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docs(odd): start T23e (L118)

Alan Buscaglia02784d644fcf
diff --git a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
index b0533b4..b6e885f 100644
--- a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
+++ b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ Branch: `feat/gentle-dot` · Delivery strategy: `single-pr` (user choice, L7; fo
| T23b | S25.5 (app side), S25.3 (dialogs) | delegated writer (Rust), parallel with T23a | done (B1 fixed in `8ac11aa`, rechecked PASS) | `1c345b5`; RED 22 failing → GREEN; 2 mutation checks; cargo test 348 | Keychain store and native approval dialog in the app |
| T23c | S25.1–S25.3 | delegated writer (Rust + TS), parallel with the T23a/b verifier | done (verified; B2 fixed `4d1eafb`; real Mac pending) | `8ac11aa`; RED across protocol, daemon, Rust, UI → GREEN; 4 mutation checks; pnpm test 658, cargo test 366 | Private app channel (socketpair on fd 3); privileged actions and native approvals only through it |
| T23d | S25.5 (daemon side) | delegated writer (Rust + TS; context backstop) | done (verified, no blockers; A1 fixed, L117) | `8b29bab`, e2e `c6d7c6f`; RED → GREEN; pnpm test 669 (8 clean full runs), cargo test 369, e2e 17 | OAuth in the daemon with the app-backed store; migration from files |
-| T23e | S25.6 | after T23d | pending | — | connectors.json HMAC |
+| T23e | S25.6 | delegated writer (TS + Rust if needed; context backstop) | in progress | — | connectors.json HMAC |
| T23f | S25.4 (subagents) | after T23c | pending | — | Enable subagents again behind the proxy; real-engine probe |
| T23g | S25.7 | after T23d | pending | — | Linux: Secret Service store and documented limit |
| T23h | S25.8 | after T23c | pending | — | VPS: engine as another OS user, encrypted secrets, PIN approvals |
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ Environment notes: Node v24.14.1 and pnpm are present. `cargo` is on PATH but `r
- **L102 (2026-10-09, user):** "bien pero, mientras estoy hablando no me aparece lo que se va enviar como cuando uso el bui† in de mac" — Parakeet transcribes correctly with our capture, so the earlier garbage came from Apple Speech with our converted 16 kHz audio (open: feed Apple the device's native buffers). Live text with the local model (`e027b19`): the recording so far (last 30 s at most) is decoded again every 0.8 s of new audio, skipping when the model is still loading or a decode runs (never blocking the audio thread), serialized with the final decode, and never shown after stop/cancel; RED (compile) → GREEN, cargo test 296. The Voice chip now names the engine ("Offline", "macOS", "Off"; `1396457`). Rebuilt, signed, restarted (also applies the model-chip fix `7ab0c0a`).
- **L103 (2026-10-09, user):** "estaria bueno que si pongo el boton de grabar de nuevo en vez de enviarlo, que se quede escrito en el input para confirmarlo, como se comporta ahora estaria bueno que sea una opcion que uno elijiese". S30.4 updated: review in the input is the default; "Send when I stop" (switch in the recording strip, stored in localStorage) keeps send-on-stop; the mic button reads "Stop and review" or "Stop and send". `e0010eb`: RED 3 failing → GREEN, pnpm test 593 (the earlier tests now cover the option). Rebuilt, signed, restarted.
- **L104 (2026-10-09, user):** "sube todo esto al repo y fijate el readme de gentle ai como es para copiar el estilo y hacer el propio para Gentle Dot"; choices "Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, público" and "main + feat/gentle-dot, y abro el PR (recomendado)"; then "usa la rosa con glow como banner". TruffleHog over the whole history: no verified secrets (unverified hits are masking-test fixtures). README rewritten in Gentle-AI's layout with an honest Security status; banner and divider rendered from the Dot's own rose strokes and glow (`docs/brand/tools/build-banner.mjs`); MIT LICENSE as in Gentle-AI. Created the public repo github.com/Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, `main` at the first commit `5ec596c`, pushed `feat/gentle-dot` (153 commits, 286 files, +57,416), and opened PR #1 (single-pr). Merge is the user's decision.
+- **L118 (2026-10-09, user):** "si" to merging PR #12 and continuing with T23e. PR #12 merged (`3954682`). T23e design: an HMAC-SHA256 key kept in the Keychain through the app channel (`secret_get/put`, id `integrity/connectors`); the daemon signs `connectors.json` on every write (a `mac` field over a canonical serialization of the rest); at start with the channel, a missing or wrong `mac` on a file that was signed before means it changed while Gentle Dot was closed: the file is moved aside (`connectors.rejected-<timestamp>.json`, private), the daemon starts with no connectors, and the user is told once; the first start after T23e signs the current file (migration); without the channel the file cannot be verified and is loaded as today (connectors needing secrets are already locked there).
- **L117 (2026-10-09):** Independent verifier on eec6776..c6d7c6f: pnpm test 669 ×3 (no flake), e2e 17, cargo test 369, clippy, typecheck, lint; no secret on disk, in WebSocket messages, logs, or errors after connect, refresh, mode change, restart, disconnect, and remove; `secret_*` unreachable from the WebSocket; every proxy method fails closed without the app; OAuth PKCE, wrong state, replayed code, pasted address for another flow, cancel, loopback-only callback, single refresh on 401, no loop without a refresh token; migration survives a kill between put and file rewrite; no blockers. Advisory A1 (serious, would have waited for T23e): a `{secretRef}` planted in `connectors.json` while the daemon was down, in another connector's slot, made the daemon fetch that item and hand it to an agent-chosen stdio command (reproduced with Notion's sign-in). Fixed inline: a reference is honored only in its own slot (ids follow from the connector and field: `connector/<id>/{value|env|header}/<k>`, `connector/<id>/signin`), so `refsOf`, `open`, `isSignedIn`, and `signInState` ignore any other; `signInState` also stopped a planted sign-in reference from sending Notion's cached token to another server. RED (both attacks reproduced on the unfixed code) → GREEN, pnpm test 671 ×2. Other advisories kept: A2 an unparsable legacy `mcp-auth.json` is marked migrated and its secrets stay on disk, and a 0-byte one is deleted; A3 the browser e2e for connector flows were replaced (they failed at the baseline since T23c); A4 an imported server's `callbackUrl` decides the callback host (non-loopback would listen outside; same as baseline); A5 `isSignedIn` is true for an uncached reference, so without the app the list says connected while the proxy fails closed; A6 `serve_secret` copies the secret into a `serde_json::Value` not zeroed; A7 every imported env and header value goes to the Keychain, non-secret ones included.
- **L116 (2026-10-09):** T23d done (`8b29bab`): `secret-source.ts` (`AppSecretSource` over the channel, in-memory cache cleared when the channel closes), `connector-oauth.ts` (daemon-run pi-mcp OAuth with PKCE and a loopback callback, replacing `mcp login`), `connectors.json` holds `{secretRef}` only, one-time migration with a `version: 2` marker (N1 planted files reported and ignored, N2 empty or unreadable files do not block), app-side `secret_*` handlers with id validation and no echo. Limits: security-framework 3.7 cannot read an item's access list, so the daemon only reads ids it recorded; secrets inside a server's URL or args stay in `connectors.json`. Parent fixes: two tests raced engine restarts under load (the proxy key rotates on each restart; and the models list pushed at engine start since L101 could be taken for the reply) — both now wait for the right event (8 consecutive full runs green); `e2e/serve.ts` dropped the removed `GENTLE_DOT_MCP_CLI`; two e2e tests still drove connector changes in the browser, which T23c made app-only, so they now check the browser shows the list with every change disabled and the reason (`c6d7c6f`, e2e 17/17). Independent verifier launched.
- **L115 (2026-10-09, user):** "si" to merging PR #5 and continuing with T23d. PR #5 merged (`ed14f2d`). T23d design: the daemon gets connector secrets from the app over the private channel (`secret_get/put/delete/list`), the app serves them from Keychain items it creates, and the daemon keeps them in memory only; OAuth sign-in and refresh run in the daemon with pi-mcp's OAuth and a channel-backed state store, replacing the `mcp login` CLI and the sign-in home files; existing secrets in the sign-in home, `connectors.json`, and the legacy `mcp-auth.json` migrate once into the Keychain and are removed from the files; without an app channel (attached daemon, `pnpm dev`) connectors that need secrets fail closed with a reason (the VPS store comes in T23h). Writer launched.