The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
"""DebPackage.unpack containment regressions (via pm.store.extract_tar).
A safe extractor must forbid ANY write or chmod outside the staged tree.
The malicious .deb fixtures are real ar+tars built in a temp sandbox and
pointed at an outside SENTINEL file/dir inside the sandbox — never real
user or /etc data. Absolute-symlink rejection runs everywhere; the
symlink-privilege-dependent shapes are host-gated because Windows may lack
symlink privilege (validator-checked before the test bodies create links).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import os
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from pm.package import DebPackage, InstallError
from tests.pm._fixtures import _ar_member
class _P(DebPackage):
name = "evil-deb"
def _build_deb(path: Path, members: list[tarfile.TarInfo | tuple[str, bytes]], *, zstd: bool = False) -> None:
"""A real ar archive with one data.tar (uncompressed, or zstd as Ubuntu ships) holding `members`."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:
for item in members:
if isinstance(item, tuple):
name, content = item
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.size = len(content)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
else:
tf.addfile(item)
payload, member = buf.getvalue(), "data.tar"
if zstd:
from compression import zstd as zstd_codec
payload, member = zstd_codec.compress(payload), "data.tar.zst"
path.write_bytes(
b"!<arch>\n"
+ _ar_member("debian-binary", b"2.0\n")
+ _ar_member(member, payload)
)
def _symlink_member(name: str, linkname: str) -> tarfile.TarInfo:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
info.linkname = linkname
info.mode = 0o777
return info
def test_chained_aliases_survive_without_symlink_support(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
def unavailable(*args, **kwargs):
raise OSError("symlinks unavailable")
monkeypatch.setattr(os, "symlink", unavailable)
deb = tmp_path / "aliases.deb"
lib = "data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib"
_build_deb(deb, [
_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so", "libexample.so.1"),
_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"),
(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1.2", b"library payload"),
])
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
for name in ("libexample.so", "libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"):
assert (staged / lib / name).read_bytes() == b"library payload"
def test_relative_member_escape_preserves_outside(tmp_path):
deb, staged = tmp_path / "escape.deb", tmp_path / "staged"
sentinel = tmp_path / "sentinel"
sentinel.write_bytes(b"outside")
_build_deb(deb, [("../sentinel", b"escaped")])
staged.mkdir()
with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert sentinel.read_bytes() == b"outside"
def test_zstd_payload_unpacks_under_the_same_containment(tmp_path):
"""Ubuntu's .debs carry data.tar.zst; it stages like any other and its escapes are refused."""
deb, staged = tmp_path / "ok.deb", tmp_path / "staged"
_build_deb(deb, [("usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1", b"omp")], zstd=True)
staged.mkdir()
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-x64")
assert (staged / "usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1").read_bytes() == b"omp"
sentinel = tmp_path / "sentinel"
sentinel.write_bytes(b"outside")
_build_deb(deb, [("../sentinel", b"escaped")], zstd=True)
with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
_P().unpack(deb, tmp_path / "staged2", "linux-x64")
assert sentinel.read_bytes() == b"outside"
def test_absolute_symlink_target_rejected(tmp_path: Path):
"""A member whose symlink target is ABSOLUTE must be refused outright:
the link points outside the staged tree the moment it is created."""
deb = tmp_path / "abs-link.deb"
_build_deb(
deb,
[
_symlink_member("data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin/tool", "/etc/shadow"),
],
)
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
with pytest.raises(InstallError):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert not (staged / "data").exists()
@pytest.mark.platforms("posix")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"shape",
["relative-link", "planted-ancestor"],
)
def test_symlink_escape_forbidden(tmp_path: Path, shape: str):
"""Relative link and pre-existing ancestor escapes leave outside bytes/mode intact.
These exercise containment, not an independent late chmod-walk guard.
"""
outside = tmp_path / "outside"
outside.mkdir()
sentinel = outside / "sentinel.txt"
sentinel.write_text("do not touch")
os.chmod(sentinel, 0o600)
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
if shape == "relative-link":
members = [_symlink_member("link", "../outside"), ("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
else:
(staged / "link").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)
members = [("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
deb = tmp_path / f"escape-{shape}.deb"
_build_deb(deb, members)
with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert sentinel.read_text() == "do not touch", (
f"{shape}: a staged symlink was followed outside the tree"
)
assert os.stat(sentinel).st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()