Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
Merge #9098 (GST-2314, v0.60.646.0) head 9ef1863c into GST-2243
garrytan79485cdcb02a
diff --cc CHANGELOG.mdindex cdaca23bec,4c16397716..1d495bd187--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@@ -10,25 -10,9 +10,25 @@@ credits are retained; no result has beeidentifiers and attribution are available in the pre-removal Git revision`6040075c6cb95be5881cc2e1b76ef7d71f4e5d29` (retained on 2026-09-23).+## [0.60.647.0] - 2026-11-10++**A team member's `remember` can now share a fact with the team, and every `remember` reply says where the fact went.** A member credential still saves privately by default, on its own page `memory/members/<member>`, so only that member recalls it. Passing `share: true` saves the fact on its subject's page instead, where everyone who reads the source recalls it, as every other caller's `remember` already does. The tool description tells agents to share facts about the team's work and keep facts about a person private. Before this, a member's `visibility: "world"` was quietly saved as private; it is now refused with `member_share_required` and nothing is saved, so no one believes they shared a fact the team cannot see. For the same reason, `share: true` onto a page whose facts are kept private (a page with readers named, or a brain whose fact default is private) is refused with `share_target_restricted`. A shared fact belongs to the team: only the brain host can withdraw it. Nothing already saved moves.++### Itemized changes++- `src/core/verbs.ts`: `remember` takes a `share` boolean on every MCP surface, starter included. A non-boolean `share`, `share: true` with `visibility: "private"`, and a member's `visibility: "world"` (`member_share_required`) are refused with `invalid_params` before anything is saved, so one such item refuses a whole batch.+- `src/core/persistence/memory-mutations.ts`: a member's `share: true` saves on the entity page with world visibility; when that page's facts would be private (whatever `visibility` the call passed), the save is refused (`share_target_restricted`), and preparation refuses it again if the page turned restricted after admission. In a batch, items saved before a refused item stay saved, as with other save-time refusals. New and replayed replies carry `page` and `visibility`.+- `src/core/facts/writeback-instructions.ts`, `writeback-config.ts`, `src/mcp/instructions.ts`, the HTTP serves, the stdio serve bound through `mcp.stdio_member` and `memory_conversation_mode`: with ambient writeback on, a member caller is told to omit `visibility` and to pass `share: true` only for facts about the team's work, instead of the brain-wide "pass visibility: world" line its saves would now be refused for. A credential that may name a member per call (`x-qm-actor` on `remember`, as QM's service does) is told both: the member rule on calls made for a member, `visibility: "world"` on the rest. The `member_share_required` refusal names the exact retry.+- `src/core/remember-batch.ts`: `share` is accepted per item and as a shared top-level key, and each item's receipt carries `page` and `visibility`.+- `test/mcp-schema-budget.test.ts`: the starter tool-list ceilings and the `remember` budget grow by what `share` costs (+144 characters, 200 headroom kept).+- QM's `memory_write` and its per-person contract (`docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v1.json`) are unchanged.+- `src/core/behavior-change-notice.ts`: one row for the changed `remember` behavior.+- Docs: `docs/tutorials/company-brain.md`, `docs/mcp/ADMIN.md`, `docs/TOOL_CATALOG.md` (regenerated).+- Tests: `test/remember-share-gst2243.test.ts` (a shared fact is recalled by another member and an unbound reader, an unshared one is not; all three refusals; replayed and non-member replies; batch `share`; `memory_write` still saves on the member page); `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` drops the `visibility: "world"` an attested member save no longer accepts.+## [0.60.646.0] - 2026-11-10- **A migration that adds a column under a running server no longer fails writes on direct Postgres.** On a direct Postgres connection the driver reuses each connection's prepared statements. When a migration adds a column to a table that a `SELECT *` reads, the next run of that statement inside a transaction fails with SQLSTATE 0A000, "cached plan must not change result type", once per pooled connection. Outside a transaction the driver quietly prepares it again; inside one, the transaction is already aborted and the error reaches the write. Two places lost writes this way. A legacy-token write whose authority reads `access_tokens` failed with `storage_error` and committed nothing; a retry worked. Worse, after a migration added a column to `persistence_requests`, an accepted write could end `failed`/`storage_error` at publication and was never retried, so a caller that left on `write_pending` lost it unless it polled the receipt; other submissions were refused at admission with `internal_error`. Four of the last 50 migrations (v254, v261, v292, v294) changed that table. Now the two `access_tokens` reads name their columns, so a new column leaves their result unchanged; the stale-plan error counts as a transient interruption of the write (cause `stale_plan`), so the request is claimed again after the usual backoff and stays bounded by `persistence.max_transient_retries`; and admission re-runs on it like a serialization failure. Only that message matches: every other 0A000 stays a refusal. A transaction-mode pooler (`prepare=false`) and PGLite were never affected. Writes that already failed this way stay failed; `gbrain doctor`'s terminal-failures check lists them, and each needs a resubmit with a new `request_id`.+ **A migration that adds a column under a running server no longer fails writes on direct Postgres.** On a direct Postgres connection the driver reuses each connection's prepared statements. When a migration adds a column to a table that a `SELECT *` reads, the next run of that statement inside a transaction fails with SQLSTATE 0A000, "cached plan must not change result type", once per pooled connection. Outside a transaction the driver quietly prepares it again; inside one, the transaction is already aborted and the error reaches the write. Two places lost writes this way. A legacy-token write whose authority reads `access_tokens` failed with `storage_error` and committed nothing; a retry worked. Worse, after a migration added a column to `persistence_requests`, an accepted write could end `failed`/`storage_error` at publication and was never retried, so a caller that left on `write_pending` lost it unless it polled the receipt; other submissions were refused at admission with `internal_error`. Four of the last 50 migrations (v254, v261, v292, v294) changed that table. Now the two `access_tokens` reads name their columns, so a new column leaves their result unchanged; the stale-plan error counts as a transient interruption of the write (cause `stale_plan`), so the request is claimed again after the usual backoff and stays bounded by `persistence.max_transient_retries`; and admission re-runs on it like a serialization failure. Only the stale-plan error matches (the server's plan-revalidation routine, in any locale, or that English message): every other 0A000 stays a refusal. Both reads also keep working on a schema behind the build (a brain whose migrations could not be applied): an accepted legacy-token write still replays, a new one is refused `migrations_pending`, and shared-skill membership still works. A transaction-mode pooler (`prepare=false`) and PGLite were never affected. Writes that already failed this way stay failed; `gbrain doctor`'s terminal-failures check lists them, and each needs a resubmit with a new `request_id`.### Itemized changes