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The agent that grows with you

feat(catalog): add airlock

Otsoa Dubief1ad1944a56af
diff --git a/plugin-catalog/airlock.yaml b/plugin-catalog/airlock.yaml
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+name: airlock
+title: airlock
+repo: https://github.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock
+sha: c18f357a22153622ecdce71e07be64fe1bff3665
+subdir: airlock
+version: "0.2.0"
+description: >-
+ Guardrails that follow what a conversation has read. Once a session reads untrusted content (a web page, a
+ browser snapshot, an MCP or third-party plugin's output, a customer's message), airlock seals it: messages to
+ anyone but the owner, network writes, pushes and deploys, memory, skill and cron writes, browser input, URLs
+ that could carry data out and code that reaches the network go through Hermes's own approval gate. Walls hold
+ in every session: credential paths and secret files, the guard's own files and Hermes's config, shell startup
+ files, other profiles, commands that switch approvals off. Shell commands are read the way the shell reads
+ them, so a command that computes or hides what it runs (eval, base64 | sh, $G push, wildcards, write-then-run)
+ is refused until written in clear. Subagents inherit the seal. It also catches an injection by its signature:
+ recognized secrets never leave in a call; a private marker in the agent's context locks the session if it shows
+ up in a tool call; a send to an address the untrusted content named is blocked; repeated refusals lock the
+ session; lookalike Unicode in commands is refused. Plugin and MCP tools nobody admitted need
+ approval. Observe mode, stop switch, `hermes airlock check|demo|log`. Tested on a corpus of 251 attacks
+ and everyday commands, and end to end in the official image.
+ Disclosure — hooks only (pre_tool_call, post_tool_call, pre_llm_call, subagent_start, on_session_reset,
+ post_approval_response), no tools. No network, no LLM call, runs no command. Reads the profile's config.yaml
+ (home channels, approvals mode) and its own policy file (<HERMES_HOME>/airlock.yaml); lists directories to
+ expand wildcards in commands it checks. Writes under plugin-data/airlock: a journal of decisions, taints and
+ approvals that includes tool arguments, truncated (journal.args: none leaves them out), the taint state and the
+ stop switch. When nobody can approve (--yolo, approvals.mode: off, cron set to approve) it blocks instead of
+ letting Hermes auto-approve (policy approvals_off: follow restores Hermes's behaviour). Install scan: caution,
+ because the default policy and the shell reader name the patterns airlock guards against (startup files,
+ crontab, credential commands, exfiltration shapes).
+maintainer: otsoa-dubief
+tier: community
+category: tools
+requires_hermes: ">=0.21.5"
+docs_url: https://github.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock#readme
+image: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/c18f357a22153622ecdce71e07be64fe1bff3665/docs/images/social-preview.png
+screenshots:
+ - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/c18f357a22153622ecdce71e07be64fe1bff3665/docs/images/live-session.gif
+ - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/c18f357a22153622ecdce71e07be64fe1bff3665/docs/images/how-it-works.png
+ - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/c18f357a22153622ecdce71e07be64fe1bff3665/docs/images/check.png
+platforms: []
+known_issues:
+ - "Built for in-process plugins (Hermes's default): under plugins.isolation: host it cannot tell third-party plugin tools from Hermes's own."
+capabilities:
+ provides_tools: []
+ provides_hooks:
+ - pre_tool_call
+ - post_tool_call
+ - pre_llm_call
+ - subagent_start
+ - on_session_reset
+ - post_approval_response
+ provides_middleware: []
+ requires_env: []