The agent that grows with you
Python aiai-agentai-agentsanthropicchatgptclaudeclaude-codecodexhermeshermes-agentllmnous-researchopenai
perf(mcp): bound the work behind a large trust-gate argument preview
teknium1b91de2cafdac
diff --git a/tools/mcp_tool_handlers.py b/tools/mcp_tool_handlers.pyindex 184ef421d26..91c2da6b4ad 100644--- a/tools/mcp_tool_handlers.py+++ b/tools/mcp_tool_handlers.py@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ def _format_trust_gate_arguments(args: dict) -> str:from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_textrendered = json.dumps(_mask_secret_fields(args), ensure_ascii=False, indent=2, default=str)+ # Scan and redact only a window well past the cap: a multi-megabyte payload (a file write) would+ # otherwise hold the prompt back for seconds.+ window = 4 * _TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_MAX_CHARS+ cut, rendered = len(rendered) > window, rendered[:window]# Bidi overrides, invisible format characters and the C1/DEL controls JSON leaves raw could make the# card show something other than what the server receives; render them as escapes.rendered = "".join(ch.encode("unicode_escape").decode()@@ -105,7 +109,7 @@ def _format_trust_gate_arguments(args: dict) -> str:# force: the approval prompt is a display boundary even with security.redact_secrets off. The CLI# prints it as-is. Redact before truncating so a cut cannot split a secret past its pattern.rendered = redact_sensitive_text(rendered, force=True)- if len(rendered) > _TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_MAX_CHARS:+ if cut or len(rendered) > _TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_MAX_CHARS:keep = _TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_MAX_CHARS - len(_TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_TRUNCATION_MARKER)rendered = rendered[:keep].rstrip() + _TRUST_GATE_ARGUMENTS_TRUNCATION_MARKERreturn rendered