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Infisical is the open-source platform for securing secrets, certificates, access, and AI Agents.

fix token issuance

Thiago Araujo da Silvab58900c67da2
diff --git a/backend/CLAUDE.md b/backend/CLAUDE.md
index a0a284bf1d..1e00f8e627 100644
--- a/backend/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/backend/CLAUDE.md
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ Built-in roles: `Admin`, `Member`, `Viewer`, `NoAccess`. Custom roles use unpack
**Privilege boundaries mean different things on the two privilege systems.** `organizations.shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem` (default `true`, backfilled `false` for orgs predating March 2025) picks which. `validatePrivilegeChangeOperation` / `assertRoleSetBoundary` (`permission-fns.ts`) are the shim: on the new system they collapse to `actorPermission.can(action, subject)`, on the legacy one they run `validatePermissionBoundary`, requiring the actor to out-rank every role the target holds. So a boundary at a call site that already gated on the same action is a no-op for new-system orgs and the only protection for legacy ones. Two consequences: "the route checks the action" is not a substitute for a boundary, and adding one is not a behavior change for most tenants. Prefer `getOrgPermissionByRoles` / `getProjectPermissionByRoles` + `assertRoleSetBoundary` over fetching the target's merged ability. It bounds each role separately, and it avoids `getProjectPermission`, which stamps whichever actor it was called for onto the request context the audit log reads.
-**Identity auth-method mutations go through `assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed`** (`src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts`), because repointing an identity's auth trust lets the caller authenticate as that identity. All 13 auth services call it once per attach/update/revoke, after the `throwUnlessCan` gate and outside the `identity.projectId` branch so both scopes are covered. A new auth method calls it too. The token and UA client-secret paths still carry their own inline boundary, org branch only.
+**Identity auth-method mutations go through `assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed`** (`src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts`), because repointing an identity's auth trust lets the caller authenticate as that identity. All 13 auth services call it once per attach/update/revoke, after the `throwUnlessCan` gate and outside the `identity.projectId` branch so both scopes are covered. A new auth method calls it too. Credential issuance (`createTokenAuthToken`, `createUniversalAuthClientSecret`) goes through it as well, under `create-token`, since minting a credential is the same escalation as repointing the trust. The remaining token read/rename/revoke paths still carry their own inline boundary, org branch only.
**Project permission caching** uses a fingerprint-based two-tier cache (`withCacheFingerprint` in `src/lib/cache/with-cache.ts`):
- **Short-lived marker** (10s TTL) in Redis — while present, cached data is served with 0 DB reads.
diff --git a/backend/src/services/identity-token-auth/identity-token-auth-service.ts b/backend/src/services/identity-token-auth/identity-token-auth-service.ts
index 0425d357a8..882c481845 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/identity-token-auth/identity-token-auth-service.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/identity-token-auth/identity-token-auth-service.ts
@@ -516,38 +516,22 @@ export const identityTokenAuthServiceFactory = ({
});
ForbiddenError.from(permission).throwUnlessCan(OrgPermissionIdentityActions.Edit, OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity);
+ }
- const { permission: rolePermission } = await permissionService.getOrgPermission({
- actor: ActorType.IDENTITY,
- actorId: identityMembershipOrg.identity.id,
+ await assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed(
+ { permissionService, orgDAL, membershipIdentityDAL },
+ {
+ identityId,
orgId: identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId,
+ projectId: identityMembershipOrg.identity.projectId,
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
+ baseMessage: "Failed to create token for identity with more privileged role",
+ actor,
+ actorId,
actorAuthMethod,
- actorOrgId,
- scope: OrganizationActionScope.Any
- });
-
- const { shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem } = await requestMemoize(
- requestMemoKeys.orgFindById(identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId),
- () => orgDAL.findById(identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId)
- );
- const permissionBoundary = validatePrivilegeChangeOperation(
- shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem,
- OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
- OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity,
- permission,
- rolePermission
- );
- if (!permissionBoundary.isValid)
- throw new PermissionBoundaryError({
- message: constructPermissionErrorMessage(
- "Failed to create token for identity with more privileged role",
- shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem,
- OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
- OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity
- ),
- details: { missingPermissions: permissionBoundary.missingPermissions }
- });
- }
+ actorOrgId
+ }
+ );
await validateIdentityUpdateForSuperAdminPrivileges(identityId, isActorSuperAdmin);
diff --git a/backend/src/services/identity-ua/identity-ua-service.ts b/backend/src/services/identity-ua/identity-ua-service.ts
index f076f04d70..219f9740dd 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/identity-ua/identity-ua-service.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/identity-ua/identity-ua-service.ts
@@ -915,37 +915,22 @@ export const identityUaServiceFactory = ({
OrgPermissionIdentityActions.Create,
OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity
);
+ }
- const { permission: rolePermission } = await permissionService.getOrgPermission({
- actor: ActorType.IDENTITY,
- actorId: identityMembershipOrg.identity.id,
+ await assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed(
+ { permissionService, orgDAL, membershipIdentityDAL },
+ {
+ identityId,
orgId: identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId,
+ projectId: identityMembershipOrg.identity.projectId,
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
+ baseMessage: "Failed to create client secret for identity with more privileged role",
+ actor,
+ actorId,
actorAuthMethod,
- actorOrgId,
- scope: OrganizationActionScope.Any
- });
- const { shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem } = await requestMemoize(
- requestMemoKeys.orgFindById(identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId),
- () => orgDAL.findById(identityMembershipOrg.scopeOrgId)
- );
- const permissionBoundary = validatePrivilegeChangeOperation(
- shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem,
- OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
- OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity,
- permission,
- rolePermission
- );
- if (!permissionBoundary.isValid)
- throw new PermissionBoundaryError({
- message: constructPermissionErrorMessage(
- "Failed to create client secret for identity.",
- shouldUseNewPrivilegeSystem,
- OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken,
- OrgPermissionSubjects.Identity
- ),
- details: { missingPermissions: permissionBoundary.missingPermissions }
- });
- }
+ actorOrgId
+ }
+ );
await validateIdentityUpdateForSuperAdminPrivileges(identityId, isActorSuperAdmin);
diff --git a/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.test.ts b/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.test.ts
index b8eb6a02c7..a8b7db5b0c 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.test.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.test.ts
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ const projectMember = createMongoAbility<MongoAbility<ProjectPermissionSet>>(pro
const projectEditAuthOnly = createMongoAbility<MongoAbility<ProjectPermissionSet>>([
{ action: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth, subject: ProjectPermissionSub.Identity }
]);
+const projectCreateTokenOnly = createMongoAbility<MongoAbility<ProjectPermissionSet>>([
+ { action: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken, subject: ProjectPermissionSub.Identity }
+]);
type TScopeCall = { scope: AccessScope; orgId: string; projectId?: string };
@@ -45,6 +48,7 @@ const runBoundary = async ({
actorPermission,
targetPermissions,
projectId,
+ action = OrgPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth,
scopeCalls = [],
roleLookups = []
}: {
@@ -52,6 +56,7 @@ const runBoundary = async ({
actorPermission: MongoAbility;
targetPermissions: MongoAbility[];
projectId?: string;
+ action?: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth | OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken;
scopeCalls?: TScopeCall[];
roleLookups?: string[];
}) => {
@@ -81,7 +86,7 @@ const runBoundary = async ({
identityId: "identity-1",
orgId: "org-1",
projectId,
- action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth,
+ action,
baseMessage: "Failed to add token auth to identity with more privileged role",
actor: ActorType.USER,
actorId: "user-1",
@@ -203,4 +208,42 @@ describe("assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed", () => {
expect(roleLookups).toEqual([]);
});
});
+
+ describe("credential issuance", () => {
+ test("a create-token-only actor may not mint a credential for an admin identity", async () => {
+ await expect(
+ runBoundary({
+ actorPermission: projectCreateTokenOnly,
+ targetPermissions: [projectAdmin],
+ projectId: "project-1",
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken
+ })
+ ).rejects.toThrow(PermissionBoundaryError);
+ await expect(
+ runBoundary({
+ actorPermission: orgMember,
+ targetPermissions: [orgAdmin],
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken
+ })
+ ).rejects.toThrow(PermissionBoundaryError);
+ });
+
+ test("an admin actor may mint a credential for a member identity", async () => {
+ await expect(
+ runBoundary({
+ actorPermission: projectAdmin,
+ targetPermissions: [projectMember],
+ projectId: "project-1",
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken
+ })
+ ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+ await expect(
+ runBoundary({
+ actorPermission: orgAdmin,
+ targetPermissions: [orgMember],
+ action: OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken
+ })
+ ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+ });
+ });
});
diff --git a/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts b/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts
index af16053faa..0199329ac6 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/identity/identity-auth-permission-fns.ts
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ import { TOrgDALFactory } from "@app/services/org/org-dal";
const PROJECT_ACTION_BY_ORG_ACTION = {
[OrgPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth]: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.EditAuth,
- [OrgPermissionIdentityActions.RevokeAuth]: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.RevokeAuth
+ [OrgPermissionIdentityActions.RevokeAuth]: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.RevokeAuth,
+ [OrgPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken]: ProjectPermissionIdentityActions.CreateToken
} as const;
type TIdentityAuthPermissionDeps = {
@@ -36,8 +37,8 @@ type TAssertIdentityAuthMutationAllowedDTO = {
actorOrgId: string;
};
-// Repointing an identity's auth trust lets you authenticate as that identity, so the actor has to
-// out-rank every role the target holds. Only bites on the legacy privilege system: on the new one
+// Repointing an identity's auth trust, or minting a credential for it, lets you authenticate as that
+// identity, so the actor has to out-rank every role the target holds. Only bites on the legacy privilege system: on the new one
// `assertRoleSetBoundary` reduces to the action check the caller already ran.
export const assertIdentityAuthMutationAllowed = async (
{ permissionService, orgDAL, membershipIdentityDAL }: TIdentityAuthPermissionDeps,