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docs(odd): close T18

Alan Buscaglia6d91d10bed72
diff --git a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
index cb3bb84..be75bca 100644
--- a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
+++ b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Branch: `feat/gentle-dot` · Delivery strategy: `single-pr` (user choice, L7; fo
| T15 | S6, S7, S11, S12, S9 | delegated writers (parallel: daemon/isolation vs. Dot circle) | done | `8626a7d`, `05000c8`, `ac86f64`; limited recheck PASS (L31) | One correction batch for verifier blockers B1–B4 and the S9 circle change, then a recheck limited to them |
| T16 | S10 | inline | done | `7337b52` RED 4 failing → GREEN 14/14 | Accounts in two steps: method first, then provider |
| T17 | S14–S17, S21 | delegated writer (context backstop) | done | `b0ee7ac`; parent re-ran 227 tests, typecheck, lint | Queue display, gentlemanprogramming.com style, typing closes options, header icons |
-| T18 | S18–S20 | explore (delegated) → implement in two batches: T18a core (catalog, single mcp.json writer, CLI sign-in, approval guard extension, Connectors UI, Notion/Linear/Atlassian, tray item) delegated and running; T18b (Discord/Slack/Gmail guides, S19, S20) next | in progress | — | Connectors: map the engine's MCP integration and the providers first |
+| T18 | S18–S20 | explore (delegated) → T18a core + T18b guides/drafts/import, each verified independently | done | `e49bd9d`, `8651bba` (T22), `994abce`, `63c8e9c`; see L46–L55 | Connectors: map the engine's MCP integration and the providers first |
| T19 | S22 (+ design §4/§6/§7 refresh) | delegated writer (context backstop) | done | `225596d`; parent re-ran 260 tests, typecheck, lint + real-engine handoff probe | Single continuous chat: hide conversations, transparent session rotation, recent-only history |
| T20 | S23 | delegated writer, after T17 (the runtime refused it in parallel: test surface overlap with T17's `packages/daemon/test/**`) | done | `823363e`, follow-up `400ec73`; parent re-ran 235 tests, typecheck, e2e 12/12 | Global Engram, project gentle-dot |
| T21 | S24 | explore → spec → implement (last) | pending | — | Computer control with permissions guide, panic stop, and approvals |
@@ -166,4 +166,5 @@ Environment notes: Node v24.14.1 and pnpm are present. `cargo` is on PATH but `r
- **L52 (2026-10-08, limited recheck + user decision):** The recheck was partial: the verifier's environment safety classifier blocked its own attack harness. Verified: the repo's real-engine probe of the original B1 attack passes (connector stays disabled, files restored, no MCP calls, notice shown); no `subagent_*` tools; 328 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 17/17. Not independently exercised: B1 variants (symlinked `.pi`, rename, python/node writers, the enforce→read race; code reading shows a second barrier, since the guard denies servers that are disabled in the in-memory policy) and B2 at runtime (covered only by the author's tests). The parent removed the scratch copies and confirmed that no probe Engram was left running. "Needs your decision" presented; user: "1" — accept T22 with the documented gaps and continue; S25 remains the real fix before any public release.
- **L53 (2026-10-08, T18b evidence):** Commit `994abce`. Guided connectors: Discord via `@pasympa/[email protected]` (pinned; MIT, 18 releases, last 2026-09-03, readOnlyHint on its tools; the alternatives have not published since 2025), Slack official `https://mcp.slack.com/mcp` (no DCR; localhost redirect only with PKCE, so the client secret is optional), and Gmail official remote (Developer Preview) with the user's own app; each has an in-app guide, secret prompts, and a fail-closed curated list. Security finding: the engine resolves env/headers/`oauth.clientSecret` with `resolveConfigValue` (`!` runs a shell command, `$NAME` expands), so every typed or imported literal is escaped (`$`→`$$`, `!`→`$!`). S19: a `propose_connector` tool in the guard sends drafts through `ctx.ui.setStatus` (a namespaced key read only by the daemon); approval adds the server read-only with all tools hidden; at most 5 pending drafts, kept in memory only. S20: a read-only scan of 7 client formats (sse rejected, dedupe, names only in payloads, source hashes unchanged). Also coalesced burst restarts ("Agent is not ready"). RED: 27 failures plus a missing module → GREEN 362 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 18/18; T18b probe passed (the engine offers propose_connector; drafts and imports are accepted by `mcp list`; imported tools are hidden from the model; secrets are absent from scan payloads; the private Engram is stopped). Parent re-ran 362 tests + typecheck and reviewed the screenshots (import list with key names only; Slack guide). Risks: Slack and Gmail not tested end-to-end (no credentials; Gmail needs the Developer Preview), masking is heuristic, env refs in imported args are copied literally, and the S25 residual now includes a custom command server injected while the daemon is down. Risk tier high → independent verifier (code review + repo probes) running.
- **L54 (2026-10-08, T18b verification):** No path found where a value runs a command or expands a variable, or where a connector is added without approval. Escaping covers exactly what the engine resolves (env, headers, `oauth.clientSecret`; `command`/`args`/`cwd`/`url` are not resolved), verified in the real mcp.json (`dummy-token-$!x` → `dummy-token-$$$!x`). Drafts pass (state changes only through a window's `connector_draft_reply`; approved servers are hidden and read-only; max 5). Import passes (read-only, 7 formats, sse rejected; the isolated HOME means `~`-relative credentials are not found). Guided connectors pass (pinned Discord; Slack/Gmail oauth fields valid; the guide's redirect equals the engine's `redirect_uri`). T22 protections are intact. Runs: 362 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 18/18, both probes. BLOCKER B1: `summarize()` (`connectors.ts:1434-1450`) leaks credentials inside imported args to the `connector_imports` and `list()` payloads (`--header "Authorization: Bearer …"`, URL query keys, userinfo in connection strings, tokens in URL paths); local authenticated windows only, not the model or logs. Advisories: `${input:}` in draft args or URL puts secrets in argv or a model-chosen URL; Gentle Shell `!command` imports run commands without a visible note; the S25 residual includes a custom command server injected while the daemon is down (medium; not blocking before S25); Gmail's `gmail.compose` scope can send; unpinned transitive Discord deps; minor UI and dedupe issues; the self-approval risk via the daemon token (S25). The parent cleaned the scratch dirs. One correction batch is running (B1 + advisories A–E).
-- **Next step:** the T18b correction batch, then a recheck limited to B1; then T14 (Linux), T21; T23/S25 before any public release.
+- **L55 (2026-10-08, T18b correction + recheck):** Commit `63c8e9c`. B1: `summarize()` masks structurally (URL userinfo dropped, query values masked, long opaque path segments masked, `--header`/`-H` and auth-like header values masked, values after secret-like flags masked, prefix masks kept). Advisories: A, `draftSecretProblem` in the guard (the model gets "Secrets can only go into environment variables.") plus `parseDraft` as a second layer; B, notes for values that run a command or read an env var (never showing the command text); C, accurate Gmail/Slack/Discord copy; D, UI drafts capped at 5 and cleared on `ready`; E, an S25 bullet for custom/imported servers edited while the daemon is down. RED 9 → GREEN; 370 tests ×2, typecheck, lint, e2e 18/18. Parent limited recheck of B1: the five verifier cases (mcp-remote `--header Authorization: Bearer`, `?api_key=`, `postgresql://user:pass@`, a token in the URL path, `--api-key`) produced summaries without the secret while keeping command, host, path, and `--port 8080`; the full suite passed again. Known over-masking (flags containing key or pass). T18 complete.
+- **Next step:** T14 (Linux, Debian/Ubuntu/Omarchy, with the tester checklist); then T21 (computer control); T23/S25 before any public release; a Docker build check when Docker runs.