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Merge branch 'main' into PLATFOR-831
Thiago Araujo da Silvaac0004d144c6
diff --cc backend/AGENTS.mdindex 444e1bd111,adf8d672d3..9b685200ee--- a/backend/AGENTS.md+++ b/backend/AGENTS.md@@@ -298,28 -298,49 +298,71 @@@ If you encounter `API_KEY` or `SERVICE_Token detection logic in `inject-identity.ts` checks `x-api-key` header first, then parses `Authorization: Bearer` and inspects JWT `authTokenType` field to determine mode.+#### SSO session binding++A session minted by a SAML, OIDC or LDAP login carries `issuingRootOrgId`, the root org whose IdP+issued it (`processProviderCallback` sets it; own-credential sessions never have it). An org that+enforces SSO admits only sessions its own IdP issued: `validateOrgSSO` compares the claim with the+org's root org on every user permission check, reading it from `userAuthInfo` in the request context+(only when the check is for the requester), so it covers `selectOrganization`, OAuth consent, and a+session that was already open when enforcement was turned on. Members who can bypass SSO are let+through, and a token with no claim (issued before it existed) is taken at its auth method. Enforcement+is org policy, not a permission: the permission service reads `authEnforced`, `googleSsoAuthEnforced`+and `bypassOrgAuthEnabled` per request from the root org (`getOrgSsoPolicy`, through the same+`orgFindById` request memo the auth layer fills), never from `permissionDAL.getPermission` or the+cached project permission, so a change applies on the next request. A sub-org has no enforcement of its+own and follows its root, and only a root org role can bypass it, so a sub-org admin role exempts no+one. The project permission cache holds only that role-derived bypass answer.++**Every path that issues or re-issues a user token must carry the claim forward** (MFA, refresh,+signup, org deletion, delegated OAuth codes and tokens). A dropped claim reads as a pre-claim token+and passes every org's enforcement. `selectOrganization` audits the refusal+(`SELECT_ORGANIZATION_REFUSED`) by catching the `FOREIGN_SSO_SESSION_ERROR_NAME` error+`getOrgPermission` throws.++ #### MFA for SSO logins++ `organizations.ssoMfaTrust` (`SsoMfaTrust` enum, `none` or `signal`) lets a SAML or OIDC login satisfy the+ org's MFA enforcement with the MFA the IdP already performed. The SAML and OIDC callbacks derive one verdict+ per login with `matchIdpMfaSignal` (`services/auth/idp-mfa-signal.ts`): the OIDC claim named by+ `oidc_configs.mfaClaimName` contains `mfa`, the SAML `AuthnContextClassRef` is a class whose definition asserts+ two factors (possession-only classes such as `Smartcard`, `SoftwarePKI` and `TimeSyncToken` are not defaults), or the+ attribute named by `saml_configs.mfaSignalAttribute` contains `mfa` or `multipleauthn`. A null attribute name+ means the provider's default: Entra ID's `authnmethodsreferences` for `azure-saml`, because Entra reports a push+ or TOTP login as `Password` in `AuthnContextClassRef` and puts `multipleauthn` only there, and `amr` for every+ other provider. The OIDC claim name defaults to `amr`, and the+ per-config allowlists extend the built-in values rather than replace them. The verdict travels on the org-less+ session token as `idpMfaOrgId`, the root org whose SSO config produced it (absent when the IdP did not signal+ MFA). A first login that still has to verify its mailbox carries it on the signup token instead, and+ `completeAccount` copies it onto the session it mints. `selectOrganization` (`auth-login-service.ts`) applies it+ through `isIdpMfaTrusted` (`auth-fns.ts`), the only reader of the setting. Rules that must hold:++ - Enforcement is decided once per selection against the root org (`actorRootOrgId`), so moving between a root+ org and its sub-orgs never re-prompts.+ - `isIdpMfaTrusted` refuses every non-SSO auth method, so password, Google and LDAP logins (break-glass+ accounts) always get the Infisical challenge.+ - The proof only counts for the root org whose IdP produced it. A user in two orgs could otherwise tune one+ org's allowlist to accept a single factor and carry that verdict into the other, so the token stores the org+ id rather than a boolean and selection requires it to equal the selected root org.+ - The trust only applies while `enforceMfa` is on, and then it waives the whole challenge, including the user's+ personal `isMfaEnabled`: passing an enforced challenge turns that flag on (`Mfa.tsx` calls `activateMfa`), so+ honoring it would make the trust dead for anyone who ever logged in before it was enabled. Personal MFA in an+ org that does not enforce it is still prompted. Like the admin SSO bypass, the setting can be stored at any+ time, before enforcement is on or before any SSO config exists; `updateOrg` only requires the plan to allow+ MFA enforcement for `signal`, and like `authEnforced` it needs `Sso.Edit`, not just `Settings.Edit`.+ - `isMfaVerified` is never set from the IdP. It still means "proved a factor to Infisical", so step-up+ (`mfa-step-up-fns.ts`) and PAM MFA are unaffected. OAuth consent (`authorizeConsent`) re-derives the MFA+ requirement for the client's org and applies the same `isIdpMfaTrusted` waiver, so a session that skipped+ the login prompt is not refused when authorizing an application.+ - Updating a SAML or OIDC config resets the org's `authEnforced` and `scimEnabled`, except when the update+ carries only the MFA signal fields (`mfaSignalAttribute` / `mfaAuthnContexts`, `mfaClaimName` /+ `mfaAmrValues`), which cannot break a login. The SSO modals send only those fields when nothing else changed,+ so tuning an allowlist on a live, enforced setup does not turn enforcement off.+ - The callback writes a `USER_LOGIN` audit event with the `idpMfa` verdict: `evidence` is what matched and+ `received` is every value the IdP sent in the fields that were read, so a rejected login shows which value+ to add to the allowlist. `SELECT_ORGANIZATION` records `mfaSatisfiedBy`, so an admin can see why a login was+ or wasn't prompted.+#### Delegated OAuth tokensTwo grants issue them: the authorization code flow (consented `scopes`) and the RFC 8693 token exchangediff --cc backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.tsindex c02e942fd3,05f384f678..7d87004212--- a/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts+++ b/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts@@@ -153,9 -153,9 +153,10 @@@ export const registerAuthRoutes = asynaccessVersion: tokenVersion.accessVersion,organizationId: decodedToken.organizationId,...(decodedToken.subOrganizationId && { subOrganizationId: decodedToken.subOrganizationId }),+ issuingRootOrgId: decodedToken.issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified: decodedToken.isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod+ mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId},appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,{ expiresIn }diff --cc backend/src/server/routes/v1/oauth-router.tsindex 1d3bf6bdab,45aedaa5ec..b6b9484954--- a/backend/src/server/routes/v1/oauth-router.ts+++ b/backend/src/server/routes/v1/oauth-router.ts@@@ -424,9 -424,9 +424,10 @@@ export const registerOAuthRouter = asynscope: req.body.scope,userId: req.auth.userId,authMethod: req.auth.authMethod,+ issuingRootOrgId: req.auth.token.issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified: req.auth.isMfaVerified,mfaMethod: req.auth.mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId: req.auth.idpMfaOrgId,ip: req.realIp});diff --cc backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.tsindex e28ef6a21c,c30ca8f690..6e7b3ca543--- a/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts+++ b/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts@@@ -77,9 -77,9 +77,10 @@@ export const registerLoginRouter = asynuserId: req.auth.userId,userAuthMethod: req.auth.authMethod,actorRootOrgId: req.auth.rootOrgId,+ issuingRootOrgId: req.auth.token.issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified: req.auth.isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod: req.auth.mfaMethod+ mfaMethod: req.auth.mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId: req.auth.idpMfaOrgId});if (tokens.isMfaEnabled) {diff --cc backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.tsindex 64e6f68e14,1d5ab30b73..2f0915e523--- a/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts@@@ -348,9 -348,9 +348,10 @@@ export const tokenServiceFactory = ({ trefreshVersion: updatedSession.refreshVersion,organizationId: decodedToken.organizationId,...(decodedToken.subOrganizationId && { subOrganizationId: decodedToken.subOrganizationId }),+ issuingRootOrgId: decodedToken.issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified: decodedToken.isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod+ mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId},appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,{ expiresIn: refreshTokenExpiresIn }diff --cc backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.tsindex f4b3abad3c,684ffa048f..5c9e15779d--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts@@@ -1,13 -1,12 +1,14 @@@import { LoginMethod } from "../super-admin/super-admin-types";import {assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled,+ isIdpMfaTrusted,isMfaProofAccepted,isOAuthLoginMethodDisabled,+ isSsoAuthMethod,+ isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg,RECOVERY_CODE_MFA_ASSURANCE} from "./auth-fns";- import { AuthMethod, MfaMethod } from "./auth-type";+ import { AuthMethod, MfaMethod, SsoMfaTrust } from "./auth-type";describe("OAuth login method policy", () => {test.each([@@@ -65,36 -64,40 +66,74 @@@ describe("isMfaProofAccepted", () =>});});+describe("isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg", () => {+ const rootOrgId = "org-a";++ test.each([+ AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML,+ AuthMethod.AZURE_SAML,+ AuthMethod.KEYCLOAK_SAML,+ AuthMethod.OIDC,+ AuthMethod.LDAP+ ] as const)("accepts a %s session this org's IdP issued", (authMethod) => {+ expect(isSsoAuthMethod(authMethod)).toBe(true);+ expect(isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg({ authMethod, issuingRootOrgId: rootOrgId, rootOrgId })).toBe(true);+ });++ test.each([AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, AuthMethod.OIDC, AuthMethod.LDAP] as const)(+ "refuses a %s session another org's IdP issued",+ (authMethod) => {+ expect(isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg({ authMethod, issuingRootOrgId: "org-b", rootOrgId })).toBe(false);+ }+ );++ test("takes a token issued before the claim existed at its method", () => {+ expect(isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg({ authMethod: AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, rootOrgId })).toBe(true);+ });++ test.each([AuthMethod.EMAIL, AuthMethod.GOOGLE, AuthMethod.GITHUB, AuthMethod.GITLAB] as const)(+ "never counts an own-credential %s session as the org's SSO",+ (authMethod) => {+ expect(isSsoAuthMethod(authMethod)).toBe(false);+ expect(isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg({ authMethod, issuingRootOrgId: rootOrgId, rootOrgId })).toBe(false);+ }+ );+});+++ describe("isIdpMfaTrusted", () => {+ const org = { id: "org-a", enforceMfa: true, ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal };++ test.each([AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, AuthMethod.AZURE_SAML, AuthMethod.OIDC] as const)(+ "trusts a signalled %s login when the org trusts the signal",+ (authMethod) => {+ expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ org, authMethod, idpMfaOrgId: org.id })).toBe(true);+ }+ );++ test("never trusts a login that carried no signal", () => {+ expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ org, authMethod: AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML })).toBe(false);+ });++ test("never trusts a signal produced by another organization's IdP", () => {+ expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ org, authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC, idpMfaOrgId: "org-b" })).toBe(false);+ });++ test("has nothing to waive while the org does not enforce MFA", () => {+ expect(+ isIdpMfaTrusted({ org: { ...org, enforceMfa: false }, authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC, idpMfaOrgId: org.id })+ ).toBe(false);+ });++ test.each([AuthMethod.EMAIL, AuthMethod.GOOGLE, AuthMethod.GITHUB, AuthMethod.LDAP] as const)(+ "never trusts a %s login, so break-glass accounts keep the Infisical challenge",+ (authMethod) => {+ expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ org, authMethod, idpMfaOrgId: org.id })).toBe(false);+ }+ );++ test.each([SsoMfaTrust.None, undefined, null, "delegate"])("ignores the signal when the setting is %s", (mode) => {+ expect(+ isIdpMfaTrusted({ org: { ...org, ssoMfaTrust: mode }, authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC, idpMfaOrgId: org.id })+ ).toBe(false);+ });+ });diff --cc backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.tsindex 0543ae9fd2,8e7cee9c4e..9686890e26--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts@@@ -72,25 -73,25 +73,44 @@@ export const getRequiredMfaMethod =return { isMfaRequired, requiredMfaMethod };};+export const isSsoAuthMethod = (authMethod: AuthMethod) =>+ isAuthMethodSaml(authMethod) || authMethod === AuthMethod.OIDC || authMethod === AuthMethod.LDAP;++/**+ * Whether a session counts as this root org's own SSO. The method alone is not enough: a SAML+ * session another org's IdP minted would otherwise satisfy this org's enforcement without its IdP,+ * MFA or deprovisioning ever seeing the login. Tokens issued before the claim existed carry no+ * issuer and are taken at their method, as before.+ */+export const isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg = ({+ authMethod,+ issuingRootOrgId,+ rootOrgId+}: {+ authMethod: AuthMethod;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;+ rootOrgId: string;+}) => isSsoAuthMethod(authMethod) && (!issuingRootOrgId || issuingRootOrgId === rootOrgId);++ // Whether the MFA the IdP performed satisfies this root org's enforcement. Shared by org selection and OAuth+ // consent so a session that skipped the login prompt is not refused later. Only SAML and OIDC carry a signed+ // IdP signal: password, Google and LDAP never qualify, so break-glass accounts always get the Infisical+ // challenge. The proof names the org whose IdP produced it: a user in two orgs could otherwise tune one org's+ // allowlist to accept a single factor and carry that verdict into the other.+ export const isIdpMfaTrusted = ({+ org,+ authMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId+ }: {+ org: { id: string; enforceMfa?: boolean | null; ssoMfaTrust?: string | null };+ authMethod: AuthMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;+ }): boolean => {+ if (!org.enforceMfa) return false;+ if (!isAuthMethodSaml(authMethod) && authMethod !== AuthMethod.OIDC) return false;+ return org.ssoMfaTrust === SsoMfaTrust.Signal && idpMfaOrgId === org.id;+ };+export const RECOVERY_CODE_MFA_ASSURANCE = "recovery-code";export type TMfaAssurance = MfaMethod | typeof RECOVERY_CODE_MFA_ASSURANCE;diff --cc backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.tsindex e1b6e01dad,eb99a81daf..f434ac8caf--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts@@@ -8,9 -8,9 +8,9 @@@ importTUsers,UserDeviceSchema} from "@app/db/schemas";- import { EventType, TAuditLogServiceFactory } from "@app/ee/services/audit-log/audit-log-types";+ import { EventType, TAuditLogServiceFactory, TMfaSatisfiedBy } from "@app/ee/services/audit-log/audit-log-types";import { OrgPermissionSsoActions, OrgPermissionSubjects } from "@app/ee/services/permission/org-permission";-import { isAuthMethodSaml } from "@app/ee/services/permission/permission-fns";+import { FOREIGN_SSO_SESSION_ERROR_NAME } from "@app/ee/services/permission/permission-fns";import { TPermissionServiceFactory } from "@app/ee/services/permission/permission-service-types";import { getConfig } from "@app/lib/config/env";import { crypto, generateSrpServerKey, srpCheckClientProof } from "@app/lib/crypto";@@@ -57,9 -57,8 +57,10 @@@ importassertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled,enforceUserLockStatus,getRequiredMfaMethod,+ isIdpMfaTrusted,isOAuthLoginMethodDisabled,+ isSsoAuthMethod,+ isSsoSessionIssuedByOrg,OAuthAuthMethod,RECOVERY_CODE_MFA_ASSURANCE} from "./auth-fns";@@@ -190,15 -189,15 +191,17 @@@ export const authLoginServiceFactory =email,authMethod,organizationId,+ issuingRootOrgId,- requiredMfaMethod+ requiredMfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId}: {userId: string;email?: string | null;authMethod: AuthMethod;organizationId?: string;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;requiredMfaMethod: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;}) => {const appCfg = getConfig();@@@ -208,9 -207,9 +211,10 @@@authTokenType: AuthTokenType.MFA_TOKEN,userId,organizationId,+ issuingRootOrgId,email,- requiredMfaMethod+ requiredMfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId},appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,{ expiresIn: appCfg.JWT_MFA_LIFETIME }@@@ -237,9 -236,9 +241,10 @@@organizationId,subOrganizationId,authMethod,+ issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId}: {userId: string;ip: string;@@@ -247,9 -246,9 +252,10 @@@organizationId?: string;subOrganizationId?: string;authMethod: AuthMethod;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;isMfaVerified?: boolean;mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;},tx?: Knex) => {@@@ -296,9 -295,9 +302,10 @@@accessVersion: tokenSession.accessVersion,organizationId,subOrganizationId,+ issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId},cfg.AUTH_SECRET,{ expiresIn: tokenSessionExpiresIn }@@@ -313,9 -312,9 +320,10 @@@refreshVersion: tokenSession.refreshVersion,organizationId,subOrganizationId,+ issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId},cfg.AUTH_SECRET,{ expiresIn: refreshTokenExpiresIn }@@@ -336,10 -336,10 +345,14 @@@}: TProcessProviderCallbackDTO): Promise<TProviderAuthCallback> => {const appCfg = getConfig();+ // SSO configs live on root orgs, so the org an IdP login names is the issuing root org. An+ // OAuth login may name an org too (the default auth org) and must not be bound to it.+ const issuingRootOrgId = isSsoAuthMethod(authMethod) ? organizationId : undefined;++ const idpMfaOrgId = idpMfa?.verified ? organizationId : undefined;++ // A first login that still has to verify its mailbox finishes in completeAccount, which mints the session+ // from this token, so the proof rides along or that one login would be prompted despite the trust.if (!user.isAccepted || !isEmailVerified) {const signupToken = crypto.jwt().sign({@@@ -349,7 -349,7 +362,8 @@@isEmailVerified,aliasId,organizationId,+ issuingRootOrgId,+ idpMfaOrgId,callbackPort,email: user.email,firstName: user.firstName,@@@ -368,7 -368,7 +382,8 @@@ip,userAgent,authMethod,- issuingRootOrgId++ issuingRootOrgId,+ idpMfaOrgId});if (organizationId) {@@@ -753,9 -778,9 +793,10 @@@userAgent,organizationId: orgId,authMethod: decodedToken.authMethod,+ issuingRootOrgId: decodedToken.issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified: true,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId});// Open the grace window for THIS session only (the one that just proved MFA), so@@@ -1170,9 -1195,9 +1211,10 @@@userId,userAuthMethod,actorRootOrgId,+ issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId}: {userAgent: string | undefined;ipAddress: string;@@@ -1180,9 -1205,9 +1222,10 @@@userId: string;userAuthMethod: AuthMethod;actorRootOrgId?: string;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;isMfaVerified?: boolean;mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;}) => {const cfg = getConfig();if (!userAgent) throw new UnauthorizedError({ name: "User-Agent header is required" });@@@ -1339,7 -1351,7 +1386,8 @@@authMethod: userAuthMethod,requiredMfaMethod,organizationId: rootOrg.id,- issuingRootOrgId++ issuingRootOrgId,+ idpMfaOrgId});return { isMfaEnabled: true, mfa: mfaToken, mfaMethod: requiredMfaMethod } as const;@@@ -1354,12 -1366,16 +1402,17 @@@ip: ipAddress,organizationId: isSubOrganization ? rootOrg.id : organizationId,subOrganizationId: isSubOrganization ? organizationId : undefined,+ issuingRootOrgId,isMfaVerified,- mfaMethod+ mfaMethod,+ idpMfaOrgId});+ let mfaSatisfiedBy: TMfaSatisfiedBy = "infisical";+ if (!isMfaRequired) mfaSatisfiedBy = "not-required";+ else if (isMfaSatisfiedByIdp) mfaSatisfiedBy = "idp";+- // In the event of this being a break-glass request (non-saml / non-oidc / non-google, when any is enforced)+ // In the event of this being a break-glass request (not this org's own SAML / OIDC / LDAP session, nor Google, when any is enforced)const isAuthEnforcedBypass =rootOrg.authEnforced &&rootOrg.bypassOrgAuthEnabled &&diff --cc backend/src/services/auth/auth-signup-service.tsindex 8bdee202bc,3ca50ecd2e..2ff70aa17d--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-signup-service.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-signup-service.ts@@@ -405,7 -405,7 +405,8 @@@ export const authSignupServiceFactoryuserAgent: dto.userAgent,authMethod,organizationId,- issuingRootOrgId: decodedToken.issuingRootOrgId++ issuingRootOrgId: decodedToken.issuingRootOrgId,+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId});return {diff --cc backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.tsindex 66278c2bed,696537a207..e81845630b--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts@@@ -111,12 -116,9 +116,13 @@@ export type AuthModeJwtTokenPayload =accessVersion: number;organizationId?: string;subOrganizationId?: string;+ // Root org whose IdP issued this session. Set only by SAML, OIDC and LDAP logins; absent on+ // own-credential sessions and on tokens issued before the claim existed, which are taken at+ // their auth method as before.+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;isMfaVerified?: boolean;mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;// Present only on delegated OAuth 2.0 access tokens. Its presence marks the token as// AuthMode.OAUTH so the default JWT middleware will not accept it as a first-party session.oauthClientId?: string;@@@ -133,8 -135,8 +139,9 @@@ export type AuthModeMfaJwtTokenPayloadauthMethod: AuthMethod;userId: string;organizationId?: string;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;requiredMfaMethod: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;};export type AuthModeRefreshJwtTokenPayload = {@@@ -146,9 -148,9 +153,10 @@@refreshVersion: number;organizationId?: string;subOrganizationId?: string;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;isMfaVerified?: boolean;mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;oauthClientId?: string;scopes?: string[];};@@@ -160,7 -162,7 +168,8 @@@ export type AuthModeSignUpTokenPayloadisEmailVerified: boolean;aliasId?: string;organizationId?: string;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;callbackPort?: string;// User profile fields for the frontend signup pageemail?: string;diff --cc backend/src/services/oauth-client/oauth-client-types.tsindex 1b32612616,3c3e92e9fc..1e894c58fa--- a/backend/src/services/oauth-client/oauth-client-types.ts+++ b/backend/src/services/oauth-client/oauth-client-types.ts@@@ -76,9 -76,9 +76,10 @@@ export type TOauthConsentDTO =scope?: string;userId: string;authMethod: AuthMethod;+ issuingRootOrgId?: string;isMfaVerified?: boolean;mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;ip: string;};