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Infisical is the open-source platform for securing secrets, certificates, access, and AI Agents.

scope to org id

Thiago Araujo da Silvae6025ba770fb
diff --git a/backend/AGENTS.md b/backend/AGENTS.md
index e0640115e3..4541976375 100644
--- a/backend/AGENTS.md
+++ b/backend/AGENTS.md
@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ per login with `matchIdpMfaSignal` (`services/auth/idp-mfa-signal.ts`): the OIDC
`oidc_configs.mfaClaimName` contains `mfa`, the SAML `AuthnContextClassRef` is a two-factor class, or the
attribute named by `saml_configs.mfaSignalAttribute` contains `mfa`. Both names default to `amr`, and the
per-config allowlists extend the built-in values rather than replace them. The verdict travels on the org-less
-session token as `idpMfaVerified`, and `selectOrganization` (`auth-login-service.ts`) applies it through
-`isIdpMfaTrusted` (`auth-fns.ts`), the only reader of the setting. Rules that must hold:
+session token as `idpMfaOrgId`, the root org whose SSO config produced it (absent when the IdP did not signal
+MFA), and `selectOrganization` (`auth-login-service.ts`) applies it through `isIdpMfaTrusted` (`auth-fns.ts`),
+the only reader of the setting. Rules that must hold:
- Enforcement is decided once per selection against the root org (`actorRootOrgId`), so moving between a root
org and its sub-orgs never re-prompts.
- `isIdpMfaTrusted` refuses every non-SSO auth method, so password, Google and LDAP logins (break-glass
accounts) always get the Infisical challenge.
+- The proof only counts for the root org whose IdP produced it. A user in two orgs could otherwise tune one
+ org's allowlist to accept a single factor and carry that verdict into the other, so the token stores the org
+ id rather than a boolean and selection requires it to equal the selected root org.
- The trust only applies while `enforceMfa` is on. A user's own account-level MFA is still prompted. The
setting can be stored before enforcement is turned on; `updateOrg` refuses any value but `none` only while
the org has no active SAML or OIDC config.
diff --git a/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-idp.spec.ts b/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-idp.spec.ts
index 93f2eb1d1d..f063293c6a 100644
--- a/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-idp.spec.ts
+++ b/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-idp.spec.ts
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ describe("Auth IdP Service-Level Tests", () => {
idpMfa
});
- expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: true, evidence: ["amr=mfa"] })).idpMfaVerified).toBe(true);
- expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: false, evidence: [] })).idpMfaVerified).toBeUndefined();
- expect(sessionClaims(await login()).idpMfaVerified).toBeUndefined();
+ expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: true, evidence: ["amr=mfa"] })).idpMfaOrgId).toBe(TEST_ORG_ID);
+ expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: false, evidence: [] })).idpMfaOrgId).toBeUndefined();
+ expect(sessionClaims(await login()).idpMfaOrgId).toBeUndefined();
});
test("an OIDC login carries the verdict on its session, and only when the IdP signalled MFA", async () => {
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ describe("Auth IdP Service-Level Tests", () => {
idpMfa
});
- expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: true, evidence: ["mfa"] })).idpMfaVerified).toBe(true);
- expect(sessionClaims(await login()).idpMfaVerified).toBeUndefined();
+ expect(sessionClaims(await login({ verified: true, evidence: ["mfa"] })).idpMfaOrgId).toBe(TEST_ORG_ID);
+ expect(sessionClaims(await login()).idpMfaOrgId).toBeUndefined();
});
});
diff --git a/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-mfa.spec.ts b/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-mfa.spec.ts
index 53547d677d..a9ad646a50 100644
--- a/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-mfa.spec.ts
+++ b/backend/e2e-test/routes/v3/auth-mfa.spec.ts
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
const rootOrgId = seedData1.organization.id;
let restoreLicense: () => void;
- const signSsoSession = async (authMethod: AuthMethod, idpMfaVerified?: boolean) => {
+ const signSsoSession = async (authMethod: AuthMethod, idpMfaOrgId?: string) => {
const [session] = await db()(TableName.AuthTokenSession)
.insert({
userId: seedData1.id,
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
userId: seedData1.id,
tokenVersionId: session.id,
accessVersion: 1,
- ...(idpMfaVerified && { idpMfaVerified })
+ ...(idpMfaOrgId && { idpMfaOrgId })
},
process.env.AUTH_SECRET as string,
{ expiresIn: "1h" }
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
async (authMethod) => {
await setSsoMfaTrust(SsoMfaTrust.Signal);
- const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(authMethod, true), rootOrgId);
+ const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(authMethod, rootOrgId), rootOrgId);
expect(payload.isMfaEnabled).toBe(false);
- expect(decode(payload.token)).toMatchObject({ organizationId: rootOrgId, idpMfaVerified: true });
+ expect(decode(payload.token)).toMatchObject({ organizationId: rootOrgId, idpMfaOrgId: rootOrgId });
}
);
@@ -174,6 +174,41 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
expect(payload.mfaMethod).toBe(MfaMethod.EMAIL);
});
+ test("the root org's proof also covers its sub-organizations", async () => {
+ await setSsoMfaTrust(SsoMfaTrust.Signal);
+ const [subOrg] = await db()(TableName.Organization)
+ .insert({
+ name: `idp-mfa-${crypto.randomUUID()}`,
+ slug: `idp-mfa-${crypto.randomUUID()}`,
+ rootOrgId,
+ parentOrgId: rootOrgId,
+ enforceMfa: true
+ })
+ .returning("*");
+ try {
+ await addUserMembership({ userId: seedData1.id, orgId: subOrg.id, role: OrgMembershipRole.Member });
+
+ const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, rootOrgId), subOrg.id);
+
+ expect(payload.isMfaEnabled).toBe(false);
+ expect(decode(payload.token)).toMatchObject({
+ organizationId: rootOrgId,
+ subOrganizationId: subOrg.id,
+ idpMfaOrgId: rootOrgId
+ });
+ } finally {
+ await db()(TableName.Organization).where({ id: subOrg.id }).del();
+ }
+ });
+
+ test("a proof produced by another organization's IdP still gets the prompt", async () => {
+ await setSsoMfaTrust(SsoMfaTrust.Signal);
+
+ const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, crypto.randomUUID()), rootOrgId);
+
+ expect(payload.isMfaEnabled).toBe(true);
+ });
+
test("a password session on the same org still gets the prompt", async () => {
await setSsoMfaTrust(SsoMfaTrust.Signal);
const { accessToken } = await loginUser(seedData1.email, seedData1.password);
@@ -186,7 +221,7 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
test("the signal is ignored while the org requires Infisical MFA", async () => {
await setSsoMfaTrust(SsoMfaTrust.None);
- const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, true), rootOrgId);
+ const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, rootOrgId), rootOrgId);
expect(payload.isMfaEnabled).toBe(true);
});
@@ -203,7 +238,7 @@ describe("Auth MFA V3", () => {
await db()(TableName.Organization).where({ id: rootOrgId }).update({ enforceMfa: false });
await db()(TableName.Users).where({ id: seedData1.id }).update({ isMfaEnabled: true });
try {
- const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, true), rootOrgId);
+ const { payload } = await selectOrg(await signSsoSession(AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, rootOrgId), rootOrgId);
expect(payload.isMfaEnabled).toBe(true);
} finally {
diff --git a/backend/src/server/plugins/auth/inject-identity.ts b/backend/src/server/plugins/auth/inject-identity.ts
index 49d73a1b03..fc45333350 100644
--- a/backend/src/server/plugins/auth/inject-identity.ts
+++ b/backend/src/server/plugins/auth/inject-identity.ts
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export type TAuthMode =
authMethod: AuthMethod;
isMfaVerified?: boolean;
mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
oauthClientId?: string;
token: AuthModeJwtTokenPayload;
}
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ export const injectIdentity = fp(
isMfaVerified: token.isMfaVerified,
token,
mfaMethod: token.mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: token.idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId: token.idpMfaOrgId
};
fireIdentifyForUser(user);
break;
diff --git a/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts b/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts
index 999ffc3e3f..05f384f678 100644
--- a/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts
+++ b/backend/src/server/routes/v1/auth-router.ts
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export const registerAuthRoutes = async (server: FastifyZodProvider) => {
...(decodedToken.subOrganizationId && { subOrganizationId: decodedToken.subOrganizationId }),
isMfaVerified: decodedToken.isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: decodedToken.idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId
},
appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,
{ expiresIn }
diff --git a/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts b/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts
index 641c53a439..98972c416e 100644
--- a/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts
+++ b/backend/src/server/routes/v3/login-router.ts
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export const registerLoginRouter = async (server: FastifyZodProvider) => {
actorRootOrgId: req.auth.rootOrgId,
isMfaVerified: req.auth.isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod: req.auth.mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: req.auth.idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId: req.auth.idpMfaOrgId
});
if (tokens.isMfaEnabled) {
diff --git a/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts b/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts
index 60afc10768..244f3829db 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/auth-token/auth-token-service.ts
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ export const tokenServiceFactory = ({ tokenDAL, userDAL, orgDAL, keyStore }: TAu
...(decodedToken.subOrganizationId && { subOrganizationId: decodedToken.subOrganizationId }),
isMfaVerified: decodedToken.isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod: decodedToken.mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: decodedToken.idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId
},
appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: refreshTokenExpiresIn }
diff --git a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts
index 979f6ada86..2efa9d6375 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.test.ts
@@ -15,16 +15,24 @@ describe("OAuth login method policy", () => {
[AuthMethod.GITLAB, LoginMethod.GITLAB]
] as const)("allows %s when it is enabled", (authMethod, loginMethod) => {
expect(isOAuthLoginMethodDisabled(authMethod, [loginMethod])).toBe(false);
- expect(() => assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({ authMethod, enabledLoginMethods: [loginMethod] })).not.toThrow();
+ expect(() =>
+ assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({
+ authMethod,
+ enabledLoginMethods: [loginMethod]
+ })
+ ).not.toThrow();
});
test.each([AuthMethod.GOOGLE, AuthMethod.GITHUB, AuthMethod.GITLAB] as const)(
"rejects disabled %s login before a user exists",
(authMethod) => {
expect(isOAuthLoginMethodDisabled(authMethod, [LoginMethod.EMAIL])).toBe(true);
- expect(() => assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({ authMethod, enabledLoginMethods: [LoginMethod.EMAIL] })).toThrow(
- /disabled by administrator/
- );
+ expect(() =>
+ assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({
+ authMethod,
+ enabledLoginMethods: [LoginMethod.EMAIL]
+ })
+ ).toThrow(/disabled by administrator/);
}
);
@@ -40,7 +48,10 @@ describe("OAuth login method policy", () => {
test("treats an unset allowlist as all methods enabled", () => {
expect(() =>
- assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({ authMethod: AuthMethod.GOOGLE, enabledLoginMethods: null })
+ assertOAuthLoginMethodEnabled({
+ authMethod: AuthMethod.GOOGLE,
+ enabledLoginMethods: null
+ })
).not.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -65,28 +76,65 @@ describe("isMfaProofAccepted", () => {
});
describe("isIdpMfaTrusted", () => {
+ const rootOrgId = "org-a";
+
test.each([AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML, AuthMethod.AZURE_SAML, AuthMethod.OIDC] as const)(
"trusts a signalled %s login when the org trusts the signal",
(authMethod) => {
- expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal, authMethod, idpMfaVerified: true })).toBe(true);
+ expect(
+ isIdpMfaTrusted({
+ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal,
+ authMethod,
+ rootOrgId,
+ idpMfaOrgId: rootOrgId
+ })
+ ).toBe(true);
}
);
test("never trusts a login that carried no signal", () => {
- expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal, authMethod: AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML })).toBe(false);
expect(
- isIdpMfaTrusted({ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal, authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC, idpMfaVerified: false })
+ isIdpMfaTrusted({
+ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal,
+ authMethod: AuthMethod.OKTA_SAML,
+ rootOrgId
+ })
+ ).toBe(false);
+ });
+
+ test("never trusts a signal produced by another organization's IdP", () => {
+ expect(
+ isIdpMfaTrusted({
+ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal,
+ authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC,
+ rootOrgId,
+ idpMfaOrgId: "org-b"
+ })
).toBe(false);
});
test.each([AuthMethod.EMAIL, AuthMethod.GOOGLE, AuthMethod.GITHUB, AuthMethod.LDAP] as const)(
"never trusts a %s login, so break-glass accounts keep the Infisical challenge",
(authMethod) => {
- expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal, authMethod, idpMfaVerified: true })).toBe(false);
+ expect(
+ isIdpMfaTrusted({
+ ssoMfaTrust: SsoMfaTrust.Signal,
+ authMethod,
+ rootOrgId,
+ idpMfaOrgId: rootOrgId
+ })
+ ).toBe(false);
}
);
test.each([SsoMfaTrust.None, undefined, null, "delegate"])("ignores the signal when the setting is %s", (mode) => {
- expect(isIdpMfaTrusted({ ssoMfaTrust: mode, authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC, idpMfaVerified: true })).toBe(false);
+ expect(
+ isIdpMfaTrusted({
+ ssoMfaTrust: mode,
+ authMethod: AuthMethod.OIDC,
+ rootOrgId,
+ idpMfaOrgId: rootOrgId
+ })
+ ).toBe(false);
});
});
diff --git a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts
index f4315e7143..59a72090ec 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-fns.ts
@@ -74,18 +74,21 @@ export const getRequiredMfaMethod = (
};
// Only SAML and OIDC carry a signed IdP signal. Password, Google and LDAP never qualify, so break-glass
-// accounts always get the Infisical challenge.
+// accounts always get the Infisical challenge. The proof names the org whose IdP produced it: a user in two
+// orgs could otherwise tune one org's allowlist to accept a single factor and carry that verdict into the other.
export const isIdpMfaTrusted = ({
ssoMfaTrust,
authMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ rootOrgId,
+ idpMfaOrgId
}: {
ssoMfaTrust?: string | null;
authMethod: AuthMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ rootOrgId: string;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
}): boolean => {
if (!isAuthMethodSaml(authMethod) && authMethod !== AuthMethod.OIDC) return false;
- return ssoMfaTrust === SsoMfaTrust.Signal && Boolean(idpMfaVerified);
+ return ssoMfaTrust === SsoMfaTrust.Signal && idpMfaOrgId === rootOrgId;
};
export const RECOVERY_CODE_MFA_ASSURANCE = "recovery-code";
@@ -96,11 +99,15 @@ export const isMfaProofAccepted = (proven: string | null | undefined, acceptedMe
export const extractBearerToken = (token?: string): string => {
if (!token) {
- throw new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Missing Authorization Header in the request header." });
+ throw new UnauthorizedError({
+ message: "Missing Authorization Header in the request header."
+ });
}
const [authTokenType, authTokenValue] = token.split(" ", 2) as [string, string];
if (!authTokenType) {
- throw new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Missing Authorization Header in the request header." });
+ throw new UnauthorizedError({
+ message: "Missing Authorization Header in the request header."
+ });
}
if (authTokenType.toLowerCase() !== "bearer") {
throw new UnauthorizedError({
diff --git a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts
index 97bc6aa7b0..54dda8bb51 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-login-service.ts
@@ -190,14 +190,14 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
authMethod,
organizationId,
requiredMfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
}: {
userId: string;
email?: string | null;
authMethod: AuthMethod;
organizationId?: string;
requiredMfaMethod: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
}) => {
const appCfg = getConfig();
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
organizationId,
email,
requiredMfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
},
appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: appCfg.JWT_MFA_LIFETIME }
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
authMethod,
isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
}: {
userId: string;
ip: string;
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
authMethod: AuthMethod;
isMfaVerified?: boolean;
mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
},
tx?: Knex
) => {
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
subOrganizationId,
isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
},
cfg.AUTH_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: tokenSessionExpiresIn }
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
subOrganizationId,
isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
},
cfg.AUTH_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: refreshTokenExpiresIn }
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
ip,
userAgent,
authMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: idpMfa?.verified || undefined
+ idpMfaOrgId: idpMfa?.verified ? organizationId : undefined
});
if (organizationId) {
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
authMethod: decodedToken.authMethod,
isMfaVerified: true,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified: decodedToken.idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId: decodedToken.idpMfaOrgId
});
// Open the grace window for THIS session only (the one that just proved MFA), so
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
actorRootOrgId,
isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
}: {
userAgent: string | undefined;
ipAddress: string;
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
actorRootOrgId?: string;
isMfaVerified?: boolean;
mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
}) => {
const cfg = getConfig();
if (!userAgent) throw new UnauthorizedError({ name: "User-Agent header is required" });
@@ -1336,7 +1336,8 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
isIdpMfaTrusted({
ssoMfaTrust: rootOrg.ssoMfaTrust,
authMethod: userAuthMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ rootOrgId: rootOrg.id,
+ idpMfaOrgId
});
const shouldTriggerMfa =
isMfaRequired && !isMfaSatisfiedByIdp && (!isMfaVerified || hasMfaMethodChanged || hasOrganizationChanged);
@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
authMethod: userAuthMethod,
requiredMfaMethod,
organizationId: rootOrg.id,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
});
return { isMfaEnabled: true, mfa: mfaToken, mfaMethod: requiredMfaMethod } as const;
@@ -1367,7 +1368,7 @@ export const authLoginServiceFactory = ({
subOrganizationId: isSubOrganization ? organizationId : undefined,
isMfaVerified,
mfaMethod,
- idpMfaVerified
+ idpMfaOrgId
});
let mfaSatisfiedBy: "not-required" | "infisical" | "idp" = "infisical";
diff --git a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts
index d5ced74aa1..d0f0b07922 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts
+++ b/backend/src/services/auth/auth-type.ts
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ export type AuthModeJwtTokenPayload = {
subOrganizationId?: string;
isMfaVerified?: boolean;
mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
// Present only on delegated OAuth 2.0 access tokens. Its presence marks the token as
// AuthMode.OAUTH so the default JWT middleware will not accept it as a first-party session.
oauthClientId?: string;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export type AuthModeMfaJwtTokenPayload = {
userId: string;
organizationId?: string;
requiredMfaMethod: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
};
export type AuthModeRefreshJwtTokenPayload = {
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ export type AuthModeRefreshJwtTokenPayload = {
subOrganizationId?: string;
isMfaVerified?: boolean;
mfaMethod?: MfaMethod;
- idpMfaVerified?: boolean;
+ idpMfaOrgId?: string;
oauthClientId?: string;
scopes?: string[];
};