Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
fix: pre-landing review fixes
garrytaned405afed91b
diff --git a/changelog.d/capy-w-a1-trust-purge-secret-scan.md b/changelog.d/capy-w-a1-trust-purge-secret-scan.mdindex b6afab8adc..e7884916ee 100644--- a/changelog.d/capy-w-a1-trust-purge-secret-scan.md+++ b/changelog.d/capy-w-a1-trust-purge-secret-scan.md@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ important: security**Model-written Life Chronicle events no longer read as your own notes after a trust claim, legacy bearer tokens keep their tools when the default MCP surface is narrowed, every way a page is hard-deleted now clears what the page left in six side tables, the secret scan catches passwords in escaped JSON and URL-encoded values, and the drift report records where it came from.** Community wave W-A1: bug reports verified on master and fixed with our own code.### Fixed-- **Trust claim and legacy chronicle events (#9284).** `gbrain trust claim-sources` lifted legacy Life Chronicle event pages (`captured_via: life-chronicle:auto`) to "your notes", even when the page they summarise is an imported third-party email, so remote agents got a model summary of a stranger's text unquoted. The chronicle capture kind is now capped at agent_written, and a claim never puts an event above its depth page's tier. `--relower --source <id>` can lower what a claim lifted even after `sources set-trust` ended that claim. Lowering never raises a row and never changes who can read a page. Rows already lifted change only when you run the relower; `gbrain doctor` counts them and names the dry-run command.+- **Trust claim and legacy chronicle events (#9284).** `gbrain trust claim-sources` lifted legacy Life Chronicle event pages (`captured_via: life-chronicle:auto`) to "your notes", even when the page they summarise is an imported third-party email, so remote agents got a model summary of a stranger's text unquoted. The chronicle capture kind is now capped at agent_written, and a claim never puts an event above its depth page's tier, including a depth page the same claim classifies for the first time. `--relower --source <id>` can lower what a claim lifted even after `sources set-trust` ended that claim. Lowering never raises a row and never changes who can read a page. Rows already lifted change only when you run the relower; `gbrain doctor` counts them and names the dry-run command.- **Legacy bearer tokens and `mcp.default_surface_dcr` (#9266).** Setting the DCR default surface also narrowed legacy bearer tokens, which have no client row to pre-seed, so they lost tools their grants allowed. Legacy tokens now keep the server surface (still bounded by their scope, source and operation grants, and still clamped by `GBRAIN_MCP_FORCE_SURFACE`); OAuth clients with no surface row still get the default. Doctor and the advisor already reported it this way.-- **Purge leftovers (#9146).** Only `delete --purge` removed a page's proposed takes, open loops, core-edit notice text, aliases, redirects and rename rows. Tombstone expiry (including after a managed connector delete), the batch delete connectors use and a restore that replays a purge now remove them too, as does source removal for the two tables that did not cascade. Write-gate holds go with the page, except a hold that arrived after the soft delete, which is a new pending write and stays until its own disposition. Works the same on brains with no repository.-- **Secret scan (#8265).** The high-entropy assignment detector missed a password whose key quote is escaped (JSON inside a JSON string) and one after a URL-encoded `%3D`/`%3A` separator. Both are caught, ordinary query strings and encoded URLs are not. New transcript imports redact both shapes; pages imported before are not rewritten, so `gbrain doctor` asks once for a read-only, model-free transcript re-audit that lists them.-- **Drift report provenance (#9208).** The dream drift phase wrote `reports/drift-<date>` with no derivation, so it was stored at tier unknown with no origin. It now records a `derive:drift` origin and takes the tier of the pages it judged, capped at agent_written.+- **Purge leftovers (#9146).** Only `delete --purge` removed a page's proposed takes, open loops, core-edit notice text, aliases, redirects and rename rows. Tombstone expiry (including after a managed connector delete), the batch delete connectors use and a restore that replays a purge now remove them too, as does source removal for the two tables that did not cascade. Write-gate holds go with the page, except a hold that arrived, or was re-opened by the same content arriving again, after the soft delete, which is a new pending write and stays until its own disposition. Works the same on brains with no repository.+- **Secret scan (#8265).** The high-entropy assignment detector missed a password whose key quote is escaped (JSON inside a JSON string) and one after a URL-encoded `%3D`/`%3A` separator. Both are caught, ordinary query strings and encoded URLs are not, and an encoded URL that carries a username and password still is. New transcript imports redact both shapes; pages imported before are not rewritten, so `gbrain doctor` asks once for a read-only, model-free transcript re-audit that lists them.+- **Drift report provenance (#9208).** The dream drift phase wrote `reports/drift-<date>` with no derivation, so it was stored at tier unknown with no origin. It now records a `derive:drift` origin and takes the lowest tier of the pages, takes and timeline entries the judge read, capped at agent_written, with each of them recorded as an input.<!-- behavior-change: chronicle_events_trust_cap_9284 --><!-- behavior-change: audit_secrets_escaped_encoded_8265 -->diff --git a/src/core/cycle/drift.ts b/src/core/cycle/drift.tsindex eebfb86dc3..ba1d64693d 100644--- a/src/core/cycle/drift.ts+++ b/src/core/cycle/drift.ts@@ -233,25 +233,27 @@ async function findDriftCandidates(}));}-/** Format the candidate page's recent timeline entries as judge evidence. */+/** Format the candidate page's recent timeline entries as judge evidence, with the ids of the rows it quotes. */async function loadEvidence(engine: BrainEngine,pageId: number,cutoffIso: string,-): Promise<string> {- const rows = await engine.executeRaw<{ date: string; source: string; summary: string }>(- `SELECT date::text AS date, source, summary FROM timeline_entries+): Promise<{ text: string; ids: number[] }> {+ const rows = await engine.executeRaw<{ id: number | string; date: string; source: string; summary: string }>(+ `SELECT id, date::text AS date, source, summary FROM timeline_entriesWHERE page_id = $1 AND date >= $2::dateORDER BY date DESC LIMIT 12`,[pageId, cutoffIso],);- if (rows.length === 0) return '(no timeline entries in window)';- return rows.map(r => `- ${r.date} [${r.source}] ${r.summary}`).join('\n');+ if (rows.length === 0) return { text: '(no timeline entries in window)', ids: [] };+ return { text: rows.map(r => `- ${r.date} [${r.source}] ${r.summary}`).join('\n'), ids: rows.map(r => Number(r.id)) };}interface JudgedCandidate {candidate: DriftCandidate;verdict: DriftVerdict;+ /** The timeline rows the judge's prompt quoted. */+ evidenceIds: number[];}function buildReportBody(@@ -343,7 +345,7 @@ export async function runPhaseDrift(let budgetExhausted = false;let failed = 0;for (const candidate of candidates.slice(0, config.maxPerCycle)) {- const evidence = await loadEvidence(engine, candidate.pageId, cutoffIso);+ const { text: evidence, ids: evidenceIds } = await loadEvidence(engine, candidate.pageId, cutoffIso);const check = meter.check({modelId,// ~4 chars per token over the prompt the judge actually sends.@@ -357,7 +359,7 @@ export async function runPhaseDrift(}try {const verdict = await judge({ candidate, evidence, modelHint: modelId, maxOutputTokens });- judged.push({ candidate, verdict });+ judged.push({ candidate, verdict, evidenceIds });} catch (e) {failed += 1;process.stderr.write(`[drift] judge failed on take ${candidate.takeId}: ${(e as Error).message}\n`);@@ -373,7 +375,8 @@ export async function runPhaseDrift(// Typed `note` (+ report_type) so the default pack declares it (#5881).// Lands in the default source (brain-global artifact, same-day re-runs// upsert the same slug).- const derivation = await deriveTrust(engine, [...new Set(judged.map(j => j.candidate.pageId))].map(id => ({ table: 'pages' as const, id })),+ const derivation = await deriveTrust(engine, judged.flatMap(j => [{ table: 'pages' as const, id: j.candidate.pageId },+ { table: 'takes' as const, id: j.candidate.takeId }, ...j.evidenceIds.map(id => ({ table: 'timeline_entries' as const, id }))]),{ channel: 'derive:drift' });if (maintenance) {const snapshot = await engine.readPageSnapshot(reportSlug, { sourceId: 'default' });diff --git a/src/core/persistence/purge-slug-stores.ts b/src/core/persistence/purge-slug-stores.tsindex 288b5c165b..b4e12baf91 100644--- a/src/core/persistence/purge-slug-stores.ts+++ b/src/core/persistence/purge-slug-stores.ts@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ export async function scrubPurgedSlugStores(/*** #9146: the write-gate holds of hard-deleted pages and their receipts. An immediate hard delete drops every hold of* the slug, as the direct purge does. A tombstone expiry passes each page's `deletedAt` (text, so microseconds- * survive) and drops only holds created up to it: a hold that arrived after the soft delete is a later write, kept- * for review.+ * survive) and drops only holds last seen up to it: a hold that arrived, or was re-opened by the same content+ * arriving again, after the soft delete is a later write, kept for review.*/export async function scrubPurgedSlugHolds(engine: Pick<BrainEngine, 'executeRaw'>,@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ export async function scrubPurgedSlugHolds(): Promise<{ write_gate_holds: number; write_gate_receipts: number }> {if (!pages.length) return { write_gate_holds: 0, write_gate_receipts: 0 };const holds = (await engine.executeRaw<{ id: string }>(`DELETE FROM write_gate_holds h USING unnest($2::text[], $3::timestamptz[]) AS d(slug, upto)- WHERE h.source_id = $1 AND h.slug = d.slug AND (d.upto IS NULL OR h.created_at <= d.upto) RETURNING h.id::text AS id`,+ WHERE h.source_id = $1 AND h.slug = d.slug AND (d.upto IS NULL OR GREATEST(h.created_at, h.last_seen_at) <= d.upto) RETURNING h.id::text AS id`,[sourceId, pages.map(p => p.slug), pages.map(p => p.deletedAt ?? null)])).map(h => h.id);const receipts = holds.length ? (await engine.executeRaw("DELETE FROM write_gate_receipts WHERE target_table = 'write_gate_holds' AND target_id = ANY($1::text[]) RETURNING 1", [holds])).length : 0;return { write_gate_holds: holds.length, write_gate_receipts: receipts };diff --git a/src/core/secret-scan-assignment.ts b/src/core/secret-scan-assignment.tsindex e6cf4afef7..03cc902064 100644--- a/src/core/secret-scan-assignment.ts+++ b/src/core/secret-scan-assignment.ts@@ -89,7 +89,9 @@ export const HIGH_ENTROPY_REQUIRES_NON_DIGIT_RE = /[^0-9]/;// value never takes `%26` (the next encoded parameter; `&` is outside both// classes), and a quoted value never opens there. The escapes and the encoded// separator sit in group 1, so offsets and fingerprints stay on the stored-// bytes. A URL-encoded URL (`https%3A%2F%2F…`) is a reference like a plain one.+// bytes. A URL-encoded URL (`https%3A%2F%2F…`) is a reference like a plain one,+// unless it carries userinfo (`%40`): the plain form's userinfo is caught by+// db_url_credentials, which never sees the encoded form.export const assignmentKey = (boundary: string) =>`${boundary}(?:(?:secret|token|passwd|password|passphrase|credential|api[_-]?key|apikey)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,64}|[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,63}[_-]key)(?:\\\\{0,3}["'])?(?:\\s*[:=]\\s*|%3[AaDd])`;export const ASSIGNMENT_QUOTED_SOURCE = (key: string) => `(${key}(?<!%3[AaDd])\\\\{0,3}["'])([^"'\\s]{11,4095}[^"'\\s\\\\])`;@@ -114,7 +116,8 @@ const DOTTED_IDENTIFIER_RE = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/;* with a letter is the accepted miss.*/export function assignmentValueIsSecretShaped(value: string): boolean {- if (/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,31}(?::\/\/|%3A%2F%2F)/i.test(value)) return false;+ if (/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,31}:\/\//.test(value)) return false;+ if (/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,31}%3A%2F%2F/i.test(value) && !/%40/i.test(value)) return false;if (value.startsWith('./') || value.startsWith('~/') || value.startsWith('${') || value.startsWith('$(')) return false;if (value.startsWith('<REDACTED:') || DOTTED_IDENTIFIER_RE.test(value)) return false;return !(value.startsWith('/') && !LEGACY_ASSIGNMENT_VALUE_RE.test(value));diff --git a/src/core/trust/backfill.ts b/src/core/trust/backfill.tsindex f30d93dc63..8991385972 100644--- a/src/core/trust/backfill.ts+++ b/src/core/trust/backfill.ts@@ -182,17 +182,20 @@ function classifier(cols: Columns, assumeClaimed: readonly string[] = [], ceilinconst least = (terms: string[]) => (terms.length ? `LEAST(${terms.join(', ')})` : 'NULL::int');/*** #9284: a legacy Life Chronicle event is model-extracted from its depth page (`event.depth`, a live page in the- * same source), so it ranks no higher than that page: its stored tier (when classified) and its frontmatter caps.- * A missing depth page adds no cap (the event's own agent_written cap still applies).+ * same source), so it ranks no higher than that page: its stored tier and frontmatter caps when classified, else+ * what the same statement classifies it as (its frontmatter caps and page signals: source kind, connector source,+ * write request), since an UPDATE reads the depth page as it was before. A missing depth page adds no cap (the+ * event's own agent_written cap still applies).*/- const chronicleDepthCap = (p: string) => {- const d = 'chronicle_depth';+ const chronicleDepthCap = (p: string, s: string) => {+ const d = 'chronicle_depth', dr = 'chronicle_depth_r';const depthCaps = least(frontmatterTrustCapsSql(`${d}.frontmatter`));+ const projected = least([...frontmatterTrustCapsSql(`${d}.frontmatter`), ...pageTerms(d, s, dr)]);return `CASE WHEN ${p}.type = 'event' AND jsonb_typeof(${p}.frontmatter->'captured_via') = 'string'AND ${edgeTrimSql(`${p}.frontmatter->>'captured_via'`)} = '${CHRONICLE_CAPTURED_VIA}'AND jsonb_typeof(${p}.frontmatter->'event') = 'object' AND jsonb_typeof(${p}.frontmatter->'event'->'depth') = 'string'- THEN (SELECT ${cols.has('pages', 'trust_tier') ? `CASE WHEN ${d}.trust_tier <> 'unknown' THEN LEAST(${trustRankSql(`${d}.trust_tier`)}, ${depthCaps}) ELSE ${depthCaps} END` : depthCaps}- FROM pages ${d} WHERE ${d}.source_id = ${p}.source_id AND ${d}.slug = ${p}.frontmatter->'event'->>'depth'${cols.has('pages', 'deleted_at') ? ` AND ${d}.deleted_at IS NULL` : ''}+ THEN (SELECT ${cols.has('pages', 'trust_tier') ? `CASE WHEN ${d}.trust_tier <> 'unknown' THEN LEAST(${trustRankSql(`${d}.trust_tier`)}, ${depthCaps}) ELSE ${projected} END` : projected}+ FROM pages ${d} ${requestJoin('pages', 'revision_write_request_id', dr, d)} WHERE ${d}.source_id = ${p}.source_id AND ${d}.slug = ${p}.frontmatter->'event'->>'depth'${cols.has('pages', 'deleted_at') ? ` AND ${d}.deleted_at IS NULL` : ''}LIMIT 1) END`;};/**@@ -204,7 +207,7 @@ function classifier(cols: Columns, assumeClaimed: readonly string[] = [], ceilinconst terms = pageTerms(p, s, r);const c = claimed(s);if (!c) return least(terms);- const caps = cols.has('pages', 'frontmatter') ? [...frontmatterTrustCapsSql(`${p}.frontmatter`), chronicleDepthCap(p)] : [];+ const caps = cols.has('pages', 'frontmatter') ? [...frontmatterTrustCapsSql(`${p}.frontmatter`), chronicleDepthCap(p, s)] : [];return `CASE WHEN ${c} AND ${legacyRowSql('pages', p, ceilings)} THEN ${least([String(rank('operator_curated')), ...caps, ...terms])} ELSE ${least(terms)} END`;};const hasTrust = cols.has('pages', 'trust_tier');diff --git a/test/drift-report-derivation-9208.test.ts b/test/drift-report-derivation-9208.test.tsindex 0652d2ac16..44e87dd850 100644--- a/test/drift-report-derivation-9208.test.ts+++ b/test/drift-report-derivation-9208.test.ts@@ -43,9 +43,11 @@ beforeEach(async () => {await resetPgliteState(engine);});-async function seed(engine: BrainEngine, tier: TrustTier) {- await engine.transaction(tx => withWriteTrust(tx, { tier, origin: { channel: 'sync' } }, async () => {- const page = await tx.putPage('people/alice-example', { type: 'person', title: 'Alice Example', compiled_truth: 'A person at Acme.', timeline: '', frontmatter: {} });+/** The judged page at `tier`; its take and timeline evidence at `rowsTier` (default: the page's). */+async function seed(engine: BrainEngine, tier: TrustTier, rowsTier: TrustTier = tier) {+ const page = await engine.transaction(tx => withWriteTrust(tx, { tier, origin: { channel: 'sync' } }, () =>+ tx.putPage('people/alice-example', { type: 'person', title: 'Alice Example', compiled_truth: 'A person at Acme.', timeline: '', frontmatter: {} })));+ await engine.transaction(tx => withWriteTrust(tx, { tier: rowsTier, origin: { channel: 'sync' } }, async () => {await tx.addTakesBatch([{ page_id: page.id, row_num: 1, claim: 'Acme will ship the widget this year', kind: 'take', holder: 'world', weight: 0.6 }]);await tx.addTimelineEntriesBatch([{ slug: 'people/alice-example', date: '2031-04-10', source: 'meeting', summary: 'Widget launch slipped' }]);}));@@ -85,4 +87,20 @@ describe('#9208 drift report carries a derive:drift derivation', () => {}, { setup: ({ engine }) => seed(engine, input) });}, 180_000);}++ test('the take and timeline evidence the judge read cap the report and are its recorded inputs', async () => {+ await seed(engine, 'operator_curated', 'external_untrusted');+ const [take] = await engine.executeRaw<{ trust_tier: string }>('SELECT trust_tier FROM takes');+ expect(take!.trust_tier).toBe('external_untrusted');+ expect(await drift(engine)).toEqual({ tier: 'external_untrusted', channel: 'derive:drift' });+ const inputs = await engine.executeRaw<{ input_table: string }>(`SELECT DISTINCT d.input_table FROM derivation_inputs d+ JOIN pages p ON d.derived_table = 'pages' AND d.derived_id = p.id::text WHERE p.slug = $1 ORDER BY 1`, [REPORT]);+ expect(inputs.map(r => r.input_table)).toEqual(['pages', 'takes', 'timeline_entries']);+ }, 120_000);++ test('managed: the take and timeline evidence the judge read cap the report', async () => {+ await managedBrain(async ({ engine }) => {+ expect(await drift(engine)).toEqual({ tier: 'external_untrusted', channel: 'derive:drift' });+ }, { setup: ({ engine }) => seed(engine, 'operator_curated', 'external_untrusted') });+ }, 180_000);});diff --git a/test/purge-slug-stores-9146.test.ts b/test/purge-slug-stores-9146.test.tsindex a9f6bc4026..fcd10bbf1d 100644--- a/test/purge-slug-stores-9146.test.ts+++ b/test/purge-slug-stores-9146.test.ts@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ const ctx = (engine: BrainEngine): OperationContext => ({ engine, sourceId: 'deflogger: { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} } } as OperationContext);const op = (name: string) => operations.find(o => o.name === name)!;-/** A write-gate hold for the slug created `ago` before now, labelled `when`, with its receipt. */+/** A write-gate hold for the slug created and last seen `ago` before now, labelled `when`, with its receipt. */async function hold(engine: BrainEngine, sourceId: string, slug: string, when: string, ago = '0 seconds') {- const [row] = await engine.executeRaw<{ id: string }>(`INSERT INTO write_gate_holds (kind, source_id, slug, fingerprint, detector_version, tier, payload, created_at)- VALUES ('fact', $1, $2, $3, 1, 'quarantine', $4::text::jsonb, now() - $5::interval) RETURNING id::text AS id`,+ const [row] = await engine.executeRaw<{ id: string }>(`INSERT INTO write_gate_holds (kind, source_id, slug, fingerprint, detector_version, tier, payload, created_at, last_seen_at)+ VALUES ('fact', $1, $2, $3, 1, 'quarantine', $4::text::jsonb, now() - $5::interval, now() - $5::interval) RETURNING id::text AS id`,[sourceId, slug, randomUUID(), JSON.stringify({ when }), ago]);await engine.executeRaw(`INSERT INTO write_gate_receipts (target_table, target_id, source_id, content_hash, tier, detector_version, verdict, request_id)VALUES ('write_gate_holds', $1, $2, $3, 'quarantine', 1, 'quarantine', $4)`, [row.id, sourceId, randomUUID(), `${slug}|${when}`]);@@ -150,6 +150,23 @@ describe('#9146 every hard delete removes the page\'s slug-keyed stores', () =>}}), 120_000);+ test('(B) the expired-tombstone purge keeps a hold the same content re-opened after the soft delete', () => withEnv({ GBRAIN_HOME: home }, async () => {+ for (const engine of engines) {+ const slug = 'people/erin-example';+ await seed(engine, slug);+ await engine.softDeletePage(slug, { sourceId: 'default' });+ await engine.executeRaw(`UPDATE write_gate_holds SET status = 'held', last_seen_at = now(), seen_count = seen_count + 1,+ payload = jsonb_set(payload, '{when}', '"reopened"') WHERE source_id = 'default' AND slug = $1`, [slug]);+ await engine.executeRaw(`UPDATE write_gate_receipts SET request_id = $1 WHERE target_table = 'write_gate_holds'+ AND target_id IN (SELECT id::text FROM write_gate_holds WHERE source_id = 'default' AND slug = $2)`, [`${slug}|reopened`, slug]);+ const purged = await purgeDeletedPagesCoordinated(engine, 0);+ expect(purged.slugs).toContain(slug);+ expect({ engine: engine.kind, residue: await residue(engine, slug) })+ .toEqual({ engine: engine.kind, residue: only(['source-b'], ['default:reopened', 'source-b:before']) });+ await otherUntouched(engine);+ }+ }), 120_000);+test('(D) the batch deletePages scrubs the rows and the slug\'s holds', () => withEnv({ GBRAIN_HOME: home }, async () => {for (const engine of engines) {const slug = 'people/carol-example';diff --git a/test/secret-scan-encoded-assignment-8265.test.ts b/test/secret-scan-encoded-assignment-8265.test.tsindex 2f0d10988b..10b61a38b1 100644--- a/test/secret-scan-encoded-assignment-8265.test.ts+++ b/test/secret-scan-encoded-assignment-8265.test.ts@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ describe('#8265 URL-encoded separators', () => {expect(redactFindings(`client_secret%3D${v}%26x%3D1`, OPTS).text).toBe(`client_secret%3D${MARK}%26x%3D1`);});+ test('a URL-encoded URL that carries userinfo is still claimed', () => {+ const v = secret();+ expect(found(`password=postgres%3A%2F%2Fu%3A${v}%40db.example%2Fapp`)).toContain('high_entropy_assignment');+ expect(found(`api_key%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fu%3A${v}%40x.example`)).toContain('high_entropy_assignment');+ });+test('a plain separator still keeps a %26 that sits inside the value', () => {const v = `${alnum(10)}%26${alnum(10)}4`;expect(redactFindings(`password=${v} next`, OPTS).text).toBe(`password=${MARK} next`);diff --git a/test/trust-claim-chronicle-9284.test.ts b/test/trust-claim-chronicle-9284.test.tsindex 7d921fc5d6..55f3df2b37 100644--- a/test/trust-claim-chronicle-9284.test.ts+++ b/test/trust-claim-chronicle-9284.test.ts@@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ for (const backend of testBackends()) {expect((await relowerClaimedRows(engine, { dryRun: true })).rows).toBe(0);}, 120_000);+ test('an unclassified depth page caps its event by the tier the same claim gives it, not by its old snapshot', async () => {+ await source('source-w');+ const depth = await page('source-w', 'inbox/acme-example-webhook', 'note', {});+ await engine.executeRaw("UPDATE pages SET source_kind = 'webhook' WHERE id = $1", [depth]);+ const event = await page('source-w', 'life/events/2026-09-09-ffff6666', 'event', eventFm('inbox/acme-example-webhook'));+ await recordSourceClaims(engine, ['source-w']);+ await liftClaimedSources(engine);+ expect((await tier('pages', depth)).t).toBe('external_untrusted');+ expect((await tier('pages', event)).t).toBe('external_untrusted');+ }, 120_000);+test('relower lowers an event a claim already lifted to its depth page tier, and doctor counts it with the dry-run command', async () => {await source('source-b');const depth = await page('source-b', 'email/acme-example-inbound', 'email', {});