Skip to content

The design language that makes your AI harness better at design.

JavaScript
2.9 KB
Raw Blame

Windows engine signing

Engine releases sign impeccable.exe with Azure Artifact Signing before computing release checksums. The publisher is Renaissance Geek, Inc. Existing release assets are immutable; never replace a shipped unsigned binary with signed bytes under the same version.

Access boundary

  • Azure account: impeccable-signing, East US (https://eus.codesigning.azure.net/).
  • Public Trust certificate profile: impeccable-windows.
  • User-assigned managed identity: impeccable-release-signing, in the same resource group.
  • Its only Azure role is Artifact Signing Certificate Profile Signer, scoped to impeccable-signing/certificateProfiles/impeccable-windows, not the account or subscription.
  • Federated credential: github-windows-signing, issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com, audience api://AzureADTokenExchange, subject repo:pbakaus/impeccable:environment:windows-signing.
  • GitHub environment: windows-signing, restricted to tags matching engine-v*, with pbakaus as required reviewer and administrator bypass off. Self-review allows the required reviewer to approve releases they trigger.
  • Environment variables AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_TENANT_ID, and AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID contain public identifiers, not secrets. No client secret, private key, or PFX is stored in GitHub.

Release and verification

Run the normal bun run release:engine flow, then review and approve the windows-signing deployment for that tag in GitHub Actions. Check the tag's commit and workflow before approving: the environment approval grants that job the ability to sign as the company.

The build job uploads Windows output as unsigned-windows-x64. A separate Windows runner downloads that artifact from the same run, signs exactly impeccable.exe, and requires a valid Authenticode signature, the expected publisher, and a timestamp before uploading impeccable-windows-x64. That runner does not check out repository code or execute the downloaded engine. Only its job receives an OIDC token; only the publish job can write releases. Publication waits for successful signing and downloads only impeccable-* artifacts, so it cannot package the unsigned intermediate.

RFC 3161 timestamping is required because Azure issues short-lived signing certificates. Don't pin a leaf certificate thumbprint: Azure rotates them. If signing or verification fails, fix the cause and retry; don't add an unsigned fallback or weaken the environment gate.

The workflow configuration is regression-tested by bun test tests/release-engine-workflow.test.js. An actual protected engine release is still needed to verify Azure OIDC and Authenticode end to end.

References: Azure signing roles, official signing action.