The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
fix(approval): show hidden characters on the remaining first-render prompt surfaces
Teknium33bce7b26dd4
diff --git a/acp_adapter/edit_approval.py b/acp_adapter/edit_approval.pyindex 12f517472c8..6c161eeb145 100644--- a/acp_adapter/edit_approval.py+++ b/acp_adapter/edit_approval.py@@ -200,9 +200,12 @@ def maybe_require_edit_approval(tool_name: str, arguments: dict[str, Any]) -> stdef build_acp_edit_tool_call(proposal: EditProposal):"""Build the ToolCallUpdate payload for ACP request_permission."""import acp+ from agent.redact import redact_approval_display+ # The title is display text; the diff keeps the raw path the client opens.return acp.update_tool_call(- f"edit-approval-{next(_PERMISSION_REQUEST_IDS)}", title=f"Approve edit: {proposal.path}", kind="edit",+ f"edit-approval-{next(_PERMISSION_REQUEST_IDS)}", title=f"Approve edit: {redact_approval_display(proposal.path)}",+ kind="edit",status="pending",content=[acp.tool_diff_content(path=proposal.path, old_text=proposal.old_text, new_text=proposal.new_text)],raw_input={"tool": proposal.tool_name, "arguments": proposal.arguments},diff --git a/agent/display.py b/agent/display.pyindex daf0c0abcd8..9ac45f1e331 100644--- a/agent/display.py+++ b/agent/display.py@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ from urllib.parse import urlsplitfrom utils import safe_json_loadsfrom agent.i18n import t-from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text+from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text, sanitize_command_for_displayfrom agent.tool_result_classification import (shape_failure_error, file_mutation_result_landed, has_failure_marker, is_guardrail_refusal)@@ -406,7 +406,9 @@ def _preview_todo_list(args: dict, _max_len: int) -> str:def _preview_shell(key: str):def _build(args: dict, max_len: int) -> str | None:command = args.get(key)- return None if command is None else _tail_trunc(summarize_shell_command(str(command)), max_len) or None+ # Sanitize before summarizing: the spinner sits under the approval prompt and must not hide what it does.+ return None if command is None else _tail_trunc(+ summarize_shell_command(sanitize_command_for_display(str(command))), max_len) or Nonereturn _builddiff --git a/tests/agent/test_approval_display_sanitize.py b/tests/agent/test_approval_display_sanitize.pyindex c5160e59497..41c73ed7a45 100644--- a/tests/agent/test_approval_display_sanitize.py+++ b/tests/agent/test_approval_display_sanitize.py@@ -68,3 +68,32 @@ def test_consent_descriptions_are_sanitized_on_tui_and_api_egress():for payload in (_approval_request_payload(data), _approval_request_event("run1", data)):assert payload["description"] == sanitize_command_for_display(data["description"])assert "\u202e" not in payload["description"] and _TAIL in payload["description"][:200]+++def test_first_render_surfaces_get_the_display_copy_while_values_stay_raw(monkeypatch):+ import json+ from types import SimpleNamespace++ from agent.display import build_tool_preview+ from tools import approval_context, approval_prompt+ from tools.clarify_tool import clarify_tool++ raw = "rm -rf ./build\u200b-cache" + "\u2028" * 60 + "; " + _TAIL+ # Selected plugin transport: command and description arrive as the display copy.+ seen = []+ monkeypatch.setattr(approval_context, "_get_approval_transport_config", lambda: ("phone", None))+ monkeypatch.setattr(approval_prompt, "get_plugin_manager", lambda: SimpleNamespace(+ get_approval_transport=lambda name: SimpleNamespace(present=lambda r: seen.append(r) or r.respond("deny"))))+ approval_prompt._present_with_selected_transport(+ command=raw, description="why\u202e", pattern_key="k", pattern_keys=["k"], session_key="s",+ surface="cli", allow_session=True, allow_permanent=True)+ assert (seen[0].command, seen[0].description) == (sanitize_command_for_display(raw), "why\\u202e")+ # Tool-progress line under the prompt shows the hidden characters instead of collapsing them.+ preview = build_tool_preview("terminal", {"command": raw}, max_len=0)+ assert "\\u200b" in preview and "\\u2028 \u00d760" in preview+ # Clarify: the surface renders the display copy; the tool result echoes the raw question and choice.+ asked = []+ result = json.loads(clarify_tool([{"question": raw, "choices": ["go\u200b"]}], callback=lambda qs: asked.extend(qs)+ or {"answers": {qs[0]["qid"]: qs[0]["choices_offered"][0]}, "outcome": "submitted"}))+ assert asked[0]["question"] == sanitize_command_for_display(raw)+ assert result["responses"][0]["question"] == raw and result["responses"][0]["user_response"] == "go\u200b"diff --git a/tools/clarify_tool.py b/tools/clarify_tool.pyindex dc381891e0f..a4a89c358b4 100644--- a/tools/clarify_tool.py+++ b/tools/clarify_tool.py@@ -116,11 +116,15 @@ def clarify_tool(questions, callback: Optional[Callable] = None) -> str:return tool_error(error)if callback is None:return tool_error(_UNAVAILABLE)+ from agent.redact import redact_approval_displayfrom tools.human_input_hooks import human_input_request+ # Every surface renders the display copy of the question; the result echoes the raw text. Choices stay+ # raw: a picked choice is the answer value.+ shown = [{**q, "question": redact_approval_display(q["question"])} for q in normalized]# Observers see the questions only; the answers stay in the tool result.- with human_input_request("clarify", prompt="\n".join(q["question"] for q in normalized)) as human:+ with human_input_request("clarify", prompt="\n".join(q["question"] for q in shown)) as human:try:- reply = callback(normalized)+ reply = callback(shown)human.outcome = str(reply.get("outcome") or "")return _result(normalized, reply)except Exception as exc:diff --git a/tools/human_input_hooks.py b/tools/human_input_hooks.pyindex 99c32e4d0fb..2b131134a88 100644--- a/tools/human_input_hooks.py+++ b/tools/human_input_hooks.py@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@dangerous-command approval) and ``on_human_input_resolved`` fires exactly once when the wait ends,with the same ``request_id`` and an ``outcome``. Observers only: return values are ignored and afailing plugin never affects the prompt. Payloads never carry what the human typed (password,-answers), and ``prompt`` is force-redacted so credentials in a command never reach a plugin.+answers), and ``prompt`` is force-redacted (with hidden characters shown) so credentials in a command never reach a plugin."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ class HumanInputRequest:def _redacted(text: str) -> str:try:- from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text- return redact_sensitive_text(str(text or ""), force=True)+ from agent.redact import redact_approval_display+ return redact_approval_display(text, force=True)except Exception:logger.debug("human-input hook prompt redaction failed", exc_info=True)return "" # never fall back to the raw text