The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
"""Replay-history sanitization shared by EVERY resume surface (messaging gateway, TUI/WebUI gateway).
A turn that died mid-tool-loop (restart command, stale timeout, interrupt before the result was written)
persists a dangling ``assistant(tool_calls)`` or interrupted ``assistant→tool`` tail; on resume the model
re-issues the unanswered call → endless "thinking"/reboot loop. These pure helpers strip those tails."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import math
import re
import time
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import make_tool_result_message
from agent.tool_result_classification import tool_may_have_side_effect
from agent.turn_context import drop_stale_api_content
from hermes_cli.timefmt import coerce_epoch
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Orphan-recovery notices: (side-effecting, read-only) for an interrupted block vs a dangling tail.
_INTERRUPTED_NOTICES = (
"[Orphan recovery: interrupted side-effecting tool may have executed; its effect is UNKNOWN. Inspect state before retrying.]",
"[Orphan recovery: interrupted read-only tool did not complete.]",
)
_DANGLING_NOTICES = (
"[Orphan recovery: this tool may have executed before Hermes stopped; its effect is UNKNOWN. Inspect current state before retrying.]",
"[Orphan recovery: this read-only tool did not complete and had no effect.]",
)
# Every executor ends the killed run's ``output`` with a bracketed marker line: "[Command
# interrupted]" (tools/environments/, exit 130), "[Command interrupted - Modal ...]"
# (managed_modal.py, exit 130), "[execution interrupted ...]" (code_execution_tool.py, exit -1).
_INTERRUPT_MARKER_LINE = re.compile(r"^\[(?:command|execution) interrupted\b[^\n]*\]\s*$", re.IGNORECASE)
def is_interrupted_tool_result(content: Any) -> bool:
"""True only when the result has the executor's interrupt SHAPE: the marker is the last
line of the output (JSON envelope with a non-zero exit code, or a bare text result). A
marker quoted inside successful output — a grep hit, a doc example — is ordinary data;
this runs on every live request, so a false positive rewrites real tool output."""
if not isinstance(content, str):
return False
output = content
if content.lstrip().startswith("{"):
try:
envelope = json.loads(content)
except ValueError:
return False
if not isinstance(envelope, dict) or envelope.get("exit_code") in (0, None):
return False
output = envelope.get("output")
if not isinstance(output, str):
return False
last_line = output.rstrip().rsplit("\n", 1)[-1]
return _INTERRUPT_MARKER_LINE.match(last_line) is not None
def _call_name(call: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return str((call.get("function") or {}).get("name") or "")
def _call_id(call: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return str(call.get("id") or call.get("call_id") or "")
def _any_side_effecting(calls: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> bool:
return any(tool_may_have_side_effect(_call_name(call)) for call in calls)
def _orphan_recovery(name: str, notices: tuple) -> tuple:
"""(effect_disposition, content) for an interrupted/dangling call named ``name``."""
if tool_may_have_side_effect(name):
return "unknown", notices[0]
return "none", notices[1]
def strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Strip interrupted assistant→tool blocks anywhere in history (a queued user message may follow one).
Read-only blocks are dropped; blocks with a side-effecting call are KEPT with the interrupted results
rewritten as orphan-recovery notices, since the effect may have happened."""
if not agent_history:
return agent_history
cleaned: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
i, n = 0, len(agent_history)
while i < n:
msg = agent_history[i]
if msg.get("role") == "assistant" and "tool_calls" in msg:
j = i + 1
while j < n and agent_history[j].get("role") == "tool":
j += 1
tool_results = agent_history[i + 1:j]
if any(is_interrupted_tool_result(m.get("content", "")) for m in tool_results):
calls = msg.get("tool_calls") or []
if _any_side_effecting(calls):
call_names = {_call_id(call): _call_name(call) for call in calls}
cleaned.append(msg)
for tool_result in tool_results:
if is_interrupted_tool_result(tool_result.get("content", "")):
name = call_names.get(str(tool_result.get("tool_call_id") or ""), "")
disposition, content = _orphan_recovery(name, _INTERRUPTED_NOTICES)
tool_result = {**tool_result, "effect_disposition": disposition, "content": content}
cleaned.append(tool_result)
else:
logger.debug("Stripping interrupted read-only assistant→tool replay block (indices %d–%d, tool_results=%d)",
i, j - 1, len(tool_results))
i = j
continue
if msg.get("role") == "tool" and is_interrupted_tool_result(msg.get("content", "")):
logger.debug("Stripping orphan interrupted tool result from replay history")
else:
cleaned.append(msg)
i += 1
return cleaned
def strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Strip a trailing ``assistant(tool_calls)`` with NO answers — a call that killed the gateway itself
(``docker restart``) left zero ``tool`` rows, invisible to ``strip_interrupted_tool_tails``. A partially
answered block still resumes. Read-only tails are dropped; side-effecting ones get UNKNOWN-effect results.
On resume the model sees an unanswered tool call at the tail and naturally re-issues it — which restarts
the gateway again, producing the infinite reboot loop in #49201. ``strip_interrupted_tool_tails`` does
not catch this because there is no tool result to inspect for an interrupt marker.
"""
if not agent_history:
return agent_history
last = agent_history[-1]
if not (isinstance(last, dict) and last.get("role") == "assistant" and last.get("tool_calls")):
return agent_history
tool_calls = last.get("tool_calls") or []
if _any_side_effecting(tool_calls):
recovered = list(agent_history)
for call in tool_calls:
name = _call_name(call) or "unknown"
disposition, content = _orphan_recovery(name, _DANGLING_NOTICES)
recovered.append(make_tool_result_message(name, content, _call_id(call), effect_disposition=disposition))
logger.warning("Recovered dangling side-effecting tool call(s) as UNKNOWN instead of erasing them")
return recovered
logger.debug("Stripping dangling unanswered read-only assistant(tool_calls) tail (%d call(s))", len(tool_calls))
return agent_history[:-1]
def sanitize_replay_history(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Both strippers in canonical order (interrupted blocks, then dangling tail); same list object when nothing strips."""
if not agent_history:
return agent_history
return strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history))
def canonicalize_replay_history(
agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]], *, now: Optional[float] = None
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Apply every destructive replay transform in the shared, fixed order.
Resume surfaces and the send path must serialize the same history bytes, or a
resumed request diverges in the middle of the cached prefix.
The input is never modified. ``now`` is the expiry clock; the send path passes the
turn's admission time so every request in one turn sees the same bytes.
"""
if not agent_history:
return agent_history
if now is None:
now = time.time()
cleaned = strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history)
cleaned = strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(cleaned)
return strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations(cleaned, now=now)
# --- Stale dangerous-confirmation text expiry ---
# Short on purpose: a dangerous confirmation must not survive any restart or resume gap.
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Stale dangerous-confirmation text
# expiry (#59607) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_EXPIRY_SECONDS = 60.0
# Phrases that unlock destructive host actions; case-insensitive substring match so trailing punctuation /
# extra context still matches. Includes i18n variants from the original incident.
_DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_PATTERNS: tuple = (
"confirm forced restart", "confirm forced reboot", "confirm shutdown", "confirm reboot", "confirm power off",
"yes, delete everything", "confirm wipe", "confirm factory reset",
"確認強制重開機", "確認強制重開", "確認重啟",
)
# Redacting in place (not deleting the message) preserves strict user/assistant alternation in the replay.
_EXPIRED_CONFIRMATION_SENTINEL = (
"[A high-risk confirmation previously given here has EXPIRED and must "
"not be acted on. Ask the user to re-confirm explicitly before "
"performing any destructive action.]"
)
def is_dangerous_confirmation(content: Any) -> bool:
"""True if user-message text contains a known dangerous confirmation phrase."""
if not isinstance(content, str):
return False
lowered = content.strip().lower()
return any(pattern in lowered for pattern in _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_PATTERNS)
def strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations(
agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]],
*,
now: float,
expiry_seconds: float = _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_EXPIRY_SECONDS,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Redact IN PLACE dangerous-confirmation text older than ``expiry_seconds`` in user messages: a confirmation
surviving a restart reads as a fresh re-confirmation minutes later. Untimestamped messages (legacy
transcripts, test scaffolding) are left untouched.
See #59607.
On the next inbound message — possibly a casual "are you there?" from the user minutes later — the LLM
sees the stale confirmation and may interpret the new turn as a fresh re-confirmation, re-executing the
destructive action. This is the failure mode reported in #59607.
"""
if not agent_history:
return agent_history
cleaned: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for msg in agent_history:
ts = msg.get("timestamp") if isinstance(msg, dict) and msg.get("role") == "user" else None
if ts is None or not is_dangerous_confirmation(msg.get("content", "")):
cleaned.append(msg)
continue
# A present-but-untrustworthy stamp (corrupt, or issued in the future relative to
# the admission clock) is treated as expired: its age is unknowable, and keeping the
# text (plus its api_content sidecar) would replay a live confirmation.
ts_f = coerce_epoch(ts, field="message timestamp")
age = math.inf if ts_f is None else now - ts_f
if 0 <= age <= expiry_seconds:
cleaned.append(msg)
continue
logger.debug(
"Redacting stale dangerous-confirmation text in user message (age=%.1fs, expiry=%.1fs): %r",
age, expiry_seconds, (msg.get("content") or "")[:80],
)
redacted = dict(msg)
redacted["content"] = _EXPIRED_CONFIRMATION_SENTINEL
# The api_content sidecar carries the exact bytes sent — the confirmation itself; replaying it would undo the redaction.
drop_stale_api_content(redacted)
cleaned.append(redacted)
return cleaned