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docs: list the personal_source room reason in the protocol and key-files docs

garrytan4bbb3c40b215
diff --git a/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md b/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
index 7cd083ff8b..3965a4bfd7 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
[Subsystem index](../KEY_FILES.md). Read only the entries relevant to your change.
Current behavior and load-bearing invariants; history belongs in Git and CHANGELOG.
-- `src/core/access/` (GBRA-218) — per-member read access inside one source. `principals.ts` normalizes frontmatter `readable_by` (bare id = `member:<id>`, `group:<g>`, ASCII case fold, space trim; anything malformed is `['!nobody']`); it is the row twin of the SQL `gbrain_access_readers()` (`test/access-principals.test.ts` holds them equal). A BEFORE trigger keeps `pages.page_readers` equal to that function (direct writes to the column are recomputed), and predicates test the array, never the function, which costs ~0.2 ms per row. A page that names readers with no derived value yet (written before the migration) reads as nobody until `gbrain repair access` (`repair/access.ts`). `members.ts` (members, groups, tombstoned ids never reused, bindings), `token-binding.ts` (the verifiers' join; a credential bound to a disabled, tombstoned or missing member is refused with `access_member_disabled`) and `caller.ts` (`remoteCallerAccess`: the identity dispatch puts on the caller-access record; stdio binds through `serve --stdio-member`, else `mcp.stdio_member`; publication re-resolves from the stored principal; a binding lookup that fails never reads as unbound: a statement error throws `access_identity_unavailable` (retryable, `fix.next: wait`), a transient failure (`transientDatabaseFailure`, `transientInterruption` in `persistence/transient-retry.ts`) or a non-statement failure is rethrown unchanged for the persistence consumer, and only a schema missing `access_members`, `access_group_members` or `member_id` reads as unbound). In `search/private-visibility.ts` every page fragment is `accessAllowedSql` AND the privacy part: plain fragments use the empty identity (over-hide, never leak), `*ForCaller` fragments the caller's, and `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES`, `search.remote_private_pages` and `granted_sources` relax only the privacy part (`privacyForCaller`). GST-2490: an owner read (`CallerAccess.lineage` with `owner`, read-only ops only) uses `lineageAccessSql`: the owner's readers and folder rules as for any member, with `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()` (v304; per origin `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`) in place of the every-caller lineage, so a derivative or fact passes when the owner reads every origin; `ownerReadsRestricted` (config `access.owner_reads_restricted`, `owner.ts` `setOwnerReadsRestricted`, local only) also passes pages kept to other members except another member's own member page and pending coverage. `access check`, `who-can-read`, `whoami` (`ownerReadsRestrictedNotice`) and doctor `access_owner_reads_restricted` report it; test `test/owner-reads-restricted.test.ts` (both engines, database and access.yml rules). GBRA-108 (migration v305, `v305-access-lineage-designs.ts`): `access_rules.covers_derived` (default true) — a raw-only rule (`folder-rules.ts` `covers_derived: false`, `rule add --raw-only`; digest unchanged for covering rules; true→false is the held widening `derived_released`, false→true the narrowing `derived_covered`) is dropped from an origin's rule set by the SQL function `gbrain_access_lineage_rules()` inside `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` and the 10-argument `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`, so it keeps its pages but not their lineage (a page's own readers still close it; fact provenance filters judge with `derived = true`). `access_members.kind` (`person` | `audience`, `members.ts` `setMemberKind`, local only): an owner read carries `CallerAccess.audienceKindMembers`, whose member pages pass the readers test and the member-page exemptions (`audiencePages`, `notOtherMemberPageSql`, the `p_audience_pages` argument of the 9-argument `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()`). Config `access.members_read_lineage` (`lineage.ts`, local only) sets `CallerAccess.lineage` for any member read speaking for itself (`caller.ts`; never an audience of several or an unbound credential; `withCallerAccess` drops it for several identities and keeps the owner opt-in and audience members owner-only). Cache keys: `knobsHash` `xol=3` and `xak=`, `callerIdentityKey` `owner_reads`/`audience_kind`. Doctor `access_lineage` (`checks/access-lineage.ts`). Tests: `test/access-raw-only-rules.test.ts`, `test/access-audience-members.test.ts`, `test/access-members-read-lineage.test.ts` (both engines, both stores; fixture `test/helpers/access-lineage-fixture.ts`). GBRA-108 design 1 (the labelled-only migration, `schema-migrations/v*-access-labelled-only.ts`): `access_members.labelled_only` (`labelled-only.ts` `setMemberLabelledOnly`, local only, refused on the owner with `access_labelled_only_owner` from `owner.ts`, which `setOwner` also raises) sets `CallerAccess.labelledOnly` (`caller.ts`, `actor.ts`, `as-preview.ts`; fails closed to true when the table cannot be read). `private-visibility.ts` `labelledOnlySql` ANDs `page_readers && identity OR folder_rule_ids && satisfied` into `callerAccessSql`, `callerReadersAllowedSql` (a snapshot needs its own readers or a rule on the live page) and the fact filters (`labelledOnlyFactSql`: a fact on the caller's own member page while it names the member, or under member lineage a provenance page that passes; else FALSE); under member lineage a derived row may pass through `gbrain_access_origin_labelled_for()` (every origin labelled, none missing). Remote read gates that are not caller-aware use `remoteReadFloorSql` / `remoteProvenanceFloorSql` (the plain fragment, plus the labelled-only conjunct only for a labelled-only caller); `test/remote-read-floor.test.ts` lists the sites that keep the plain fragment. `labelledOnlyFor` never reports the configured owner, and dispatch refuses a scope read for a labelled-only person (`scope-read.ts` `scopeReadLabelledOnlyRefused`). The entity page of a fact is judged by the ordinary policy. Writes: `persistence/page-visibility.ts` (`writerReadPolicySql`, `remoteLabelsChecked` → `assertLabelledOnlyCreate` → `access_labelled_only_unnamed`), `cli/enforced-member.ts` `memberPageView`. Cache keys `xlo=1`, `labelled_only`; doctor `access_labelled_only_members` (`checks/access-labelled-only.ts`). Test: `test/access-labelled-only.test.ts` (both engines, both storesA derivative of a page that names readers is otherwise hidden from every remote caller (`originAllowedSql`, which calls the SQL function `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` only for atom, question, concept, event or `derived_from` rows, so each read plans one call instead of four subplans). Both parts lead with column tests (`page_readers IS NULL`, `type`) so row estimates follow column statistics; an expression test such as `->'readable_by' IS NULL` estimates almost no rows and sent restricted vector searches into nested-loop sequential scans. The index walk's page probe (`INDEX_WALK_PAGE_COLUMNS`) projects `page_readers`. Config `access.restrictions_present` (set by a trigger, sticky) keeps every pre-A1 path on a brain with no restriction. `check:remote-privacy-reads` keeps the two relaxations read only in `private-visibility.ts`. Tests: `test/member-read-access.test.ts` (remote matrix, both engines), `test/access-*.test.ts`. Folder rules (A2) keep whole folders of a source to named members. `folder-rules.ts` is the grammar (`.gbrain/access.yml`: `rules:` of `id`, `prefix`, `readable_by`), `classifyRulebook` (each change is narrowing or widening; the target installs only the narrowing part) and `matchingRuleIds`. `policy.ts` owns the one applied rulebook for both stores: `access_rules` (source-qualified ids), the append-only `access_policy_revisions` log, `access_pending_coverage` (prefixes that read as nobody while a narrowing restamps, or while a committed file is invalid) and `sources.config.access_store`, persisted at the first rule and changed only by `policy-migrate.ts` (journaled in `access_policy_migrations`). `proposeRevision` installs narrowing at once under a per-source row lock and holds widening for `applyApproved` (`plan_hash`, `preview_changed`); `restampSource` rewrites `pages.folder_rule_ids` in id windows, then clears pending coverage under the lock; re-proposing the same rulebook finishes an interrupted restamp. A trigger stamps `folder_rule_ids` from the SQL function `gbrain_access_folder_rules()` on insert and on slug or source change, never from git on the serve path. `policy-git.ts` is the git store (files committed through the commit door, applied by `syncAccessPolicyAt` from sync preflight and before and after every managed pass (`performManagedSync`: sync, drain, `sources refresh`, git conversion), read with `git show` at the synced commit (GST-2331: every read under `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV`, so a partial clone fetches nothing; a policy file the commit names that the clone lacks, or a history the replay cannot read, makes the source read as nobody until the objects are fetched: the problem names the exact `git cat-file -p` or `git log --first-parent -p` that fetches them, and the next sync applies the rules and clears the mark); a database with no revision yet replays each committed `access.yml` since the `access.approved` baseline, so a rebuild holds a removal a plain commit made); `policy-transfer.ts` carries the applied rulebook through `gbrain export` and installs it before any page in `gbrain import`; `policy-notice.ts` is the `access_policy_pending` degraded notice. In `private-visibility.ts`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` sits inside `accessAllowedSql` (`folder_rule_ids IS NULL OR folder_rule_ids <@ <satisfied ids>` plus coverage conjuncts), so no hatch, grant or `--as` relaxes it, and the unrestricted short form tests `folder_rule_ids IS NULL` next to `page_readers IS NULL` (v283 triggers set `access.restrictions_present` on the first rule or pending prefix); `caller.ts`'s `folderAccessFor` fails closed to whole-source coverage. CLI: `src/commands/access-rules.ts`; doctor: `src/commands/doctor/checks/folder-access.ts`. Tests: `test/access-folder-rules.test.ts` (database store, both engines), `test/access-folder-rules-git.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-transfer.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-doctor.test.ts`. Shared agents (B, GBRA-231): `audience.ts` parses the audience a harness asserts (`X-Gbrain-On-Behalf-Of` or request-level `_meta.on_behalf_of`, 1-50 principals, `guest` = the empty identity; the same key inside tool arguments is refused) and appends each assertion to `access-audience-YYYY-Www.jsonl`. Dispatch resolves it on every remote call through `caller.ts` (`resolveAudienceIdentities`: every entry must be in the credential's live `may_act_for`, then name an enabled member or existing group); the caller-access record then carries `audienceIdentities`, and `accessAllowedForAllSql` needs one readers conjunct per identity, folder rules the intersection of each entry's satisfied set (`folderAccessForAll`). Privacy relaxes only for a one-member audience. Writes carry the audience as `WriteAuthority.actingFor` (re-resolved at publication) and agent jobs as `grant.actingFor`. Every remote response carries `_meta.access` (`appliedAccessSummary`), which `whoami` returns as `access.applied`; doctor `access_may_act_for_wildcard` (`checks/shared-agent-access.ts`) warns on `*`. Tests: `test/access-on-behalf-of.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-on-behalf-of.test.ts`. Rooms (GST-2639): `room.ts` reads the shared chat an answer goes into (`readRoomDeclaration`: the `X-Gbrain-Room` header, request-level `_meta.room` and a `room` tool argument, which is stripped before the handler; the argument can only add people, a disagreement sets `conflict`; an empty or malformed channel is `invalid`, never a refusal) and `assessRoom` marks a copy of a covered op's result (`ROOM_COVERED_OPS`) plus hot memory with `room_access`: pages through `privatePagesFilterForCaller` under the room's caller-access record (`audienceCallerAccess`, the audience branch of `remoteCallerAccess`), facts through `factVisibilitySql` and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy`, with reasons `readers`, `folder_rule`, `labelled_only`, `private_label`, `derived`. It never throws, never narrows, reorders or fails the read (a failure, the 3 s deadline, more than 2,000 references or an uncovered op leave the body unchanged and mark items unknown), writes `_meta.room` and the notices `room_above_level`, `room_hints_unavailable`, `room_conflict`, and appends a count-only `room_marked` audit row. `resolveAudienceIdentities` takes `mayActFor: 'owner_room_assessment'` to skip `may_act_for` for the owner's room only. Dispatch ignores a room on a trusted local call. Test: `test/access-room.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less). Attested actor (C1, GST-359): `actor-model.ts` (dependency-free: `x-qm-actor`, `acting_user`, `EXTERNAL_ID_RE` = 1-256 visible ASCII, `attestRightFrom`: the right counts only for a member-less credential whose token is legacy or `client_credentials`, read from `oauth_tokens.grant_type`) and `actor.ts`. `resolveAttestedActor` runs in dispatch before any work: an invalid id refuses `actor_not_attested` (`invalid_actor_id`) before any lookup, then the right, the op list (`attest_ops`, default `get_write_request,memory_recall,memory_write`), `acting_user` = header (stripped), and `actorCoverage` (the one coverage test: live right plus a live link in `access_member_links` to an enabled member, compared exactly) or `actor_unlinked`. GST-1158: `scope-read.ts` holds `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` (no identity, actor or audience; privacy never relaxed) and `SCOPE_READ_OPS`; dispatch runs an attested call to one of those ops that names `source_id`/`source_ids` under that record (`attestedReadMode`, which refuses `__all__`/`all_sources`), or as the person when the right's `attest_read` (v298, `--attest-read`; over HTTP `attestRead` on `/admin/api/access/attest`) is `person`, and handlers read the mode with `currentReadMode`. GST-2407: `context_pack` is a scope read too: its `entity_refs` count as naming sources, `assertPackConfined` refuses before any read a scope call without `source_id`, with an `entity_refs` entry in another source or with `session_id`, and the handler reads the named source as home (core block, pull brief, hot facts). `attest_read = 'scope'` refuses a call that names no actor (`actor_required`). Tests: `test/qm-scope-read.test.ts` (both engines), `test/doctor-attest-read-shared-scope.test.ts`. GBRA-284: `member-sources.ts` binds a source to its member (`access_member_sources`, v299; `gbrain access member source add|remove|list`); `attestedReadScope`, called in dispatch for every attested call and in `minions/tools/brain-allowlist.ts` for an attested job's tool calls, replaces the call's read grant with the grant minus personal sources bound to another member (every personal source under a scope read), so every resolver refuses or skips them like out-of-grant sources and nothing is added. Test: `test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts` (both engines). `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS` (`capture`, `extract_facts`, take writes, `list_write_conflicts`, and since GST-2249 W1 every page write; `test/qm-attest-write-boundary.test.ts` classifies every attestable mutating operation) are never attestable: refused by `parseAttestOps`, `bindCredential`, every call and the stored re-check, which also re-checks `attest_ops` for a queued write's operation and each job tool call. Under the header serve-http lists only attested tools and refuses `resources/read`. `attestedCallerAccess` is a one-member audience with privacy never relaxed (no granted sources, no hatch), never B's `may_act_for` path. Writes store `WriteAuthority.actingFor = {system, external_id, member}` and jobs `grant.actor`; `storedActorIdentity` re-resolves both through `actorCoverage` and refuses when the member changed. `linkMember` / `unlinkMember` / `listMemberLinks` back `gbrain access member link|unlink|links`; `linkMemberByEmail` (GST-1158) finds the member by its declared email (`members.ts` `memberByEmail`: `access_members.email`, migration v301, case-folded, unique, cleared on removal; `not_found` when none, `email_ambiguous` when several) and then links exactly as `linkMember`, from the local CLI and the owner-session routes in `src/commands/serve-http-access.ts` only; `--attest-actor` / `--attest-ops` on `auth rescope` (`members.ts`) only for a member-less legacy token or confidential client-credentials client. Migration v286. Tests: `test/access-qm-actor.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-actor.test.ts`. Member facts (C2, GST-359): `member-facts.ts`. A remote `remember` from an attested actor or a lone-member credential (`callerMember`, never an audience of several) writes to `memory/members/<member>` (`memberFactPage`; `persistence/memory-prepare.ts` creates the page with `readable_by: [member:<id>]`), `visibility: private`, `infer_entity` off, the entity kept as `entity_slug`, unless the call passes `share: true` (GST-2243), which takes the ordinary world route to the subject's page; a member's explicit `visibility: "world"` is refused in `remember`'s validation (`member_share_required`), so a batch with one such item saves nothing. GST-2346 D1: the owner speaking for itself (`ownerSpeaksForItself`: `CallerAccess.owner`, no actor or audience, no subagent, no slug fence) takes the world route unless it passes `visibility: "private"` or the page or `facts.default_visibility` makes the default private (then its member page), is never refused `member_share_required`, and its `forget` of a fact off its member page takes the ordinary remote path when that path reads the fact. A fact off every member and scope page, on a page the owner reads under the GST-2490 rule with the opt-in off (`ownerReadPolicyFragment`) and may write as a member, a page whose readers name it included, with the fact's entity page judged the same way (`ownerReachesFact`, `forget-prepare.ts`), is withdrawn too: submission marks the request `owner_reach`, and preparation judges the owner again from the stored authority (`storedOwnerSpeaksForItself`, `page-visibility.ts`), so a writer that is no longer the owner gets `not_found`; a more trusted fact files the `forget_requires_owner` proposal. A member id whose page slug `slugifyPath` would change (`a--b`, `zed-`) is refused (`invalid_params`). The page must name that member alone (`memberPageIsOwn`, checked at submission and again in preparation, `memberPageNotOwned`), and remote writes under `memory/members/` go only to the caller's own page (`assertMemberPageWriter`, called from `ops/context.ts` `enforceClientSlugFence`, so every remote page write passes it; trusted local callers are unaffected). Reads widen a world-only fact list only by `memberFactAdmitSql` (a private fact on the caller's own live member page whose readers and folder rules admit the caller; `factVisibilitySql` in `engine-sql/facts.ts` and `search/fact-relevance.ts`), and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy` judges a member-page fact's source page as the caller (every other fact keeps the empty identity, so a fact from a page that names readers stays hidden from every remote caller). Writers never cross pages: `facts/single-prepare.ts` (`SingleFactIntent.page_slug`) and `trust/supersede-handlers.ts` dedup, supersede and contest only within the member page, and no other write matches a fact there (`onMemberPageSql`); a remote save there meets only the page's own withdrawals and those of a claim its member reads (`memberPageWithdrawal`), and the insert guards mark a member-page row only by its page's own withdrawals (`schema-migrations/*-member-page-withdrawal-scope.ts`), so a claim the member never read cannot refuse or expire its save; consolidation skips facts whose page names readers (`readersSourcedFactSql`). Per-person keys: `callerIdentityKey` joins the hot-memory cache key (`facts/meta-hook.ts`, `::xid=`), `callerSessionKey` the `delta` cursor (`ops/facts.ts`), `sameAttestedActor` gates receipts (`persistence/authority.ts` `ownRequestAccessible`) and replays (`persistence/journal.ts`) on the stored actor, else the stored audience, and `get_agent_job` and the owner-fenced `get_job`, `wait_job`, `get_job_progress`, `list_jobs` and `cancel_job` match the job's `grant.actor` (system, external id, member) and `grant.actingFor` (the same distinct audience entries; `jobActorSql` in `minions/types.ts`), so a job or receipt with an actor or audience reads as missing to the bare client and to other actors and audiences, and one with neither to every actor and audience. Tests: `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` (both engines), `test/access-member-sweep.test.ts` (every attestable op as Bob, the bare client and an unbound credential; `test/helpers/member-sweep.ts`), `test/e2e/serve-http-member-sweep.test.ts` (two members over a real `serve --http` on a keyless repo-less brain).
+- `src/core/access/` (GBRA-218) — per-member read access inside one source. `principals.ts` normalizes frontmatter `readable_by` (bare id = `member:<id>`, `group:<g>`, ASCII case fold, space trim; anything malformed is `['!nobody']`); it is the row twin of the SQL `gbrain_access_readers()` (`test/access-principals.test.ts` holds them equal). A BEFORE trigger keeps `pages.page_readers` equal to that function (direct writes to the column are recomputed), and predicates test the array, never the function, which costs ~0.2 ms per row. A page that names readers with no derived value yet (written before the migration) reads as nobody until `gbrain repair access` (`repair/access.ts`). `members.ts` (members, groups, tombstoned ids never reused, bindings), `token-binding.ts` (the verifiers' join; a credential bound to a disabled, tombstoned or missing member is refused with `access_member_disabled`) and `caller.ts` (`remoteCallerAccess`: the identity dispatch puts on the caller-access record; stdio binds through `serve --stdio-member`, else `mcp.stdio_member`; publication re-resolves from the stored principal; a binding lookup that fails never reads as unbound: a statement error throws `access_identity_unavailable` (retryable, `fix.next: wait`), a transient failure (`transientDatabaseFailure`, `transientInterruption` in `persistence/transient-retry.ts`) or a non-statement failure is rethrown unchanged for the persistence consumer, and only a schema missing `access_members`, `access_group_members` or `member_id` reads as unbound). In `search/private-visibility.ts` every page fragment is `accessAllowedSql` AND the privacy part: plain fragments use the empty identity (over-hide, never leak), `*ForCaller` fragments the caller's, and `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES`, `search.remote_private_pages` and `granted_sources` relax only the privacy part (`privacyForCaller`). GST-2490: an owner read (`CallerAccess.lineage` with `owner`, read-only ops only) uses `lineageAccessSql`: the owner's readers and folder rules as for any member, with `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()` (v304; per origin `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`) in place of the every-caller lineage, so a derivative or fact passes when the owner reads every origin; `ownerReadsRestricted` (config `access.owner_reads_restricted`, `owner.ts` `setOwnerReadsRestricted`, local only) also passes pages kept to other members except another member's own member page and pending coverage. `access check`, `who-can-read`, `whoami` (`ownerReadsRestrictedNotice`) and doctor `access_owner_reads_restricted` report it; test `test/owner-reads-restricted.test.ts` (both engines, database and access.yml rules). GBRA-108 (migration v305, `v305-access-lineage-designs.ts`): `access_rules.covers_derived` (default true) — a raw-only rule (`folder-rules.ts` `covers_derived: false`, `rule add --raw-only`; digest unchanged for covering rules; true→false is the held widening `derived_released`, false→true the narrowing `derived_covered`) is dropped from an origin's rule set by the SQL function `gbrain_access_lineage_rules()` inside `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` and the 10-argument `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`, so it keeps its pages but not their lineage (a page's own readers still close it; fact provenance filters judge with `derived = true`). `access_members.kind` (`person` | `audience`, `members.ts` `setMemberKind`, local only): an owner read carries `CallerAccess.audienceKindMembers`, whose member pages pass the readers test and the member-page exemptions (`audiencePages`, `notOtherMemberPageSql`, the `p_audience_pages` argument of the 9-argument `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()`). Config `access.members_read_lineage` (`lineage.ts`, local only) sets `CallerAccess.lineage` for any member read speaking for itself (`caller.ts`; never an audience of several or an unbound credential; `withCallerAccess` drops it for several identities and keeps the owner opt-in and audience members owner-only). Cache keys: `knobsHash` `xol=3` and `xak=`, `callerIdentityKey` `owner_reads`/`audience_kind`. Doctor `access_lineage` (`checks/access-lineage.ts`). Tests: `test/access-raw-only-rules.test.ts`, `test/access-audience-members.test.ts`, `test/access-members-read-lineage.test.ts` (both engines, both stores; fixture `test/helpers/access-lineage-fixture.ts`). GBRA-108 design 1 (the labelled-only migration, `schema-migrations/v*-access-labelled-only.ts`): `access_members.labelled_only` (`labelled-only.ts` `setMemberLabelledOnly`, local only, refused on the owner with `access_labelled_only_owner` from `owner.ts`, which `setOwner` also raises) sets `CallerAccess.labelledOnly` (`caller.ts`, `actor.ts`, `as-preview.ts`; fails closed to true when the table cannot be read). `private-visibility.ts` `labelledOnlySql` ANDs `page_readers && identity OR folder_rule_ids && satisfied` into `callerAccessSql`, `callerReadersAllowedSql` (a snapshot needs its own readers or a rule on the live page) and the fact filters (`labelledOnlyFactSql`: a fact on the caller's own member page while it names the member, or under member lineage a provenance page that passes; else FALSE); under member lineage a derived row may pass through `gbrain_access_origin_labelled_for()` (every origin labelled, none missing). Remote read gates that are not caller-aware use `remoteReadFloorSql` / `remoteProvenanceFloorSql` (the plain fragment, plus the labelled-only conjunct only for a labelled-only caller); `test/remote-read-floor.test.ts` lists the sites that keep the plain fragment. `labelledOnlyFor` never reports the configured owner, and dispatch refuses a scope read for a labelled-only person (`scope-read.ts` `scopeReadLabelledOnlyRefused`). The entity page of a fact is judged by the ordinary policy. Writes: `persistence/page-visibility.ts` (`writerReadPolicySql`, `remoteLabelsChecked` → `assertLabelledOnlyCreate` → `access_labelled_only_unnamed`), `cli/enforced-member.ts` `memberPageView`. Cache keys `xlo=1`, `labelled_only`; doctor `access_labelled_only_members` (`checks/access-labelled-only.ts`). Test: `test/access-labelled-only.test.ts` (both engines, both storesA derivative of a page that names readers is otherwise hidden from every remote caller (`originAllowedSql`, which calls the SQL function `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` only for atom, question, concept, event or `derived_from` rows, so each read plans one call instead of four subplans). Both parts lead with column tests (`page_readers IS NULL`, `type`) so row estimates follow column statistics; an expression test such as `->'readable_by' IS NULL` estimates almost no rows and sent restricted vector searches into nested-loop sequential scans. The index walk's page probe (`INDEX_WALK_PAGE_COLUMNS`) projects `page_readers`. Config `access.restrictions_present` (set by a trigger, sticky) keeps every pre-A1 path on a brain with no restriction. `check:remote-privacy-reads` keeps the two relaxations read only in `private-visibility.ts`. Tests: `test/member-read-access.test.ts` (remote matrix, both engines), `test/access-*.test.ts`. Folder rules (A2) keep whole folders of a source to named members. `folder-rules.ts` is the grammar (`.gbrain/access.yml`: `rules:` of `id`, `prefix`, `readable_by`), `classifyRulebook` (each change is narrowing or widening; the target installs only the narrowing part) and `matchingRuleIds`. `policy.ts` owns the one applied rulebook for both stores: `access_rules` (source-qualified ids), the append-only `access_policy_revisions` log, `access_pending_coverage` (prefixes that read as nobody while a narrowing restamps, or while a committed file is invalid) and `sources.config.access_store`, persisted at the first rule and changed only by `policy-migrate.ts` (journaled in `access_policy_migrations`). `proposeRevision` installs narrowing at once under a per-source row lock and holds widening for `applyApproved` (`plan_hash`, `preview_changed`); `restampSource` rewrites `pages.folder_rule_ids` in id windows, then clears pending coverage under the lock; re-proposing the same rulebook finishes an interrupted restamp. A trigger stamps `folder_rule_ids` from the SQL function `gbrain_access_folder_rules()` on insert and on slug or source change, never from git on the serve path. `policy-git.ts` is the git store (files committed through the commit door, applied by `syncAccessPolicyAt` from sync preflight and before and after every managed pass (`performManagedSync`: sync, drain, `sources refresh`, git conversion), read with `git show` at the synced commit (GST-2331: every read under `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV`, so a partial clone fetches nothing; a policy file the commit names that the clone lacks, or a history the replay cannot read, makes the source read as nobody until the objects are fetched: the problem names the exact `git cat-file -p` or `git log --first-parent -p` that fetches them, and the next sync applies the rules and clears the mark); a database with no revision yet replays each committed `access.yml` since the `access.approved` baseline, so a rebuild holds a removal a plain commit made); `policy-transfer.ts` carries the applied rulebook through `gbrain export` and installs it before any page in `gbrain import`; `policy-notice.ts` is the `access_policy_pending` degraded notice. In `private-visibility.ts`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` sits inside `accessAllowedSql` (`folder_rule_ids IS NULL OR folder_rule_ids <@ <satisfied ids>` plus coverage conjuncts), so no hatch, grant or `--as` relaxes it, and the unrestricted short form tests `folder_rule_ids IS NULL` next to `page_readers IS NULL` (v283 triggers set `access.restrictions_present` on the first rule or pending prefix); `caller.ts`'s `folderAccessFor` fails closed to whole-source coverage. CLI: `src/commands/access-rules.ts`; doctor: `src/commands/doctor/checks/folder-access.ts`. Tests: `test/access-folder-rules.test.ts` (database store, both engines), `test/access-folder-rules-git.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-transfer.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-doctor.test.ts`. Shared agents (B, GBRA-231): `audience.ts` parses the audience a harness asserts (`X-Gbrain-On-Behalf-Of` or request-level `_meta.on_behalf_of`, 1-50 principals, `guest` = the empty identity; the same key inside tool arguments is refused) and appends each assertion to `access-audience-YYYY-Www.jsonl`. Dispatch resolves it on every remote call through `caller.ts` (`resolveAudienceIdentities`: every entry must be in the credential's live `may_act_for`, then name an enabled member or existing group); the caller-access record then carries `audienceIdentities`, and `accessAllowedForAllSql` needs one readers conjunct per identity, folder rules the intersection of each entry's satisfied set (`folderAccessForAll`). Privacy relaxes only for a one-member audience. Writes carry the audience as `WriteAuthority.actingFor` (re-resolved at publication) and agent jobs as `grant.actingFor`. Every remote response carries `_meta.access` (`appliedAccessSummary`), which `whoami` returns as `access.applied`; doctor `access_may_act_for_wildcard` (`checks/shared-agent-access.ts`) warns on `*`. Tests: `test/access-on-behalf-of.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-on-behalf-of.test.ts`. Rooms (GST-2639): `room.ts` reads the shared chat an answer goes into (`readRoomDeclaration`: the `X-Gbrain-Room` header, request-level `_meta.room` and a `room` tool argument, which is stripped before the handler; the argument can only add people, a disagreement sets `conflict`; an empty or malformed channel is `invalid`, never a refusal) and `assessRoom` marks a copy of a covered op's result (`ROOM_COVERED_OPS`) plus hot memory with `room_access`: pages through `privatePagesFilterForCaller` under the room's caller-access record (`audienceCallerAccess`, the audience branch of `remoteCallerAccess`), facts through `factVisibilitySql` and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy`, with reasons `readers`, `folder_rule`, `labelled_only`, `private_label`, `derived`, `personal_source` (a page the room could otherwise read that sits in someone's personal source while the room holds anyone else: `hiddenPersonalSources`). It never throws, never narrows, reorders or fails the read (a failure, the 3 s deadline, more than 2,000 references or an uncovered op leave the body unchanged and mark items unknown), writes `_meta.room` and the notices `room_above_level`, `room_hints_unavailable`, `room_conflict`, and appends a count-only `room_marked` audit row. `resolveAudienceIdentities` takes `mayActFor: 'owner_room_assessment'` to skip `may_act_for` for the owner's room only. Dispatch ignores a room on a trusted local call. Test: `test/access-room.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less). Attested actor (C1, GST-359): `actor-model.ts` (dependency-free: `x-qm-actor`, `acting_user`, `EXTERNAL_ID_RE` = 1-256 visible ASCII, `attestRightFrom`: the right counts only for a member-less credential whose token is legacy or `client_credentials`, read from `oauth_tokens.grant_type`) and `actor.ts`. `resolveAttestedActor` runs in dispatch before any work: an invalid id refuses `actor_not_attested` (`invalid_actor_id`) before any lookup, then the right, the op list (`attest_ops`, default `get_write_request,memory_recall,memory_write`), `acting_user` = header (stripped), and `actorCoverage` (the one coverage test: live right plus a live link in `access_member_links` to an enabled member, compared exactly) or `actor_unlinked`. GST-1158: `scope-read.ts` holds `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` (no identity, actor or audience; privacy never relaxed) and `SCOPE_READ_OPS`; dispatch runs an attested call to one of those ops that names `source_id`/`source_ids` under that record (`attestedReadMode`, which refuses `__all__`/`all_sources`), or as the person when the right's `attest_read` (v298, `--attest-read`; over HTTP `attestRead` on `/admin/api/access/attest`) is `person`, and handlers read the mode with `currentReadMode`. GST-2407: `context_pack` is a scope read too: its `entity_refs` count as naming sources, `assertPackConfined` refuses before any read a scope call without `source_id`, with an `entity_refs` entry in another source or with `session_id`, and the handler reads the named source as home (core block, pull brief, hot facts). `attest_read = 'scope'` refuses a call that names no actor (`actor_required`). Tests: `test/qm-scope-read.test.ts` (both engines), `test/doctor-attest-read-shared-scope.test.ts`. GBRA-284: `member-sources.ts` binds a source to its member (`access_member_sources`, v299; `gbrain access member source add|remove|list`); `attestedReadScope`, called in dispatch for every attested call and in `minions/tools/brain-allowlist.ts` for an attested job's tool calls, replaces the call's read grant with the grant minus personal sources bound to another member (every personal source under a scope read), so every resolver refuses or skips them like out-of-grant sources and nothing is added. Test: `test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts` (both engines). `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS` (`capture`, `extract_facts`, take writes, `list_write_conflicts`, and since GST-2249 W1 every page write; `test/qm-attest-write-boundary.test.ts` classifies every attestable mutating operation) are never attestable: refused by `parseAttestOps`, `bindCredential`, every call and the stored re-check, which also re-checks `attest_ops` for a queued write's operation and each job tool call. Under the header serve-http lists only attested tools and refuses `resources/read`. `attestedCallerAccess` is a one-member audience with privacy never relaxed (no granted sources, no hatch), never B's `may_act_for` path. Writes store `WriteAuthority.actingFor = {system, external_id, member}` and jobs `grant.actor`; `storedActorIdentity` re-resolves both through `actorCoverage` and refuses when the member changed. `linkMember` / `unlinkMember` / `listMemberLinks` back `gbrain access member link|unlink|links`; `linkMemberByEmail` (GST-1158) finds the member by its declared email (`members.ts` `memberByEmail`: `access_members.email`, migration v301, case-folded, unique, cleared on removal; `not_found` when none, `email_ambiguous` when several) and then links exactly as `linkMember`, from the local CLI and the owner-session routes in `src/commands/serve-http-access.ts` only; `--attest-actor` / `--attest-ops` on `auth rescope` (`members.ts`) only for a member-less legacy token or confidential client-credentials client. Migration v286. Tests: `test/access-qm-actor.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-actor.test.ts`. Member facts (C2, GST-359): `member-facts.ts`. A remote `remember` from an attested actor or a lone-member credential (`callerMember`, never an audience of several) writes to `memory/members/<member>` (`memberFactPage`; `persistence/memory-prepare.ts` creates the page with `readable_by: [member:<id>]`), `visibility: private`, `infer_entity` off, the entity kept as `entity_slug`, unless the call passes `share: true` (GST-2243), which takes the ordinary world route to the subject's page; a member's explicit `visibility: "world"` is refused in `remember`'s validation (`member_share_required`), so a batch with one such item saves nothing. GST-2346 D1: the owner speaking for itself (`ownerSpeaksForItself`: `CallerAccess.owner`, no actor or audience, no subagent, no slug fence) takes the world route unless it passes `visibility: "private"` or the page or `facts.default_visibility` makes the default private (then its member page), is never refused `member_share_required`, and its `forget` of a fact off its member page takes the ordinary remote path when that path reads the fact. A fact off every member and scope page, on a page the owner reads under the GST-2490 rule with the opt-in off (`ownerReadPolicyFragment`) and may write as a member, a page whose readers name it included, with the fact's entity page judged the same way (`ownerReachesFact`, `forget-prepare.ts`), is withdrawn too: submission marks the request `owner_reach`, and preparation judges the owner again from the stored authority (`storedOwnerSpeaksForItself`, `page-visibility.ts`), so a writer that is no longer the owner gets `not_found`; a more trusted fact files the `forget_requires_owner` proposal. A member id whose page slug `slugifyPath` would change (`a--b`, `zed-`) is refused (`invalid_params`). The page must name that member alone (`memberPageIsOwn`, checked at submission and again in preparation, `memberPageNotOwned`), and remote writes under `memory/members/` go only to the caller's own page (`assertMemberPageWriter`, called from `ops/context.ts` `enforceClientSlugFence`, so every remote page write passes it; trusted local callers are unaffected). Reads widen a world-only fact list only by `memberFactAdmitSql` (a private fact on the caller's own live member page whose readers and folder rules admit the caller; `factVisibilitySql` in `engine-sql/facts.ts` and `search/fact-relevance.ts`), and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy` judges a member-page fact's source page as the caller (every other fact keeps the empty identity, so a fact from a page that names readers stays hidden from every remote caller). Writers never cross pages: `facts/single-prepare.ts` (`SingleFactIntent.page_slug`) and `trust/supersede-handlers.ts` dedup, supersede and contest only within the member page, and no other write matches a fact there (`onMemberPageSql`); a remote save there meets only the page's own withdrawals and those of a claim its member reads (`memberPageWithdrawal`), and the insert guards mark a member-page row only by its page's own withdrawals (`schema-migrations/*-member-page-withdrawal-scope.ts`), so a claim the member never read cannot refuse or expire its save; consolidation skips facts whose page names readers (`readersSourcedFactSql`). Per-person keys: `callerIdentityKey` joins the hot-memory cache key (`facts/meta-hook.ts`, `::xid=`), `callerSessionKey` the `delta` cursor (`ops/facts.ts`), `sameAttestedActor` gates receipts (`persistence/authority.ts` `ownRequestAccessible`) and replays (`persistence/journal.ts`) on the stored actor, else the stored audience, and `get_agent_job` and the owner-fenced `get_job`, `wait_job`, `get_job_progress`, `list_jobs` and `cancel_job` match the job's `grant.actor` (system, external id, member) and `grant.actingFor` (the same distinct audience entries; `jobActorSql` in `minions/types.ts`), so a job or receipt with an actor or audience reads as missing to the bare client and to other actors and audiences, and one with neither to every actor and audience. Tests: `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` (both engines), `test/access-member-sweep.test.ts` (every attestable op as Bob, the bare client and an unbound credential; `test/helpers/member-sweep.ts`), `test/e2e/serve-http-member-sweep.test.ts` (two members over a real `serve --http` on a keyless repo-less brain).
- `src/core/access/open-twins.ts` (GST-2603) — `openTwins(engine, pages, readers, cover)`: for the pages a label or rule preview changes, the live pages with the same slug in other sources that are not private by their own labels (`privateSnapshotFilterFragment`; no links are read) and that the empty identity or an enabled member outside `readers` passes by its own readers and folder rules (`readersAllowedSql`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` with `folderAccessFor`), since labels and rules apply per source. Read-only and bounded (`OPEN_TWINS_PAGES` 1000 pages checked, `OPEN_TWINS_LISTED` 50 named, `count` over all); never part of a preview hash. Callers: `repair/visibility.ts` (pages turning private, owner inside), `repair/readers.ts` (`--readers`), `repair/private-labels.ts` (`--class restore`) and `commands/access-rules.ts` `previewRules` (each narrowed rule's pages); `cover(source, slugs)` names the same repair or rule with `--source <other>`. Test: `test/label-repair-derived-stamps-gst2603.test.ts`.
- `src/core/access/federation-exposure.ts` (#8982) — `remotePagesFederationExposes(engine, source)`: the live pages of a source that name no readers and no folder rule, that the read paths' privacy rules (`privacyPartSql`) do not hide from a no-grant connection (#9068; skipped when `remotePrivacyRelaxed` says an operator opted out), and whose live revision (`pages.revision_principal_*`) or any version (`page_versions.write_principal_*`) a token or OAuth client wrote (revoked or deleted included; no record keeps a credential's member at write time, so an unbound, rebound or deleted one counts and each example names its member now; a tag change moves the revision attribution without a version, hiding the earlier author): count, the first five slugs, and shell-quoted `who-can-read` / `access rule add` commands. `remotePagesFederationExposesOrWarn` runs it, after the change commits, only for a change that added the source to the no-grant floor (federate reads the prior state under the source row lock), and turns a failed read into a stderr warning, so the caller's federation never changes. Read by `sources federate`, the unmanaged `sources restore` (stderr; `--json` as `pages_exposed`) and the managed `source_lifecycle` restore result. Pinned by `test/sources-federate-member-pages.test.ts` and `test/federation-exposure-private-9068.test.ts`.
- `src/core/access/serves.ts` + `src/commands/access-serves.ts` (GST-363 PR 1) — whether a brain serves several people (`brainServes`: config `access.serves` `one`|`several` wins, else `access.serves_derived`, which migration v309's trigger keeps as `several` while 2+ members are enabled; `since` is `access.serves_since`, set once) and `gbrain access serves [several --members a,b [--yes]]`: preview, then config, members (kept when present), one folder rule `people/<member>/` per member through `addFolderRules` (`access-rules.ts`, the `rule add` preview-then-write path; a git store commits `.gbrain/access.yml` through the commit door), and one read-write token `member-<id>` per member through `auth-mint.ts` (the `auth create` mint) written to `<configDir>/member-keys/<id>.key` (0600, dir 0700, refused inside a git work tree: `access_serves_key_dir_in_git`). Idempotent on the member id; a token whose file is gone is reported, never re-minted. `GBRAIN_SETUP_ABORT_AFTER=serves-members|serves-rules|serves-key` is the crash seam. Doctor: `checks/unlabeled-people-folders.ts` fails a `people/<x>/` folder with pages no rule covers on a several-person brain. Tests: `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts` (both engines).
diff --git a/docs/protocol/MCP_META_CHANNELS.md b/docs/protocol/MCP_META_CHANNELS.md
index 4b9781af90..407fdb57e0 100644
--- a/docs/protocol/MCP_META_CHANNELS.md
+++ b/docs/protocol/MCP_META_CHANNELS.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ shape for it.
| `degraded` | dispatch (`src/core/degraded-stamp.ts`), on every transport | `{reasons: [...]}`: present only when the result is partial or degraded; sorted, unique stable codes ([AGENT_OPERATOR_v1.md, Degraded stamp](AGENT_OPERATOR_v1.md#degraded-stamp)). Mirrored as the last content block, `[gbrain degraded: <codes>] …` |
| `retrieval` | `search`/`query` op handlers; `recall` and `find_experts` emit `{degraded[]}` when their page search degraded | `returned_count`, `retrieved_count`, `vector_enabled`, `expansion_applied`, `cache`, `token_budget`, `degraded[]` (closed stage vocabulary), `rerank_degraded` (on a call whose reranker failed: `{reason, fallback: "fused_order", calls_this_session}`; reason is `timeout`, `budget`, `rate_limited`, `unreachable`, `auth` or `provider_error`; no `fields: "full"` needed), `hint` (non-contractual prose), `rows` (`"lean"` or `"full"`: the row shape of content[0]; reported for remote callers and whenever `fields` is passed), `timings` (`{total_ms, stages_ms, other_ms, overlapped_ms?, parts_ms?}`, integer ms, every response; [search-explain.md](../guides/search-explain.md#see-where-the-time-went)) |
| `access` | dispatch (`appliedAccessSummary`, `src/core/access/caller.ts`), every remote response that reached the operation | The view the call was answered under: `member` and `groups` it read as (null and `[]` for an unbound caller or an audience of several entries), `audience` (the normalized `on_behalf_of` principals, or null), `policy_rev` (each source's applied folder-rule revision; null on a brain with no restriction), `relaxation` (`none`, `granted_sources`, `operator` or `owner`: what relaxed `visibility: private`; `owner` is a credential bound to the brain owner, see [access designations](../guides/access-designations.md)). `whoami` returns the same object as `access.applied`. An attested call adds `actor` (`{system}`); an unlinked `memory_recall` carries `code: "actor_unlinked"`, `member: null` and the id as sent. |
-| `room` | dispatch (`assessRoom`, `src/core/access/room.ts`), only on a call that declared a room | The shared chat the answer goes into, as read: `principals`, `declared_by` (`harness` or `argument`), `conflict` (present when the argument and the harness disagreed), `complete`, `counts` (`{items, readable, above, unknown}`), `by_reason`, `above` (references the room could not read) and `unavailable` (why no marks could be computed: `invalid`, `not_permitted`, `unknown_principal`, `unbound`, `mark_failed`, `deadline`, `op_not_covered`, `response_cap`). Each page and fact in the body, each hot-memory fact and each entry of `retrieval.saved_facts` carries `room_access` (`{readable: true}`, `{readable: false, reason}` with reason `readers`, `folder_rule`, `labelled_only`, `private_label` or `derived`, or `{readable: "unknown", reason}`). [Details](#room) |
+| `room` | dispatch (`assessRoom`, `src/core/access/room.ts`), only on a call that declared a room | The shared chat the answer goes into, as read: `principals`, `declared_by` (`harness` or `argument`), `conflict` (present when the argument and the harness disagreed), `complete`, `counts` (`{items, readable, above, unknown}`), `by_reason`, `above` (references the room could not read) and `unavailable` (why no marks could be computed: `invalid`, `not_permitted`, `unknown_principal`, `unbound`, `mark_failed`, `deadline`, `op_not_covered`, `response_cap`). Each page and fact in the body, each hot-memory fact and each entry of `retrieval.saved_facts` carries `room_access` (`{readable: true}`, `{readable: false, reason}` with reason `readers`, `folder_rule`, `labelled_only`, `private_label`, `derived` or `personal_source`, or `{readable: "unknown", reason}`). [Details](#room) |
| `warnings` | dispatch strict-params warn mode | `[{code: 'unknown_param', param, suggestion?}]`: a parameter a read ignored. This is the only place the warning appears; no content block or notice carries it, so a harness that stores tool output in its turns never stores it (writes refuse unknown parameters instead). |
| `pagination` | `list_pages` op handler | `truncated` (more rows match), `limit` (effective), `clamped_from?` (the caller's limit when capped), `next?` (params for the following page: `{sort, updated_after, updated_after_slug}` under `updated_asc`, else `{offset}`). The model-visible counterpart is the `listing_truncated` notice block (kind `info`, never deduped), whose `fix.mcp` is the next-page call. |