Compress tool outputs, logs, files, and RAG chunks before they reach the LLM. 20% fewer tokens for coding agents, 60-95% fewer tokens for JSON, same answers. Library, proxy, MCP server.
Python agentaianthropicclaude-codecompressioncontext-engineeringcontext-windowcursorfastapilangchainllmmcpopenaiprompt-engineeringproxypythonragtoken-optimizationtokenstypescript
"""CORS scoping tests.
The proxy binds on localhost and serves content endpoints (e.g. ``/v1/retrieve``
returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs). A wildcard CORS origin combined with
``allow_credentials=True`` let any web page the user had open read those
responses via a cross-origin fetch to ``127.0.0.1`` (CWE-346). The default
policy must allow only loopback origins — on *any* port, since the bound port
lives in the CLI/uvicorn layer, not in ``ProxyConfig`` — while still offering an
explicit override for Docker / remote-dashboard deployments. See #863 / #864.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import httpx
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
def _make_client() -> TestClient:
config = ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
)
return TestClient(create_app(config))
def _preflight(client: TestClient, origin: str) -> httpx.Response:
"""Send a CORS preflight; CORSMiddleware answers it directly."""
return client.options(
"/v1/messages",
headers={"Origin": origin, "Access-Control-Request-Method": "POST"},
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"origin",
[
"http://localhost:8787",
"http://127.0.0.1:8787",
"http://localhost:9000", # non-default port — must still be allowed
"http://127.0.0.1:54321",
"https://localhost:8787",
"http://[::1]:8787", # IPv6 loopback
"http://localhost", # no explicit port
],
)
def test_loopback_origins_allowed_on_any_port(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, origin: str) -> None:
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", raising=False)
resp = _preflight(_make_client(), origin)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == origin
# The original vulnerability was wildcard + credentials; credentials stay off.
assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") != "true"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"origin",
[
"http://evil.com",
"https://attacker.example",
"http://localhost.evil.com", # suffix smuggling
"http://127.0.0.1.evil.com",
"http://notlocalhost", # prefix smuggling
],
)
def test_cross_origin_pages_rejected(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, origin: str) -> None:
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", raising=False)
resp = _preflight(_make_client(), origin)
# A disallowed origin is never echoed back, so the browser blocks the read.
assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") != origin
def test_explicit_allowlist_override(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://dash.example.com, http://10.0.0.5:3000")
client = _make_client()
allowed = _preflight(client, "https://dash.example.com")
assert allowed.status_code == 200
assert allowed.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == "https://dash.example.com"
# Once an explicit list is set, loopback is no longer implicitly trusted.
blocked = _preflight(client, "http://localhost:8787")
assert blocked.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") != "http://localhost:8787"
def test_wildcard_optback(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", "*")
resp = _preflight(_make_client(), "http://evil.com")
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == "*"
# Wildcard opt-back must not silently re-enable credentialed reads.
assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") != "true"