A personal assistant that lives on your desktop, remembers what matters, and can use your Mac for you.
TypeScript
docs(odd): record T23a and the app channel design (L111)
Alan Buscaglia67e002763253
diff --git a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.mdindex 8c837d3..eace511 100644--- a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md+++ b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Branch: `feat/gentle-dot` · Delivery strategy: `single-pr` (user choice, L7; fo- **S25 — Connector enforcement outside the agent's reach (stage 2, before publishing to other users).** Decided in L48. The daemon proxies MCP traffic: connector tokens live in the OS secure store (macOS Keychain, with an equivalent on Linux and the VPS), the engine sees only local proxy URLs, and enabled state, mode, and approvals are enforced by the daemon, not by files or an in-engine hook. Subagent child processes are covered too. Approvals must reach the user through a channel the agent cannot reach (L49: with the daemon access key, the agent could connect to the WebSocket and answer its own approval cards), for example a native OS dialog shown by the desktop app, or a per-window key never stored in a file the agent can read.- **Refined in L109** (map: L109; user choices: "Mac primero, Linux documentado (recomendado)", "Motor con otro usuario + PIN (recomendado)"). Trust boundary: the agent is a same-user process with a shell, so files and environment variables are never secrets. What it cannot reach on macOS: Keychain items owned by the signed app (other readers trigger a SecurityAgent prompt, which computer control blocks), the app's native dialogs, and a secret handed from the app to the daemon over an inherited pipe and closed before any child spawns.- - **S25.1 App key.** The desktop app generates a per-launch key and passes it to a daemon it launched through an inherited file descriptor (never a file or env var); the daemon reads it and closes the descriptor before spawning anything. A daemon the app merely attached to (already running) gets no key and none of the privileges below.+ - **S25.1 App channel.** The desktop app passes one end of a Unix socketpair to a daemon it launched as an inherited file descriptor (never a file, env var, or listening socket); the daemon keeps it from every child process (L111: the connection itself authenticates, replacing the per-launch key first drafted here). A daemon the app merely attached to (already running) gets no key and none of the privileges below.- **S25.2 Privileged actions only through the app.** Answering a connector approval, changing a connector's mode, enabling, connecting, or removing a connector, registering the computer helper, and storing or reading connector secrets are accepted only on a channel authenticated with the app key. The WebSocket access key (`<data>/token`) keeps chat, history, accounts, and read-only views; approval cards on the WebSocket become informational.- **S25.3 Native approvals.** Connector approvals and mode changes are confirmed in a native dialog shown by the desktop app (as computer control does), with the action's full preview; declining or no answer refuses; if the app or the channel is gone, the action is refused (fail closed).- **S25.4 MCP proxy.** The engine's `mcp.json` lists only `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp/<id>` entries with a per-engine-launch key; the daemon fronts every connector (remote HTTP with tokens it injects upstream, stdio servers it runs itself), filters `tools/list` by mode, refuses hidden tools on `tools/call`, filters resources and prompts the same way, and asks S25.3 before every sending action. Subagents reach connectors only through the proxy, so they can be enabled again (`GENTLE_PI_AGENTS`).@@ -193,9 +193,9 @@ Branch: `feat/gentle-dot` · Delivery strategy: `single-pr` (user choice, L7; fo| T32 | S24.10 | inline, after T31 | done (real NaN check pending) | `d9f0fa8`; RED 2 files failing → GREEN; pnpm test 584 | Model picker in the chat || T33 | S33 | delegated writer (context backstop; Rust + UI) | done (real Mac pending) | `2d1f5e4`; RED 51 compile errors + UI import → GREEN; cargo test 314, pnpm test 609 | Settings screen with a recordable, live-applied shortcut || T34 | S30.6 | delegated writer (Rust, `apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/voice/**`), parallel with the S25 map | in progress | — | Apple Speech fed with native buffers |-| T23a | S25.4 | delegated writer (daemon proxy), parallel with T23b | in progress | — | MCP proxy in the daemon: list/call filtering, hidden-tool refusal, resources, upstream HTTP and stdio |+| T23a | S25.4 | delegated writer (daemon proxy), parallel with T23b | done (verify running) | `6016b43`; RED 14+8 failing → GREEN; mutation check; pnpm test 636 | MCP proxy in the daemon: list/call filtering, hidden-tool refusal, resources, upstream HTTP and stdio || T23b | S25.5 (app side), S25.3 (dialogs) | delegated writer (Rust), parallel with T23a | done (not wired; real Mac pending) | `1c345b5`; RED 22 failing → GREEN; 2 mutation checks; cargo test 348 | Keychain store and native approval dialog in the app |-| T23c | S25.1, S25.2 | after T23a/T23b | pending | — | App key over an inherited fd; privileged channel; WebSocket loses approval and mode rights |+| T23c | S25.1–S25.3 | delegated writer (Rust + TS), parallel with the T23a/b verifier | in progress | — | Private app channel (socketpair on fd 3); privileged actions and native approvals only through it || T23d | S25.5 (daemon side) | after T23c | pending | — | OAuth in the daemon with the app-backed store; migration from files || T23e | S25.6 | after T23d | pending | — | connectors.json HMAC || T23f | S25.4 (subagents) | after T23c | pending | — | Enable subagents again behind the proxy; real-engine probe |@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ Environment notes: Node v24.14.1 and pnpm are present. `cargo` is on PATH but `r- **L102 (2026-10-09, user):** "bien pero, mientras estoy hablando no me aparece lo que se va enviar como cuando uso el bui† in de mac" — Parakeet transcribes correctly with our capture, so the earlier garbage came from Apple Speech with our converted 16 kHz audio (open: feed Apple the device's native buffers). Live text with the local model (`e027b19`): the recording so far (last 30 s at most) is decoded again every 0.8 s of new audio, skipping when the model is still loading or a decode runs (never blocking the audio thread), serialized with the final decode, and never shown after stop/cancel; RED (compile) → GREEN, cargo test 296. The Voice chip now names the engine ("Offline", "macOS", "Off"; `1396457`). Rebuilt, signed, restarted (also applies the model-chip fix `7ab0c0a`).- **L103 (2026-10-09, user):** "estaria bueno que si pongo el boton de grabar de nuevo en vez de enviarlo, que se quede escrito en el input para confirmarlo, como se comporta ahora estaria bueno que sea una opcion que uno elijiese". S30.4 updated: review in the input is the default; "Send when I stop" (switch in the recording strip, stored in localStorage) keeps send-on-stop; the mic button reads "Stop and review" or "Stop and send". `e0010eb`: RED 3 failing → GREEN, pnpm test 593 (the earlier tests now cover the option). Rebuilt, signed, restarted.- **L104 (2026-10-09, user):** "sube todo esto al repo y fijate el readme de gentle ai como es para copiar el estilo y hacer el propio para Gentle Dot"; choices "Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, público" and "main + feat/gentle-dot, y abro el PR (recomendado)"; then "usa la rosa con glow como banner". TruffleHog over the whole history: no verified secrets (unverified hits are masking-test fixtures). README rewritten in Gentle-AI's layout with an honest Security status; banner and divider rendered from the Dot's own rose strokes and glow (`docs/brand/tools/build-banner.mjs`); MIT LICENSE as in Gentle-AI. Created the public repo github.com/Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, `main` at the first commit `5ec596c`, pushed `feat/gentle-dot` (153 commits, 286 files, +57,416), and opened PR #1 (single-pr). Merge is the user's decision.+- **L111 (2026-10-09):** T23a done (`6016b43`): `mcp-proxy.ts` (Bearer per engine launch, Origin check, JSON-RPC over POST, mode filtering of tools/resources/prompts, hidden-tool refusal, one approval with the full preview before sending, upstream via pi-mcp HTTP or daemon-run stdio), engine `mcp.json` with proxy entries only, sign-in in `<data>/connector-signin` (0700/0600, protected, put back, one-time verified migration), guard `policy.proxied`. The user's install has no legacy `mcp-auth.json` and an empty `connectors.json`, so the migration is a no-op there. Design change for S25.1 by the parent: instead of a key, the app passes one end of a Unix socketpair as fd 3 when it spawns the daemon; the connection itself authenticates, with no key to steal and no listening socket to impersonate. Independent verifier on 7cde26d..6016b43 and the T23c writer launched in parallel.- **L110 (2026-10-09):** T23b done (`1c345b5`): `secure_store` (Keychain via security-framework, items created by the signed app; Secret Service on Linux, not compiled here; in-memory fake; redacted `Secret`), `approvals` (one native dialog at a time, full sanitized preview, Decline is the default button, 120 s timeout declines, `abortModal` for a stale dialog), and advisory A2 from L75 applied: computer-control grant, risky-action, and yolo dialogs default to their refusing button (Return no longer approves). A real Keychain put/get/delete under a throwaway service passed with no prompt and left no item. Open advisories for T23c/T23d: a same-user process can delete items (DoS, fail closed) or plant an item before the first put; `get` does not verify the item's ACL; item ids are readable. T23a (proxy) still running: sign-in moves to a daemon-owned `<data>/connector-signin/` home, protected like today's credential files.- **L109 (2026-10-09):** S25 map (explorer without web; platform facts inferred): any WebSocket client with `<data>/token` can answer approvals and also switch a connector to read and send, connect, or remove it (bridge.ts:253-273); pi-mcp 1.0.4 is client-only (stdio, streamable HTTP, OAuth with an injectable state store), so the daemon writes its own MCP server side, as the Rust computer helper already does (plain JSON over POST, accepted by the engine); a Keychain item created through the `security` CLI does not protect from the agent, one created by the signed app does; Linux Secret Service has no per-caller ACL. User choices: "Mac primero, Linux documentado (recomendado)" and "Motor con otro usuario + PIN (recomendado)". S25 refined into S25.1–S25.8 and T23a–T23h; T23a and T23b launched in parallel. Also: T34 done (`7a8773c`, native buffers for Apple Speech) and Voice language in Settings (`b2b2c79`) after the writer found the Mac is set to en-US, so Apple Speech always listened in English; app rebuilt, signed, restarted.- **L108 (2026-10-09, user):** "merge" — PR #3 merged (`231f413`). Then "da a todos" for: Apple Speech with native buffers (S30.6/T34, writer launched), S25 (T23, read-only map launched in parallel), and the real-hardware checks (need a second Mac, an x86_64 PC, and GNOME/Hyprland desktops: handed to the user and testers as a checklist).