Convert Claude Code or Codex into the most intelligent Deep Research Agent. Collect, search, and synthesize web research into a persistent, searchable wiki that builds on itself. Hosted API + MCP: hyperresearch.ai
Python agentsagentskillscitationsclaude-codecodexcodex-plugincodex-skilldeep-researchdeep-research-agentdeepresearchmcp-serverresearchresearch-agentresearch-tools
security: classify IPv4-mapped IPv6 by its embedded IPv4; reject host:port allowlist entries (#127)
Francois du Plessis0e897463a58f
diff --git a/src/hyperresearch/web/safe_http.py b/src/hyperresearch/web/safe_http.pyindex 2f39106..e733d43 100644--- a/src/hyperresearch/web/safe_http.py+++ b/src/hyperresearch/web/safe_http.py@@ -90,12 +90,19 @@ _CGNAT_NET = ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")# 6to4 (RFC 3056): a 2002:AABB:CCDD::/48 prefix embeds the IPv4 address# A.B.C.D, so 2002:7f00:1:: is loopback wearing an IPv6 coat. The transport# is deprecated and rarely routed, but the ipaddress module does not flag it-# and the embedded address is what matters. IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) is-# already caught because ipaddress unwraps it for the is_* properties.+# and the embedded address is what matters._6TO4_NET = ipaddress.ip_network("2002::/16")def _is_blocked_ip(ip: ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address) -> bool:+ # Classify IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:a.b.c.d) by its embedded IPv4, which+ # is where the OS sends the connection. The ipaddress is_* properties do+ # not agree on mapped addresses across interpreters: on 3.11 and 3.13 a+ # mapped CGNAT address passes every property, and the CGNAT check below+ # only looks at version-4 addresses, so it was allowed; on 3.12 every+ # mapped address reports is_reserved, so even a mapped public address+ # was refused. Unmapping first gives the same answer everywhere.+ ip = getattr(ip, "ipv4_mapped", None) or ipif ip.version == 6 and ip in _6TO4_NET:packed = int(ip) >> 80 & 0xFFFFFFFFreturn _is_blocked_ip(ipaddress.IPv4Address(packed))@@ -146,12 +153,22 @@ def _parse_allowlist(if not entry:continuetry:- networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(entry, strict=False))+ # Brackets are URL notation for an IPv6 literal ("[::1]"); the+ # network types reject them, so parse the address inside.+ networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(entry.strip("[]"), strict=False))except ValueError:if "/" in entry: # meant as a CIDR, but malformedraise SafeHTTPError(f"invalid allow_private_hosts entry {entry!r}: not a valid CIDR") from None+ if ":" in entry:+ # host:port. URL hostnames never carry the port, so the entry+ # would become a hostname that can never match: a silent dead+ # entry that looks like an SSRF refusal of the user's mirror.+ raise SafeHTTPError(+ f"invalid allow_private_hosts entry {entry!r}: entries are "+ "hostnames or CIDRs; drop the port"+ )hostnames.add(entry.lower())return frozenset(hostnames), networksdiff --git a/tests/test_web/test_safe_http.py b/tests/test_web/test_safe_http.pyindex c7a5487..fa9ba5c 100644--- a/tests/test_web/test_safe_http.py+++ b/tests/test_web/test_safe_http.py@@ -315,6 +315,33 @@ def test_check_url_allows_6to4_wrapping_public_ipv4():check_url("http://[2002:808:808::]/")+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:a.b.c.d) is classified by the embedded IPv4. The+# ipaddress properties disagree across interpreters: 3.11 and 3.13 report a+# mapped CGNAT address as public, 3.12 reports even a mapped public address+# as reserved.+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++ "url",+ [+ "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/",+ "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/", # mapped cloud metadata+ "http://[::ffff:100.64.0.1]/", # mapped CGNAT: allowed on 3.11 and 3.13+ ],+)+def test_check_url_rejects_ipv4_mapped_private_forms(url):+ with pytest.raises(SafeHTTPError, match="non-public address"):+ check_url(url)+++def test_check_url_allows_ipv4_mapped_public():+ """A mapped PUBLIC address stays fetchable: the verdict follows the+ embedded address, where 3.12's is_reserved refused it wholesale."""+ check_url("http://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/")++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------# allow_private_hosts — the [fetch] escape hatch for intranet mirrors# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -382,3 +409,23 @@ def test_safe_get_redirect_to_allowlisted_private_host_is_followed():allow_private_hosts=("192.168.1.20",),)assert resp.content == b"mirror content"+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# allow_private_hosts entry hygiene+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------++[email protected]("entry", ["192.168.1.20:8443", "mirror.internal:8443"])+def test_allowlist_entry_with_port_is_a_loud_error(entry):+ """A host:port entry would otherwise become a hostname that can never+ match (URL hostnames carry no port): a silent dead entry presenting as+ an SSRF refusal of the user's own mirror."""+ with pytest.raises(SafeHTTPError, match="drop the port"):+ check_url("http://8.8.8.8/", allow_private_hosts=(entry,))+++def test_allowlist_bracketed_ipv6_entry_admits_the_literal():+ """A bracketed IPv6 entry (URL notation) parses as the address itself+ instead of becoming a hostname that never matches."""+ check_url("http://[::1]/", allow_private_hosts=("[::1]",))