The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
"""Auth-gate middleware for the dashboard.
Engaged when ``app.state.auth_required is True``; a no-op otherwise (loopback
mode is handled by the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` ``auth_middleware``). Allows
the auth-bootstrap routes and static assets through unauthenticated; for
everything else demands a bearer token or a valid session cookie and attaches
the verified :class:`Session` to ``request.state.session``. On the gateway's
Webapp a cookie session also needs its sign-in binding to the browser credential
(``hermes_cli.webapp_sign_in``), and its cookie writes, sign-out included, must come
from the Webapp's own origin. HTML routes are
redirected to ``/login``; ``/api/*`` routes get a 401 JSON envelope.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from typing import Awaitable, Callable
from urllib.parse import quote
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
from starlette.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
from hermes_cli import webapp_sign_in
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_interactive_providers, list_session_providers
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import ProviderError
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import (
clear_session_cookies, clear_sso_attempt_cookie, detect_https, read_session_cookies,
read_session_provider, read_sso_attempt_cookie, set_session_cookies,
set_session_provider_cookie, set_sso_attempt_cookie)
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import PUBLIC_API_PATHS
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.refresh_singleflight import refresh_session_coalesced
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.request_utils import (
access_token_max_age as _expires_in_seconds, client_ip as _client_ip,
cookie_origin_is_allowed, extract_bearer as _extract_bearer, is_safe_next_path,
scan_session_providers, unreachable_response)
_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Prefix-matched bypass list: auth bootstrap routes and static asset mounts. ``/assets/`` with
# the trailing slash matches ``/assets/foo.css`` but not ``/assetsleak``.
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"/auth/login", "/auth/callback", "/auth/native/authorize", "/auth/native/token",
"/auth/native/refresh", "/auth/password-login", "/auth/logout", "/login",
"/api/auth/providers", "/api/mcp/oauth/callback/",
"/assets/", "/dashboard-plugins/", "/favicon.ico", "/ds-assets/", "/fonts/", "/fonts-terminal/")
# Page icons, matched exactly. Browsers fetch them without cookies (the Webapp's page icon and
# home-screen icon are ``/apple-touch-icon.png``), so behind the gate they hit the sign-in redirect
# and log an auto-SSO ``login_start`` with no sign-in behind it.
_GATE_PUBLIC_ICONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"/apple-touch-icon.png"})
def _path_is_public(path: str) -> bool:
""":data:`PUBLIC_API_PATHS` (shared with the legacy middleware) and :data:`_GATE_PUBLIC_ICONS`
matched exactly so ``/api/status`` never exposes ``/api/status/extension``;
:data:`_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES` prefix-matched."""
return path in PUBLIC_API_PATHS or path in _GATE_PUBLIC_ICONS or any(
path == p or path.startswith(p) for p in _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES)
def _safe_next_target(request: Request) -> str:
"""URL-encoded ``next`` value for the login redirect, or ``""``. Only same-origin paths outside
the auth flow and ``/api`` are kept (query preserved); dropped deep links fall back to the
SPA's ``sessionStorage["hermes.lastLocation"]``.
Behind a reverse proxy at a sub-path (``X-Forwarded-Prefix``, e.g. ``/hermes``), the prefix
is prepended AFTER validation so the post-login redirect lands within the mount
(``/hermes/sessions`` rather than bare ``/sessions``)."""
path = request.url.path
if not path or not is_safe_next_path(path):
return ""
prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
if prefix:
path = prefix + path
query = request.url.query
return quote(f"{path}?{query}" if query else path, safe="")
#: The 403 detail for a cookie write from another origin; only the gateway's Webapp checks
#: (``SurfacePolicy.own_origin_cookie_writes``), so it names the public URL that listener reads.
_CROSS_ORIGIN_WRITE_DETAIL = ("Cookie-authenticated writes must come from the Webapp's own origin. "
"Behind a reverse proxy, set webapp.public_url to the URL the browser uses.")
_SAFE_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"})
def _own_origin_writes(request: Request) -> bool:
from hermes_cli.web_server_surface import policy
return policy(request.app.state).own_origin_cookie_writes
def _unauth_response(request: Request, *, reason: str) -> Response:
"""API routes -> 401 JSON with ``login_url``; HTML routes -> 302 -> /login. fetch() follows a
302 opaquely into the cross-origin OAuth dance, so API routes never get redirects; the SPA's
401 handler navigates to ``login_url`` on ``unauthenticated`` / ``session_expired``."""
next_param = _safe_next_target(request)
prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
login_url = f"{prefix}/login?next={next_param}" if next_param else f"{prefix}/login"
if request.url.path.startswith("/api/"):
expired = reason == "invalid_or_expired_session"
# Same reason the client already receives. Never include the bearer.
audit_log(AuditEvent.SESSION_REJECTED, reason=reason, path=request.url.path,
ip=_client_ip(request))
return JSONResponse(
{"error": "session_expired" if expired else "unauthenticated", "detail": "Unauthorized",
"reason": reason, "login_url": login_url}, status_code=401)
return RedirectResponse(url=login_url, status_code=302)
def _auto_sso_response(request: Request) -> Response | None:
"""302 straight to ``/auth/login`` on an unauthenticated HTML load, or ``None``.
Only for a document load (not ``/api/*``) when exactly one interactive OAuth-style provider is
registered (a password provider must render the form) and the one-shot loop-guard cookie is
absent — a present marker means the portal had no session last time: clear it and fall back
to ``/login`` rather than ping-pong. Convenience, not a security check.
"""
if request.url.path.startswith("/api/"):
return None
gateway = webapp_sign_in.cookie_gateway(request)
if read_sso_attempt_cookie(request, gateway):
resp = _unauth_response(request, reason="no_cookie")
clear_sso_attempt_cookie(resp, prefix=prefix_from_request(request), gateway=gateway)
return resp
providers = list_interactive_providers()
if len(providers) != 1 or getattr(providers[0], "supports_password", False):
return None
provider = providers[0]
prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
next_param = _safe_next_target(request)
auth_login = f"{prefix}/auth/login?provider={quote(provider.name, safe='')}"
if next_param:
auth_login = f"{auth_login}&next={next_param}"
resp = RedirectResponse(url=auth_login, status_code=302)
set_sso_attempt_cookie(resp, use_https=detect_https(request), prefix=prefix, gateway=gateway)
audit_log(AuditEvent.LOGIN_START, provider=provider.name, reason="auto_sso",
ip=_client_ip(request))
return resp
def _verify_access_token(
request: Request, *, access_token: str, provider_hint: str | None = None, audit: bool = True):
"""Run ``verify_session`` across the provider stack; Session or ``None``. ``audit=False`` is
the native-app bearer path (no cookie, no server-side refresh — the desktop rotates via
``/auth/native/refresh``); 503-on-outage semantics come from :func:`scan_session_providers`."""
def _audit_unreachable(provider):
if audit:
audit_log(AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE, provider=provider.name,
reason="provider_unreachable", ip=_client_ip(request))
return scan_session_providers(
provider_hint, lambda p: p.verify_session(access_token=access_token),
phase="verify" if audit else "bearer verify", log=_log, on_unreachable=_audit_unreachable)
def peek_session(request: Request):
"""The verified Session a request to a PUBLIC path carries, or ``None``, with the gate's own
checks (Webapp sign-in binding, bearers only a native app was given) and none of its side
effects: no refresh, no cookie writes, no audit records, no 401. A public route uses it to
decide how much to show; an expired or unverifiable session reads as signed out."""
bearer = _extract_bearer(request)
if bearer:
if not webapp_sign_in.token_works_alone(request, bearer):
return None
access_token, provider_hint = bearer, None
else:
gateway = webapp_sign_in.cookie_gateway(request)
access_token, _rt = read_session_cookies(request, gateway)
if not access_token or (webapp_sign_in.applies(request) and not webapp_sign_in.check(request)):
return None
provider_hint = read_session_provider(request, gateway)
try:
return _verify_access_token(
request, access_token=access_token, provider_hint=provider_hint, audit=False)
except ProviderError:
return None
async def _serve_refreshed(request: Request, call_next, new_session, provider: str) -> Response:
"""Serve the request under a just-rotated session and write the rotated cookies back. Writing
the ROTATED RT is mandatory: Portal runs reuse detection, so replaying the stale RT would
revoke the session."""
request.state.session = new_session
response = await call_next(request)
set_session_cookies(
response, access_token=new_session.access_token, refresh_token=new_session.refresh_token,
access_token_expires_in=_expires_in_seconds(new_session), use_https=detect_https(request),
prefix=prefix_from_request(request), provider=provider,
gateway=webapp_sign_in.cookie_gateway(request))
webapp_sign_in.renew(response, request)
audit_log(AuditEvent.REFRESH_SUCCESS, provider=provider, user_id=new_session.user_id,
ip=_client_ip(request))
return response
def _session_expired_response(request: Request) -> Response:
"""Refresh failed (or no RT): structured 401/redirect and clear the dead cookies under the
active prefix so the deletion Path matches the set Path."""
audit_log(AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE, reason="no_provider_recognises",
ip=_client_ip(request))
response = _unauth_response(request, reason="invalid_or_expired_session")
clear_session_cookies(response, prefix=prefix_from_request(request),
gateway=webapp_sign_in.cookie_gateway(request))
return response
async def gated_auth_middleware(
request: Request, call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]]) -> Response:
"""Engaged only when ``app.state.auth_required is True``."""
if not getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
return await call_next(request)
# Already authenticated by the token-auth seam (service caller on a registered token
# route): not a cookie session, must not bounce to /login.
if (getattr(request.state, "token_authenticated", False)
or getattr(request.state, "native_http_principal", None)):
return await call_next(request)
# Login/callback routes have their own credentials/state checks. Logout is public so an
# expired session can leave; where cookie writes must come from the listener's own origin it
# still consumes cookies, so it goes through that check.
own_origin = _own_origin_writes(request)
cookie_logout = own_origin and request.url.path == "/auth/logout"
if _path_is_public(request.url.path) and not cookie_logout:
return await call_next(request)
# RFC 8252 native-app bearer path: the same provider-minted access token the cookie flow
# stores, verified with the same provider stack, no cookie read or set. A presented-but-
# invalid bearer gets the structured 401 so the desktop refreshes/re-logs instead of
# following a cookie redirect. On the gateway's Webapp only tokens it gave a native app's
# sign-in work here: a browser login's tokens work only as its cookies, which sign-out ends.
bearer = _extract_bearer(request)
if bearer:
if cookie_logout:
return await call_next(request)
if not webapp_sign_in.token_works_alone(request, bearer):
return _unauth_response(request, reason="invalid_or_expired_session")
try:
bearer_session = _verify_access_token(request, access_token=bearer, audit=False)
except ProviderError as e:
return unreachable_response(str(e))
if bearer_session is not None:
request.state.session = bearer_session
return await call_next(request)
return _unauth_response(request, reason="invalid_or_expired_session")
gateway = webapp_sign_in.cookie_gateway(request)
at, _rt = read_session_cookies(request, gateway)
provider_hint = read_session_provider(request, gateway)
if (own_origin and (at or _rt) and request.method not in _SAFE_METHODS
and not cookie_origin_is_allowed(request)):
return JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"detail": _CROSS_ORIGIN_WRITE_DETAIL})
if cookie_logout:
return await call_next(request)
if not at and not _rt:
# No session at all: try the silent portal bounce before /login.
auto = _auto_sso_response(request)
return auto if auto is not None else _unauth_response(request, reason="no_cookie")
if webapp_sign_in.applies(request) and not webapp_sign_in.check(request):
# A login on the gateway's Webapp holds only while the browser credential it was bound to is
# in use; signing out replaced it. The cookies stay and open nothing until it signs in again.
return _unauth_response(request, reason="signed_out")
# An absent AT with a present RT is the COMMON expiry case (the AT cookie's Max-Age tracks
# the token TTL, so the browser evicts it first) — skip straight to refresh.
session = None
if at:
try:
session = _verify_access_token(request, access_token=at, provider_hint=provider_hint)
except ProviderError as e:
return unreachable_response(str(e))
if session is None:
# Rotate via the refresh token before forcing re-login; on success the request is
# served transparently with the rotated cookies re-set.
try:
refreshed = await run_in_threadpool(
_attempt_refresh, request, refresh_token=_rt, provider_hint=provider_hint)
except ProviderError as e:
# Uncertain (provider unreachable), not rejected: keep the cookies.
return unreachable_response(str(e))
if refreshed is None:
return _session_expired_response(request)
return await _serve_refreshed(request, call_next, *refreshed)
request.state.session = session
response = await call_next(request)
if not provider_hint and session.provider:
set_session_provider_cookie(
response, provider=session.provider, use_https=detect_https(request),
prefix=prefix_from_request(request), gateway=gateway)
return response
def _attempt_refresh(request: Request, *, refresh_token, provider_hint: str | None = None):
"""Rotate an expired session via the refresh token; ``(Session, provider_name)`` or ``None``.
Concurrent requests carrying the same stale RT are coalesced (``refresh_singleflight``): a
burst of parallel fetches after AT expiry must not replay a rotated RT into the provider's
reuse detection. ``RefreshExpiredError`` rejects that candidate only (Basic raises it for
foreign opaque tokens too); if none succeeds and any raised ``ProviderError`` it is
re-raised so the caller returns 503 without clearing cookies. Synchronous: the gate runs it
in the threadpool so a slow IdP never blocks the event loop."""
if not refresh_token:
return None
def _audit_failure(reason):
return lambda provider: audit_log(
AuditEvent.REFRESH_FAILURE, provider=provider.name, reason=reason,
ip=_client_ip(request))
return refresh_session_coalesced(
refresh_token, provider_hint or "", phase="refresh", log=_log,
on_rejected=_audit_failure("refresh_expired"),
on_unreachable=_audit_failure("provider_unreachable"))