Compress tool outputs, logs, files, and RAG chunks before they reach the LLM. 20% fewer tokens for coding agents, 60-95% fewer tokens for JSON, same answers. Library, proxy, MCP server.
Python agentaianthropicclaude-codecompressioncontext-engineeringcontext-windowcursorfastapilangchainllmmcpopenaiprompt-engineeringproxypythonragtoken-optimizationtokenstypescript
"""Loopback-gating tests for state-mutating / content-leaking endpoints.
``/transformations/feed`` can return full prompt + completion bodies (when
``log_full_messages`` is on) and ``/cache/clear`` mutates server state. With the
default ``--host 0.0.0.0`` Docker bind, neither should be reachable by an
arbitrary network client — they are gated to the loopback interface via
``require_loopback`` (the same guard already used for ``/admin/*`` and
``/debug/*``). See #863.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from headroom.cache.backends import InMemoryBackend
from headroom.cache.compression_feedback import CompressionHints
from headroom.cache.compression_store import get_compression_store, reset_compression_store
from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import is_ip_literal_host_header
from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
GATED = [
("get", "/transformations/feed"),
("post", "/cache/clear"),
("get", "/v1/telemetry"),
("get", "/v1/telemetry/export"),
("post", "/v1/telemetry/import"),
("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools"),
("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools/example"),
("get", "/v1/toin/stats"),
("get", "/v1/toin/patterns"),
("get", "/v1/toin/pattern/example"),
# #2927 guarded the eight telemetry/TOIN routes the issue enumerated but
# left these two siblings open, and their payload carries the same raw
# agent query text (``common_queries``, built from ``event.query``).
("get", "/v1/feedback"),
("get", "/v1/feedback/example"),
]
def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
return create_app(
ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
)
)
def _loopback_client() -> TestClient:
# A real loopback peer + a loopback Host header — passes both guard gates
# (client-IP check and the DNS-rebinding Host-header check).
return TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
def test_debug_memory_is_available_to_loopback_published_container_host(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY", "172.17.0.1")
app = create_app(ProxyConfig(optimize=False, cache_enabled=False, stateless=True))
loopback = TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8787", client=("127.0.0.1", 1))
host = TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8787", client=("172.17.0.1", 1))
other_container = TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8787", client=("172.17.0.5", 1))
wrong_host = TestClient(app, base_url="http://attacker.example:8787", client=("172.17.0.1", 1))
assert "/debug/memory" in host.get("/openapi.json").json()["paths"]
assert loopback.get("/debug/memory").status_code == 200
response = host.get("/debug/memory")
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert "process" in response.json()
assert other_container.get("/debug/memory").status_code == 404
assert wrong_host.get("/debug/memory").status_code == 404
def _seed_ccr_entry() -> str:
reset_compression_store()
store = get_compression_store(backend=InMemoryBackend())
return store.store(
"seeded-ccr-content",
"<<ccr:seeded>>",
original_tokens=3,
compressed_tokens=1,
tool_name="seeded-test",
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
def test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
# A vanilla TestClient presents client.host="testclient", which is not a
# loopback IP, so the guard returns 404 (invisible, not 403).
client = TestClient(_make_app())
resp = client.request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
def test_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
client = _loopback_client()
resp = client.request(method, path, json={} if method == "post" else None)
# Detail routes legitimately return 404 when their test key is absent;
# the companion non-loopback test proves the guard itself.
assert resp.status_code in {200, 404, 422}, resp.text
def test_toin_pattern_detail_whitelists_learned_payload(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
class FakeTOIN:
def export_patterns(self):
return {
"patterns": {
"unknown|unknown|abc123": {
"sample_size": 10,
"total_compressions": 8,
"total_retrievals": 2,
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
"confidence": 0.4,
"skip_compression_recommended": False,
"optimal_max_items": 20,
"query_pattern_frequency": {"secret prompt": 1},
"common_query_patterns": ["secret prompt"],
"field_semantics": {"secret": "value"},
}
}
}
monkeypatch.setattr("headroom.proxy.server.get_toin", lambda: FakeTOIN())
client = _loopback_client()
identifier = client.get("/v1/toin/patterns").json()[0]["hash"]
response = client.get(f"/v1/toin/pattern/{identifier}")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {
"compressions": 8,
"retrievals": 2,
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
"confidence": 0.4,
"skip_recommended": False,
"optimal_max_items": 20,
}
@pytest.fixture
def scoped_toin(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path):
from headroom.telemetry.toin import TOINConfig, ToolIntelligenceNetwork
toin = ToolIntelligenceNetwork(TOINConfig(storage_path=str(tmp_path / "toin.json")))
patterns = {
"global|unknown|unknown|abc123": 8,
"global|unknown|unknown|abc456": 16,
"global|payg|claude|abc123": 24,
"other-tenant|unknown|unknown|abc123": 32,
"tenant/alpha?scope=one#fragment|unknown|unknown|abc123": 40,
}
toin.import_patterns(
{
"instance_id": "scoped-pattern-regression",
"patterns": {
key: {
"tool_signature_hash": key.rsplit("|", 1)[-1],
"sample_size": count,
"total_compressions": count,
"total_retrievals": 0,
}
for key, count in patterns.items()
},
}
)
monkeypatch.setattr("headroom.proxy.server.get_toin", lambda: toin)
return patterns
def test_listed_toin_identifiers_address_their_own_scoped_pattern(scoped_toin) -> None:
from urllib.parse import quote
client = _loopback_client()
listed = client.get("/v1/toin/patterns").json()
assert {item["hash"] for item in listed} == set(scoped_toin)
for item in listed:
response = client.get(f"/v1/toin/pattern/{quote(item['hash'], safe='')}")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["compressions"] == item["compressions"]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("prefix", "status", "count"),
[
("global|unknown|unknown|abc", 409, None),
("global|unknown|unknown|abc1", 200, 8),
("missing-pattern", 404, None),
],
)
def test_toin_prefix_lookup_is_unambiguous(scoped_toin, prefix, status, count) -> None:
response = _loopback_client().get(f"/v1/toin/pattern/{prefix}")
assert response.status_code == status
if count is not None:
assert response.json()["compressions"] == count
# Mutating routes reachable from loopback. `require_loopback` cannot stop a
# remote page from POSTing to a known 127.0.0.1 URL: a "simple" cross-origin
# request (Content-Type: text/plain carrying JSON) skips preflight, and the
# browser still sends the real loopback Host header. Only `Origin` betrays the
# attacker, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it.
CSRF_GUARDED = [
"/stats/reset",
"/cache/clear",
"/v1/retrieve",
"/v1/retrieve/tool_call",
"/v1/telemetry/import",
"/admin/runtime-env",
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
def test_cross_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
resp = _loopback_client().post(
path,
headers={"Origin": "https://attacker.example", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
content="{}",
)
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
def test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
# A sandboxed iframe or file:// page sends the opaque literal "null".
resp = _loopback_client().post(
path,
headers={"Origin": "null", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
content="{}",
)
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
def test_loopback_origin_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
# The local dashboard is same-origin on loopback and must keep working.
resp = _loopback_client().post(
path,
headers={"Origin": "http://127.0.0.1"},
json={},
)
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
def test_originless_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
# CLI tools and the TypeScript SDK send no Origin header at all; the guard
# must pass them through or it breaks every non-browser client.
resp = _loopback_client().post(path, json={})
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
def _feedback_with_query_text():
"""A feedback singleton whose patterns carry raw agent query text."""
class FakePattern:
total_compressions = 8
total_retrievals = 2
retrieval_rate = 0.25
full_retrieval_rate = 0.1
search_rate = 0.5
common_queries = {"find the customer api key rotation runbook": 3}
queried_fields = {"internal_field_name": 2}
class FakeFeedback:
def get_stats(self):
return {
"total_compressions": 8,
"total_retrievals": 2,
"global_retrieval_rate": 0.25,
"tools_tracked": 1,
"tool_patterns": {
"Grep": {
"compressions": 8,
"retrievals": 2,
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
"full_rate": 0.1,
"search_rate": 0.5,
"common_queries": ["find the customer api key rotation runbook"],
"queried_fields": ["internal_field_name"],
}
},
}
def get_compression_hints(self, tool_name):
# The real implementation is annotated ``-> CompressionHints`` and
# always returns one, so the double must too.
return CompressionHints()
def get_all_patterns(self):
return {"Grep": FakePattern()}
return FakeFeedback()
def test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(
"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
_feedback_with_query_text,
)
response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback")
assert response.status_code == 200
pattern = response.json()["feedback"]["tool_patterns"]["Grep"]
assert "common_queries" not in pattern
assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
# The aggregate counters the endpoint exists to expose still survive.
assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
def test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr(
"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
_feedback_with_query_text,
)
response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback/Grep")
assert response.status_code == 200
pattern = response.json()["pattern"]
assert "common_queries" not in pattern
assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
assert "internal_field_name" not in response.text
# CCR data endpoints — cached session content, gated to 404 off-loopback (#1227).
def test_stats_lifetime_route_uses_dashboard_metadata_access_policy(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv(
"HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS",
"100.90.0.5/32",
)
app = _make_app()
expected = {
"requests": {"total": 7},
"projects": {"headroom": {"requests": 3}},
"persistence": {
"enabled": True,
"healthy": False,
"error": "D:/private/proxy_savings.json: access denied",
},
}
monkeypatch.setattr(
app.state.proxy.metrics.savings_tracker,
"lifetime_response",
lambda: expected,
)
network = TestClient(app).get("/stats-lifetime")
assert network.status_code == 200, network.text
assert network.json() == {
"requests": {"total": 7},
"persistence": {
"enabled": True,
"healthy": False,
"error": None,
},
}
loopback = TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
).get("/stats-lifetime")
assert loopback.status_code == 200, loopback.text
assert loopback.json() == expected
trusted_dashboard = TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
).get("/stats-lifetime")
assert trusted_dashboard.status_code == 200, trusted_dashboard.text
assert trusted_dashboard.json() == expected
CCR_GATED = [
("post", "/v1/retrieve"),
("get", "/v1/retrieve/stats"),
("get", "/v1/retrieve/somehash"),
("post", "/v1/retrieve/tool_call"),
("post", "/v1/compress"),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", CCR_GATED)
def test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path, json={})
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
def test_ccr_retrieve_hash_route_blocks_valid_hash_for_non_loopback() -> None:
ccr_hash = _seed_ccr_entry()
try:
loopback = _loopback_client()
loopback_resp = loopback.get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
assert loopback_resp.status_code == 200, loopback_resp.text
assert loopback_resp.json()["original_content"] == "seeded-ccr-content"
network_resp = TestClient(_make_app()).get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
assert network_resp.status_code == 404, network_resp.text
finally:
reset_compression_store()
SETTINGS_GATED = [
("get", "/settings/schema"),
("get", "/settings"),
("get", "/dashboard/settings"),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
def test_settings_non_loopback_gets_404_without_trusted_cidr(method: str, path: str) -> None:
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
def test_settings_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
resp = _loopback_client().request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
def test_settings_trusted_gateway_dashboard_client_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, method: str, path: str
) -> None:
"""Settings routes must follow the same trust chain as /stats so the
dashboard works behind a reverse-proxy/gateway (#2466)."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
resp = client.request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
def test_settings_trusted_gateway_cidr_mismatch_still_404s(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.9", 12345),
)
assert client.get("/settings").status_code == 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path,body",
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
)
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_same_origin_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
) -> None:
"""Regression for #2491 review: a trusted-gateway dashboard client's real
same-origin browser POST (Origin matching this Host) must not be rejected
by the loopback-only same-origin guard."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"})
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path,body",
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
)
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_mismatched_origin_rejected(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
) -> None:
"""A trusted-gateway peer with a foreign Origin is still CSRF-rejected.
The mismatched Origin also fails the first (loopback-or-trusted-client)
gate's own same-origin check, so this surfaces as 404, not 403 -- either
way the write must not go through."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://attacker.example"})
assert resp.status_code in (403, 404), resp.text
def test_settings_post_loopback_null_origin_still_rejected() -> None:
"""Loopback callers keep the stricter loopback-only origin check: a
sandboxed-iframe/file:// "null" Origin must still 403, unaffected by the
trusted-dashboard-client carve-out."""
client = _loopback_client()
resp = client.post("/settings", json={"values": {}}, headers={"origin": "null"})
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
def test_dns_rebinding_host_header_rejected() -> None:
# Loopback peer IP but an attacker-controlled Host header (the DNS-rebinding
# shape) must still be rejected by the second gate.
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
resp = client.get("/transformations/feed", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host_header",
["100.82.0.2", "100.82.0.2:8787", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]:8787"],
)
def test_ip_literal_host_header_accepts_ip_addresses(host_header: str) -> None:
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host_header",
[None, "", "attacker.example", "localhost", "[email protected]", "100.82.0.2/path", "[fd7a::1"],
)
def test_ip_literal_host_header_rejects_non_addresses(host_header: str | None) -> None:
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is False
def _client(*, loopback: bool) -> TestClient:
app = _make_app()
if loopback:
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
# Default TestClient presents client.host="testclient" — not loopback.
return TestClient(app)
def test_health_config_block_is_loopback_only(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""/health stays reachable for monitors but hides the `config` block (which
echoes upstream API URLs + backend settings) from non-loopback callers."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SKIP_UPSTREAM_CHECK", "1")
network = _client(loopback=False).get("/health")
assert network.status_code == 200
assert "config" not in network.json()
# Basic health is still visible to monitors.
assert network.json()["status"] in {"healthy", "unhealthy"}
local = _client(loopback=True).get("/health")
assert local.status_code == 200
assert "config" in local.json()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("exclude_tools", "requested"),
[(None, "Bash"), ({"WebSearch"}, "Bash,WebSearch")],
)
def test_protected_tool_reuse_does_not_warn_about_missing_exclusions(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str],
exclude_tools: set[str] | None,
requested: str,
) -> None:
from headroom.cli.wrap import _warn_proxy_mode_mismatch
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SKIP_UPSTREAM_CHECK", "1")
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_MODE", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_MIN_TOKENS", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_EXCLUDE_TOOLS", requested)
app = create_app(
ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
disable_kompress=True,
exclude_tools=exclude_tools,
protect_tool_results={"Bash"},
)
)
client = TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
response = client.get("/health")
assert response.status_code == 200
capsys.readouterr()
_warn_proxy_mode_mismatch(response.json()["config"])
assert capsys.readouterr().out == ""
def test_stats_per_request_metadata_is_loopback_only() -> None:
"""/stats keeps aggregate counters public but restricts per-request metadata
(recent_requests / request_logs) and `config` to loopback callers."""
network = _client(loopback=False).get("/stats")
assert network.status_code == 200
payload = network.json()
assert "tokens" in payload # aggregate counters still served
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
assert "request_logs" not in payload
assert "config" not in payload
local = _client(loopback=True).get("/stats").json()
assert "recent_requests" in local
assert "config" in local
def test_stats_metadata_served_to_trusted_gateway_peer(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Containerized dashboards: a browser on the host reaches a bridge-network
container via the gateway IP, so the peer isn't 127.0.0.1 and per-request
metadata gets stripped. When the operator allow-lists the gateway CIDR via
HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS, the peer is treated as
loopback-equivalent and the metadata is served again."""
gateway_ip = "172.18.0.1" # typical docker/mocker bridge gateway
app = _make_app()
def _gateway_client() -> TestClient:
# Loopback Host header (the operator browses http://127.0.0.1:8787) but
# the peer IP is the container gateway, not loopback.
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
# Without the allow-list, the gateway peer is untrusted → metadata stripped.
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", raising=False)
stripped = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
assert "recent_requests" not in stripped
assert "config" not in stripped
# Allow-list the gateway CIDR → peer trusted → metadata served.
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
served = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
assert "recent_requests" in served
assert "config" in served
# DNS-rebinding defence still applies even for a trusted gateway peer: a
# non-loopback Host header must be rejected.
rebind = TestClient(app, base_url="http://attacker.example", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
payload = rebind.get("/stats").json()
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_for_ip_literal_host(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
cached: bool,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
app = _make_app()
client = TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}).json()
assert "recent_requests" in payload
assert "request_logs" in payload
assert "config" in payload
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"headers",
[
{"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"},
{"referer": "http://100.82.0.2:8787/dashboard"},
],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_to_same_origin_browser(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers).json()
assert "recent_requests" in payload
assert "request_logs" in payload
assert "config" in payload
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"headers",
[
{"origin": "http://attacker.example"},
{"referer": "http://attacker.example/dashboard"},
],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_hides_stats_metadata_from_cross_origin_browser(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
response = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers)
payload = response.json()
assert response.status_code == 200
assert "tokens" in payload
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
assert "request_logs" not in payload
assert "config" not in payload
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_uses_forwarded_proto_from_trusted_gateway(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
)
payload = client.get(
"/stats",
headers={
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
},
).json()
assert "recent_requests" in payload
assert "request_logs" in payload
assert "config" in payload
spoofed = (
TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
.get(
"/stats",
headers={
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
},
)
.json()
)
assert "recent_requests" not in spoofed
assert "request_logs" not in spoofed
assert "config" not in spoofed
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_rejects_unlisted_clients_and_hostname_hosts(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
app = _make_app()
unlisted = (
TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.6", 12345),
)
.get("/stats")
.json()
)
hostname = (
TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
.get("/stats", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
.json()
)
for payload in (unlisted, hostname):
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
assert "request_logs" not in payload
assert "config" not in payload
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_accepts_forwarded_client_from_trusted_gateway(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
app = _make_app()
trusted = (
TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
)
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
.json()
)
forged = (
TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("198.51.100.10", 12345),
)
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
.json()
)
assert "recent_requests" in trusted
assert "recent_requests" not in forged
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_normalizes_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.0/24")
app = _make_app()
payload = (
TestClient(
app,
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("::ffff:100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
.get("/stats")
.json()
)
assert "recent_requests" in payload
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_does_not_expand_other_management_endpoints(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
health = client.get("/health")
assert health.status_code == 200
assert "config" not in health.json()
assert client.get("/admin/upstream").status_code == 404
assert client.get("/debug/tasks").status_code == 404
assert client.post("/stats/reset").status_code == 404
# ─────────────────────── read-only telemetry routes ─────────────────────────
# These carried operator data (model/project/session labels, spend history,
# subscription utilisation, provider quota) to any network caller. They now
# share the /settings* trust chain: loopback or a trusted dashboard client
# behind a gateway; everyone else sees 404. The dashboard shell is a static
# template and stays reachable.
DASHBOARD_GATED = [
("get", "/stats-history"),
("get", "/stats-history?format=csv"),
("get", "/quota"),
("get", "/subscription-window"),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", DASHBOARD_GATED)
def test_dashboard_routes_non_loopback_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", DASHBOARD_GATED)
def test_dashboard_routes_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
resp = _loopback_client().request(method, path)
# /subscription-window answers 503 when tracking is off; the point here is
# that the *guard* let the caller through.
assert resp.status_code != 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", DASHBOARD_GATED)
def test_dashboard_routes_trusted_gateway_dashboard_client_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, method: str, path: str
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
resp = client.request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code != 404, resp.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", DASHBOARD_GATED)
def test_dashboard_routes_token_authenticated_operator_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, method: str, path: str
) -> None:
"""With a token configured the security gate is the control: 401 without,
through with. Mirrors the docker-bind e2e contract (correct token → 200)."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN", "s3cr3t-token")
app = _make_app()
network = TestClient(app, base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787", client=("10.10.0.7", 1))
assert network.request(method, path).status_code == 401
wrong = network.request(method, path, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer wrong"})
assert wrong.status_code == 401
ok = network.request(method, path, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t-token"})
assert ok.status_code not in (401, 404), ok.text
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", ["/stats-history", "/quota", "/metrics"])
def test_token_does_not_exempt_a_loopback_peer_from_the_host_check(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str
) -> None:
"""The gate waves loopback peers through without a token, so a configured
token must not short-cut the DNS-rebinding defence for them."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN", "s3cr3t-token")
app = _make_app()
local = TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8787", client=("127.0.0.1", 1))
assert local.get(path).status_code != 404
rebound = TestClient(app, base_url="http://attacker.example", client=("127.0.0.1", 1))
assert rebound.get(path).status_code == 404
def test_dashboard_shell_is_not_gated() -> None:
"""Static template, no operator data: a container published on host loopback
(peer = bridge gateway, Host = localhost) must still load it."""
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://localhost:8787", client=("172.17.0.1", 1))
assert client.get("/dashboard").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/stats-history").status_code == 404
def _acknowledged_container_app(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> FastAPI:
"""A token-less 0.0.0.0 bind acknowledged as published on host loopback,
running in a container whose bridge gateway is 172.17.0.1."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_BIND", "1")
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY", "172.17.0.1")
return create_app(
ProxyConfig(
host="0.0.0.0",
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
)
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", ["/stats-history", "/quota", "/subscription-window"])
def test_loopback_published_container_serves_dashboard_data_to_its_host(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str
) -> None:
"""Host browser -> 127.0.0.1 publication -> container sees the bridge gateway."""
app = _acknowledged_container_app(monkeypatch)
host = TestClient(app, base_url="http://localhost:8787", client=("172.17.0.1", 1))
assert host.get(path).status_code != 404
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"client,base_url,headers",
[
# Another container on the same bridge is not the host.
(("172.17.0.5", 1), "http://127.0.0.1:8787", {}),
# The trust is the TCP peer; a forwarded header naming the gateway is ignored.
(("172.17.0.5", 1), "http://127.0.0.1:8787", {"X-Forwarded-For": "172.17.0.1"}),
# The DNS-rebinding defence still applies to the gateway peer.
(("172.17.0.1", 1), "http://attacker.example:8787", {}),
],
)
def test_loopback_published_container_trust_is_exact(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
client: tuple[str, int],
base_url: str,
headers: dict[str, str],
) -> None:
app = _acknowledged_container_app(monkeypatch)
resp = TestClient(app, base_url=base_url, client=client).get("/stats-history", headers=headers)
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_container_gateway_needs_the_open_bind_acknowledgement(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Without the launcher's acknowledgement nothing vouches for the publication."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY", "172.17.0.1")
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://localhost:8787", client=("172.17.0.1", 1))
assert client.get("/stats-history").status_code == 404
def test_stats_history_csv_export_not_served_to_network_callers() -> None:
"""The CSV export is the whole spend/model/session history in one GET."""
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).get("/stats-history", params={"format": "csv"})
assert resp.status_code == 404
assert "text/csv" not in resp.headers.get("content-type", "")
# ─────────────────────────────── /metrics ───────────────────────────────────
# A Prometheus target: it cannot demand the dashboard's IP-literal Host header,
# but it must not be a free read for every network peer either.
def test_metrics_non_loopback_gets_404_without_token_or_cidr() -> None:
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).get("/metrics")
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
def test_metrics_loopback_allowed() -> None:
resp = _loopback_client().get("/metrics")
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert "text/plain" in resp.headers["content-type"]
def test_metrics_trusted_gateway_cidr_scraper_allowed(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""A scraper inside HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS with a hostname Host."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "10.9.0.0/24")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787",
client=("10.9.0.7", 40000),
)
assert client.get("/metrics").status_code == 200
def test_metrics_trusted_dashboard_cidr_allowed(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
)
assert client.get("/metrics").status_code == 200
def test_metrics_trusted_cidr_peer_outside_range_still_404s(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "10.9.0.0/24")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787",
client=("10.10.0.7", 40000),
)
assert client.get("/metrics").status_code == 404
def test_metrics_trusted_gateway_forwarding_an_outside_scraper_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Gateway CIDRs vouch for the connecting peer, not the forwarded scraper."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "10.9.0.0/24")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787",
client=("10.9.0.7", 40000),
)
resp = client.get("/metrics", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "192.0.2.8"})
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
def test_metrics_forwarded_gateway_address_from_untrusted_peer_404s(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Naming a gateway-CIDR address in X-Forwarded-For grants nothing."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "10.9.0.0/24")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787",
client=("10.10.0.7", 40000),
)
resp = client.get("/metrics", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "10.9.0.7"})
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_metrics_trusted_cidr_cross_origin_browser_rejected(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Browser provenance from another origin is refused even from a trusted peer."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "10.9.0.0/24")
client = TestClient(
_make_app(),
base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787",
client=("10.9.0.7", 40000),
)
resp = client.get("/metrics", headers={"Origin": "http://attacker.example"})
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_metrics_token_authenticated_network_caller_allowed(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""With a token configured the security gate is the control; /metrics defers to it."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN", "s3cr3t-token")
app = _make_app()
network = TestClient(app, base_url="http://headroom.svc.internal:8787", client=("10.10.0.7", 1))
assert network.get("/metrics").status_code == 401
ok = network.get("/metrics", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t-token"})
assert ok.status_code == 200, ok.text