed).+ - `src/core/error-registry.ts`: new code `postgres_tls_required` (host_only, actor user; fix asks the user, reads `gbrain engine status --probe --json`, verifies with `gbrain doctor --only postgres_tls --json`). `docs/guides/error-codes.md` regenerated.+ - `src/core/pg-access-classify.ts`: new reason `tls_required_default` (manual tier in `gbrain db-repair`, which never removes TLS on its own; fatal for persistence reads).+ - `src/commands/doctor/checks/postgres-tls.ts` (new): `postgres_tls` (ops) judges TLS from the client side, from the mode the driver used for the URL the engine connected with. It warns on `sslmode=disable` and on a `sslmode=prefer` connection that fell back or may have fallen back to plaintext (it never certifies prefer as encrypted), and is ok for a TLS client behind a pooler. The session's `pg_stat_ssl` row, which behind a pooler describes the pooler's hop, is detail only. It emits nothing on PGLite.+ - `src/core/behavior-change-notice.ts`: one row (`postgres_tls_default`) disclosing the new default and the opt-out.+ - `gbrain init` prints the Supabase URL format with `?sslmode=require`; `docs/ENGINES.md#tls-for-postgres-connections` documents the modes, `verify-full` with Supabase's CA, and the opt-out; the personal-brain tutorial and the other documented Postgres URLs carry `?sslmode=require`.+ - `scripts/ci-local.sh`, `scripts/run-e2e.sh`: the Docker CI gate reaches its untrusted-by-name service hosts (`postgres-N`, `pgbouncer`) with an explicit `sslmode=disable`, and the derived PgBouncer E2E URL keeps the base URL's query.+ - Tests: `test/pg-tls.test.ts` (loopback, remote, explicit modes, opt-out, a guard that every `postgres()` pool in `src/` goes through `withPgTls`), `test/pg-tls-default-refusal.test.ts` (a fake server without TLS on a non-loopback interface gets the coded error; `sslmode=disable` and a TLS-capable server do not), `test/doctor-postgres-tls.test.ts`, `test/e2e/pg-tls-postgres.test.ts` (real servers: a TLS server through a non-loopback address connects with `pg_stat_ssl.ssl = true` on both pool kinds; an `ssl=off` server refuses, then connects with `sslmode=disable` and doctor warns; `sslmode=prefer` falls back and doctor says so; an opt-in TLS-client pooler with a plaintext upstream reads ok).+ - `bun.lock`: moves `fast-xml-parser` to 5.12.0 and `fast-xml-builder` to 1.3.1 (the minimum 5.12.0 declares) for a Low advisory in the parser's non-default `stopNodes` option, which gbrain's code does not reach; package.json ranges are unchanged.++ ## [0.60.652.0] - 2026-11-10++ **The private-labels preview finishes on large sources.** On a source with a few hundred thousand pages, `gbrain repair private-labels` ran past its 120-second statement bound while counting the pages a window of clears would expose, so the preview failed, and so did every `--apply --expect`, which repeats the check. The count used to pair every page with every cleared page. It now reads each page's references once and joins them to the cleared pages, so it returns the same pages and the same exposure map well inside the bound, which is unchanged. On a synthetic brain (`scripts/bench/private-labels-dependents.ts`: 300,000 pages in the window's source, 100,000 in another, 8 links per page) with a 1,000-page window, master hit the 120-second bound and this release took 0.33 to 1.06 seconds across the four shapes.++ ### Itemized changes++ - The dependents statement in `src/core/repair/private-labels.ts` lists each page's `source_slug`, `event.depth` and `derived_from` slugs (with `.md` removed) in one pass, matches them to the cleared pages with equality joins, and applies the post-clear privacy rules only to the candidate pages. It runs with JIT off and is planned for its real parameters. No migration and no new index.+ - New equivalence tests on PGLite and Postgres run the old statement, kept verbatim in a test helper, next to the new one and require identical rows: a fixture with every kind of tie, each cleared page alone, a generated source and privacy aliases turned off.+ - A Postgres scale test requires a 50,000-page source with a 1,000-page window to finish inside 20 seconds. The old statement fails it.+ - `scripts/bench/private-labels-dependents.ts` builds the synthetic brain and times the preview, with `--lineage` for common `derived_from` chains and `--class alias-and-visibility`.## [0.60.651.0] - 2026-11-10diff --cc docs/architecture/key-files/access.mdindex 7feda72682,ee9cd5c5ef..2adb9465ce--- a/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md+++ b/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md@@@ -3,6 -3,6 +3,6 @@@[Subsystem index](../KEY_FILES.md). Read only the entries relevant to your change.Current behavior and load-bearing invariants; history belongs in Git and CHANGELOG.- - `src/core/access/` (GBRA-218) — per-member read access inside one source. `principals.ts` normalizes frontmatter `readable_by` (bare id = `member:<id>`, `group:<g>`, ASCII case fold, space trim; anything malformed is `['!nobody']`); it is the row twin of the SQL `gbrain_access_readers()` (`test/access-principals.test.ts` holds them equal). A BEFORE trigger keeps `pages.page_readers` equal to that function (direct writes to the column are recomputed), and predicates test the array, never the function, which costs ~0.2 ms per row. A page that names readers with no derived value yet (written before the migration) reads as nobody until `gbrain repair access` (`repair/access.ts`). `members.ts` (members, groups, tombstoned ids never reused, bindings), `token-binding.ts` (the verifiers' join; a credential bound to a disabled, tombstoned or missing member is refused with `access_member_disabled`) and `caller.ts` (`remoteCallerAccess`: the identity dispatch puts on the caller-access record; stdio binds through `mcp.stdio_member`; publication re-resolves from the stored principal). In `search/private-visibility.ts` every page fragment is `accessAllowedSql` AND the privacy part: plain fragments use the empty identity (over-hide, never leak), `*ForCaller` fragments the caller's, and `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES`, `search.remote_private_pages` and `granted_sources` relax only the privacy part (`privacyForCaller`). A derivative of a page that names readers is hidden from every remote caller (`originAllowedSql`, which calls the SQL function `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` only for atom, question, concept, event or `derived_from` rows, so each read plans one call instead of four subplans). Both parts lead with column tests (`page_readers IS NULL`, `type`) so row estimates follow column statistics; an expression test such as `->'readable_by' IS NULL` estimates almost no rows and sent restricted vector searches into nested-loop sequential scans. The index walk's page probe (`INDEX_WALK_PAGE_COLUMNS`) projects `page_readers`. Config `access.restrictions_present` (set by a trigger, sticky) keeps every pre-A1 path on a brain with no restriction. `check:remote-privacy-reads` keeps the two relaxations read only in `private-visibility.ts`. Tests: `test/member-read-access.test.ts` (remote matrix, both engines), `test/access-*.test.ts`. Folder rules (A2) keep whole folders of a source to named members. `folder-rules.ts` is the grammar (`.gbrain/access.yml`: `rules:` of `id`, `prefix`, `readable_by`), `classifyRulebook` (each change is narrowing or widening; the target installs only the narrowing part) and `matchingRuleIds`. `policy.ts` owns the one applied rulebook for both stores: `access_rules` (source-qualified ids), the append-only `access_policy_revisions` log, `access_pending_coverage` (prefixes that read as nobody while a narrowing restamps, or while a committed file is invalid) and `sources.config.access_store`, persisted at the first rule and changed only by `policy-migrate.ts` (journaled in `access_policy_migrations`). `proposeRevision` installs narrowing at once under a per-source row lock and holds widening for `applyApproved` (`plan_hash`, `preview_changed`); `restampSource` rewrites `pages.folder_rule_ids` in id windows, then clears pending coverage under the lock; re-proposing the same rulebook finishes an interrupted restamp. A trigger stamps `folder_rule_ids` from the SQL function `gbrain_access_folder_rules()` on insert and on slug or source change, never from git on the serve path. `policy-git.ts` is the git store (files committed through the commit door, applied by `syncAccessPolicyAt` from sync preflight and before and after every managed pass (`performManagedSync`: sync, drain, `sources refresh`, git conversion), read with `git show` at the synced commit; a database with no revision yet replays each committed `access.yml` since the `access.approved` baseline, so a rebuild holds a removal a plain commit made); `policy-transfer.ts` carries the applied rulebook through `gbrain export` and installs it before any page in `gbrain import`; `policy-notice.ts` is the `access_policy_pending` degraded notice. In `private-visibility.ts`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` sits inside `accessAllowedSql` (`folder_rule_ids IS NULL OR folder_rule_ids <@ <satisfied ids>` plus coverage conjuncts), so no hatch, grant or `--as` relaxes it, and the unrestricted short form tests `folder_rule_ids IS NULL` next to `page_readers IS NULL` (v283 triggers set `access.restrictions_present` on the first rule or pending prefix); `caller.ts`'s `folderAccessFor` fails closed to whole-source coverage. CLI: `src/commands/access-rules.ts`; doctor: `src/commands/doctor/checks/folder-access.ts`. Tests: `test/access-folder-rules.test.ts` (database store, both engines), `test/access-folder-rules-git.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-transfer.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-doctor.test.ts`. Shared agents (B, GBRA-231): `audience.ts` parses the audience a harness asserts (`X-Gbrain-On-Behalf-Of` or request-level `_meta.on_behalf_of`, 1-50 principals, `guest` = the empty identity; the same key inside tool arguments is refused) and appends each assertion to `access-audience-YYYY-Www.jsonl`. Dispatch resolves it on every remote call through `caller.ts` (`resolveAudienceIdentities`: every entry must be in the credential's live `may_act_for`, then name an enabled member or existing group); the caller-access record then carries `audienceIdentities`, and `accessAllowedForAllSql` needs one readers conjunct per identity, folder rules the intersection of each entry's satisfied set (`folderAccessForAll`). Privacy relaxes only for a one-member audience. Writes carry the audience as `WriteAuthority.actingFor` (re-resolved at publication) and agent jobs as `grant.actingFor`. Every remote response carries `_meta.access` (`appliedAccessSummary`), which `whoami` returns as `access.applied`; doctor `access_may_act_for_wildcard` (`checks/shared-agent-access.ts`) warns on `*`. Tests: `test/access-on-behalf-of.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-on-behalf-of.test.ts`. Attested actor (C1, GST-359): `actor-model.ts` (dependency-free: `x-qm-actor`, `acting_user`, `EXTERNAL_ID_RE` = 1-256 visible ASCII, `attestRightFrom`: the right counts only for a member-less credential whose token is legacy or `client_credentials`, read from `oauth_tokens.grant_type`) and `actor.ts`. `resolveAttestedActor` runs in dispatch before any work: an invalid id refuses `actor_not_attested` (`invalid_actor_id`) before any lookup, then the right, the op list (`attest_ops`, default `get_write_request,memory_recall,memory_write`), `acting_user` = header (stripped), and `actorCoverage` (the one coverage test: live right plus a live link in `access_member_links` to an enabled member, compared exactly) or `actor_unlinked`. `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS` (`capture`, `extract_facts`, take writes, `list_write_conflicts`) are never attestable until each is keyed to the member: refused by `parseAttestOps`, `bindCredential`, every call and the stored re-check, which also re-checks `attest_ops` for a queued write's operation and each job tool call. Under the header serve-http lists only attested tools and refuses `resources/read`. `attestedCallerAccess` is a one-member audience with privacy never relaxed (no granted sources, no hatch), never B's `may_act_for` path. Writes store `WriteAuthority.actingFor = {system, external_id, member}` and jobs `grant.actor`; `storedActorIdentity` re-resolves both through `actorCoverage` and refuses when the member changed. `linkMember` / `unlinkMember` / `listMemberLinks` back `gbrain access member link|unlink|links`; `--attest-actor` / `--attest-ops` on `auth rescope` (`members.ts`) only for a member-less legacy token or confidential client-credentials client. Migration v286. Tests: `test/access-qm-actor.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-actor.test.ts`. Member facts (C2, GST-359): `member-facts.ts`. A remote `remember` from an attested actor or a lone-member credential (`callerMember`, never an audience of several) writes to `memory/members/<member>` (`memberFactPage`; `persistence/memory-prepare.ts` creates the page with `readable_by: [member:<id>]`), `visibility: private`, `infer_entity` off, the entity kept as `entity_slug`, unless the call passes `share: true` (GST-2243), which takes the ordinary world route to the subject's page; a member's explicit `visibility: "world"` is refused in `remember`'s validation (`member_share_required`), so a batch with one such item saves nothing. A member id whose page slug `slugifyPath` would change (`a--b`, `zed-`) is refused (`invalid_params`). The page must name that member alone (`memberPageIsOwn`, checked at submission and again in preparation, `memberPageNotOwned`), and remote writes under `memory/members/` go only to the caller's own page (`assertMemberPageWriter`, called from `ops/context.ts` `enforceClientSlugFence`, so every remote page write passes it; trusted local callers are unaffected). Reads widen a world-only fact list only by `memberFactAdmitSql` (a private fact on the caller's own live member page whose readers and folder rules admit the caller; `factVisibilitySql` in `engine-sql/facts.ts` and `search/fact-relevance.ts`), and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy` judges a member-page fact's source page as the caller (every other fact keeps the empty identity, so a fact from a page that names readers stays hidden from every remote caller). Writers never cross pages: `facts/single-prepare.ts` (`SingleFactIntent.page_slug`) and `trust/supersede-handlers.ts` dedup, supersede and contest only within the member page, and no other write matches a fact there (`onMemberPageSql`); consolidation skips facts whose page names readers (`readersSourcedFactSql`). Per-person keys: `callerIdentityKey` joins the hot-memory cache key (`facts/meta-hook.ts`, `::xid=`), `callerSessionKey` the `delta` cursor (`ops/facts.ts`), `sameAttestedActor` gates receipts (`persistence/authority.ts` `ownRequestAccessible`) and replays (`persistence/journal.ts`) on the stored actor, else the stored audience, and `get_agent_job` and the owner-fenced `get_job`, `wait_job`, `get_job_progress`, `list_jobs` and `cancel_job` match the job's `grant.actor` (system, external id, member) and `grant.actingFor` (the same distinct audience entries; `jobActorSql` in `minions/types.ts`), so a job or receipt with an actor or audience reads as missing to the bare client and to other actors and audiences, and one with neither to every actor and audience. Tests: `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` (both engines), `test/access-member-sweep.test.ts` (every attestable op as Bob, the bare client and an unbound credential; `test/helpers/member-sweep.ts`), `test/e2e/serve-http-member-sweep.test.ts` (two members over a real `serve --http` on a keyless repo-less brain).+ - `src/core/access/` (GBRA-218) — per-member read access inside one source. `principals.ts` normalizes frontmatter `readable_by` (bare id = `member:<id>`, `group:<g>`, ASCII case fold, space trim; anything malformed is `['!nobody']`); it is the row twin of the SQL `gbrain_access_readers()` (`test/access-principals.test.ts` holds them equal). A BEFORE trigger keeps `pages.page_readers` equal to that function (direct writes to the column are recomputed), and predicates test the array, never the function, which costs ~0.2 ms per row. A page that names readers with no derived value yet (written before the migration) reads as nobody until `gbrain repair access` (`repair/access.ts`). `members.ts` (members, groups, tombstoned ids never reused, bindings), `token-binding.ts` (the verifiers' join; a credential bound to a disabled, tombstoned or missing member is refused with `access_member_disabled`) and `caller.ts` (`remoteCallerAccess`: the identity dispatch puts on the caller-access record; stdio binds through `mcp.stdio_member`; publication re-resolves from the stored principal). In `search/private-visibility.ts` every page fragment is `accessAllowedSql` AND the privacy part: plain fragments use the empty identity (over-hide, never leak), `*ForCaller` fragments the caller's, and `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES`, `search.remote_private_pages` and `granted_sources` relax only the privacy part (`privacyForCaller`). A derivative of a page that names readers is hidden from every remote caller (`originAllowedSql`, which calls the SQL function `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` only for atom, question, concept, event or `derived_from` rows, so each read plans one call instead of four subplans). Both parts lead with column tests (`page_readers IS NULL`, `type`) so row estimates follow column statistics; an expression test such as `->'readable_by' IS NULL` estimates almost no rows and sent restricted vector searches into nested-loop sequential scans. The index walk's page probe (`INDEX_WALK_PAGE_COLUMNS`) projects `page_readers`. Config `access.restrictions_present` (set by a trigger, sticky) keeps every pre-A1 path on a brain with no restriction. `check:remote-privacy-reads` keeps the two relaxations read only in `private-visibility.ts`. Tests: `test/member-read-access.test.ts` (remote matrix, both engines), `test/access-*.test.ts`. Folder rules (A2) keep whole folders of a source to named members. `folder-rules.ts` is the grammar (`.gbrain/access.yml`: `rules:` of `id`, `prefix`, `readable_by`), `classifyRulebook` (each change is narrowing or widening; the target installs only the narrowing part) and `matchingRuleIds`. `policy.ts` owns the one applied rulebook for both stores: `access_rules` (source-qualified ids), the append-only `access_policy_revisions` log, `access_pending_coverage` (prefixes that read as nobody while a narrowing restamps, or while a committed file is invalid) and `sources.config.access_store`, persisted at the first rule and changed only by `policy-migrate.ts` (journaled in `access_policy_migrations`). `proposeRevision` installs narrowing at once under a per-source row lock and holds widening for `applyApproved` (`plan_hash`, `preview_changed`); `restampSource` rewrites `pages.folder_rule_ids` in id windows, then clears pending coverage under the lock; re-proposing the same rulebook finishes an interrupted restamp. A trigger stamps `folder_rule_ids` from the SQL function `gbrain_access_folder_rules()` on insert and on slug or source change, never from git on the serve path. `policy-git.ts` is the git store (files committed through the commit door, applied by `syncAccessPolicyAt` from sync preflight and before and after every managed pass (`performManagedSync`: sync, drain, `sources refresh`, git conversion), read with `git show` at the synced commit (GST-2331: every read under `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV`, so a partial clone fetches nothing; a policy file the commit names that the clone lacks, or a history the replay cannot read, makes the source read as nobody until the objects are fetched: the problem names the exact `git cat-file -p` or `git log --first-parent -p` that fetches them, and the next sync applies the rules and clears the mark); a database with no revision yet replays each committed `access.yml` since the `access.approved` baseline, so a rebuild holds a removal a plain commit made); `policy-transfer.ts` carries the applied rulebook through `gbrain export` and installs it before any page in `gbrain import`; `policy-notice.ts` is the `access_policy_pending` degraded notice. In `private-visibility.ts`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` sits inside `accessAllowedSql` (`folder_rule_ids IS NULL OR folder_rule_ids <@ <satisfied ids>` plus coverage conjuncts), so no hatch, grant or `--as` relaxes it, and the unrestricted short form tests `folder_rule_ids IS NULL` next to `page_readers IS NULL` (v283 triggers set `access.restrictions_present` on the first rule or pending prefix); `caller.ts`'s `folderAccessFor` fails closed to whole-source coverage. CLI: `src/commands/access-rules.ts`; doctor: `src/commands/doctor/checks/folder-access.ts`. Tests: `test/access-folder-rules.test.ts` (database store, both engines), `test/access-folder-rules-git.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-transfer.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-doctor.test.ts`. Shared agents (B, GBRA-231): `audience.ts` parses the audience a harness asserts (`X-Gbrain-On-Behalf-Of` or request-level `_meta.on_behalf_of`, 1-50 principals, `guest` = the empty identity; the same key inside tool arguments is refused) and appends each assertion to `access-audience-YYYY-Www.jsonl`. Dispatch resolves it on every remote call through `caller.ts` (`resolveAudienceIdentities`: every entry must be in the credential's live `may_act_for`, then name an enabled member or existing group); the caller-access record then carries `audienceIdentities`, and `accessAllowedForAllSql` needs one readers conjunct per identity, folder rules the intersection of each entry's satisfied set (`folderAccessForAll`). Privacy relaxes only for a one-member audience. Writes carry the audience as `WriteAuthority.actingFor` (re-resolved at publication) and agent jobs as `grant.actingFor`. Every remote response carries `_meta.access` (`appliedAccessSummary`), which `whoami` returns as `access.applied`; doctor `access_may_act_for_wildcard` (`checks/shared-agent-access.ts`) warns on `*`. Tests: `test/access-on-behalf-of.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-on-behalf-of.test.ts`. Attested actor (C1, GST-359): `actor-model.ts` (dependency-free: `x-qm-actor`, `acting_user`, `EXTERNAL_ID_RE` = 1-256 visible ASCII, `attestRightFrom`: the right counts only for a member-less credential whose token is legacy or `client_credentials`, read from `oauth_tokens.grant_type`) and `actor.ts`. `resolveAttestedActor` runs in dispatch before any work: an invalid id refuses `actor_not_attested` (`invalid_actor_id`) before any lookup, then the right, the op list (`attest_ops`, default `get_write_request,memory_recall,memory_write`), `acting_user` = header (stripped), and `actorCoverage` (the one coverage test: live right plus a live link in `access_member_links` to an enabled member, compared exactly) or `actor_unlinked`. GST-1158: `scope-read.ts` holds `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` (no identity, actor or audience; privacy never relaxed) and `SCOPE_READ_OPS`; dispatch runs an attested call to one of those ops that names `source_id`/`source_ids` under that record (`attestedReadMode`, which refuses `__all__`/`all_sources`), or as the person when the right's `attest_read` (v298, `--attest-read`) is `person`, and handlers read the mode with `currentReadMode`. `attest_read = 'scope'` refuses a call that names no actor (`actor_required`). Tests: `test/qm-scope-read.test.ts` (both engines), `test/doctor-attest-read-shared-scope.test.ts`. GBRA-284: `member-sources.ts` binds a source to its member (`access_member_sources`, v299; `gbrain access member source add|remove|list`); `attestedReadScope`, called in dispatch for every attested call and in `minions/tools/brain-allowlist.ts` for an attested job's tool calls, replaces the call's read grant with the grant minus personal sources bound to another member (every personal source under a scope read), so every resolver refuses or skips them like out-of-grant sources and nothing is added. Test: `test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts` (both engines). `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS` (`capture`, `extract_facts`, take writes, `list_write_conflicts`) are never attestable until each is keyed to the member: refused by `parseAttestOps`, `bindCredential`, every call and the stored re-check, which also re-checks `attest_ops` for a queued write's operation and each job tool call. Under the header serve-http lists only attested tools and refuses `resources/read`. `attestedCallerAccess` is a one-member audience with privacy never relaxed (no granted sources, no hatch), never B's `may_act_for` path. Writes store `WriteAuthority.actingFor = {system, external_id, member}` and jobs `grant.actor`; `storedActorIdentity` re-resolves both through `actorCoverage` and refuses when the member changed. `linkMember` / `unlinkMember` / `listMemberLinks` back `gbrain access member link|unlink|links`; `linkMemberByEmail` (GST-1158) finds the member by its declared email (`members.ts` `memberByEmail`: `access_members.email`, migration v301, case-folded, unique, cleared on removal; `not_found` when none, `email_ambiguous` when several) and then links exactly as `linkMember`, from the local CLI and the owner-session routes in `src/commands/serve-http-access.ts` only; `--attest-actor` / `--attest-ops` on `auth rescope` (`members.ts`) only for a member-less legacy token or confidential client-credentials client. Migration v286. Tests: `test/access-qm-actor.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-actor.test.ts`. Member facts (C2, GST-359): `member-facts.ts`. A remote `remember` from an attested actor or a lone-member credential (`callerMember`, never an audience of several) writes to `memory/members/<member>` (`memberFactPage`; `persistence/memory-prepare.ts` creates the page with `readable_by: [member:<id>]`), `visibility: private`, `infer_entity` off, the entity kept as `entity_slug`, unless the call passes `share: true` (GST-2243), which takes the ordinary world route to the subject's page; a member's explicit `visibility: "world"` is refused in `remember`'s validation (`member_share_required`), so a batch with one such item saves nothing. A member id whose page slug `slugifyPath` would change (`a--b`, `zed-`) is refused (`invalid_params`). The page must name that member alone (`memberPageIsOwn`, checked at submission and again in preparation, `memberPageNotOwned`), and remote writes under `memory/members/` go only to the caller's own page (`assertMemberPageWriter`, called from `ops/context.ts` `enforceClientSlugFence`, so every remote page write passes it; trusted local callers are unaffected). Reads widen a world-only fact list only by `memberFactAdmitSql` (a private fact on the caller's own live member page whose readers and folder rules admit the caller; `factVisibilitySql` in `engine-sql/facts.ts` and `search/fact-relevance.ts`), and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy` judges a member-page fact's source page as the caller (every other fact keeps the empty identity, so a fact from a page that names readers stays hidden from every remote caller). Writers never cross pages: `facts/single-prepare.ts` (`SingleFactIntent.page_slug`) and `trust/supersede-handlers.ts` dedup, supersede and contest only within the member page, and no other write matches a fact there (`onMemberPageSql`); consolidation skips facts whose page names readers (`readersSourcedFactSql`). Per-person keys: `callerIdentityKey` joins the hot-memory cache key (`facts/meta-hook.ts`, `::xid=`), `callerSessionKey` the `delta` cursor (`ops/facts.ts`), `sameAttestedActor` gates receipts (`persistence/authority.ts` `ownRequestAccessible`) and replays (`persistence/journal.ts`) on the stored actor, else the stored audience, and `get_agent_job` and the owner-fenced `get_job`, `wait_job`, `get_job_progress`, `list_jobs` and `cancel_job` match the job's `grant.actor` (system, external id, member) and `grant.actingFor` (the same distinct audience entries; `jobActorSql` in `minions/types.ts`), so a job or receipt with an actor or audience reads as missing to the bare client and to other actors and audiences, and one with neither to every actor and audience. Tests: `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` (both engines), `test/access-member-sweep.test.ts` (every attestable op as Bob, the bare client and an unbound credential; `test/helpers/member-sweep.ts`), `test/e2e/serve-http-member-sweep.test.ts` (two members over a real `serve --http` on a keyless repo-less brain).-- `src/core/access/federation-exposure.ts` (#8982) — `remotePagesFederationExposes(engine, source)`: the live pages of a source that name no readers and no folder rule and whose live revision (`pages.revision_principal_*`) or any version (`page_versions.write_principal_*`) a token or OAuth client wrote (revoked or deleted included; no record keeps a credential's member at write time, so an unbound, rebound or deleted one counts and each example names its member now; a tag change moves the revision attribution without a version, hiding the earlier author): count, the first five slugs, and shell-quoted `who-can-read` / `access rule add` commands. `remotePagesFederationExposesOrWarn` runs it, after the change commits, only for a change that added the source to the no-grant floor (federate reads the prior state under the source row lock), and turns a failed read into a stderr warning, so the caller's federation never changes. Read by `sources federate`, the unmanaged `sources restore` (stderr; `--json` as `pages_exposed`) and the managed `source_lifecycle` restore result. Pinned by `test/sources-federate-member-pages.test.ts`.+- `src/core/access/federation-exposure.ts` (#8982) — `remotePagesFederationExposes(engine, source)`: the live pages of a source that name no readers and no folder rule, that the read paths' privacy rules (`privacyPartSql`) do not hide from a no-grant connection (#9068; skipped when `remotePrivacyRelaxed` says an operator opted out), and whose live revision (`pages.revision_principal_*`) or any version (`page_versions.write_principal_*`) a token or OAuth client wrote (revoked or deleted included; no record keeps a credential's member at write time, so an unbound, rebound or deleted one counts and each example names its member now; a tag change moves the revision attribution without a version, hiding the earlier author): count, the first five slugs, and shell-quoted `who-can-read` / `access rule add` commands. `remotePagesFederationExposesOrWarn` runs it, after the change commits, only for a change that added the source to the no-grant floor (federate reads the prior state under the source row lock), and turns a failed read into a stderr warning, so the caller's federation never changes. Read by `sources federate`, the unmanaged `sources restore` (stderr; `--json` as `pages_exposed`) and the managed `source_lifecycle` restore result. Pinned by `test/sources-federate-member-pages.test.ts` and `test/federation-exposure-private-9068.test.ts`.- - `src/core/ops/qm-memory.ts` (GST-359 D) — QM's memory provider pair. `memory_recall` reads the attested person's own last-24-hour facts on their member page (`listFactsSince` with `sourceMarkdownSlug`), then `rankFactsByQuestion` over the facts they may read, renders one plain line per fact (`plainFactText` strips fence and heading markers) and cuts at a line within `max_chars` (`boundFactLines`). A call that names `source_id` or `source_ids` (full surface only) reads as that scope instead: `recallSources` resolves them through `requestSourceScope` (a source outside the credential's grant is `permission_denied`), `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` empties identity, actor and audience, so no own facts and no member-page fact are read, restricted pages stay hidden and privacy is never relaxed; the query is ranked on its first 2,000 characters (`MEMORY_RECALL_QUERY_CHARS`). `memory_write` validates 1-20 facts, derives each request id from uuidv5(member, idempotency_key) (`memoryWriteRequestId`) and saves through `remember`'s handler with `ctx.attestedOp = 'memory_write'`, which the stored write authority keeps (`WriteAuthority.attestedOp`) so publication and receipt reads re-check that operation's attest right. `qmMemoryToolResult` (dispatch) moves the result into `structuredContent` and leaves the model text in `content`; `unlinkedRecallResult` is the empty success dispatch's `actorRefusal` returns for an unlinked person. Contract fixture: `scripts/build-qm-memory-contract.ts` writes `docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v1.json` (frozen, byte-identical) and `v2.json` (the scope read and write; `regen:all` artifacts). Scope writes (GST-1113): `memory_write {source_id}` saves on `memory/scope` in a scope source listed in the credential's `attest_sources` (migration v293, on `access_tokens` and `oauth_clients`); `access/attest-sources.ts` holds `perCallWriteSource` (the one exemption from the one-write-source checks in `page-mutations.ts`, `memory-mutations.ts` and `persistence/authority.ts`, keyed to that slug and re-checked at publication through `actorCoverage(..., source)`), the sticky mark `sources.config.qm_scope` (set by `applyAttestSources` under row locks; `isSourceFederated` ignores federation on it), `assertScopeSourceGrant` (in `insertClientGrant`, `persistGrant`, `writeTokenGrant` and `insertUnifiedToken`) and `withoutScopeSources` (a person recall never reads a scope source). `member-facts.ts` `assertScopePageWriter` keeps other remote writers off `memory/scope`. Tests: `test/qm-scope-writes.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-memory-tools.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-memory-contract.test.ts` (drift), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-memory.test.ts` (keyless `serve --http`).+ - `src/core/ops/qm-memory.ts` (GST-359 D) — QM's memory provider pair. `memory_recall` reads the attested person's own last-24-hour facts on their member page (`listFactsSince` with `sourceMarkdownSlug`), then `rankFactsByQuestion` over the facts they may read, renders one plain line per fact (`plainFactText` strips fence and heading markers) and cuts at a line within `max_chars` (`boundFactLines`). A call that names `source_id` or `source_ids` (full surface only) reads as that scope instead: `recallSources` resolves them through `requestSourceScope` (a source outside the credential's grant is `permission_denied`), `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` empties identity, actor and audience, so no own facts and no member-page fact are read, restricted pages stay hidden and privacy is never relaxed; the query is ranked on its first 2,000 characters (`MEMORY_RECALL_QUERY_CHARS`). `memory_write` validates 1-20 facts, derives each request id from uuidv5(member, idempotency_key) (`memoryWriteRequestId`) and saves through `remember`'s handler with `ctx.attestedOp = 'memory_write'`, which the stored write authority keeps (`WriteAuthority.attestedOp`) so publication and receipt reads re-check that operation's attest right. `qmMemoryToolResult` (dispatch) moves the result into `structuredContent` and leaves the model text in `content`; GST-1158 F2 does the same for an attested call to a contract v3 personal tool (`QM_PERSONAL_OPS`), keeping its JSON in `content` (a list as `structuredContent.results`; context_pack's text alone, like memory_recall), and dispatch measures that frame against the result cap again; each memory_recall fact carries `arm` (`own` or `ranked`, F5); `unlinkedRecallResult` is the empty success dispatch's `actorRefusal` returns for an unlinked person. Contract fixture: `scripts/build-qm-memory-contract.ts` writes `docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v1.json` (frozen, byte-identical) and `v2.json` (the scope read and write; `regen:all` artifacts; `v3.json` adds the personal tools with frozen result shapes). Scope writes (GST-1113): `memory_write {source_id}` saves on `memory/scope` in a scope source listed in the credential's `attest_sources` (migration v293, on `access_tokens` and `oauth_clients`); `access/attest-sources.ts` holds `perCallWriteSource` (the one exemption from the one-write-source checks in `page-mutations.ts`, `memory-mutations.ts` and `persistence/authority.ts`, keyed to that slug and re-checked at publication through `actorCoverage(..., source)`), the sticky mark `sources.config.qm_scope` (set by `applyAttestSources` under row locks; `isSourceFederated` ignores federation on it), `assertScopeSourceGrant` (in `insertClientGrant`, `persistGrant`, `writeTokenGrant` and `insertUnifiedToken`) and `withoutScopeSources` (a person recall never reads a scope source). `member-facts.ts` `assertScopePageWriter` keeps other remote writers off `memory/scope`. Tests: `test/qm-scope-writes.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-memory-tools.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-personal-tools.test.ts` (v3 tools over dispatch, both engines), `test/qm-memory-contract.test.ts` (drift), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-memory.test.ts` (keyless `serve --http`).diff --cc docs/architecture/key-files/files-and-sync-1.mdindex 982b3f9efa,a07dcc73a1..ae1abb2179--- a/docs/architecture/key-files/files-and-sync-1.md+++ b/docs/architecture/key-files/files-and-sync-1.md@@@ -51,11 -51,13 +51,11 @@@ Current behavior and load-bearing invar- `src/core/source-resolver.ts` — 6-tier source resolution. `resolveSourceWithTier(engine, explicit, cwd)` returns `{ source_id, tier: SourceTier, detail? }` alongside `resolveSourceId()` (unchanged). `SOURCE_TIER_NAMES = ['flag', 'env', 'dotfile', 'local_path', 'sole_non_default', 'brain_default', 'seed_default']` (7 entries; order matches priority). Tier `sole_non_default` slots between `local_path` and `brain_default`: when NO `sources.default` config is set AND exactly one registered source has `local_path` AND isn't `'default'` AND the `'default'` source holds no active pages (the emptiness guard — the tier's charter is rescuing brains whose `'default'` is empty; when `'default'` carries an established corpus, auto-routing would hijack every bare write into the side-source, so the resolver falls through to `seed_default` and prints a one-line stderr notice naming both sides so the suppressed flip is diagnosable, same `GBRAIN_NO_SOLE_NON_DEFAULT_NUDGE=1` suppression knob as the routing nudge; a failed pages probe on an exotic/legacy schema keeps the auto-route), auto-route to it; archived sources excluded (try/catch for pre-v34 brains); private `pickSoleNonDefaultSource(engine)` shared by both resolver entry points so they cannot drift. Exported `formatSoleNonDefaultNudge(sourceId): string | null` builds the user-facing stderr nudge (null when `GBRAIN_NO_SOLE_NON_DEFAULT_NUDGE=1`). `resolveCliSyncSource` in `src/commands/sync/run.ts` calls `resolveSourceWithTier` unconditionally so the tier fires; `src/commands/import.ts:96-128` mirrors with the tier-gated nudge. Consumed by `gbrain sources current`, `import --source-id`, `extract --source-id`, and the `source_routing_health` doctor check. Pinned by `test/source-resolver-with-tier.test.ts` (`withEnv()` per test-isolation lint), `test/source-resolver-sole-non-default.test.ts` (20 cases incl. both-ways emptiness-guard + probe-failure fallback), `test/sync-sole-non-default-routing.test.ts` (3 PGLite cases driving real `runSync`), `test/pages-source-scoping-4329.test.ts` (real-engine both-ways guard coverage). Also exports `noGrantFederatedScope(engine, hasSourceGrant, sourceId)`, the widening decision transports share: returns `localFederatedSourceIds(..., 'seed_default')` ONLY when `hasSourceGrant === false` (the legacy-bearer no-grant floor), `undefined` for a granted token, for an OAuth client (flag `undefined` — a falsy gate here would widen every OAuth client), and when the resolver throws (best-effort; the scalar scope stands rather than failing the request). Called by `src/commands/serve-http.ts`; pinned by `test/no-grant-federated-scope.test.ts` (6 cases). `explicitReadBinding(engine, sourceId, tier)` (#5081) is the explicit-tier twin used by the stdio transport for `GBRAIN_SOURCE` (`env`) and `.gbrain-source` (`dotfile`) bindings: `{ sourceId, via, sourceIds, optedOut }`, where `sourceIds` is the same set `localFederatedSourceIds` computes (shared `federatedSetFor`, so an isolated anchor admits only itself) and `optedOut` lists `federated === false` sources for the denial hint; `undefined` for every other tier. Pinned by `test/explicit-read-admission-5081.test.ts`. Unscoped default-write guard family (the `seed_default` tier is the only one that actually lands a write in `'default'`): `assessDefaultWriteGuard(engine)` → `DefaultWriteAssessment { shouldGuard, defaultPages, nonDefaultPages, nonDefaultSources, failed? }` — an unindexed full-`pages` aggregate; `shouldGuard` when ≥1 non-default source holds pages AND non-default pages outnumber default's; a query failure returns the fail-open no-guard verdict stamped `failed: true`, which cachers/latchers must not treat as settled. `assessDefaultWriteGuardOnce(engine)` is the per-engine WeakMap memo (arms on the first SUCCESSFUL assessment whatever its verdict, forgets a failed attempt so the next caller retries, coalesces concurrent callers; `__resetDefaultWriteGuardMemo` is the test seam). `assessUnscopedDefaultWrite(engine, tier, mutating)` → `{ warning, assessed }` (`assessed: false` only when the aggregate failed); `formatDefaultWriteWarning(a, sourceFlag?)` / `formatDefaultWriteRefusal(cmd, a)` render the two surfaces; `defaultWriteAllowedByEnv()` is the `GBRAIN_ALLOW_DEFAULT_WRITE=1` escape hatch. Consumers: `sync` refuses (dry-run warns), `import` warns via the memo, MCP stdio's `createDefaultWriteAdvisory` prints once. Also exports `isResolverUserError(e)` — the ONE predicate for this module's user-facing throws (`Source "…" not found.` / `not found or is archived.`, `Invalid --source value`, `Invalid GBRAIN_SOURCE value`), consumed by dream.ts, agent.ts and code-scope.ts so a CLI command turns an unknown/archived source into a clean stderr line + exit 1 while anything else keeps propagating. A request snapshot serves tiers 4, 5.5 (its rows carry the 'default' emptiness probe, `default_has_pages`), `assertSourceExists` and the federated set from one sources read, sent with the config table (`resolveSourceWithTier` reads tier 5's key beside the tier-4 listing) (GBRA-156).-- `src/core/source-delete.ts` — `deleteSourceRow`: every unmanaged source delete (`sources remove`, `sources purge`, the `sources_remove` op, expired-archive purge) deletes the `sources` row and that incarnation's `persistence_source_bindings` row in one statement; bindings have no FK to `sources`. Bindings of other incarnations are left to `gbrain repair orphan-bindings` (`src/core/persistence/orphan-bindings.ts`, doctor `orphan_persistence_bindings`). The unmanaged claim check (`sync-authority.ts`) and doctor `unbound_source` count only a binding of the source's current incarnation. `EXPIRED_ARCHIVE_SQL` is the one purge-eligibility predicate (unmanaged sweep, its per-row DELETE and the managed `expiredOnly` purge): both archive timestamps must be later than the epoch and the expiry past; `UNVERIFIED_ARCHIVE_SQL` lists archived rows with a missing or epoch timestamp, which the sweep reports blocked with restore-then-archive guidance instead of purging.+- `src/core/source-delete.ts` — `deleteSourceRow`: every unmanaged source delete (`sources remove`, `sources purge`, the `sources_remove` op, expired-archive purge) deletes the `sources` row and that incarnation's `persistence_source_bindings` row in one statement; bindings have no FK to `sources`. #9068: that statement also runs `removedSourceScrubCtes` (the managed `remove`/`purge` in `source-lifecycle.ts` runs them in its final transaction too), which delete the source's `retrieval_event_pages`, `retrieval_event_links`, `retrieval_feedback` and `context_volunteer_events` rows and strip from `eval_candidates.retrieved_slugs` each slug no other source the candidate covers has a page for (`retrieval_weights` and `mention_gazetteer_entries` cascade from `sources`); a second statement runs them again, for a feedback write or capture that held a page row while the delete waited, unless a source with the same id exists again (so a re-created source keeps its rows). Pinned by `test/purge-scrub-followups-9068.test.ts`. Bindings of other incarnations are left to `gbrain repair orphan-bindings` (`src/core/persistence/orphan-bindings.ts`, doctor `orphan_persistence_bindings`). The unmanaged claim check (`sync-authority.ts`) and doctor `unbound_source` count only a binding of the source's current incarnation. `EXPIRED_ARCHIVE_SQL` is the one purge-eligibility predicate (unmanaged sweep, its per-row DELETE and the managed `expiredOnly` purge): both archive timestamps must be later than the epoch and the expiry past; `UNVERIFIED_ARCHIVE_SQL` lists archived rows with a missing or epoch timestamp, which the sweep reports blocked with restore-then-archive guidance instead of purging.- `src/core/sources-ops.ts` — Multi-source registration + clone-lifecycle ops (`addSource`, `recloneIfMissing`, `defaultCloneDir`, `isOwnedClone`, `unownedHint`). **Reclone-ownership invariant (must-never-violate): gbrain may only delete/re-clone a clone it created, NEVER a user working tree.** `recloneIfMissing` deletes `local_path`, so it gates on `isOwnedClone(src)` and throws a `SourceOpError('unmanaged_path', ...)` BEFORE any filesystem op when ownership is unprovable — fail-closed. Ownership is proven by `config.managed_clone === true` (written by `addSource`'s `--url` path, covering default-location and `--clone-dir` clones) OR `local_path === defaultCloneDir(id)` (back-compat for pre-marker clones, via exact normalized-path equality, symlink-free). A row with `remote_url` + an unowned `local_path` (a user-registered working tree, e.g. `sources add --path`) is refused untouched; re-add with `--url` to regain auto-reclone. The reclone is EXDEV-safe: clone into a SIBLING temp of `local_path` (not the shared `clones/.tmp`, which may sit on a different mount than a `--clone-dir` target), then swap (move old aside → move new in → drop old) so `local_path` is never left missing-and-unrecoverable; on swap failure the original is restored, and if restore fails the error names the `aside` path so it's never reflexively deleted. A TOCTOU re-check re-confirms ownership immediately before the destructive move and rejects a symlink leaf swapped in after the entry check (`symlink_escape`). `unownedHint(src, state)` is the shared recovery message used by both the core error and the `gbrain sync --source` CLI error; `gbrain sources restore` special-cases `unmanaged_path` to print "DB row restored; gbrain syncs this path read-only" instead of the misleading "try sync to recover" guidance. `SourceOpErrorCode` includes `unmanaged_path`. Pinned by `test/sources-ops.test.ts`, `test/sources-resync-recovery.test.ts`. `assertNoOverlappingPath(engine, id, path)` is the ONE overlapping-path guard shared by every surface that binds a `local_path` (`addSource`, `gbrain sources set-path`): a path equal to, nested inside, or enclosing another source's `local_path` throws `SourceOpError('overlapping_path')` — overlapping trees make sync/write-through attribute files to the wrong source, so no add or repair path may skip it. The guard compares by spelling AND by realpath (both the candidate and each sibling `local_path` are `realpathSync`'d when they exist, fail-open to the spelling otherwise), so a symlink resolving into or over another source's tree cannot slip past it; the stored pointer and the error message keep the operator's spelling. #6946: `isOwnedClone`/`defaultCloneDir` live in `src/core/url-clone.ts`, re-exported here.-- `src/core/sync-concurrency.ts` — single source of truth for the parallel-sync policy. Exports `autoConcurrency(engine, fileCount, override?)` (PGLite always serial; explicit override clamped to >=1; auto path returns `DEFAULT_PARALLEL_WORKERS=4` when `fileCount > AUTO_CONCURRENCY_FILE_THRESHOLD=100`), `shouldRunParallel(workers, fileCount, explicit)` (explicit `--workers` bypasses the >50-file floor), and `parseWorkers(s)` (rejects `'0'`, `'-3'`, `'foo'`, `'1.5'`, trailing chars). Used by `performSync`, `performFullSync`, `runImport`, and the Minion `sync` handler so the sites can't drift. `DEFAULT_PARALLEL_SOURCES = 4` is a SEPARATE constant for the per-source fan-out under `gbrain sync --all` — kept distinct from `DEFAULT_PARALLEL_WORKERS` because total live Postgres connections per wave ≈ `DEFAULT_PARALLEL_SOURCES × DEFAULT_PARALLEL_WORKERS × 2 (per-file pool)` = 32 at both defaults (each per-file worker opens its own `PostgresEngine` with `poolSize = min(2, resolvePoolSize(2))`); `sync.ts` warns when `parallel × workers × 2 > 16`. `resolveWorkersWithClamp(engine, override, commandName, fileCount)` wraps `autoConcurrency` with a per-command stderr clamp warning on PGLite (per-(command, requested) dedup via module-scoped warned-once set with `_resetWorkersClampWarningsForTest()` seam) and is the canonical surface for every bulk-command `--workers N` flag (extract-conversation-facts, extract, edges-backfill, reindex-multimodal, reindex, reindex-code); embed.ts deliberately bypasses it and keeps `GBRAIN_EMBED_CONCURRENCY || 20`. `resolveMaxConnections()` (reads `GBRAIN_MAX_CONNECTIONS`, undefined when unset) + `clampWorkersForConnectionBudget(workers, perWorkerPool, maxConnections, parentPool)` back the opt-in single-sync connection-footprint clamp so a big sync stays under a low pooler cap (`parent_pool + workers×perWorkerPool ≤ budget`); `gbrain doctor`'s `pool_budget` check (`computePoolBudgetCheck` / `checkPoolBudget` in `src/commands/doctor/checks/consolidation-cycle.ts`, re-exported by `src/commands/doctor.ts`) warns when the budget leaves no room for a worker, pointing at `GBRAIN_POOL_SIZE=2`. Pinned by `test/pglite-workers-clamp.test.ts`.-- `src/core/sync-cost-gate.ts` + `sync-git.ts` + `sync-anchor.ts` + `sync-lock.ts` + `sync-reconcile.ts` + `sync-status-report.ts` — six pure-function clusters behind the `src/commands/sync.ts` façade, which re-exports them; `facadeExpansion` in `scripts/generate-flag-registry.ts` keeps exactly these six (NOT the other `sync-*` siblings, which are ordinary deps) on the sync command's flag-scan surface. `sync-cost-gate.ts`: the inline-embed cost gate + token estimation for `gbrain sync`. `sync-git.ts`: git plumbing — invocation building, repo discovery, baseline-commit self-heal, path-containment guards, OS-relative paths normalized to Git slash form by `gitRelativePath`, and the delete/rename slug resolvers (`resolveSlugByPathOrSourcePath` — see its dedicated entry above — plus the verified `resolveSlugsForRemovedPaths`/`resolveRemovedPathSlug`). `sync-anchor.ts`: sync anchor + chunker-version state helpers (source-scoped vs legacy global-config storage). `sync-lock.ts`: the lock layer — typed lock-busy error, the rich busy message, `--break-lock` handling, the partial-result envelope (`performSync` itself stays in the façade). `sync-reconcile.ts`: full-sync reconcile planning (the mass-delete valve and ever-committed gate), with stored paths normalized before scope filtering, plus sync deadline/stall resolution (the default and env deadlines are progress-aware; `syncWatchdogPlan` and `syncDeadlineStopNotice` build the watchdog options and its stdout stop notice — see the `process-watchdog.ts` entry). `sync-status-report.ts`: the per-source sync status report backing `gbrain sources status` and the `get_status_snapshot` op. Its queue context is engine-aware: only an explicitly worker-backed surface may promise job deferral; otherwise non-interactive cost deferral returns `manual_drain_required` with exact per-source `gbrain embed --stale --source <id>` commands and never writes or claims an embed-backfill row. GBRA-133 2b.3: a `--no-pull` estimate (`estimateInlineNewTokens` / `CostGateContext.noPull`) prices local HEAD and never fetches origin. `sync-git.ts` adds `gitAsync` / `discoverGitRootAsync` / `isDetachedHeadAsync`, which classic sync preflight, finalize, the lossless delta, upstream observation and the source filesystem lock now use, so a resident sync spawns no synchronous Git.- - `src/core/sync-delta.ts` — the single "what changed since last_commit" helper, consumed by BOTH `performSyncInner` (sync executor) and `estimateInlineNewTokens` (cost estimator) so the gate's dollar figure can't drift from what the sync imports. `computeSyncDelta(repoPath, fromCommit, toCommit, {detachedManifest?, detached?})` → `{status:'ok', manifest}` | `{status:'unavailable', reason:'anchor_missing'|'diff_failed'}`. Anchor reachability via `git cat-file -t` (a gc'd bookmark is `anchor_missing`, but a present-but-non-ancestor bookmark is still diffed tree-to-tree), then `git diff --name-status -M from..to` parsed by `buildSyncManifest`; merges the detached working-tree manifest when detached (`buildDetachedWorkingTreeManifest`). NO dirty/untracked probe in the estimator — pricing dirty files would create phantom costs on a busy brain. The executor imports only the commit diff on attached HEADs BY DEFAULT, but counts uncommitted working-tree files (untracked + dirty) as `SyncResult.uncommitted` drift and, with `--working-tree` / config `sync.include_working_tree`, merges the working-tree manifest into the delta so attached repos can import uncommitted state (the estimator does not price that opt-in). `execFileSync` array-args (shell-injection safe), 30s / 100 MiB budget, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0` (`git-env.ts` `GIT_READ_ENV`: sync's Git reads never take `index.lock`). Test seam `_setGitRunnerForTests`. Pinned by `test/sync-delta.test.ts`. Classic sync reads the same delta as bytes instead: `computeLosslessSyncDelta` / `buildLosslessWorkingTreeManifest` run `git diff --raw -z -M` (and `ls-files -z --others`) into a Buffer and `parseRawDiffZ` keeps each name exactly as Git has it (no trim, no unquoting); a name that is not UTF-8 or holds a control character goes to `unsupported` (present) or `gone` (left the tree) instead of the manifest, and a gitlink (mode 160000) that appears goes to `gitlinks`, never the manifest (seam `_setGitBytesRunnerForTests`). Managed discovery and the cost estimator keep `computeSyncDelta`. Pinned by `test/pathological/s-classic-byte-paths.test.ts`.+ - `src/core/sync-delta.ts` — the single "what changed since last_commit" helper, consumed by BOTH `performSyncInner` (sync executor) and `estimateInlineNewTokens` (cost estimator) so the gate's dollar figure can't drift from what the sync imports. `computeSyncDelta(repoPath, fromCommit, toCommit, {detachedManifest?, detached?})` → `{status:'ok', manifest}` | `{status:'unavailable', reason:'anchor_missing'|'diff_failed'}`. Anchor reachability via `git cat-file -t` (a gc'd bookmark is `anchor_missing`, but a present-but-non-ancestor bookmark is still diffed tree-to-tree), then `git diff --name-status -M from..to` parsed by `buildSyncManifest`; merges the detached working-tree manifest when detached (`buildDetachedWorkingTreeManifest`). NO dirty/untracked probe in the estimator — pricing dirty files would create phantom costs on a busy brain. The executor imports only the commit diff on attached HEADs BY DEFAULT, but counts uncommitted working-tree files (untracked + dirty) as `SyncResult.uncommitted` drift and, with `--working-tree` / config `sync.include_working_tree`, merges the working-tree manifest into the delta so attached repos can import uncommitted state (the estimator does not price that opt-in). `execFileSync` array-args (shell-injection safe), 30s / 100 MiB budget, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0` (`git-env.ts` `GIT_READ_ENV`: sync's Git reads never take `index.lock`). GST-2331: runs with `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV`. Test seam `_setGitRunnerForTests`. Pinned by `test/sync-delta.test.ts`. Classic sync reads the same delta as bytes instead: `computeLosslessSyncDelta` / `buildLosslessWorkingTreeManifest` run `git diff --raw -z -M` (and `ls-files -z --others`) into a Buffer and `parseRawDiffZ` keeps each name exactly as Git has it (no trim, no unquoting); a name that is not UTF-8 or holds a control character goes to `unsupported` (present) or `gone` (left the tree) instead of the manifest, and a gitlink (mode 160000) that appears goes to `gitlinks`, never the manifest (seam `_setGitBytesRunnerForTests`). Managed discovery and the cost estimator keep `computeSyncDelta`. Pinned by `test/pathological/s-classic-byte-paths.test.ts`.- `src/core/sync-byte-paths.ts` — classic sync's byte-exact names (GBRA-133). `classifyGitPathBytes` (strict UTF-8 with the BOM kept, no `[\x00-\x1f\x7f]`, else `not_utf8` / `control_character`); the `unsupported_path` hold key `encodeBytePathKey` (`/gbrain-bytes/` + the path with each byte outside a printable UTF-8 character, and `%`, as `%XX`; Git never emits a leading `/`, so it never equals a path) and `decodeBytePathKey` (canonical keys only, else null); `displayBytePath` (C escapes, 200-character cap); `bytePathItemId` (first 16 hex of the bytes' sha256); `bytePathRenameCommand` (printf octal escapes piped NUL-terminated to `xargs -0 git mv`, plain ASCII); `bytePathHoldGone` (lstat of the exact bytes; null for an ordinary key), read by `commands/sync/holds.ts` re-screen and full-sync settle; `unsupportedPathHoldFix`, dispatched by `gitHoldFix` (ask_user rename, argv a read-only `sources status`, then `sync --no-pull`).- `src/commands/sync/unsupported-paths.ts` — classic sync's routing of the lossless delta's extras: `selectBytePaths` applies the manifest's scope / exclude / syncability filters (name probed with U+FFFD for bad bytes and `_` for control characters) and makes paths mode-relative; `holdUnsupportedPaths` writes each `unsupported_path` hold (`writeGitHold`, mode legacy, slug and page null, never gating the bookmark), schedules the holds of `gone` names to clear and prints one `gitlink_not_followed` line; `gitlinkFields` puts `gitlinks_not_followed` on the result (declared on `SyncResult` by module augmentation here) for the run that advances past them.diff --cc src/core/deletion-inventory.tsindex f1b2a08642,f59b1b0869..00799ebd60--- a/src/core/deletion-inventory.ts+++ b/src/core/deletion-inventory.ts@@@ -105,7 -106,8 +106,8 @@@ const ROWS: readonly Row[] =['mcp_request_log', 'out_of_scope', 'probed_reported', 'token_name agent_name operation status params error_message', 'params error_message'],['mcp_spend_log', 'out_of_scope', 'no_memory_text', 'client_id token_name operation provider model budget_key'],['mcp_spend_reservations', 'out_of_scope', 'no_memory_text', 'client_id model provider status usage_unknown_reason budget_key'],+ ['memory_proposals', 'out_of_scope', 'probed_reported', 'principal_kind principal_id system external_id member_id source_id kind operation slug to_slug payload payload_digest expected_revision authority state reason decided_by error_code', 'payload reason'],- ['mention_gazetteer_entries', 'out_of_scope', 'no_memory_text', 'source_id name_norm target_slug'],+ ['mention_gazetteer_entries', 'swept', 'page_names', 'source_id name_norm target_slug'],['mention_index_status', 'out_of_scope', 'no_memory_text', 'source_id state policy_fingerprint error'],['migration_impact_log', 'out_of_scope', 'probed_reported', 'remediation_id metric_name source_id brain_id idempotency_key applied_by details', 'details'],['minion_attachments', 'out_of_scope', 'probed_reported', 'filename content_type content storage_uri sha256', 'content'],diff --cc test/postgres-unit-arms.txtindex fc4c7c1a6f,140d9b8e5b..eeec99728a--- a/test/postgres-unit-arms.txt+++ b/test/postgres-unit-arms.txt@@@ -469,11 -470,13 +471,15 @@@ test/purge-expires-page-facts.test.ttest/purge-fact.test.tstest/purge-global-marker.test.tstest/purge-missing-cache-6911.test.ts+test/purge-name-stores-9068.test.tstest/purge-read-surfaces.test.ts+test/purge-scrub-followups-9068.test.tstest/purge-sync-tombstone-hold-7130.test.ts+ test/qm-memory-propose.test.tstest/qm-memory-tools.test.ts+ test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts+ test/qm-personal-tools.test.ts+ test/qm-scope-read.test.tstest/qm-scope-writes.test.tstest/read-meta-diag.test.tstest/reason-trailers-gbra217.test.ts