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Point the file index at the six test files that replaced two slow ones (#9391)

Garry Tana34ebcb872ab
diff --git a/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md b/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
index 6a3f75e1cc..282b08a132 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/key-files/access.md
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ Current behavior and load-bearing invariants; history belongs in Git and CHANGEL
- `src/core/access/` (GBRA-218) — per-member read access inside one source. `principals.ts` normalizes frontmatter `readable_by` (bare id = `member:<id>`, `group:<g>`, ASCII case fold, space trim; anything malformed is `['!nobody']`); it is the row twin of the SQL `gbrain_access_readers()` (`test/access-principals.test.ts` holds them equal). A BEFORE trigger keeps `pages.page_readers` equal to that function (direct writes to the column are recomputed), and predicates test the array, never the function, which costs ~0.2 ms per row. A page that names readers with no derived value yet (written before the migration) reads as nobody until `gbrain repair access` (`repair/access.ts`). `members.ts` (members, groups, tombstoned ids never reused, bindings), `token-binding.ts` (the verifiers' join; a credential bound to a disabled, tombstoned or missing member is refused with `access_member_disabled`) and `caller.ts` (`remoteCallerAccess`: the identity dispatch puts on the caller-access record; stdio binds through `serve --stdio-member`, else `mcp.stdio_member`; publication re-resolves from the stored principal; a binding lookup that fails never reads as unbound: a statement error throws `access_identity_unavailable` (retryable, `fix.next: wait`), a transient failure (`transientDatabaseFailure`, `transientInterruption` in `persistence/transient-retry.ts`) or a non-statement failure is rethrown unchanged for the persistence consumer, and only a schema missing `access_members`, `access_group_members` or `member_id` reads as unbound). In `search/private-visibility.ts` every page fragment is `accessAllowedSql` AND the privacy part: plain fragments use the empty identity (over-hide, never leak), `*ForCaller` fragments the caller's, and `GBRAIN_REMOTE_PRIVATE_PAGES`, `search.remote_private_pages` and `granted_sources` relax only the privacy part (`privacyForCaller`). GST-2490: an owner read (`CallerAccess.lineage` with `owner`, read-only ops only) uses `lineageAccessSql`: the owner's readers and folder rules as for any member, with `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()` (v304; per origin `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`) in place of the every-caller lineage, so a derivative or fact passes when the owner reads every origin; `ownerReadsRestricted` (config `access.owner_reads_restricted`, `owner.ts` `setOwnerReadsRestricted`, local only) also passes pages kept to other members except another member's own member page and pending coverage. `access check`, `who-can-read`, `whoami` (`ownerReadsRestrictedNotice`) and doctor `access_owner_reads_restricted` report it; test `test/owner-reads-restricted.test.ts` (both engines, database and access.yml rules). GBRA-108 (migration v305, `v305-access-lineage-designs.ts`): `access_rules.covers_derived` (default true) — a raw-only rule (`folder-rules.ts` `covers_derived: false`, `rule add --raw-only`; digest unchanged for covering rules; true→false is the held widening `derived_released`, false→true the narrowing `derived_covered`) is dropped from an origin's rule set by the SQL function `gbrain_access_lineage_rules()` inside `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` and the 10-argument `gbrain_access_origin_closed_for()`, so it keeps its pages but not their lineage (a page's own readers still close it; fact provenance filters judge with `derived = true`). `access_members.kind` (`person` | `audience`, `members.ts` `setMemberKind`, local only): an owner read carries `CallerAccess.audienceKindMembers`, whose member pages pass the readers test and the member-page exemptions (`audiencePages`, `notOtherMemberPageSql`, the `p_audience_pages` argument of the 9-argument `gbrain_access_origin_hidden_for()`). Config `access.members_read_lineage` (`lineage.ts`, local only) sets `CallerAccess.lineage` for any member read speaking for itself (`caller.ts`; never an audience of several or an unbound credential; `withCallerAccess` drops it for several identities and keeps the owner opt-in and audience members owner-only). Cache keys: `knobsHash` `xol=3` and `xak=`, `callerIdentityKey` `owner_reads`/`audience_kind`. Doctor `access_lineage` (`checks/access-lineage.ts`). Tests: `test/access-raw-only-rules.test.ts`, `test/access-audience-members.test.ts`, `test/access-members-read-lineage.test.ts` (both engines, both stores; fixture `test/helpers/access-lineage-fixture.ts`). GBRA-108 design 1 (the labelled-only migration, `schema-migrations/v*-access-labelled-only.ts`): `access_members.labelled_only` (`labelled-only.ts` `setMemberLabelledOnly`, local only, refused on the owner with `access_labelled_only_owner` from `owner.ts`, which `setOwner` also raises) sets `CallerAccess.labelledOnly` (`caller.ts`, `actor.ts`, `as-preview.ts`; fails closed to true when the table cannot be read). `private-visibility.ts` `labelledOnlySql` ANDs `page_readers && identity OR folder_rule_ids && satisfied` into `callerAccessSql`, `callerReadersAllowedSql` (a snapshot needs its own readers or a rule on the live page) and the fact filters (`labelledOnlyFactSql`: a fact on the caller's own member page while it names the member, or under member lineage a provenance page that passes; else FALSE); under member lineage a derived row may pass through `gbrain_access_origin_labelled_for()` (every origin labelled, none missing). Remote read gates that are not caller-aware use `remoteReadFloorSql` / `remoteProvenanceFloorSql` (the plain fragment, plus the labelled-only conjunct only for a labelled-only caller); `test/remote-read-floor.test.ts` lists the sites that keep the plain fragment. `labelledOnlyFor` never reports the configured owner, and dispatch refuses a scope read for a labelled-only person (`scope-read.ts` `scopeReadLabelledOnlyRefused`). The entity page of a fact is judged by the ordinary policy. Writes: `persistence/page-visibility.ts` (`writerReadPolicySql`, `remoteLabelsChecked` → `assertLabelledOnlyCreate` → `access_labelled_only_unnamed`), `cli/enforced-member.ts` `memberPageView`. Cache keys `xlo=1`, `labelled_only`; doctor `access_labelled_only_members` (`checks/access-labelled-only.ts`). Test: `test/access-labelled-only.test.ts` (both engines, both storesA derivative of a page that names readers is otherwise hidden from every remote caller (`originAllowedSql`, which calls the SQL function `gbrain_access_origin_restricted()` only for atom, question, concept, event or `derived_from` rows, so each read plans one call instead of four subplans). Both parts lead with column tests (`page_readers IS NULL`, `type`) so row estimates follow column statistics; an expression test such as `->'readable_by' IS NULL` estimates almost no rows and sent restricted vector searches into nested-loop sequential scans. The index walk's page probe (`INDEX_WALK_PAGE_COLUMNS`) projects `page_readers`. Config `access.restrictions_present` (set by a trigger, sticky) keeps every pre-A1 path on a brain with no restriction. `check:remote-privacy-reads` keeps the two relaxations read only in `private-visibility.ts`. Tests: `test/member-read-access.test.ts` (remote matrix, both engines), `test/access-*.test.ts`. Folder rules (A2) keep whole folders of a source to named members. `folder-rules.ts` is the grammar (`.gbrain/access.yml`: `rules:` of `id`, `prefix`, `readable_by`), `classifyRulebook` (each change is narrowing or widening; the target installs only the narrowing part) and `matchingRuleIds`. `policy.ts` owns the one applied rulebook for both stores: `access_rules` (source-qualified ids), the append-only `access_policy_revisions` log, `access_pending_coverage` (prefixes that read as nobody while a narrowing restamps, or while a committed file is invalid) and `sources.config.access_store`, persisted at the first rule and changed only by `policy-migrate.ts` (journaled in `access_policy_migrations`). `proposeRevision` installs narrowing at once under a per-source row lock and holds widening for `applyApproved` (`plan_hash`, `preview_changed`); `restampSource` rewrites `pages.folder_rule_ids` in id windows, then clears pending coverage under the lock; re-proposing the same rulebook finishes an interrupted restamp. A trigger stamps `folder_rule_ids` from the SQL function `gbrain_access_folder_rules()` on insert and on slug or source change, never from git on the serve path. `policy-git.ts` is the git store (files committed through the commit door, applied by `syncAccessPolicyAt` from sync preflight and before and after every managed pass (`performManagedSync`: sync, drain, `sources refresh`, git conversion), read with `git show` at the synced commit (GST-2331: every read under `HARDENED_GIT_ARGS` and `NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENV`, so a partial clone fetches nothing; a policy file the commit names that the clone lacks, or a history the replay cannot read, makes the source read as nobody until the objects are fetched: the problem names the exact `git cat-file -p` or `git log --first-parent -p` that fetches them, and the next sync applies the rules and clears the mark); a database with no revision yet replays each committed `access.yml` since the `access.approved` baseline, so a rebuild holds a removal a plain commit made); `policy-transfer.ts` carries the applied rulebook through `gbrain export` and installs it before any page in `gbrain import`; `policy-notice.ts` is the `access_policy_pending` degraded notice. In `private-visibility.ts`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` sits inside `accessAllowedSql` (`folder_rule_ids IS NULL OR folder_rule_ids <@ <satisfied ids>` plus coverage conjuncts), so no hatch, grant or `--as` relaxes it, and the unrestricted short form tests `folder_rule_ids IS NULL` next to `page_readers IS NULL` (v283 triggers set `access.restrictions_present` on the first rule or pending prefix); `caller.ts`'s `folderAccessFor` fails closed to whole-source coverage. CLI: `src/commands/access-rules.ts`; doctor: `src/commands/doctor/checks/folder-access.ts`. Tests: `test/access-folder-rules.test.ts` (database store, both engines), `test/access-folder-rules-git.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-transfer.test.ts`, `test/access-folder-doctor.test.ts`. Shared agents (B, GBRA-231): `audience.ts` parses the audience a harness asserts (`X-Gbrain-On-Behalf-Of` or request-level `_meta.on_behalf_of`, 1-50 principals, `guest` = the empty identity; the same key inside tool arguments is refused) and appends each assertion to `access-audience-YYYY-Www.jsonl`. Dispatch resolves it on every remote call through `caller.ts` (`resolveAudienceIdentities`: every entry must be in the credential's live `may_act_for`, then name an enabled member or existing group); the caller-access record then carries `audienceIdentities`, and `accessAllowedForAllSql` needs one readers conjunct per identity, folder rules the intersection of each entry's satisfied set (`folderAccessForAll`). Privacy relaxes only for a one-member audience. Writes carry the audience as `WriteAuthority.actingFor` (re-resolved at publication) and agent jobs as `grant.actingFor`. Every remote response carries `_meta.access` (`appliedAccessSummary`), which `whoami` returns as `access.applied`; doctor `access_may_act_for_wildcard` (`checks/shared-agent-access.ts`) warns on `*`. Tests: `test/access-on-behalf-of.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-on-behalf-of.test.ts`. Rooms (GST-2639): `room.ts` reads the shared chat an answer goes into (`readRoomDeclaration`: the `X-Gbrain-Room` header, request-level `_meta.room` and a `room` tool argument, which is stripped before the handler; the argument can only add people, a disagreement sets `conflict`; an empty or malformed channel is `invalid`, never a refusal) and `assessRoom` marks a copy of a covered op's result (`ROOM_COVERED_OPS`) plus hot memory with `room_access`: pages through `privatePagesFilterForCaller` under the room's caller-access record (`audienceCallerAccess`, the audience branch of `remoteCallerAccess`), facts through `factVisibilitySql` and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy`, with reasons `readers`, `folder_rule`, `labelled_only`, `private_label`, `derived`, `personal_source` (a page the room could otherwise read that sits in someone's personal source while the room holds anyone else: `hiddenPersonalSources`). It never throws, never narrows, reorders or fails the read (a failure, the 3 s deadline, more than 2,000 references or an uncovered op leave the body unchanged and mark items unknown), writes `_meta.room` and the notices `room_above_level`, `room_hints_unavailable`, `room_conflict`, and appends a count-only `room_marked` audit row. `resolveAudienceIdentities` takes `mayActFor: 'owner_room_assessment'` to skip `may_act_for` for the owner's room only. Dispatch ignores a room on a trusted local call. Test: `test/access-room.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less). Attested actor (C1, GST-359): `actor-model.ts` (dependency-free: `x-qm-actor`, `acting_user`, `EXTERNAL_ID_RE` = 1-256 visible ASCII, `attestRightFrom`: the right counts only for a member-less credential whose token is legacy or `client_credentials`, read from `oauth_tokens.grant_type`) and `actor.ts`. `resolveAttestedActor` runs in dispatch before any work: an invalid id refuses `actor_not_attested` (`invalid_actor_id`) before any lookup, then the right, the op list (`attest_ops`, default `get_write_request,memory_recall,memory_write`), `acting_user` = header (stripped), and `actorCoverage` (the one coverage test: live right plus a live link in `access_member_links` to an enabled member, compared exactly) or `actor_unlinked`. GST-1158: `scope-read.ts` holds `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` (no identity, actor or audience; privacy never relaxed) and `SCOPE_READ_OPS`; dispatch runs an attested call to one of those ops that names `source_id`/`source_ids` under that record (`attestedReadMode`, which refuses `__all__`/`all_sources`), or as the person when the right's `attest_read` (v298, `--attest-read`; over HTTP `attestRead` on `/admin/api/access/attest`) is `person`, and handlers read the mode with `currentReadMode`. GST-2407: `context_pack` is a scope read too: its `entity_refs` count as naming sources, `assertPackConfined` refuses before any read a scope call without `source_id`, with an `entity_refs` entry in another source or with `session_id`, and the handler reads the named source as home (core block, pull brief, hot facts). `attest_read = 'scope'` refuses a call that names no actor (`actor_required`). Tests: `test/qm-scope-read.test.ts` (both engines), `test/doctor-attest-read-shared-scope.test.ts`. GBRA-284: `member-sources.ts` binds a source to its member (`access_member_sources`, v299; `gbrain access member source add|remove|list`); `attestedReadScope`, called in dispatch for every attested call and in `minions/tools/brain-allowlist.ts` for an attested job's tool calls, replaces the call's read grant with the grant minus personal sources bound to another member (every personal source under a scope read), so every resolver refuses or skips them like out-of-grant sources and nothing is added. Test: `test/qm-personal-sources.test.ts` (both engines). `ACTOR_DEFERRED_OPS` (`capture`, `extract_facts`, take writes, `list_write_conflicts`, and since GST-2249 W1 every page write; `test/qm-attest-write-boundary.test.ts` classifies every attestable mutating operation) are never attestable: refused by `parseAttestOps`, `bindCredential`, every call and the stored re-check, which also re-checks `attest_ops` for a queued write's operation and each job tool call. Under the header serve-http lists only attested tools and refuses `resources/read`. `attestedCallerAccess` is a one-member audience with privacy never relaxed (no granted sources, no hatch), never B's `may_act_for` path. Writes store `WriteAuthority.actingFor = {system, external_id, member}` and jobs `grant.actor`; `storedActorIdentity` re-resolves both through `actorCoverage` and refuses when the member changed. `linkMember` / `unlinkMember` / `listMemberLinks` back `gbrain access member link|unlink|links`; `linkMemberByEmail` (GST-1158) finds the member by its declared email (`members.ts` `memberByEmail`: `access_members.email`, migration v301, case-folded, unique, cleared on removal; `not_found` when none, `email_ambiguous` when several) and then links exactly as `linkMember`, from the local CLI and the owner-session routes in `src/commands/serve-http-access.ts` only; `--attest-actor` / `--attest-ops` on `auth rescope` (`members.ts`) only for a member-less legacy token or confidential client-credentials client. Migration v286. Tests: `test/access-qm-actor.test.ts` (both engines), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-actor.test.ts`. Member facts (C2, GST-359): `member-facts.ts`. A remote `remember` from an attested actor or a lone-member credential (`callerMember`, never an audience of several) writes to `memory/members/<member>` (`memberFactPage`; `persistence/memory-prepare.ts` creates the page with `readable_by: [member:<id>]`), `visibility: private`, `infer_entity` off, the entity kept as `entity_slug`, unless the call passes `share: true` (GST-2243), which takes the ordinary world route to the subject's page; a member's explicit `visibility: "world"` is refused in `remember`'s validation (`member_share_required`), so a batch with one such item saves nothing. GST-2346 D1: the owner speaking for itself (`ownerSpeaksForItself`: `CallerAccess.owner`, no actor or audience, no subagent, no slug fence) takes the world route unless it passes `visibility: "private"` or the page or `facts.default_visibility` makes the default private (then its member page), is never refused `member_share_required`, and its `forget` of a fact off its member page takes the ordinary remote path when that path reads the fact. A fact off every member and scope page, on a page the owner reads under the GST-2490 rule with the opt-in off (`ownerReadPolicyFragment`) and may write as a member, a page whose readers name it included, with the fact's entity page judged the same way (`ownerReachesFact`, `forget-prepare.ts`), is withdrawn too: submission marks the request `owner_reach`, and preparation judges the owner again from the stored authority (`storedOwnerSpeaksForItself`, `page-visibility.ts`), so a writer that is no longer the owner gets `not_found`; a more trusted fact files the `forget_requires_owner` proposal. A member id whose page slug `slugifyPath` would change (`a--b`, `zed-`) is refused (`invalid_params`). The page must name that member alone (`memberPageIsOwn`, checked at submission and again in preparation, `memberPageNotOwned`), and remote writes under `memory/members/` go only to the caller's own page (`assertMemberPageWriter`, called from `ops/context.ts` `enforceClientSlugFence`, so every remote page write passes it; trusted local callers are unaffected). Reads widen a world-only fact list only by `memberFactAdmitSql` (a private fact on the caller's own live member page whose readers and folder rules admit the caller; `factVisibilitySql` in `engine-sql/facts.ts` and `search/fact-relevance.ts`), and `privateProvenanceFilterUnderPolicy` judges a member-page fact's source page as the caller (every other fact keeps the empty identity, so a fact from a page that names readers stays hidden from every remote caller). Writers never cross pages: `facts/single-prepare.ts` (`SingleFactIntent.page_slug`) and `trust/supersede-handlers.ts` dedup, supersede and contest only within the member page, and no other write matches a fact there (`onMemberPageSql`); a remote save there meets only the page's own withdrawals and those of a claim its member reads (`memberPageWithdrawal`), and the insert guards mark a member-page row only by its page's own withdrawals (`schema-migrations/*-member-page-withdrawal-scope.ts`), so a claim the member never read cannot refuse or expire its save; consolidation skips facts whose page names readers (`readersSourcedFactSql`). Per-person keys: `callerIdentityKey` joins the hot-memory cache key (`facts/meta-hook.ts`, `::xid=`), `callerSessionKey` the `delta` cursor (`ops/facts.ts`), `sameAttestedActor` gates receipts (`persistence/authority.ts` `ownRequestAccessible`) and replays (`persistence/journal.ts`) on the stored actor, else the stored audience, and `get_agent_job` and the owner-fenced `get_job`, `wait_job`, `get_job_progress`, `list_jobs` and `cancel_job` match the job's `grant.actor` (system, external id, member) and `grant.actingFor` (the same distinct audience entries; `jobActorSql` in `minions/types.ts`), so a job or receipt with an actor or audience reads as missing to the bare client and to other actors and audiences, and one with neither to every actor and audience. Tests: `test/access-member-facts.test.ts` (both engines), `test/access-member-sweep.test.ts` (every attestable op as Bob, the bare client and an unbound credential; `test/helpers/member-sweep.ts`), `test/e2e/serve-http-member-sweep.test.ts` (two members over a real `serve --http` on a keyless repo-less brain).
- `src/core/access/open-twins.ts` (GST-2603) — `openTwins(engine, pages, readers, cover)`: for the pages a label or rule preview changes, the live pages with the same slug in other sources that are not private by their own labels (`privateSnapshotFilterFragment`; no links are read) and that the empty identity or an enabled member outside `readers` passes by its own readers and folder rules (`readersAllowedSql`, `folderRulesAllowedSql` with `folderAccessFor`), since labels and rules apply per source. Read-only and bounded (`OPEN_TWINS_PAGES` 1000 pages checked, `OPEN_TWINS_LISTED` 50 named, `count` over all); never part of a preview hash. Callers: `repair/visibility.ts` (pages turning private, owner inside), `repair/readers.ts` (`--readers`), `repair/private-labels.ts` (`--class restore`) and `commands/access-rules.ts` `previewRules` (each narrowed rule's pages); `cover(source, slugs)` names the same repair or rule with `--source <other>`. Test: `test/label-repair-derived-stamps-gst2603.test.ts`.
- `src/core/access/federation-exposure.ts` (#8982) — `remotePagesFederationExposes(engine, source)`: the live pages of a source that name no readers and no folder rule, that the read paths' privacy rules (`privacyPartSql`) do not hide from a no-grant connection (#9068; skipped when `remotePrivacyRelaxed` says an operator opted out), and whose live revision (`pages.revision_principal_*`) or any version (`page_versions.write_principal_*`) a token or OAuth client wrote (revoked or deleted included; no record keeps a credential's member at write time, so an unbound, rebound or deleted one counts and each example names its member now; a tag change moves the revision attribution without a version, hiding the earlier author): count, the first five slugs, and shell-quoted `who-can-read` / `access rule add` commands. `remotePagesFederationExposesOrWarn` runs it, after the change commits, only for a change that added the source to the no-grant floor (federate reads the prior state under the source row lock), and turns a failed read into a stderr warning, so the caller's federation never changes. Read by `sources federate`, the unmanaged `sources restore` (stderr; `--json` as `pages_exposed`) and the managed `source_lifecycle` restore result. Pinned by `test/sources-federate-member-pages.test.ts` and `test/federation-exposure-private-9068.test.ts`.
-- `src/core/access/serves.ts` + `src/commands/access-serves.ts` (GST-363 PR 1) — whether a brain serves several people (`brainServes`: config `access.serves` `one`|`several` wins, else `access.serves_derived`, which migration v309's trigger keeps as `several` while 2+ members are enabled; `since` is `access.serves_since`, set once) and `gbrain access serves [several --members a,b [--yes]]`: preview, then config, members (kept when present), one folder rule `people/<member>/` per member through `addFolderRules` (`access-rules.ts`, the `rule add` preview-then-write path; a git store commits `.gbrain/access.yml` through the commit door), and one read-write token `member-<id>` per member through `auth-mint.ts` (the `auth create` mint) written to `<configDir>/member-keys/<id>.key` (0600, dir 0700, refused inside a git work tree: `access_serves_key_dir_in_git`). Idempotent on the member id; a token whose file is gone is reported, never re-minted. `GBRAIN_SETUP_ABORT_AFTER=serves-members|serves-rules|serves-key` is the crash seam. Doctor: `checks/unlabeled-people-folders.ts` fails a `people/<x>/` folder with pages no rule covers on a several-person brain. Tests: `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts` (both engines). GST-2670: `src/core/access/open-pages.ts` counts the pages every member's key reads (`openPages`: `accessAllowedSql` with the empty identity under `withoutCallerAccess`, so it never depends on the caller; private pages split out unless `remotePrivacyRelaxed` or a reading member's `private_pages` grant opens their source; throws `open_pages_unknown` when `gbrain_access_state_unreadable()`; Postgres runs it read-only under `SET LOCAL statement_timeout`), over the sources the bound tokens, OAuth clients and config `mcp.stdio_member` binding of enabled, non-labelled-only members other than the owner read (`credentialReadSources`, `stdioReadSources`), or every source when none reads one (doctor then reports information); `SENSITIVE_PAGE_TYPES` (`grants/shared-exposure.ts`) is the DM, chat, conversation and mail tier. `readOpenPages` never throws; `ServesReceipt.open_pages` / `open_pages_error` carry it in the preview and receipt (planned members counted against the source their keys will read, this run's `people/<member>/` rules excluded), `gbrain access serves` prints it, `--labelled-only` calls `setMemberLabelledOnly` after the members step (the owner in the roster is BLOCKED), doctor `checks/open-shared-pages.ts` warns on sensitive pages, and `printOpenPagesUpgradeNotice` runs in post-upgrade. Callers gate on `brainServes`, so a one-person brain runs no query. Test: `test/open-shared-pages.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less).
+- `src/core/access/serves.ts` + `src/commands/access-serves.ts` (GST-363 PR 1) — whether a brain serves several people (`brainServes`: config `access.serves` `one`|`several` wins, else `access.serves_derived`, which migration v309's trigger keeps as `several` while 2+ members are enabled; `since` is `access.serves_since`, set once) and `gbrain access serves [several --members a,b [--yes]]`: preview, then config, members (kept when present), one folder rule `people/<member>/` per member through `addFolderRules` (`access-rules.ts`, the `rule add` preview-then-write path; a git store commits `.gbrain/access.yml` through the commit door), and one read-write token `member-<id>` per member through `auth-mint.ts` (the `auth create` mint) written to `<configDir>/member-keys/<id>.key` (0600, dir 0700, refused inside a git work tree: `access_serves_key_dir_in_git`). Idempotent on the member id; a token whose file is gone is reported, never re-minted. `GBRAIN_SETUP_ABORT_AFTER=serves-members|serves-rules|serves-key` is the crash seam. Doctor: `checks/unlabeled-people-folders.ts` fails a `people/<x>/` folder with pages no rule covers on a several-person brain. Tests: `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts` (both engines), `test/setup-serves-stdio-member.test.ts` and `test/setup-serves-upgrade.test.ts` (PGLite), shared setup in `test/helpers/setup-serves-box.ts`. GST-2670: `src/core/access/open-pages.ts` counts the pages every member's key reads (`openPages`: `accessAllowedSql` with the empty identity under `withoutCallerAccess`, so it never depends on the caller; private pages split out unless `remotePrivacyRelaxed` or a reading member's `private_pages` grant opens their source; throws `open_pages_unknown` when `gbrain_access_state_unreadable()`; Postgres runs it read-only under `SET LOCAL statement_timeout`), over the sources the bound tokens, OAuth clients and config `mcp.stdio_member` binding of enabled, non-labelled-only members other than the owner read (`credentialReadSources`, `stdioReadSources`), or every source when none reads one (doctor then reports information); `SENSITIVE_PAGE_TYPES` (`grants/shared-exposure.ts`) is the DM, chat, conversation and mail tier. `readOpenPages` never throws; `ServesReceipt.open_pages` / `open_pages_error` carry it in the preview and receipt (planned members counted against the source their keys will read, this run's `people/<member>/` rules excluded), `gbrain access serves` prints it, `--labelled-only` calls `setMemberLabelledOnly` after the members step (the owner in the roster is BLOCKED), doctor `checks/open-shared-pages.ts` warns on sensitive pages, and `printOpenPagesUpgradeNotice` runs in post-upgrade. Callers gate on `brainServes`, so a one-person brain runs no query. Test: `test/open-shared-pages.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less).
- `src/commands/repair-propose.ts` (GST-2670 phase 2) — `gbrain repair visibility --propose [--source <id>] [--out <dir>]`, preview only: gated on `brainServes` (a one-person or pinned-one brain gets "nothing to propose" before any pages query), it reads the open pages through `open-pages.ts` `withOpenScope` / `openPageSql` / `membersReadOpen` (the same predicates as the count), takes each page's `participants`, `attendees`, `to`, `from`, `cc` entries (`Name <a@b>` read as the address), matches each to an enabled member's declared email through `assertMemberEmail` (exact, case-folded; anything else is `unmatched`), groups pages by source and reader set with the owner (`ownerView`) first, writes one slugs file per set (0600, split at `READERS_MAX_PAGES`) under `<configDir>/visibility-proposals/` or `--out` (refused inside a git work tree with `gitRootAbove` from `access-serves.ts`: `repair_propose_dir_in_git`), and prints the `repair visibility --slugs-file --readers` command per set and the `access rule add --prefix` command per folder of `SENSITIVE_PAGE_TYPES` pages with no address list. Writes no label, rule, config or page. `src/commands/repair.ts` parses `--propose`/`--out` (only `--source`, `--out`, `--json` beside it) and dispatches before the kind run. Test: `test/repair-visibility-propose-gst2670.test.ts` (both engines, repo-less).
- `gbrain serve --stdio-member <id>` (GST-363 PR 3) — `parseStdioMemberFlag`, `registeredStdioMember` and `withStdioMember` live in `src/core/stdio-member-flag.ts` (kept out of `mcp-registration.ts` so serve and doctor pick up no registration flags); serve passes the value to `startMcpServer`, dispatch sets `OperationContext.stdioMember` only for an unauthenticated stdio call, and `caller.ts` resolves it live ahead of config `mcp.stdio_member` (a disabled or unknown member reads as nobody, no fallback). Stored writes stamp it on `WriteAuthority.stdioMember` (jsonb, no migration); a stdio watch uses principal id `registration` so the wake drain re-checks that member. Setup writes it into one claude-code or codex entry (`ClaudeSetupPlan`/`CodexSetupPlan.stdioMember`); inspection reports an owned entry's member so setup re-runs and `refreshHookLaunchers` carry it, and `setupRerunArgv` never names it.
- `src/core/access/requester-scope.ts` + `src/commands/doctor/checks/unscoped-shared-reads.ts` (GST-363 PR 2) — on a brain that serves several people (`servesPolicyFrom` in `search/private-visibility.ts`, read from the request config snapshot: explicit `access.serves` wins, else `access.serves_derived`; a brain pinned `one` never gates) a remote read from a connection bound to no member (no member identity, no audience, not attested, no `reads_unscoped`) is refused `requester_scope_required` before any work. Deny by default: every op not `mutating: true`, and every read-scope one (`think`), except `REQUESTER_SCOPE_EXEMPT` and `OWN_JOB_OPS` for a non-admin credential; `test/requester-scope.test.ts` pins the list and spies every handler. `requesterScopeGate` runs in `dispatchToolCall` after access resolves (attested calls exempt; an unreachable op keeps the unknown-tool envelope) and in `brain-allowlist.ts` `scopedJobAccess` per job tool call; a bound caller's access is never changed. `readsUnscoped`/`createdAt` come from the verifiers (`token-binding.ts` `credentialScopeFields`), else `credentialScopeFor`. Grace: 14 days from `access.serves_since` (migration v309's trigger sets it once) for connections created at or before it (unknown creation and stdio count as old), with `_meta.access.requester_scope`; `access.requester_scope_enforce false` (hosted) gives the notice only. An unreadable policy (`servesUnknown`) is read once more (`withServesReread`); a second failure refuses `requester_scope_unknown` (retryable). `assertCredentialScoped` refuses unbound `auth create`/`register-client` and `POST /admin/api/api-keys` (`credential_scope_required`); `--reads-unscoped [none]` changes go to the `access-reads-unscoped` audit file. `unscopedConnections` feeds doctor `unscoped_shared_reads`, `whoami` (`requesterScopeView`) and post-upgrade.
- `src/core/access/stdio-bind-route.ts` + `src/commands/doctor/checks/shared-stdio-binding.ts` (GST-363 PR 2) — `stdioBindRoute()` is the one place that says how to bind an unbound stdio connection: `gbrain setup claude-code|codex --stdio-member <id>` for a harness one person uses (that harness entry, either engine), else a per-person `serve --http` key. The requester-scope refusal and notice, `gbrain access owner`'s Bind-one line and whoami's unbound note read it. Doctor `shared_stdio_binding` fails when `mcp.stdio_member` is set and `sharedStdioHarness()` (`setup-serves.ts`; a `hermes` on PATH counts only as a script, not React Native's compiled engine) finds OpenClaw or Hermes on a brain that serves several people (not applicable on a one-person brain); fix `gbrain config unset mcp.stdio_member`. `requesterScopeRefuses()` lets dispatch drop hot memory from the ops the gate does not cover for a connection it would refuse. Tests: `test/shared-stdio-binding.test.ts`.
- `src/core/ops/qm-memory.ts` (GST-359 D) — QM's memory provider pair. `memory_recall` reads the attested person's own last-24-hour facts on their member page (`listFactsSince` with `sourceMarkdownSlug`), then `rankFactsByQuestion` over the facts they may read, renders one plain line per fact (`plainFactText` strips fence and heading markers) and cuts at a line within `max_chars` (`boundFactLines`). A call that names `source_id` or `source_ids` (full surface only) reads as that scope instead: `recallSources` resolves them through `requestSourceScope` (a source outside the credential's grant is `permission_denied`), `SCOPE_READ_ACCESS` empties identity, actor and audience, so no own facts and no member-page fact are read, restricted pages stay hidden and privacy is never relaxed; the query is ranked on its first 2,000 characters (`MEMORY_RECALL_QUERY_CHARS`). `memory_write` validates 1-20 facts, derives each request id from uuidv5(member, idempotency_key) (`memoryWriteRequestId`) and saves through `remember`'s handler with `ctx.attestedOp = 'memory_write'`, which the stored write authority keeps (`WriteAuthority.attestedOp`) so publication and receipt reads re-check that operation's attest right. `qmMemoryToolResult` (dispatch) moves the result into `structuredContent` and leaves the model text in `content`; GST-1158 F2 does the same for an attested call to a contract v3 personal tool (`QM_PERSONAL_OPS`), keeping its JSON in `content` (a list as `structuredContent.results`; context_pack's text alone, like memory_recall), and dispatch measures that frame against the result cap again; each memory_recall fact carries `arm` (`own` or `ranked`, F5) and `own_page` (GST-2407: `member-facts.ts` `ownMemberFactIds`, the one set forget_fact's ownership gate also reads); `unlinkedRecallResult` is the empty success dispatch's `actorRefusal` returns for an unlinked person. Contract fixture: `scripts/build-qm-memory-contract.ts` writes `docs/contracts/qm-memory-provider/v1.json` (frozen, byte-identical) and `v2.json` (the scope read and write; `regen:all` artifacts; `v3.json` adds the personal tools with frozen result shapes; `v4.json` adds memory_propose, each personal tool's `scope_read` marking and `own_page`; `v5.json` marks context_pack `scope_read`, v4's markings frozen as `V4_SCOPE_READ_OPS`). Scope writes (GST-1113): `memory_write {source_id}` saves on `memory/scope` in a scope source listed in the credential's `attest_sources` (migration v293, on `access_tokens` and `oauth_clients`); `access/attest-sources.ts` holds `perCallWriteSource` (the one exemption from the one-write-source checks in `page-mutations.ts`, `memory-mutations.ts` and `persistence/authority.ts`, keyed to that slug and re-checked at publication through `actorCoverage(..., source)`), the sticky mark `sources.config.qm_scope` (set by `applyAttestSources` under row locks; `isSourceFederated` ignores federation on it), `assertScopeSourceGrant` (in `insertClientGrant`, `persistGrant`, `writeTokenGrant` and `insertUnifiedToken`) and `withoutScopeSources` (a person recall never reads a scope source). `member-facts.ts` `assertScopePageWriter` keeps other remote writers off `memory/scope`. Tests: `test/qm-scope-writes.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-memory-tools.test.ts` (both engines), `test/qm-personal-tools.test.ts` (v3 tools over dispatch, both engines), `test/qm-memory-contract.test.ts` (drift), `test/e2e/serve-http-qm-memory.test.ts` (keyless `serve --http`).
-- `src/cli/enforced-member.ts` + `src/cli/enforced-member-classes.ts` + `src/cli/enforced-commit-push.ts`: enforced member mode ([guide](../../guides/enforced-member.md)). With `GBRAIN_ENFORCED_MEMBER` set, `enforcedGate` in `src/cli/main.ts` classifies the command before any dispatch (`enforcedClassOf`: read, write, allowed, silent or refused; anything unclassified is refused, exit 3, `enforced_member_refused`). An empty value, an unknown member or the owner id refuses everything. The gate classifies before help: a refused command refuses with `--help` too, and an allowed one prints only its static help. `checkEnforcedOpArgs` first refuses every write operation except `get_write_request` with reason `writes_off` (`refuseWritesOff`) when the brain's config `access.enforced_member_writes` (database only, read by `enforcedWritesMode`: `checked` or unset, `refuse_pages`, else `refuse`, also on a failed read) is not `checked`, before any member, page or source lookup, and `checkEnforcedCommitPush` refuses a named-path commit the same way under `refuse` before any path lookup; then it refuses a named source (`--source`, `--source-id`, `--source-ids`) the member cannot read or that is not registered, alike. Reads go through `dispatchToolCall` (with only the operation's declared params; the source travels as the call's `sourceId`) with `remote: true`, `transport: 'stdio'`, `stdioMember` and `enforcedMember: true` (dispatch forces `hidePrivate`, `owner: false` and no private-readable sources), minus other members' personal sources (`hiddenPersonalSources`; an explicit `--source` naming one refuses), and `namesHiddenPage` withholds any output that still names a hidden page. Writes stay trusted local writes (`ctx.remote` false): `checkEnforcedWrite` refuses a target the member cannot read (`memberPageView`) and any label change, and `remember` needs `--entity` naming a readable page (`checkEnforcedRemember`, the one decision point). `write-request` answers only ids in the member's receipt ledger (`recordEnforcedReceipts`, `configDir()/enforced-member/<member>.receipts`); any other id is swapped for a fresh one, so it answers as unknown. sync, `sources refresh` and `git commit-push` (checked by `checkEnforcedCommitPush`: every named path readable, no label or `.gbrain/` change, refused modes) run with output replaced by one line (`withWithheldOutput`, which also captures the fd-1 chain through `setStdoutCapture`); `doctor` prints only check names, statuses and counts (`withDoctorCounts`); sync and `sources refresh` take only their listed flags and a readable source (`syncSourceArg`); `entity` and every coverage notice drop the mention coverage count (`withoutCoverageCounts`); `timeline-add` refuses a gbrain fence marker; `hook` succeeds silently. The warm CLI socket, the persistence delegate and the skill-resolver fast path are skipped under the mode. Tests: `test/enforced-member.serial.test.ts` (CLI subprocesses, both engines, repo-less and git), `test/enforced-member-classes.test.ts` (every command and operation classified once), `test/enforced-member-writes-off.test.ts` (the switch's values and a failed read).
+- `src/cli/enforced-member.ts` + `src/cli/enforced-member-classes.ts` + `src/cli/enforced-commit-push.ts`: enforced member mode ([guide](../../guides/enforced-member.md)). With `GBRAIN_ENFORCED_MEMBER` set, `enforcedGate` in `src/cli/main.ts` classifies the command before any dispatch (`enforcedClassOf`: read, write, allowed, silent or refused; anything unclassified is refused, exit 3, `enforced_member_refused`). An empty value, an unknown member or the owner id refuses everything. The gate classifies before help: a refused command refuses with `--help` too, and an allowed one prints only its static help. `checkEnforcedOpArgs` first refuses every write operation except `get_write_request` with reason `writes_off` (`refuseWritesOff`) when the brain's config `access.enforced_member_writes` (database only, read by `enforcedWritesMode`: `checked` or unset, `refuse_pages`, else `refuse`, also on a failed read) is not `checked`, before any member, page or source lookup, and `checkEnforcedCommitPush` refuses a named-path commit the same way under `refuse` before any path lookup; then it refuses a named source (`--source`, `--source-id`, `--source-ids`) the member cannot read or that is not registered, alike. Reads go through `dispatchToolCall` (with only the operation's declared params; the source travels as the call's `sourceId`) with `remote: true`, `transport: 'stdio'`, `stdioMember` and `enforcedMember: true` (dispatch forces `hidePrivate`, `owner: false` and no private-readable sources), minus other members' personal sources (`hiddenPersonalSources`; an explicit `--source` naming one refuses), and `namesHiddenPage` withholds any output that still names a hidden page. Writes stay trusted local writes (`ctx.remote` false): `checkEnforcedWrite` refuses a target the member cannot read (`memberPageView`) and any label change, and `remember` needs `--entity` naming a readable page (`checkEnforcedRemember`, the one decision point). `write-request` answers only ids in the member's receipt ledger (`recordEnforcedReceipts`, `configDir()/enforced-member/<member>.receipts`); any other id is swapped for a fresh one, so it answers as unknown. sync, `sources refresh` and `git commit-push` (checked by `checkEnforcedCommitPush`: every named path readable, no label or `.gbrain/` change, refused modes) run with output replaced by one line (`withWithheldOutput`, which also captures the fd-1 chain through `setStdoutCapture`); `doctor` prints only check names, statuses and counts (`withDoctorCounts`); sync and `sources refresh` take only their listed flags and a readable source (`syncSourceArg`); `entity` and every coverage notice drop the mention coverage count (`withoutCoverageCounts`); `timeline-add` refuses a gbrain fence marker; `hook` succeeds silently. The warm CLI socket, the persistence delegate and the skill-resolver fast path are skipped under the mode. Tests: `test/enforced-member.serial.test.ts`, `test/enforced-member-writes.serial.test.ts` and `test/enforced-member-writes-setting.serial.test.ts` (CLI subprocesses, both engines, repo-less and git; shared setup in `test/helpers/enforced-member-brain.ts`), `test/enforced-member-classes.test.ts` (every command and operation classified once), `test/enforced-member-writes-off.test.ts` (the switch's values and a failed read).
diff --git a/docs/architecture/key-files/commands-5.md b/docs/architecture/key-files/commands-5.md
index 4f9738a6d0..7b11f1ce75 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/key-files/commands-5.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/key-files/commands-5.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Current behavior and load-bearing invariants; history belongs in Git and CHANGEL
- `src/commands/skillify-check.ts` — `gbrain skillpack-check` agent-readable health report. Exit 0/1/2 for CI gating; JSON for debugging. Wraps `check-resolvable --json`, `doctor --json`, and migration ledger into one payload. Required item 12 (`brain_first_compliance`) calls `analyzeSkillBrainFirst()` on the candidate SKILL.md; exits 1 when the verdict is `missing_brain_first` (external-lookup pattern present, no callout, no `brain_first: exempt`). The scaffold path in `src/core/skillify/templates.ts` pre-inserts the canonical Convention callout into new SKILL.md files so freshly-scaffolded skills pass item 12.
-- `src/commands/setup.ts` + `src/cli/commands/setup.ts` — `gbrain setup <harness>` (D8), pre-connect and engine-free (`thinClient: 'none'`, `json: 'document'`): an orchestrator over the existing wiring, not a new installation system. Target first: it resolves the brain (`loadConfig`; none → a `gbrain init --pglite --no-embedding --json` child, `--providers` drops `--no-embedding`; setup prints `Brain ready at <path>` and never init's standalone quickstart or `[AGENT]` banners; on the brain it just created it runs the setup migrations init left pending (`finishFreshSetupMigrations`, `src/commands/setup-migrations.ts`: one `apply-migrations --yes --no-autopilot-install --json` child built by `setupMigrationsArgv` in `migrations/fresh-install.ts`, 60 s bound, offline; v0.11.0 is held back when its host phase would edit an existing `~/.claude/AGENTS.md`, `~/.openclaw/AGENTS.md` or OpenClaw cron manifest (`hostRewriteTargets`)) and replaces init's `[init] Migrations:` line with `[setup] Migrations: …` (a failure keeps init's hand-off plus the error code; an existing brain is not touched), and renders a `Memory:` line naming `remember` (#6606: world facts are pushed, private ones are recall-only, capture writes a page) and then `setupFirstRunNotices` once after `Next:` in human output, or under `notices` in `--json`), the source (`--source` > `GBRAIN_SOURCE` > unpinned), the launcher (`--gbrain-bin` > `resolveGbrainBin`), the surface (`--surface` > `GBRAIN_SURFACE` > the receipt's > `REGISTRATION_SURFACE`) and the registration owner, prints them, then refuses before any write with `setup_hosted_connection` (thin-client config, hosted connection receipt or remote entry: never a second, local brain) or `setup_owner_conflict` (`live_serve` from `peekLock` unless the live stdio serve is this registration's own, `unowned_entry`, `other_install` by receipt `gbrain_home`, `harness_lane` for a bootstrap harness receipt that wired the configuration setup would write (a target in that config directory, compared after symlink resolution; project-scoped hooks; or a receipt recording no paths for the host) or another gbrain marker on a wanted event; #7771, `test/setup-harness-lane-scope-7771.test.ts`). Consent is three recorded decisions (`resolveConsent`): wiring scope (`--scope`, `--no-hooks`, `GBRAIN_HOOKS=0`), capture (`--capture`/`--no-capture`; a file-config `memory.auto_writeback: off` wins) and providers; read-context events come from the capability row, capture events only when accepted. Verify reuses `smokeStdioRegistration` from `doctor/checks/harness-wiring.ts`; states are `configured` → `connection-verified` → `native-pending` (`native-verified` is never claimed). `gbrain setup codex` (`runCodexSetup`/`runCodexRemove`, writer in `src/core/setup/codex.ts`) shares the target, consent, refusal and verify steps: user scope only (`--scope project` exits 2), the codex plugin (`codexPluginProvidesName`) skips the MCP table, `harness_lane` also covers a bootstrap harness receipt targeting codex (in the same scoped sense) or a bootstrap-lane group on a wanted event, the dry run adds a `trust` step, and the final state is `native-verified` when the codex row's push is verified and the receipt owns the trusted UserPromptSubmit hook. Unsupported harness ids (`openclaw`, `hermes`, unknown) refuse with `setup_harness_unsupported` naming the row's guide (exit 2). `GBRAIN_SETUP_ABORT_AFTER=receipt|mcp|hooks` is the crash-injection seam. `--serves one|several` (GST-363, `src/commands/setup-serves.ts`): `several` runs `gbrain access serves several --yes --json` and one `gbrain find people/ --as <member> --json` per member as children and prints the receipt (paths, never keys); a one-person setup on a several-person brain refuses `setup_serves_several` unless the owner (written as `mcp.stdio_member`) or `mcp.stdio_member` binds the connection; the brain-first access then carries `serves: 'several'`. Pinned by `test/setup.test.ts` and `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts`.
+- `src/commands/setup.ts` + `src/cli/commands/setup.ts` — `gbrain setup <harness>` (D8), pre-connect and engine-free (`thinClient: 'none'`, `json: 'document'`): an orchestrator over the existing wiring, not a new installation system. Target first: it resolves the brain (`loadConfig`; none → a `gbrain init --pglite --no-embedding --json` child, `--providers` drops `--no-embedding`; setup prints `Brain ready at <path>` and never init's standalone quickstart or `[AGENT]` banners; on the brain it just created it runs the setup migrations init left pending (`finishFreshSetupMigrations`, `src/commands/setup-migrations.ts`: one `apply-migrations --yes --no-autopilot-install --json` child built by `setupMigrationsArgv` in `migrations/fresh-install.ts`, 60 s bound, offline; v0.11.0 is held back when its host phase would edit an existing `~/.claude/AGENTS.md`, `~/.openclaw/AGENTS.md` or OpenClaw cron manifest (`hostRewriteTargets`)) and replaces init's `[init] Migrations:` line with `[setup] Migrations: …` (a failure keeps init's hand-off plus the error code; an existing brain is not touched), and renders a `Memory:` line naming `remember` (#6606: world facts are pushed, private ones are recall-only, capture writes a page) and then `setupFirstRunNotices` once after `Next:` in human output, or under `notices` in `--json`), the source (`--source` > `GBRAIN_SOURCE` > unpinned), the launcher (`--gbrain-bin` > `resolveGbrainBin`), the surface (`--surface` > `GBRAIN_SURFACE` > the receipt's > `REGISTRATION_SURFACE`) and the registration owner, prints them, then refuses before any write with `setup_hosted_connection` (thin-client config, hosted connection receipt or remote entry: never a second, local brain) or `setup_owner_conflict` (`live_serve` from `peekLock` unless the live stdio serve is this registration's own, `unowned_entry`, `other_install` by receipt `gbrain_home`, `harness_lane` for a bootstrap harness receipt that wired the configuration setup would write (a target in that config directory, compared after symlink resolution; project-scoped hooks; or a receipt recording no paths for the host) or another gbrain marker on a wanted event; #7771, `test/setup-harness-lane-scope-7771.test.ts`). Consent is three recorded decisions (`resolveConsent`): wiring scope (`--scope`, `--no-hooks`, `GBRAIN_HOOKS=0`), capture (`--capture`/`--no-capture`; a file-config `memory.auto_writeback: off` wins) and providers; read-context events come from the capability row, capture events only when accepted. Verify reuses `smokeStdioRegistration` from `doctor/checks/harness-wiring.ts`; states are `configured` → `connection-verified` → `native-pending` (`native-verified` is never claimed). `gbrain setup codex` (`runCodexSetup`/`runCodexRemove`, writer in `src/core/setup/codex.ts`) shares the target, consent, refusal and verify steps: user scope only (`--scope project` exits 2), the codex plugin (`codexPluginProvidesName`) skips the MCP table, `harness_lane` also covers a bootstrap harness receipt targeting codex (in the same scoped sense) or a bootstrap-lane group on a wanted event, the dry run adds a `trust` step, and the final state is `native-verified` when the codex row's push is verified and the receipt owns the trusted UserPromptSubmit hook. Unsupported harness ids (`openclaw`, `hermes`, unknown) refuse with `setup_harness_unsupported` naming the row's guide (exit 2). `GBRAIN_SETUP_ABORT_AFTER=receipt|mcp|hooks` is the crash-injection seam. `--serves one|several` (GST-363, `src/commands/setup-serves.ts`; tests `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts`, `test/setup-serves-stdio-member.test.ts`, `test/setup-serves-upgrade.test.ts`): `several` runs `gbrain access serves several --yes --json` and one `gbrain find people/ --as <member> --json` per member as children and prints the receipt (paths, never keys); a one-person setup on a several-person brain refuses `setup_serves_several` unless the owner (written as `mcp.stdio_member`) or `mcp.stdio_member` binds the connection; the brain-first access then carries `serves: 'several'`. Pinned by `test/setup.test.ts` and `test/setup-serves-several.test.ts`.
- `src/core/setup/brain-first.ts` + `src/core/managed-block.ts` — the brain-first instruction block every harness install writes by default (`<!-- gbrain:brain-first:begin/end -->`, `BRAIN_FIRST_VERSION`). `brainFirstTarget` names each harness's own instruction file (Claude Code `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` or `./CLAUDE.local.md`, Codex `AGENTS.md` or an existing `AGENTS.override.md`, opencode global `AGENTS.md`, OpenClaw `<workspace>/AGENTS.md` from JSON5 `agents.defaults.workspace` (several agents need `--workspace`), Hermes `SOUL.md` after the identity text, Cursor `.cursor/rules/gbrain-brain-first.mdc`); other clients get the block printed to paste. `syncBrainFirst` splices only between the markers (idempotent, upgrades in place, preserves a damaged block and reports it), and the decision (`--no-instructions` / `GBRAIN_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS=0`, `--instructions`, prior) is remembered in `<configDir>/agent-instructions.json` with the writer (`underInstructionLedgerLock` holds one lock, `<configDir>/agent-instructions.lock`, shared with `skill-loading.json`, across the ledger read, the file and permission edits and the ledger write, re-reads a recorded decision under it, reports a lock it cannot take within 10 seconds as `preserve`, and a dry run takes none; `test/instruction-ledger-lock.test.ts`, `test/instruction-ledger-lock-timeout.slow.test.ts`), so `--remove` on setup, `connect --install` and `bootstrap harness` (lane in `bootstrap/harness-brain-first.ts`) strips only its own blocks. Text varies by access: MCP search surface, verbs surface, or the thin-client CLI launcher (`GBRAIN-INSTRUCTIONS.md` starts with it). doctor `harness_wiring` reads the ledger plus each registered or plugin-served harness's default file and warns on a missing, stale or damaged block with a fix that rewrites only the block (`instructionBlockViews`, `withInstructionBlocks`); `gbrain post-upgrade` prints the same command (`brain-first-upgrade-notice.ts`, `instructionBlockUpgradeHints`). The Claude Code and Codex plugin manifests declare setup's UserPromptSubmit hook with `GBRAIN_HOOK_LANE=plugin`; it yields when another gbrain lane wires the event (`bootstrap/plugin-lanes.ts` `pluginHookYields`; `test/plugin-turn-hook.test.ts`). `managed-block.ts` is the shared marker splice/probe/remove that `bootstrap/instructions-block.ts` also uses (`test/setup-brain-first.test.ts`).
- `src/core/setup/turn-hook.ts` + `src/core/setup/turn-hook-check.ts` — the per-turn rule hook for installs whose MCP came from a plain `mcp add` or another installer: a `turn-rule-v1` Claude Code UserPromptSubmit entry or a Codex `hooks.json` group plus its `config.toml` trust entry, running `GBRAIN_HOOK_LANE=turn-rule <hook launcher> gbrain hook user-prompt` (rule only, no local context; it yields to setup, bootstrap and plugin lanes). Written by `setup <claude-code|codex> --instructions-only`, `connect --install`, the hosted `harness connect --install` and `bootstrap harness` (not in registrar mode); with no absolute binary the outcome is `print` with the one-line next step. `inspectTurnHook` (files only; it also reads Claude Code's managed `managed-settings.json` and `managed-settings.d/*.json`, and `turnRuleHookYields` counts a managed gbrain hook, #8057) feeds doctor `harness_wiring` (`turnHookViews`, `withTurnHooks`: untrusted, or missing beside a ledger block, warns with code `turn_hook_not_loaded`); `verifyTurnHook` runs the hook (Claude Code, Codex), `openclaw plugins inspect gbrain-turn-rule --runtime --json` or `hermes hooks doctor`, and every install path exits non-zero with `turn_hook_not_loaded` when it fails (`docs/guides/repair.md#turn-hook-not-loaded`). OpenClaw and Hermes rules name the gbrain tools and the `tool_search` route (`renderBrainFirstTurnRule(access, harness)`; `test/brain-first-turn-rule.test.ts`, `test/setup-brain-first.test.ts`).
- `src/core/setup/hook-launcher.ts` + `src/core/setup/hook-launcher-refresh.ts` — the trusted-directory hook launcher (#8424): `<config dir>/hook-launcher/gbrain-hook`, a POSIX sh script that records the session directory in `GBRAIN_HOOK_CWD`, changes into its own directory and execs gbrain there, so a script-mode install never lets the session directory's `bunfig.toml` preload or `.env` load; it refuses (exit 1, one stderr line) when its directory holds anything else. Every setup-lane and turn-rule hook command names it (`buildClaudeHookCommand(…, launcher)`, `codexSetupHookGroup(…, launcher)`, `buildCodexSessionEndCommand(bin, launcher)`); `ensureHookLauncher` writes it before any hook that names it, and `gbrain hook` reads the session directory through `hookSessionCwd()`. `hookLauncherProblem` (turn-hook-check.ts) feeds doctor `harness_wiring` (`withHookLaunchers`, code `hook_session_cwd`, reasons `session_cwd|missing|stale|foreign`); `refreshHookLaunchers` runs in `gbrain post-upgrade` and moves the turn-rule entries and each installed user-scope setup receipt's hooks onto the launcher through their own writers. The stdio MCP entries (`desiredMcpEntry`, `desiredCodexMcpEntry`, `registerClaudeMcp`/`registerCodexMcp` with `hookLauncher`) and the bootstrap, harness and Codex SessionEnd lanes use it too (#8426, #8428); `gbrain serve` captures `GBRAIN_HOOK_CWD` through `src/core/session-cwd.ts` and never changes directory. `src/core/setup/launcher-lanes.ts` (`launcherLaneFindings`) finds those entries for doctor and post-upgrade; post-upgrade rewrites only a Claude Code setup MCP entry setup still owns, under the setup lock, and names every Codex and bootstrap entry. Tests: `test/launcher-lanes-bunfig.serial.test.ts`. Tests: `test/hook-launcher-bunfig.test.ts` (a hostile checkout's preload never runs from any shape), `test/setup.test.ts` (#8424 block).