A personal assistant that lives on your desktop, remembers what matters, and can use your Mac for you.
TypeScript
docs(odd): record the T18b verification
Alan Buscaglia103e49625a4d
diff --git a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.mdindex ad28eec..cb3bb84 100644--- a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md+++ b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md@@ -165,4 +165,5 @@ Environment notes: Node v24.14.1 and pnpm are present. `cargo` is on PATH but `r- **L51 (2026-10-08, T22 evidence):** Commit `8651bba`. B1: connector state is in memory (loaded once), `prepareSpawn` renders from memory, the self-referential hash was removed, and changes to connectors.json/mcp.json are reverted while a `<workspace>/.pi/mcp.json` is removed (symlink-safe). The watcher uses fs.watch, a 1 s poll (macOS FSEvents missed early writes), a check before each spawn, and one after each settle; the UI shows "A change to your connectors was blocked.". B2: the guard blocks read/grep/find/ls/write/edit on auth.json, mcp-auth.json, models.json, mcp.json, connectors.json, `<data>/token`, and the guard file (realpath, dev:ino, case, `@`), and bash/powershell by basename after unquoting (documented best-effort). A3: full preview up to 8000 chars. A5: `redirect: manual`. A4: the private Engram is stopped by verified PID. A1: subagents disabled (`GENTLE_PI_AGENTS=0`; the probe asserts no `subagent_*`/`orchestrator_*`). The onboarding banner sits in the chat flow. Real-engine probe: before (base copy) notion-search ran with 0 cards and the files stayed altered; after, no MCP calls, files restored, notice shown. 328 tests ×3, typecheck, lint, e2e 17/17. Residuals documented for S25: edits while the daemon is down, edit-and-kill races, obfuscated bash, `presentText` normalizing whitespace in previews, A4 not exercised with a real Engram. The user's app was rebuilt and restarted with T22. Limited recheck running.- **L52 (2026-10-08, limited recheck + user decision):** The recheck was partial: the verifier's environment safety classifier blocked its own attack harness. Verified: the repo's real-engine probe of the original B1 attack passes (connector stays disabled, files restored, no MCP calls, notice shown); no `subagent_*` tools; 328 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 17/17. Not independently exercised: B1 variants (symlinked `.pi`, rename, python/node writers, the enforce→read race; code reading shows a second barrier, since the guard denies servers that are disabled in the in-memory policy) and B2 at runtime (covered only by the author's tests). The parent removed the scratch copies and confirmed that no probe Engram was left running. "Needs your decision" presented; user: "1" — accept T22 with the documented gaps and continue; S25 remains the real fix before any public release.- **L53 (2026-10-08, T18b evidence):** Commit `994abce`. Guided connectors: Discord via `@pasympa/[email protected]` (pinned; MIT, 18 releases, last 2026-09-03, readOnlyHint on its tools; the alternatives have not published since 2025), Slack official `https://mcp.slack.com/mcp` (no DCR; localhost redirect only with PKCE, so the client secret is optional), and Gmail official remote (Developer Preview) with the user's own app; each has an in-app guide, secret prompts, and a fail-closed curated list. Security finding: the engine resolves env/headers/`oauth.clientSecret` with `resolveConfigValue` (`!` runs a shell command, `$NAME` expands), so every typed or imported literal is escaped (`$`→`$$`, `!`→`$!`). S19: a `propose_connector` tool in the guard sends drafts through `ctx.ui.setStatus` (a namespaced key read only by the daemon); approval adds the server read-only with all tools hidden; at most 5 pending drafts, kept in memory only. S20: a read-only scan of 7 client formats (sse rejected, dedupe, names only in payloads, source hashes unchanged). Also coalesced burst restarts ("Agent is not ready"). RED: 27 failures plus a missing module → GREEN 362 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 18/18; T18b probe passed (the engine offers propose_connector; drafts and imports are accepted by `mcp list`; imported tools are hidden from the model; secrets are absent from scan payloads; the private Engram is stopped). Parent re-ran 362 tests + typecheck and reviewed the screenshots (import list with key names only; Slack guide). Risks: Slack and Gmail not tested end-to-end (no credentials; Gmail needs the Developer Preview), masking is heuristic, env refs in imported args are copied literally, and the S25 residual now includes a custom command server injected while the daemon is down. Risk tier high → independent verifier (code review + repo probes) running.-- **Next step:** the T18b verification; then T14 (Linux), T21 (computer control); T23/S25 before any public release.+- **L54 (2026-10-08, T18b verification):** No path found where a value runs a command or expands a variable, or where a connector is added without approval. Escaping covers exactly what the engine resolves (env, headers, `oauth.clientSecret`; `command`/`args`/`cwd`/`url` are not resolved), verified in the real mcp.json (`dummy-token-$!x` → `dummy-token-$$$!x`). Drafts pass (state changes only through a window's `connector_draft_reply`; approved servers are hidden and read-only; max 5). Import passes (read-only, 7 formats, sse rejected; the isolated HOME means `~`-relative credentials are not found). Guided connectors pass (pinned Discord; Slack/Gmail oauth fields valid; the guide's redirect equals the engine's `redirect_uri`). T22 protections are intact. Runs: 362 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 18/18, both probes. BLOCKER B1: `summarize()` (`connectors.ts:1434-1450`) leaks credentials inside imported args to the `connector_imports` and `list()` payloads (`--header "Authorization: Bearer …"`, URL query keys, userinfo in connection strings, tokens in URL paths); local authenticated windows only, not the model or logs. Advisories: `${input:}` in draft args or URL puts secrets in argv or a model-chosen URL; Gentle Shell `!command` imports run commands without a visible note; the S25 residual includes a custom command server injected while the daemon is down (medium; not blocking before S25); Gmail's `gmail.compose` scope can send; unpinned transitive Discord deps; minor UI and dedupe issues; the self-approval risk via the daemon token (S25). The parent cleaned the scratch dirs. One correction batch is running (B1 + advisories A–E).+- **Next step:** the T18b correction batch, then a recheck limited to B1; then T14 (Linux), T21; T23/S25 before any public release.