A personal assistant that lives on your desktop, remembers what matters, and can use your Mac for you.
TypeScript
docs(odd): record T23h (L129)
Alan Buscagliaae6f7336c96a
diff --git a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.mdindex 98c6e98..2610568 100644--- a/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md+++ b/odd/tasks/gentle-dot.md@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ Branch: `feat/gentle-dot` · Delivery strategy: `single-pr` (user choice, L7; fo| T23e | S25.6 | delegated writer (TS; context backstop) | done (verified; A1/A3 fixed, L120) | `9925c39`; RED 17 failing → GREEN; mutation check; pnpm test 688 ×2, e2e 17 | connectors.json HMAC || T23f | S25.4 (subagents) | delegated writer, parallel with T23g | done (verified, B1 fixed and rechecked) | `e9869d4`, `b6e235d` | Enable subagents again behind the proxy; real-engine probe || T23g | S25.7 | delegated writer (Rust Linux + containers), parallel with T23f | done (verified, B1/B2 fixed and rechecked) | `837a42d`, `920455b` | Linux: Secret Service store and documented limit |-| T23h | S25.8 | delegated writer (context backstop), after T23f | in progress | — | VPS: engine as another OS user, encrypted secrets, PIN approvals |+| T23h | S25.8 | delegated writer (context backstop), after T23f | done (verified; B1 fixed; full re-verification no blockers) | `35b942b`, `162473c`, `4d1035e` | VPS: engine as another OS user, encrypted secrets, PIN approvals || T35 | S35.1 | inline | in progress | — | No jiti cache inside the bundle || T36 | S35.2, S35.3 | delegated writer (daemon + Rust daemon spawn), parallel with T37/T38 | in progress | — | Daemon lifetime and engine home ownership || T37 | S35.4, S35.5 (#25) | delegated writer (UI), parallel | in progress | — | Composer send result; voice re-check |@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Environment notes: Node v24.14.1 and pnpm are present. `cargo` is on PATH but `r- **L102 (2026-10-09, user):** "bien pero, mientras estoy hablando no me aparece lo que se va enviar como cuando uso el bui† in de mac" — Parakeet transcribes correctly with our capture, so the earlier garbage came from Apple Speech with our converted 16 kHz audio (open: feed Apple the device's native buffers). Live text with the local model (`e027b19`): the recording so far (last 30 s at most) is decoded again every 0.8 s of new audio, skipping when the model is still loading or a decode runs (never blocking the audio thread), serialized with the final decode, and never shown after stop/cancel; RED (compile) → GREEN, cargo test 296. The Voice chip now names the engine ("Offline", "macOS", "Off"; `1396457`). Rebuilt, signed, restarted (also applies the model-chip fix `7ab0c0a`).- **L103 (2026-10-09, user):** "estaria bueno que si pongo el boton de grabar de nuevo en vez de enviarlo, que se quede escrito en el input para confirmarlo, como se comporta ahora estaria bueno que sea una opcion que uno elijiese". S30.4 updated: review in the input is the default; "Send when I stop" (switch in the recording strip, stored in localStorage) keeps send-on-stop; the mic button reads "Stop and review" or "Stop and send". `e0010eb`: RED 3 failing → GREEN, pnpm test 593 (the earlier tests now cover the option). Rebuilt, signed, restarted.- **L104 (2026-10-09, user):** "sube todo esto al repo y fijate el readme de gentle ai como es para copiar el estilo y hacer el propio para Gentle Dot"; choices "Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, público" and "main + feat/gentle-dot, y abro el PR (recomendado)"; then "usa la rosa con glow como banner". TruffleHog over the whole history: no verified secrets (unverified hits are masking-test fixtures). README rewritten in Gentle-AI's layout with an honest Security status; banner and divider rendered from the Dot's own rose strokes and glow (`docs/brand/tools/build-banner.mjs`); MIT LICENSE as in Gentle-AI. Created the public repo github.com/Gentleman-Programming/gentle-dot, `main` at the first commit `5ec596c`, pushed `feat/gentle-dot` (153 commits, 286 files, +57,416), and opened PR #1 (single-pr). Merge is the user's decision.+- **L129 (2026-10-10):** T23h committed (`35b942b`): server mode `GENTLE_DOT_VPS=1` (image only; refuses without root); daemon root with SETUID, SETGID, CHOWN, FOWNER, DAC_OVERRIDE, KILL and no-new-privileges; engine `dot` (uid 1001), stdio connector servers `dotmcp` (uid 999) via setpriv with `<data>/connector-home` (they cannot see the engine's workspace; documented); data dir root 0711, token/state/connectors/secrets/PIN root 0600; secrets AES-256-GCM per record (id as AAD) under `GENTLE_DOT_SECRETS_KEY`, scrubbed from every child, old file secrets migrated once; web PIN `pin_set`/`pin_command`/`pin_approve` (6-12 digits, scrypt + salt, constant-time, 5 failures -> 15 min persisted lockout; declining needs no PIN); desktop with the app channel unchanged. RED across protocol (4), UI (5), env scrub, spawn uid, new modules, vps-gateway 10/10, migration, CLI -> GREEN; pnpm test 778. Writer deviation: one `git stash` to observe a RED (checked: stash empty, HEAD intact; told not to repeat). The first independent verifier crashed twice (runtime errors) after a lead the parent confirmed by code: **B1** the root daemon ran Pi's ModelRuntime on dot-owned `auth.json`/`models.json` (`resolveConfigValue` runs `!cmd` values; voice refresh calls it on every provider list) and wrote engine files dot could replace with links. Correction `162473c` (class fix): ModelRuntime in `cli.ts --auth-helper` spawned as dot (no capabilities, scrubbed env, Node IPC, plain data back); every other daemon access to engine folders (profiles/settings, mcp.json + shim, `.pi`, `.engram`, history/rotation, uploads + prompt images, legacy mcp-auth.json, isolation) inside a synchronous `engineAccess` bracket (setgroups/setegid/seteuid to dot and back, exit 70 if it cannot restore); root files through `writePrivateFile` (O_EXCL temp, owner check, refused inside a bracket); per-launch hand-over removed; static guard against async fs (seteuid applies to every thread). RED: 2 non-root + 5 root tests in the container against a mktemp copy of `35b942b`; GREEN: pnpm test 790 (13 root-only skipped on macOS), root tests 18/18 in the image, 3 mutations caught. Fresh full verifier (7ff8021..162473c): **no blockers**; S25.8 PASS, desktop S25.1/2/5/6 unchanged; as dot every daemon file EACCES, environ denied, links and hardlinks refused, planted `!cmd` ran only as uid 1001, PIN lockout persisted, PIN never in logs. Advisories fixed in `4d1035e`: the user switch moved inside its try (root tests 18/18 in the image), entrypoint `.engram` hand-over only of root-owned files (`--from=0:0`), capability reasons in compose.yaml/deploy-vps.md corrected, stale token-folder comment. Advisories kept: connector `!cmd` values (user- or root-import-supplied only) resolve as root; root `existsSync` on engine-reported paths (boolean only); upgrade-only chmod in `prepareVpsLayout` follows a link left by an older image; `docker exec` shells inherit the key (documented); dot can ptrace/kill the helper (spoofed data or DoS, no root execution); a future library doing async fs as root is not caught by the guard. Not run: startup hand-over link probe (the safety policy blocks recursive chown commands), a daemon restart for lockout, a live connector `pin_approve`. S25 stage 2 complete (T23a-T23h). **Next step:** PR for T23f-T23h (about 4,700 changed lines; delivery decision pending), then the user's real-Mac round.- **L128 (2026-10-10):** T23g independent verifier: S25.1 (Linux channel) and S25.7 store PASS, Docker Linux check rerun green (379 tests, clippy, GNOME Keyring cases); two blockers. B1: the new docs said a keyring installed later needs no restart and that the assistant names it, but a keyring missing (or a prompt dismissed) at start leaves `unchecked` for the whole run (T23e fail-closed, by design), so the assistant gets INTEGRITY_UNCHECKED until a restart. B2: the daemon's mapping matched every `the secret store is unavailable: ` answer, changing macOS's locked-keychain wording and dropping the proxy's log line. Correction `920455b`: only the Linux answer (`/^the secret store is unavailable: .*Secret Service/`) is passed on; macOS keeps its wording (regression test); the proxy logs `connector <id> cannot get its secrets: …`; install.md, linux-testing.md, and design.md say to unlock/install the keyring and restart Gentle Dot. RED 2 → GREEN 43/43. Recheck: B1 and B2 closed (probes against a `git archive` copy). Advisories kept: getrlimit not on the POSIX async-signal-safe list (safe in glibc/musl); fcntl fallback never exercised; the 120 s bound is per prompt and the crate never dismisses a timed-out prompt; no-prompter maps to Denied; provider error text reaches the model unbounded (same-user only). T23h design accepted (writer's notice): `GENTLE_DOT_VPS=1` only in the container; daemon root, engine `dot`, stdio connector servers `dotmcp` via `setpriv`; `/app` root-owned read-only; root 0600 token, connectors.json, secrets, PIN; AES-256-GCM per record with `GENTLE_DOT_SECRETS_KEY` scrubbed from env; PIN over the WebSocket, scrypt + salt, 5 failures → 15 min persisted lockout; desktop unchanged. Parent added: `no-new-privileges`, `cap_drop: ALL`, only justified `cap_add`, and a smoke check that the engine and `dotmcp` have no effective or ambient capabilities.- **L127 (2026-10-10):** T23f done (`e9869d4`): subagents on by default (`GENTLE_DOT_SUBAGENTS=off` opts out); children load the approval guard through a daemon-written, protected shim in `<agentHome>/extensions/` that is inert outside assistant children and imports the guard from the daemon's install path; no `propose_connector` in children; inherited child markers scrubbed. RED 10 → GREEN 21/21; mutations (inert shim, `&&`→`||`) caught; opt-in offline real-engine probe (`GENTLE_DOT_SUBAGENT_PROBE=1`) passes in ~4 s. Risk tier high (item 2). Independent verifier: one blocker B1, an unwritable `extensions` folder made `enforce()` throw (daemon failed to start with subagents on or off; a planted `.pi/mcp.json` stayed; error logged every second). Correction `b6e235d`: any error placing the shim is reported once, subagents start off, the other checks still run; RED 2 tests → GREEN 9/9; recheck: B1 closed (scenarios A, B, C). Advisories kept: A1 shim written even with subagents off (harmless now), A2 planted `<shim>.<pid>.tmp` symlink (same as `mcp.json` at baseline), A3 children in other worktrees (baseline), A4 up-to-1 s unguarded window and a running engine keeps subagents on until its next start (documented), A5 probe uses a launcher fixture, not full gentle-shell. T23g done (`837a42d`): Linux crate 379 tests + clippy in the container; Secret Service put/get/delete against GNOME Keyring; no bus/no provider → Unavailable with the keyring reason; locked keyring → Denied fast; 120 s prompt bound; the app marks other fds close-on-exec in `pre_exec` (`close_range`, fcntl fallback); Node marks fd 3 CLOEXEC at startup so no daemon child holds the channel (strace; package smoke on debian and ubuntu: other holders none); same-user keyring limit documented (install.md, design.md, README, linux-testing step 17). Parent added the daemon side of the writer's finding: an app error starting `the secret store is unavailable: ` becomes `SecretsUnavailableError`, so the assistant names the missing keyring instead of "Could not reach X right now" (RED 1 → GREEN). Checks at `837a42d`: cargo test 385 passed 4 ignored, pnpm test 734 passed 6 skipped, typecheck, tracked lint clean. Not run: the GTK approval dialog on a real Linux desktop (S25.3 on Linux, tester step 17), KWallet, amd64. **Next step:** T23g verifier verdict, then T23h.- **L126 (2026-10-10, user):** "Sigue" (continue with the rest of S25 before the user's Mac checks). T23f (subagents behind the proxy) and T23g (Linux Secret Service, channel inheritance on Linux, documented limit) launched in parallel with disjoint surfaces; T23h (VPS) follows T23f because both touch the daemon's spawn and isolation.