The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
fix(url-safety): look for controls on the string the host checks read
unsupportedpastels55bfc47de1ea
diff --git a/tests/tools/test_url_safety_authority_floor.py b/tests/tools/test_url_safety_authority_floor.pyindex ae1912e057b..883c9dc3f87 100644--- a/tests/tools/test_url_safety_authority_floor.py+++ b/tests/tools/test_url_safety_authority_floor.py@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ TEMPLATED_CODE = ['js("fetch(`http://localhost:${port}/api`)")',]+# Trailing C0 controls (and DEL) that urlsplit keeps in the host and WHATWG clients drop.+TRAILING_CONTROLS = ["\x00", "\x01", "\x08", "\x1b", "\x1f", "\x7f"]+class TestFloorAcceptsTemplatedUrlLiterals:@pytest.mark.parametrize("code", TEMPLATED_CODE)def test_local_browser_runs_templated_dev_server_urls(self, local_browser, code):@@ -84,3 +87,22 @@ class TestFloorJudgesPercentEncodedHostDecoded:@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["http://%6c%6f%63%61%6c%68%6f%73%74/", "http://exa%20mple.com/"])def test_decoded_ordinary_host_not_blocked(self, url):assert is_always_blocked_url(url) is False+++class TestTrailingControlCannotHideMetadataHost:+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("control", TRAILING_CONTROLS)+ def test_floor_blocks_despite_dns_failure(self, control):+ assert is_always_blocked_url("http://169.254.169.254" + control) is True++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("control", TRAILING_CONTROLS)+ def test_is_safe_url_refuses_with_proxy_configured(self, proxy, control):+ assert is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254" + control) is False++ def test_browser_scan_blocks_raw_control_literal(self, local_browser):+ verdict = browser_use_cli._code_url_verdict('new_tab("http://169.254.169.254\x01")')+ assert verdict.blocked is not None++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("url", [" https://example.com/ ", "https://example.com/\n", "\thttps://example.com/\r\n"])+ def test_surrounding_whitespace_still_accepted(self, proxy, url):+ assert is_always_blocked_url(url) is False+ assert is_safe_url(url) is Truediff --git a/tools/url_safety.py b/tools/url_safety.pyindex 8a7ef15d974..98f24b985da 100644--- a/tools/url_safety.py+++ b/tools/url_safety.py@@ -230,8 +230,18 @@ def _normalize_hostname(host: Optional[str]) -> str:# different host from one string: WHATWG ends the authority at ``\``, percent-decodes the host and# accepts ``http:\\host`` or ``http:///host``; urlsplit does none of these. So# ``http://127.0.0.1:8080\@1.1.1.1`` is 1.1.1.1 here and 127.0.0.1:8080 in a browser. Such-# URLs are refused rather than guessed at. Both parsers strip C0 controls and space from the ends.-_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = "".join(chr(c) for c in range(0x21))+# URLs are refused rather than guessed at. WHATWG strips every C0 control from the ends, but urlsplit+# keeps a trailing one in the host, so only ordinary whitespace is stripped before looking for controls.+_URL_EDGE_WHITESPACE = " \t\n\r\x0b\x0c"+++def _url_hostname(url: str, *, percent_decode: bool = False) -> str:+ """The host of *url* as every check compares it: the same edge stripping as the ambiguity check,+ lowercased, trailing dot dropped, optionally percent-decoded first."""+ host = urlsplit(url.strip(_URL_EDGE_WHITESPACE)).hostname or ""+ if percent_decode:+ host = unquote(host)+ return _normalize_hostname(host)def _authority_ambiguity(url: str, *, floor: bool = False) -> Optional[str]:@@ -241,7 +251,7 @@ def _authority_ambiguity(url: str, *, floor: bool = False) -> Optional[str]:``floor`` keeps only what can move the host itself (controls, no ``//``, ``\\`` in the authority):userinfo and an unparseable port (templated ``{port}``/``%d`` literals) leave the host as is, andthe floor checks a percent-encoded host after decoding it."""- url = url.strip(_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)+ url = url.strip(_URL_EDGE_WHITESPACE)parts = urlsplit(url)if parts.scheme.lower() not in _HTTP_SCHEMES:return None@@ -336,7 +346,7 @@ def is_always_blocked_url(url: str) -> bool:if reason is not None:logger.warning("Blocked request — ambiguous URL authority (always-blocked floor): %s", reason)return True- hostname = _normalize_hostname(unquote(urlparse(url).hostname or ""))+ hostname = _url_hostname(url, percent_decode=True)if not hostname:return Falseif hostname in _BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES:@@ -389,9 +399,7 @@ def is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:clients could parse differently (userinfo included). ``allow_private_urls`` skips private-IPblocking, but cloud metadata endpoints remain blocked regardless."""try:- parsed = urlparse(url)- hostname = _normalize_hostname(parsed.hostname)- scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").strip().lower()+ scheme = (urlparse(url).scheme or "").strip().lower()if scheme not in _HTTP_SCHEMES:logger.warning("Blocked request — unsupported URL scheme: %s", scheme or "<empty>")return False@@ -400,6 +408,7 @@ def is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:# The reason only: the URL may carry userinfo credentials.logger.warning("Blocked request — ambiguous URL authority: %s", reason)return False+ hostname = _url_hostname(url)if not hostname:return False