Infisical is the open-source platform for securing secrets, certificates, access, and AI Agents.
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diff --git a/backend/src/ee/services/pam-discovery/mssql/mssql-discovery-factory.ts b/backend/src/ee/services/pam-discovery/mssql/mssql-discovery-factory.tsindex aee69e7b89..ab5e5b8bbb 100644--- a/backend/src/ee/services/pam-discovery/mssql/mssql-discovery-factory.ts+++ b/backend/src/ee/services/pam-discovery/mssql/mssql-discovery-factory.ts@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import knex from "knex";import pLimit from "p-limit";import RE2 from "re2";+import { crypto } from "@app/lib/crypto/cryptography";import { BadRequestError } from "@app/lib/errors";import { logger } from "@app/lib/logger";@@ -30,13 +31,15 @@ const PROXY_HOST = "127.0.0.1";const SQL_LOGIN_AUTH_METHOD = "sql-login";// without these a login sees only itself and sa, and reconciliation would treat every other login as gone-const VISIBILITY_QUERY = `SELECT CASE WHEN HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'VIEW ANY DEFINITION') = 1 OR HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'VIEW ANY SECURITY DEFINITION') = 1 OR HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'ALTER ANY LOGIN') = 1 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END AS canSeeLogins`;+const VISIBILITY_QUERY = `SELECT CASE WHEN HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'VIEW ANY DEFINITION') = 1 OR HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'VIEW ANY SECURITY DEFINITION') = 1 OR HAS_PERMS_BY_NAME(NULL, NULL, 'ALTER ANY LOGIN') = 1 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END AS canSeeLogins, IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin') AS isSysadmin, (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM sys.server_permissions p JOIN sys.server_principals g ON g.principal_id = p.grantee_principal_id WHERE p.state = 'D' AND (g.sid = SUSER_SID() OR (g.type = 'R' AND IS_SRVROLEMEMBER(g.name) = 1)) AND ((p.class = 100 AND p.permission_name IN ('VIEW ANY DEFINITION', 'VIEW ANY SECURITY DEFINITION')) OR (p.class = 101 AND p.permission_name IN ('VIEW DEFINITION', 'CONTROL') AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM sys.server_principals r WHERE r.principal_id = p.major_id AND r.type = 'R')))) AS denials`;// one row past the cap so truncation is detectable; 63 is the longest username a PAM MSSQL account acceptsconst ENUMERATION_QUERY = `SELECT TOP (${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST + 1}) name, default_database_name AS defaultDatabase, CASE WHEN principal_id = 1 OR sid = SUSER_SID() THEN 1 ELSE 0 END AS alwaysVisible FROM sys.server_principals WHERE type = 'S' AND is_disabled = 0 AND name NOT LIKE '##%##' AND LEN(name) <= 63 ORDER BY name`;const VISIBILITY_MESSAGE ="The credential account can only see its own login. Grant it VIEW ANY DEFINITION or ALTER ANY LOGIN to discover every login on the instance.";+const DENIED_LOGINS_MESSAGE =+ "A DENY permission hides some logins from the credential account, so logins missing from this scan weren't marked stale.";const OWN_LOGIN_ONLY_MESSAGE ="Only sa and the credential account's own login were visible. If the instance has other logins, check that the credential account isn't denied permission to see them.";const REDIRECT_MESSAGE = "The instance redirected the connection to another server, which discovery doesn't follow";@@ -45,6 +48,13 @@ const GATEWAY_FAILURE_MESSAGE =type TLogin = { name: string; defaultDatabase: string | null; alwaysVisible: number };+type TInstanceResult = {+ accounts: TDiscoveredAccount[];+ error?: TDiscoveryMachineError;+ machine: string;+ complete: boolean;+};+const describeDriverError = (err: unknown): string => {const { code, name, cause } = err as { code?: string; name?: string; cause?: { code?: string } };switch (code) {@@ -71,7 +81,10 @@ const describeDriverError = (err: unknown): string => {case "DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT":case "SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN":case "UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE":+ case "UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY":return "TLS verification failed. Add the instance's CA certificate to the credential account, or disable certificate verification.";+ case "CERT_HAS_EXPIRED":+ return "The instance's TLS certificate has expired.";case "ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID":return "The instance's TLS certificate isn't valid for this target. List the instance by a name on its certificate, or disable certificate verification.";default:@@ -191,12 +204,14 @@ export const msSqlDiscoveryFactory: TPamDiscoveryFactory = ({});try {- const [visibility] = await db.raw<{ canSeeLogins: number }[]>(VISIBILITY_QUERY);+ const [visibility] =+ await db.raw<{ canSeeLogins: number; isSysadmin: number | null; denials: number }[]>(VISIBILITY_QUERY);if (visibility?.canSeeLogins !== 1) {failure = VISIBILITY_MESSAGE;throw new Error(failure);}- return await db.raw<TLogin[]>(ENUMERATION_QUERY);+ const logins = await db.raw<TLogin[]>(ENUMERATION_QUERY);+ return { logins, isSysadmin: visibility.isSysadmin === 1, denials: visibility.denials };} catch (err) {if (!failure) {logger.warn({ err }, `PAM SQL Server discovery query failed [host=${host}] [port=${port}]`);@@ -215,66 +230,76 @@ export const msSqlDiscoveryFactory: TPamDiscoveryFactory = ({}};- const scanInstance = async (- host: string,- port: number,- signal: AbortSignal- ): Promise<{- accounts: TDiscoveredAccount[];- error?: TDiscoveryMachineError;- machine: string;- complete: boolean;- }> => {+ const scanInstance = async (host: string, port: number, signal: AbortSignal): Promise<TInstanceResult> => {const machine = `${host}:${port}`;const candidates = [...accounts.filter((a) => a.host === host && a.port === port),...accounts.filter((a) => a.host !== host || a.port !== port)].filter(isUsableAccount);+ const toResult = (account: TMsSqlAccount, logins: TLogin[], error?: string): TInstanceResult => ({+ machine,+ complete: !error,+ ...(error ? { error: { machine, error } } : {}),+ accounts: logins.slice(0, MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST).map((login) => ({+ accountType: PamAccountType.MsSQL,+ name: toAccountName(host, port, login.name),+ fingerprint: `${machine}:${login.name}`,+ details: {+ connectionDetails: {+ host,+ port,+ database: login.defaultDatabase || account.database,+ sslEnabled: account.sslEnabled,+ sslRejectUnauthorized: account.sslRejectUnauthorized,+ ...(account.sslCertificate ? { sslCertificate: account.sslCertificate } : {})+ },+ credentials: { authMethod: SQL_LOGIN_AUTH_METHOD, username: login.name }+ }+ }))+ });+let lastError = "No credential account could authenticate";+ let matchedError: string | undefined;+ let partial: TInstanceResult | undefined;+ const loggedIn = new Set<string>();for (const account of candidates) {if (signal.aborted) return { accounts: [], machine, complete: false };+ // another account for a login that already got in sees the same logins, and would only send it another password+ if (loggedIn.has(account.username.toLowerCase())) continue;try {// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop- const logins = await enumerateInstance(host, port, account);- let error: string | undefined;+ const { logins, isSysadmin, denials } = await enumerateInstance(host, port, account);if (logins.length > MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST) {logger.warn(`PAM SQL Server discovery truncated an instance at the per-instance limit [machine=${machine}] [limit=${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST}]`);- error = `Instance has more than ${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST} logins; only the first ${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST} were staged`;- } else if (logins.every((login) => login.alwaysVisible === 1)) {- // a DENY can hide every other login without failing the permission check, so this list can't be trusted- error = OWN_LOGIN_ONLY_MESSAGE;+ return toResult(+ account,+ logins,+ `Instance has more than ${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST} logins; only the first ${MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST} were staged`+ );}- return {- machine,- complete: !error,- ...(error ? { error: { machine, error } } : {}),- accounts: logins.slice(0, MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_HOST).map((login) => ({- accountType: PamAccountType.MsSQL,- name: toAccountName(host, port, login.name),- fingerprint: `${machine}:${login.name}`,- details: {- connectionDetails: {- host,- port,- database: login.defaultDatabase || account.database,- sslEnabled: account.sslEnabled,- sslRejectUnauthorized: account.sslRejectUnauthorized,- ...(account.sslCertificate ? { sslCertificate: account.sslCertificate } : {})- },- credentials: { authMethod: SQL_LOGIN_AUTH_METHOD, username: login.name }- }- }))- };+ // a DENY can hide logins without failing the permission check (sysadmin is exempt from DENY), so a list it may+ // have cut is kept as a fallback while the other credentials are tried+ let hidden: string | undefined;+ if (!isSysadmin && denials > 0) hidden = DENIED_LOGINS_MESSAGE;+ else if (!isSysadmin && logins.every((login) => login.alwaysVisible === 1)) hidden = OWN_LOGIN_ONLY_MESSAGE;+ if (!hidden) return toResult(account, logins);+ partial ??= toResult(account, logins, hidden);+ loggedIn.add(account.username.toLowerCase());} catch (err) {logger.warn({ err }, `PAM SQL Server discovery failed to scan instance [machine=${machine}]`);lastError = describeScanError(err);+ // the account stored for this instance explains a failure better than one tried as a fallback+ if (account.host === host && account.port === port) matchedError ??= lastError;}}- if (candidates.length) return { accounts: [], error: { machine, error: lastError }, machine, complete: false };+ if (partial) return partial;+ if (candidates.length) {+ return { accounts: [], error: { machine, error: matchedError ?? lastError }, machine, complete: false };+ }return { accounts: [], machine, complete: false };};@@ -318,9 +343,15 @@ export const msSqlDiscoveryFactory: TPamDiscoveryFactory = ({instancesToScan.map(({ host, port }) => limit(() => scanInstance(host, port, signal))));+ const scannedHosts = new Set(instancesToScan.map(({ host }) => host));+ const machineErrors: TDiscoveryMachineError[] = targets+ .filter((host) => !scannedHosts.has(host))+ .map((host) => ({+ machine: host,+ error: `Not reachable through the gateway on the credential accounts' ports (${usablePorts.join(", ")})`+ }));const discovered: TDiscoveredAccount[] = [];const scannedAccountMachines: string[] = [];- const machineErrors: TDiscoveryMachineError[] = [];let droppedInstances = 0;for (const result of results) {if (discovered.length + result.accounts.length > MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_SCAN) {@@ -341,8 +372,18 @@ export const msSqlDiscoveryFactory: TPamDiscoveryFactory = ({);}+ // logins that slugify alike, or names cut to the length limit, would collide on import into one folder+ const nameCounts = new Map<string, number>();+ discovered.forEach(({ name }) => nameCounts.set(name, (nameCounts.get(name) ?? 0) + 1));+ const staged = discovered.map((account) => {+ if ((nameCounts.get(account.name) ?? 0) < 2) return account;+ const hash = crypto.nativeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(account.fingerprint).digest("hex").slice(0, 6);+ const base = account.name.slice(0, MAX_ACCOUNT_NAME_LENGTH - hash.length - 1).replace(TRAILING_HYPHENS_REGEX, "");+ return { ...account, name: `${base}-${hash}` };+ });+return {- accounts: discovered,+ accounts: staged,machineErrors,dependencies: [],scannedDependencyMachines: [],