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/** Sanitize a figma-exported SVG before it touches disk (design spec §5). DOM-walk allowlist
* (linkedom): unknown elements and attributes are dropped by default rather than pattern-matched
* as dangerous, so a new SVG feature can't reopen a class of bug the way regex denylisting did.
*/
import { DOMParser } from "linkedom";
const SAFE_ELEMENTS = new Set([
"svg",
"g",
"defs",
"symbol",
"use",
"image",
"a",
"switch",
"rect",
"circle",
"ellipse",
"line",
"polyline",
"polygon",
"path",
"text",
"tspan",
"textPath",
"linearGradient",
"radialGradient",
"stop",
"pattern",
"mask",
"clipPath",
"marker",
"filter",
"feBlend",
"feColorMatrix",
"feComponentTransfer",
"feComposite",
"feConvolveMatrix",
"feDiffuseLighting",
"feDisplacementMap",
"feDistantLight",
"feDropShadow",
"feFlood",
"feFuncA",
"feFuncB",
"feFuncG",
"feFuncR",
"feGaussianBlur",
"feImage",
"feMerge",
"feMergeNode",
"feMorphology",
"feOffset",
"fePointLight",
"feSpecularLighting",
"feSpotLight",
"feTile",
"feTurbulence",
"title",
"desc",
"metadata",
"style",
]);
// Local names only — a namespace prefix (xlink:href, x:href, ...) is stripped before this
// lookup, so it doesn't matter which prefix an attacker aliases onto a real or fake namespace.
const SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
"id",
"class",
"style",
"transform",
"viewBox",
"width",
"height",
"x",
"y",
"x1",
"y1",
"x2",
"y2",
"cx",
"cy",
"r",
"rx",
"ry",
"fx",
"fy",
"points",
"d",
"offset",
"enable-background",
"gradientUnits",
"gradientTransform",
"spreadMethod",
"patternUnits",
"patternContentUnits",
"patternTransform",
"maskUnits",
"maskContentUnits",
"clipPathUnits",
"clip-rule",
"filterUnits",
"primitiveUnits",
"preserveAspectRatio",
"space",
"lang",
"role",
"focusable",
"tabindex",
"version",
"baseProfile",
"fill",
"fill-opacity",
"fill-rule",
"stroke",
"stroke-width",
"stroke-opacity",
"stroke-linecap",
"stroke-linejoin",
"stroke-miterlimit",
"stroke-dasharray",
"stroke-dashoffset",
"opacity",
"color",
"stop-color",
"stop-opacity",
"font-family",
"font-size",
"font-weight",
"font-style",
"text-anchor",
"dominant-baseline",
"alignment-baseline",
"letter-spacing",
"word-spacing",
"text-decoration",
"clip-path",
"mask",
"filter",
"marker-start",
"marker-mid",
"marker-end",
"marker",
"cursor",
"pointer-events",
"visibility",
"display",
"overflow",
"vector-effect",
"paint-order",
"color-interpolation",
"color-interpolation-filters",
"isolation",
"mix-blend-mode",
"startOffset",
"method",
"spacing",
"side",
"textLength",
"lengthAdjust",
"in",
"in2",
"result",
"mode",
"type",
"values",
"dx",
"dy",
"stdDeviation",
"edgeMode",
"k1",
"k2",
"k3",
"k4",
"operator",
"radius",
"scale",
"xChannelSelector",
"yChannelSelector",
"baseFrequency",
"numOctaves",
"seed",
"stitchTiles",
"tableValues",
"slope",
"intercept",
"amplitude",
"exponent",
"order",
"divisor",
"bias",
"targetX",
"targetY",
"kernelMatrix",
"preserveAlpha",
"kernelUnitLength",
"surfaceScale",
"diffuseConstant",
"specularConstant",
"specularExponent",
"lighting-color",
"flood-color",
"flood-opacity",
"azimuth",
"elevation",
"pointsAtX",
"pointsAtY",
"pointsAtZ",
"limitingConeAngle",
]);
function localName(name: string): string {
const i = name.lastIndexOf(":");
return i === -1 ? name : name.slice(i + 1);
}
/** href/xlink:href (any prefix): a same-document fragment always, `data:image/` only off `<a>`
* (an `<a>` navigates the top-level document on click; `<use>`/`<image>`/`<feImage>` only fetch
* it as an inert image resource). */
function isAllowedHref(value: string, tagLocalName: string): boolean {
const v = value.trim();
if (v.startsWith("#")) return true;
return /^data:image\//i.test(v) && tagLocalName.toLowerCase() !== "a";
}
/** CSS loads a resource only through a function (`url()`, `image-set()`, `src()`, ...) or
* `@import`, so CSS text passes only if every function is on this compute-only list, every
* `url()` is a same-document fragment, and there is no `@import`. `""` is a bare `(...)` group. */
const SAFE_CSS_FUNCTIONS = new Set([
"",
"url",
"rgb",
"rgba",
"hsl",
"hsla",
"hwb",
"lab",
"lch",
"oklab",
"oklch",
"color",
"color-mix",
"var",
"calc",
"min",
"max",
"clamp",
"matrix",
"matrix3d",
"translate",
"translatex",
"translatey",
"translatez",
"translate3d",
"scale",
"scalex",
"scaley",
"scalez",
"scale3d",
"rotate",
"rotatex",
"rotatey",
"rotatez",
"rotate3d",
"skew",
"skewx",
"skewy",
"perspective",
"cubic-bezier",
"steps",
"blur",
"brightness",
"contrast",
"drop-shadow",
"grayscale",
"hue-rotate",
"invert",
"opacity",
"saturate",
"sepia",
]);
function decodeCssEscape(hex: string | undefined, char: string | undefined): string {
if (hex === undefined) return char ?? "";
const cp = parseInt(hex, 16);
const invalid = cp === 0 || cp > 0x10ffff || (cp >= 0xd800 && cp <= 0xdfff);
return invalid ? "�" : String.fromCodePoint(cp);
}
// A browser reads `\75 rl(` as `url(`, so every check runs on escape-decoded, lowercased text.
// Comments stay in: CSS never lets one join a function name or `@import`, only split tokens.
function canonicalCss(text: string): string {
return text
.replace(/\\([0-9a-f]{1,6})[ \t\n\r\f]?|\\([\s\S])/gi, (_, hex, char) =>
decodeCssEscape(hex, char),
)
.toLowerCase();
}
// The scans below are single-pass indexOf loops, not regexes: the input is attacker-controlled
// and a backtracking regex here stalled the CLI for seconds on a few KB of padding.
function isCssNameChar(c: string | undefined): boolean {
return c !== undefined && /[-\w]/.test(c);
}
function functionNameBefore(css: string, paren: number): string {
let start = paren;
while (isCssNameChar(css[start - 1])) start--;
return css.slice(start, paren);
}
function everyFunctionIsSafe(css: string): boolean {
for (let at = css.indexOf("("); at !== -1; at = css.indexOf("(", at + 1)) {
if (!SAFE_CSS_FUNCTIONS.has(functionNameBefore(css, at))) return false;
}
return true;
}
// A value holding "(" is rejected, so no second url( can hide inside the one being checked.
function isLocalUrlValue(raw: string): boolean {
const value = raw.trim().replace(/^['"]/, "");
return value.startsWith("#") && !value.includes("(");
}
function everyUrlIsLocalFragment(css: string): boolean {
for (let at = css.indexOf("url("); at !== -1; ) {
const close = css.indexOf(")", at + 4);
if (close === -1 || !isLocalUrlValue(css.slice(at + 4, close))) return false;
at = css.indexOf("url(", close + 1);
}
return true;
}
function isSafeCss(text: string): boolean {
const css = canonicalCss(text);
return !css.includes("@import") && everyFunctionIsSafe(css) && everyUrlIsLocalFragment(css);
}
function isXmlnsAttribute(name: string): boolean {
return name === "xmlns" || name.startsWith("xmlns:");
}
// aria-*/data-* are inert key/value pairs everywhere else; still CSS-checked below,
// defensively, rather than trusted just because no browser reads CSS from them today.
function isKnownAttribute(local: string): boolean {
return SAFE_ATTRIBUTES.has(local) || local.startsWith("aria-") || local.startsWith("data-");
}
// Every kept value goes through isSafeCss (style= and presentation attributes are CSS); a
// non-CSS value that merely looks like a call, e.g. id="XRP-(XRP)", is dropped: fails closed.
function isSafeAttribute(tagLocalName: string, name: string, value: string): boolean {
if (isXmlnsAttribute(name)) return true;
const local = localName(name);
if (local === "href") return isAllowedHref(value, tagLocalName);
return isKnownAttribute(local) && isSafeCss(value);
}
export function sanitizeSvg(svg: string): string {
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(svg, "image/svg+xml");
const root = doc.documentElement;
if (!root) return "";
for (const el of [...doc.querySelectorAll("*")]) {
if (!el.isConnected) continue;
if (!SAFE_ELEMENTS.has(el.tagName)) {
el.remove();
continue;
}
if (el.tagName === "style" && !isSafeCss(el.textContent)) {
el.remove();
continue;
}
for (const attr of [...el.attributes]) {
if (!isSafeAttribute(el.tagName, attr.name, attr.value)) el.removeAttribute(attr.name);
}
}
return root.isConnected ? root.outerHTML : "";
}