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fix(proxy): enforce HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN on WebSocket handshakes (#3305)
Tejas Chopra27b4e2d147c5
diff --git a/headroom/proxy/server.py b/headroom/proxy/server.pyindex 233a0367c..e4c94d70c 100644--- a/headroom/proxy/server.py+++ b/headroom/proxy/server.py@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import sysimport threadingimport timefrom collections import OrderedDict-from collections.abc import Callable+from collections.abc import Callable, Mappingfrom dataclasses import fields, is_dataclass, replacefrom datetime import datetime, timezonefrom pathlib import Path@@ -2605,6 +2605,92 @@ _is_known_websocket_callback_failure = is_known_websocket_callback_failure_tool_schema_saved_from_tags = tool_schema_saved_from_tags+def read_proxy_token(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> str | None:+ """Return the caller-supplied proxy token from request headers, or ``None``.++ Shared by the HTTP security gate and :class:`WebSocketAuthMiddleware` so the+ two transports cannot drift on what counts as a credential. Header names are+ expected to be lowercase (Starlette's ``Headers`` is case-insensitive; the+ WebSocket middleware lowercases the raw ASGI pairs itself).+ """+ auth = str(headers.get("authorization") or "")+ if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):+ return auth[7:].strip() or None+ raw = headers.get("x-headroom-proxy-token")+ return str(raw) if raw else None+++class WebSocketAuthMiddleware:+ """Enforce ``HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN`` on WebSocket handshakes.++ The HTTP security gate is registered with ``@app.middleware("http")``, which+ is a Starlette ``BaseHTTPMiddleware`` — and that class hands any scope whose+ type is not ``http`` straight to the wrapped app. WebSocket connections+ therefore never reached the gate, so every ``app.websocket(...)`` route+ accepted unauthenticated callers even with a token configured. Those routes+ are not incidental: ``/v1/responses`` and ``/v1/live`` relay to the upstream+ provider using the operator's own credentials, and they are registered+ unconditionally. ``/v1/responses`` exists on both transports, so the POST was+ authenticated while the upgrade on the very same path was not.++ Written as a raw ASGI middleware rather than folded into the gate because+ that is the only layer that sees the ``websocket`` scope at all.++ Loopback callers are exempt, matching the HTTP gate exactly (same trust+ boundary as the admin/debug routes). Credentials are read from headers only:+ the handshake carries them fine for the programmatic clients these routes+ serve, and accepting a token from the query string would put it in access+ logs and browser history.+ """++ def __init__(self, app: Any, *, proxy_token: str | None = None) -> None:+ self.app = app+ self.proxy_token = proxy_token+ # Pre-encoded for constant-time comparison, mirroring the HTTP gate:+ # compare_digest on str raises TypeError for non-ASCII input, which+ # would turn a rejected handshake into a 500.+ self.token_bytes = proxy_token.encode("utf-8") if proxy_token else b""++ async def __call__(self, scope: Any, receive: Any, send: Any) -> None:+ if scope["type"] != "websocket" or not self.proxy_token:+ await self.app(scope, receive, send)+ return++ client = scope.get("client")+ client_host = client[0] if client else None+ if is_loopback_host(client_host):+ await self.app(scope, receive, send)+ return++ # Starlette's own Headers rather than a hand-built dict: on a repeated+ # header it returns the FIRST occurrence, which is what the HTTP gate+ # sees. Building a dict here instead took the LAST one, so the two+ # transports disagreed about which `Authorization` counted — exactly the+ # drift the shared reader below exists to prevent.+ from starlette.datastructures import Headers++ provided = read_proxy_token(Headers(scope=scope))+ if provided is not None and hmac.compare_digest(+ provided.encode("utf-8", "replace"), self.token_bytes+ ):+ await self.app(scope, receive, send)+ return++ logger.warning(+ "event=proxy_auth_rejected transport=websocket path=%s client=%s reason=%s",+ scope.get("path"),+ client_host,+ "missing_token" if provided is None else "bad_token",+ )+ # Receive the handshake before refusing it: ASGI servers send+ # ``websocket.connect`` and wait for the application to answer, and+ # answering with ``websocket.close`` *before* an accept is what refuses+ # the upgrade on the wire instead of accepting and then dropping it.+ message = await receive()+ if message["type"] == "websocket.connect":+ await send({"type": "websocket.close", "code": 1008})++class WebSocketProjectPrefixMiddleware:"""Normalize project-prefixed WebSocket paths before route matching."""@@ -3450,10 +3536,12 @@ def create_app(config: ProxyConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI:)return response- # ── Security gate (registered last → runs outermost) ──────────────────- # Three concerns, kept together because they all wrap every inbound+ # ── Security gate (outermost of the HTTP middlewares) ─────────────────+ # Three concerns, kept together because they all wrap every inbound HTTP# request: optional inbound auth on the data plane, response security# headers, and an audit trail for state-mutating admin endpoints.+ # WebSocket handshakes are covered separately — see the+ # WebSocketAuthMiddleware registration just below this block._proxy_token = config.proxy_token or os.environ.get("HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN") or None# Pre-encode once for constant-time comparison (compare_digest on str raises# TypeError for non-ASCII input, which would turn a 401 into a 500).@@ -3483,12 +3571,9 @@ def create_app(config: ProxyConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI:"Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")- def _extract_proxy_token(headers) -> str | None:- auth = str(headers.get("authorization") or "")- if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):- return auth[7:].strip() or None- raw = headers.get("x-headroom-proxy-token")- return str(raw) if raw else None+ # Delegates so the HTTP gate and WebSocketAuthMiddleware read a credential+ # by exactly one rule; they guard the same token on two transports.+ _extract_proxy_token = read_proxy_token@app.middleware("http")async def _security_gate(request, call_next):@@ -3530,6 +3615,12 @@ def create_app(config: ProxyConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI:logger.debug("admin audit emission failed", exc_info=True)return response+ # The gate above is http-only (BaseHTTPMiddleware ignores every other+ # scope), so the same token rule is applied to the `websocket` scope here.+ # Added after it, which makes it the outermost layer — an unauthenticated+ # handshake is refused before any project-prefix or routing work happens.+ app.add_middleware(WebSocketAuthMiddleware, proxy_token=_proxy_token)+# Third-party proxy extensions (Enterprise, custom plugins). Discovered via# the `headroom.proxy_extension` entry-point group, but **opt-in only**:# only names listed in config.proxy_extensions (CLI: --proxy-extension,diff --git a/tests/test_proxy_hardening.py b/tests/test_proxy_hardening.pyindex 65d158c02..85ddec4d8 100644--- a/tests/test_proxy_hardening.py+++ b/tests/test_proxy_hardening.py@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from fastapi.testclient import TestClientfrom headroom.cache.compression_store import reset_compression_storefrom headroom.offline import apply_offline_env, is_offlinefrom headroom.proxy.audit import is_auditable_path-from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app+from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, WebSocketAuthMiddleware, create_appNONLOOPBACK = ("203.0.113.5", 44444) # TEST-NET-3, never loopbackLOOPBACK = ("127.0.0.1", 12345)@@ -85,6 +85,217 @@ class TestInboundAuthToken:assert c.get("/readyz").status_code in (200, 503) # ready/not-ready, never 401+# ──────────────────── 2.1b inbound auth token over WebSocket ──────────────+++WS_PATHS = ("/v1/responses", "/v1/live")+++class _SpyApp:+ """Downstream ASGI app that records whether it was ever reached."""++ def __init__(self) -> None:+ self.called = False++ async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:+ self.called = True+++def _ws_scope(*, client=NONLOOPBACK, headers=(), path="/v1/responses"):+ return {+ "type": "websocket",+ "path": path,+ "client": client,+ "headers": [(k.lower().encode("latin-1"), v.encode("latin-1")) for k, v in headers],+ }+++async def _drive(middleware, scope):+ """Run one connection through the middleware, returning (sent, downstream)."""+ inbox = [{"type": "websocket.connect"}]+ sent: list[dict] = []++ async def receive():+ return inbox.pop(0) if inbox else {"type": "websocket.disconnect"}++ async def send(message):+ sent.append(message)++ await middleware(scope, receive, send)+ return sent+++def _closed_with_policy_violation(sent) -> bool:+ return any(m.get("type") == "websocket.close" and m.get("code") == 1008 for m in sent)+++class TestWebSocketAuthMiddleware:+ """The middleware itself, driven directly over ASGI.++ Asserted at this layer because a pre-accept close surfaces through+ ``TestClient`` as a bare ``AttributeError`` — indistinguishable from any+ other handshake failure — so an exception-shape assertion would pass for+ the wrong reason.+ """++ async def test_rejects_missing_credential(self):+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())++ assert downstream.called is False+ assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_rejects_wrong_credential(self):+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer wrong")]))++ assert downstream.called is False+ assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_accepts_correct_bearer(self):+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token")]))++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_accepts_custom_header(self):+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("x-headroom-proxy-token", "s3cr3t-token")]))++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_loopback_is_exempt(self):+ """Same trust boundary the HTTP gate already grants loopback."""+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=LOOPBACK))++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_unknown_client_is_treated_as_loopback(self):+ """Mirrors is_loopback_host(None) -> True, as the HTTP gate does."""+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=None))++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_repeated_header_resolves_like_the_http_gate(self):+ """A duplicated Authorization must mean the same thing on both transports.++ Starlette's Headers (what the HTTP gate reads) returns the FIRST+ occurrence. A hand-built dict returns the last, which would let the two+ paths disagree about which credential counted.+ """+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(+ mw,+ _ws_scope(+ headers=[+ ("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token"),+ ("authorization", "Bearer wrong"),+ ]+ ),+ )++ # First header wins → authenticated, same as the HTTP gate.+ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_no_token_configured_is_a_passthrough(self):+ """Default deployment must gain no new challenge."""+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=None)++ sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)++ async def test_http_scope_is_left_to_the_http_gate(self):+ downstream = _SpyApp()+ mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")++ sent = await _drive(mw, {**_ws_scope(), "type": "http"})++ assert downstream.called is True+ assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)+++class TestWebSocketRoutesAreGatedInTheApp:+ """The middleware is actually wired into ``create_app``.++ Asserts the security property directly — the route handler must never run+ for an unauthenticated handshake — rather than inspecting the exception the+ client happens to see.+ """++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)+ def test_unauthenticated_handshake_never_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):+ app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")+ reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)++ with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:+ try:+ with c.websocket_connect(path):+ pass+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - the refusal shape is asserted above+ pass++ assert reached() is False++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)+ def test_authenticated_handshake_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):+ app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")+ reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)++ with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:+ try:+ with c.websocket_connect(path, headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token"}):+ pass+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - route may fail with no upstream+ pass++ assert reached() is True+++def _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch):+ """Spy both WebSocket route families; returns a callable reporting arrival."""+ from headroom.providers import proxy_routes++ seen: list[str] = []++ # Each spy must terminate the handshake itself: a handler that returns+ # without accepting or closing leaves the client waiting forever.+ async def _responses_spy(websocket):+ seen.append("responses")+ await websocket.close(code=1000)++ async def _live_spy(websocket, *args, **kwargs):+ seen.append("live")+ await websocket.close(code=1000)++ monkeypatch.setattr(app.state.proxy, "handle_openai_responses_ws", _responses_spy)+ monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_routes, "handle_codex_live_websocket", _live_spy)+ return lambda: bool(seen)++# ───────────────────────────── 3.1 security headers ───────────────────────