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JiuwenSwarm is an intelligent AI Agent built on openJiuwen. It extends the powerful capabilities of large language models directly to your fingertips through various communication apps you use daily.

Python

fix: 修复全仓工具白名单与校验名单的不一致问题

zhangfuzhi57e4b887dc70
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/auto_memory/tool_restriction_rail.py b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/auto_memory/tool_restriction_rail.py
index 34dc26eb38..30151301ee 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/auto_memory/tool_restriction_rail.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/auto_memory/tool_restriction_rail.py
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ but runtime restriction prevents unauthorized tool use.
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
+import re
+import shlex
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict
@@ -52,6 +54,31 @@ READ_ONLY_BASH_COMMANDS = (
"file",
)
+_SHELL_SEGMENT_SEPARATOR_RE = re.compile(r"\|\||&&|\||;")
+_SHELL_UNSAFE_TOKENS = (">", "<", "`", "$(", "&", "\n", "\r")
+_FIND_WRITE_ARGS = frozenset(
+ {"-delete", "-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir", "-fprint", "-fprint0", "-fprintf", "-fls"}
+)
+
+
+def _is_read_only_shell_segment(segment: str) -> bool:
+ if any(token in segment for token in _SHELL_UNSAFE_TOKENS):
+ return False
+ try:
+ words = shlex.split(segment)
+ except ValueError:
+ return False
+ if not words:
+ return False
+ command = words[0].lower()
+ if command == "git":
+ if " ".join(words[:2]).lower() not in READ_ONLY_BASH_COMMANDS:
+ return False
+ return not any(word == "--output" or word.startswith("--output=") for word in words)
+ if command not in READ_ONLY_BASH_COMMANDS:
+ return False
+ return command != "find" or _FIND_WRITE_ARGS.isdisjoint(words)
+
class AutoMemoryToolRestrictionRail(AgentRail):
"""Restrict tool calls for extract_memories subagent.
@@ -208,25 +235,11 @@ class AutoMemoryToolRestrictionRail(AgentRail):
Returns:
True if the command is read-only (no file modification).
"""
- command = tool_args.get("command", "")
- if not command:
- return False
-
- # Check against read-only command patterns
- command_lower = command.lower()
- for allowed_cmd in READ_ONLY_BASH_COMMANDS:
- if allowed_cmd.lower() in command_lower:
- return True
-
- # Also check for explicit read-only flags
- # e.g., "git status --porcelain" is safe
- if any(
- flag in command_lower
- for flag in ("--status", "--list", "--show", "--print", "--read")
- ):
- return True
-
- return False
+ command = str(tool_args.get("command") or "").strip()
+ segments = [
+ segment for segment in _SHELL_SEGMENT_SEPARATOR_RE.split(command) if segment.strip()
+ ]
+ return bool(segments) and all(_is_read_only_shell_segment(segment) for segment in segments)
def _is_in_memory_dir(self, tool_args: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""Check if the target path is within memory_dir.
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/rails/progressive_tool_rail.py b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/rails/progressive_tool_rail.py
index 7939395da9..18897fddb9 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/rails/progressive_tool_rail.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/common/rails/progressive_tool_rail.py
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ class ProgressiveToolRail(DeepAgentRail):
if str(item).strip()
]
self._cached_model_name = ""
+ self._bypass_logged_model: str | None = None
self._deepresearch_context_provider = deepresearch_context_provider
self._active_skill_provider = active_skill_provider
self._disabled_tools: set[str] = {
@@ -484,13 +485,16 @@ class ProgressiveToolRail(DeepAgentRail):
return False
model_name = self._resolve_model_name_for_ctx(ctx)
if not self._is_lazy_load_enabled_for_model(model_name):
- logger.info(
- "%s lazy load bypassed for model=%s enable_for_models=%s",
- _LOG_PREFIX,
- model_name,
- self._enable_for_models,
- )
+ if model_name != self._bypass_logged_model:
+ self._bypass_logged_model = model_name
+ logger.info(
+ "%s lazy load bypassed for model=%s enable_for_models=%s",
+ _LOG_PREFIX,
+ model_name,
+ self._enable_for_models,
+ )
return False
+ self._bypass_logged_model = None
return True
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -522,6 +526,7 @@ class ProgressiveToolRail(DeepAgentRail):
def uninit(self, agent: Any) -> None:
self._set_meta_tools_active(False)
+ self._remove_navigation_section(agent)
self._deep_agent = None
self._runtime_agent = None
self._meta_tools = None
@@ -757,6 +762,8 @@ class ProgressiveToolRail(DeepAgentRail):
agent = self._resolve_runtime_agent(ctx)
if lazy_load_active:
await self._refresh_deferred_tool_cache_if_stale()
+ else:
+ self._remove_navigation_section(agent)
disabled = self._current_disabled_tools()
if lazy_load_active and any(
str(getattr(tool, "name", "") or "") in disabled
@@ -910,6 +917,21 @@ class ProgressiveToolRail(DeepAgentRail):
spb.add_section(navigation_section)
self._navigation_name_fingerprint = name_fp
+ def _remove_navigation_section(self, agent: Any) -> None:
+ """Drop TOOL_NAVIGATION once lazy load stops applying to this agent.
+
+ The builder outlives the invoke, so the section would keep telling the
+ model to use tools_search after the meta tools were unregistered.
+ """
+ spb = getattr(agent, "system_prompt_builder", None)
+ if spb is None or not hasattr(spb, "has_section"):
+ return
+ if not spb.has_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION):
+ return
+ if hasattr(spb, "remove_section"):
+ spb.remove_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION)
+ self._navigation_name_fingerprint = None
+
async def _build_navigation_section(self) -> PromptSection | None:
"""Build navigation prompt section for deferred tools."""
if not self._cached_deferred_tool_infos:
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/docs/specs/S_04_plan-approval.md b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/docs/specs/S_04_plan-approval.md
index 4d72553a6c..3ac8f636ed 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/docs/specs/S_04_plan-approval.md
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/docs/specs/S_04_plan-approval.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|---|---|
| Spec ID | S_04 |
| 状态 | 当前实现的真实描述(含未装配遗留机制的登记) |
-| 修订日期 | 2026-10-28 |
+| 修订日期 | 2026-11-02 |
| 关联模块 | `jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/code/rails/code_plan_approval_interrupt_rail.py`(p78 现行审批门,357 行)<br>`jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/code/prompt/plan_approval.py`(常量、Web 三动作描述符、意图分类,368 行)<br>`jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/code/rails/code_agent_mode_rail.py`(批准后的模式恢复 / 正文压缩 / 延迟收尾消费面,325 行)<br>`jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/work/rails/work_agent_mode_rail.py`(76 行)+ `work/prompt/work_plan_prompts.py` 的 `WORK_PLAN_ALLOWED_TOOLS`(work profile plan 白名单)<br>`jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/code/rails/code_plan_approval_rail.py`(p76 文本审批,**未装配遗留**,226 行) |
| 装配点 | 三处,均返回同一个 `PlanApprovalInterruptRail()` 实例类:① `server/runtime/agent_adapter/interface_deep.py` `_build_work_plan_approval_rail()`(~10580,`_RailBuildInfo("_work_plan_approval_rail")` ~10800,deep 与 work profile 共用);② `server/runtime/agent_adapter/interface_code.py` `_build_plan_approval_rail()`(~1339),并在 `_get_current_agent_rails`(~1353-1369)纳入热重载覆盖;③ `agents/swarm/providers/code_rails.py` `build_team_plan_approval`(~375,`_is_team_plan_leader` 门控,team.plan leader 复用) |
| 消费点 | `server/runtime/agent_adapter/interface.py`(~2256-2285 Web 动作 → confirm 载荷映射;~97/253 reminder 原文还原)<br>`agents/harness/common/rails/interrupt/interrupt_helpers.py`(~1078 ask_user 载荷增强)<br>`server/handlers/_shared.py`(~645 进 plan 轮记录 original_query)<br>`server/handlers/_default.py`(~201 消费 `PLAN_MODE_EXITED_EVENT_TYPE`) |
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Web revise:`reject` + `custom_input` → `approved=False, feedback=修改意
`_compact_exit_plan_result` 把 `exit_plan_mode` 结果里 "## Plan:" / "## 计划:" 起到 `<system-reminder>` 之前的正文抽掉。模型写计划时已有全文在上下文,用户刚在 UI 里批准过,重读一遍只会诱导模型"再总结一遍计划并询问是否开始"而非直接执行。
**N13 work profile plan 白名单:白名单制 + 刻意排除**
-`WORK_PLAN_ALLOWED_TOOLS`(15 项):`enter_plan_mode` / `exit_plan_mode` / `ask_user` / `read_file` / `grep` / `list_files` / `glob` / `bash` / `write_file` / `edit_file` / `web_search` / `web_free_search` / `web_paid_search` / `web_fetch` / `web_fetch_webpage`。设计要点:① 白名单而非黑名单——工具集随配置 / 技能 / MCP 动态增长,黑名单会漏;② **排除 task_tool**——子代理有独立 session 与 plan_mode 状态,父 agent 的 plan 约束不传播,委派即可绕开只读约束(评审定论;待上游给 TaskTool 下发 plan 标记后再评估恢复);③ 排除 `send_file_to_user` / `cron_create` / `switch_mode`(work 的 plan 开关由服务端控制);④ 与 openjiuwen 基线 `DEFAULT_PLAN_MODE_ALLOWED_TOOLS`(12 项,**含 task_tool 与 switch_mode**,无 web 五件)的差异即 work 的定制面。`WorkAgentModeRail` 直接继承 `CodeAgentModeRail`,构造时只换 `allowed_tools` 与 `exit_plan_notification`;`before_model_call` 在**非 plan 态**追加隐藏 `switch_mode`(plan 态本就被 N14 的 switch_mode 拦截覆盖)。
+`WORK_PLAN_ALLOWED_TOOLS`(16 项):`enter_plan_mode` / `exit_plan_mode` / `ask_user` / `read_file` / `grep` / `list_files` / `glob` / `bash` / `write_file` / `edit_file` / `web_search` / `web_free_search` / `web_paid_search` / `fetch_webpage` / `web_fetch` / `web_fetch_webpage`。设计要点:① 白名单而非黑名单——工具集随配置 / 技能 / MCP 动态增长,黑名单会漏;② **排除 task_tool**——子代理有独立 session 与 plan_mode 状态,父 agent 的 plan 约束不传播,委派即可绕开只读约束(评审定论;待上游给 TaskTool 下发 plan 标记后再评估恢复);③ 排除 `send_file_to_user` / `cron_create` / `switch_mode`(work 的 plan 开关由服务端控制);④ 与 openjiuwen 基线 `DEFAULT_PLAN_MODE_ALLOWED_TOOLS`(12 项,**含 task_tool 与 switch_mode**,无 web 六件)的差异即 work 的定制面。`WorkAgentModeRail` 直接继承 `CodeAgentModeRail`,构造时只换 `allowed_tools` 与 `exit_plan_notification`;`before_model_call` 在**非 plan 态**追加隐藏 `switch_mode`(plan 态本就被 N14 的 switch_mode 拦截覆盖)。
**N14 plan 态双闸:switch_mode 退出拦截 + bash 写操作正则**
`CodeAgentModeRail.before_tool_call`:plan 态下 `switch_mode` 目标为 normal/auto 即拒绝("请先调用 exit_plan_mode 提交计划等待审批")——模式退出必须过审批门,模型不能单方面走;bash 命令命中 `_NON_GIT_WRITE_RE`(mkdir/touch/mv/cp/chmod/chown/dd/tee/wget/curl -O/rm -rf/压缩解压/`>`/`>>` 重定向)即拒绝。`write_file`/`edit_file` 不在拦截之列(计划文件本身需要写)。
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/team/team_runtime_inheritance.py b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/team/team_runtime_inheritance.py
index e5f2afa2da..44854844ab 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/team/team_runtime_inheritance.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/team/team_runtime_inheritance.py
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ TOOL_WHITELIST = frozenset({
"search_alarms",
"modify_alarm",
"delete_alarm",
- "xiaoyi_collection",
"image_reading",
"xiaoyi_gui_agent",
"web_search",
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/work/prompt/work_plan_prompts.py b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/work/prompt/work_plan_prompts.py
index 82003bf7e2..5a1b75f0d8 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/work/prompt/work_plan_prompts.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/agents/harness/work/prompt/work_plan_prompts.py
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ WORK_PLAN_ALLOWED_TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"web_search",
"web_free_search",
"web_paid_search",
+ "fetch_webpage",
"web_fetch",
"web_fetch_webpage",
)
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_09_mcp-integration.md b/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_09_mcp-integration.md
index d11dc084f5..3404a35301 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_09_mcp-integration.md
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_09_mcp-integration.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
| 类型 | spec |
| 编号 / slug | S_09 / mcp-integration |
| 关联模块 | jiuwenswarm/common/{mcp_config, mcp_server_registry, mcp_call_timeout_patch, mcp_tool_list_refresh_patch}.py |
-| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-30 |
+| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-31 |
| 关联 feature | F_01_deepresearch-mcp-delegation.md |
## 范围 / 边界
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
## 装配 / 分层关系
```
-mcp_config.py(基础层,~2720 行)
+mcp_config.py(基础层,~2640 行)
配置条目 → SDK McpServerConfig 转换 + 安全准入(白名单/SSRF/鉴权)
请求级 worker 池 + OfficeClaw 工具发现/白名单绑定
▲ 复用 _PooledMcpWorker / create_mcp_tool / list_request_mcp_server_tools
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ mcp_tool_list_refresh_patch.py ┘ 唯一装配点:interface_deep.DeepAdapter.
- **N1 transport 归一**:`http` / `streamable_http` → `streamable-http`;缺省 `stdio`。
归一发生在 `build_mcp_server_config`,下游只见归一后的值。
- **N2 安全准入三闸**(fail-closed):企业版禁本地 stdio;stdio 命令白名单
- node / python / npx / uvx + 危险参数(`-e` / `-c`)拦截;SSRF 屏蔽内网 / 元数据地址
+ node / python / npx / uvx(python 解释器名精确匹配:`python`、`pythonw`,可带版本号及 `.exe` / `.cmd` / `.bat` 后缀)
+ + 危险参数(`-e` / `-c`)拦截;SSRF 屏蔽内网 / 元数据地址
(逃生 env `JIUWENSWARM_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_MCP`)。鉴权必须进 `auth_headers`(兼容
`headers` 别名)。
- **N3 超时与缓存**:调用 / 发现超时默认 300s;schema 缓存 env
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_10_model-and-reasoning.md b/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_10_model-and-reasoning.md
index b8d994b4de..cd4a7673a6 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_10_model-and-reasoning.md
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/common/docs/specs/S_10_model-and-reasoning.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
| 类型 | spec |
| 编号 / slug | S_10 / model-and-reasoning |
| 关联模块 | jiuwenswarm/common/{model_client_extensions, model_config_validation, model_identity, openrouter_attribution, reasoning_config, reasoning_injector}.py |
-| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-13 |
+| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-31 |
| 关联 feature | 暂无 |
## 范围 / 边界
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
`react` 三处。
- **N5 reasoning 三层白名单**:provider ∈ {openai, deepseek, dashscope};host 判定
`deepseek_official`(api.deepseek.com)/ `dashscope_bailian`(dashscope +
- compatible-mode);模型仅 deepseek-v4-pro / flash / flash-0731
+ compatible-mode);模型仅 deepseek-v4-pro / flash / flash-0731 / v4.1-flash / v4.1-flash-1017
(`SUPPORTED_DEEPSEEK_V4_MODELS`)。三层全过才注入。
- **N6 reasoning_level 是内部字段**:注入前从 runtime config **剥离**、绝不透传 SDK;
level 归一 off / low / medium / high,effort 映射 low/medium/high → high。
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/common/enterprise_methods.py b/jiuwenswarm/common/enterprise_methods.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f60a8f3b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/common/enterprise_methods.py
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2026. All rights reserved.
+"""企业版北向方法白名单,Gateway 与 AgentServer 共用同一份。"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+#: 企业版经 SPI 开放只读列表/详情与用户自装/卸载/更新写操作;技能卸载走
+#: ``skills.enterprise.uninstall``。
+ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED_METHODS = frozenset({
+ "skills.list",
+ "skills.get",
+ "skills.toggle",
+ "skills.source.providers",
+ "skills.source.search",
+ "skills.source.install",
+ "skills.updates.check",
+ "skills.update",
+ "skills.enterprise.list",
+ "skills.enterprise.install",
+ "skills.enterprise.uninstall",
+ "skills.enterprise.source.providers",
+ "skills.enterprise.source.search",
+})
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/common/mcp_config.py b/jiuwenswarm/common/mcp_config.py
index 948ee99212..58b759175f 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/common/mcp_config.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/common/mcp_config.py
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import ipaddress
import json
import os
import re
-import sys
import threading
import time
import weakref
@@ -336,6 +335,9 @@ def _safe_id_part(value: str, *, default: str) -> str:
return (normalized or default)[:48]
+_PYTHON_COMMAND_RE = re.compile(r"pythonw?(\d+(\.\d+)*t?)?(\.exe|\.cmd|\.bat)?")
+
+
def _normalize_stdio_command_kind(command: str) -> str:
"""将 command 归一化为 'node'、'python'、'npx' 或 'uvx'。
@@ -349,7 +351,7 @@ def _normalize_stdio_command_kind(command: str) -> str:
normalized = raw.replace("\\", "/").rsplit("/", 1)[-1].lower()
if normalized in ("node", "node.exe"):
return "node"
- if normalized.startswith("python"):
+ if _PYTHON_COMMAND_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
return "python"
if normalized in ("npx", "npx.exe", "npx.cmd", "npx.bat"):
return "npx"
@@ -415,133 +417,17 @@ def _check_dangerous_args(tool_name: str, args: list) -> None:
arg_str = str(arg).strip()
if arg_str in _DANGEROUS_ARGS_PATTERN:
raise ValueError(
- f"安全拦截阻断:工具 '{tool_name}' 的 args 包含危险标志 '{arg_str}',"
- "禁止通过参数注入执行任意代码。"
+ f"MCP 配置校验未通过:工具 '{tool_name}' 的 args 包含不允许的标志 '{arg_str}',"
+ "不支持通过参数内联执行代码。"
)
for dangerous_prefix in ("-e=", "--eval=", "-c=", "--command="):
if arg_str.lower().startswith(dangerous_prefix):
raise ValueError(
- f"安全拦截阻断:工具 '{tool_name}' 的 args 包含危险标志 '{arg_str}',"
- "禁止通过参数注入执行任意代码。"
+ f"MCP 配置校验未通过:工具 '{tool_name}' 的 args 包含不允许的标志 '{arg_str}',"
+ "不支持通过参数内联执行代码。"
)
-def _trusted_cat_cafe_stdio_roots() -> list[Path]:
- roots: list[Path] = []
- raw = (os.getenv("CAT_CAFE_MCP_CWD") or "").strip()
- if raw:
- try:
- roots.append(Path(raw).expanduser().resolve())
- except OSError:
- pass
- try:
- roots.append((Path.home() / ".office-claw").resolve())
- except OSError:
- pass
- try:
- roots.append(Path(sys.executable).resolve().parent)
- except OSError:
- pass
- lp = (os.getenv("LOCALAPPDATA") or "").strip()
- if lp:
- inst = Path(lp) / "Programs" / "OfficeClaw"
- try:
- if inst.exists():
- roots.append(inst.resolve())
- except OSError:
- pass
- for env_key in ("ProgramFiles", "ProgramFiles(x86)"):
- base = os.getenv(env_key, "").strip()
- if not base:
- continue
- inst = Path(base) / "OfficeClaw"
- try:
- if inst.exists():
- roots.append(inst.resolve())
- except OSError:
- pass
- seen: set[str] = set()
- out: list[Path] = []
- for r in roots:
- key = os.path.normcase(str(r))
- if key not in seen:
- seen.add(key)
- out.append(r)
- return out
-
-
-def _path_is_under_trusted_root(path: Path, roots: list[Path]) -> bool:
- try:
- rp = path.resolve()
- except OSError:
- return False
- for root in roots:
- try:
- rp.relative_to(root)
- return True
- except ValueError:
- continue
- return False
-
-
-def _validate_cat_cafe_request_scoped_stdio(params: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
- """限制请求级 stdio:禁止内联代码执行面,脚本路径须在受信根目录下。
-
- npx/uvx 为包运行器,参数为包名及其参数,不适用本地脚本路径受信根校验
- (代码来源为包仓库而非本地文件,信任决策在于包名而非路径)。
- """
- cmd = str(params.get("command") or "").strip()
- args = params.get("args") or []
- if not isinstance(args, list):
- raise ValueError("stdio MCP 的 args 须为列表")
-
- kind = _normalize_stdio_command_kind(cmd)
- flat = [str(a) for a in args]
- lowered = [a.strip().lower() for a in flat]
- if any(x == "-c" or x == "--command" for x in lowered):
- raise ValueError("请求级 cat_cafe_mcp 禁止使用 python -c / --command")
- if kind == "node" and any(x in ("-e", "--eval") for x in lowered):
- raise ValueError("请求级 cat_cafe_mcp 禁止使用 node -e / --eval")
-
- if kind in ("npx", "uvx"):
- return
-
- cwd_path: Path | None = None
- cwd_raw = params.get("cwd")
- if isinstance(cwd_raw, str) and cwd_raw.strip():
- try:
- cwd_path = Path(cwd_raw).expanduser().resolve()
- except OSError as exc:
- raise ValueError(f"请求级 cat_cafe_mcp cwd 无效: {cwd_raw}") from exc
- if not _path_is_under_trusted_root(cwd_path, _trusted_cat_cafe_stdio_roots()):
- raise ValueError(f"请求级 cat_cafe_mcp cwd 不在受信根目录下: {cwd_path}")
-
- roots = _trusted_cat_cafe_stdio_roots()
- for a in flat:
- s = a.strip()
- if not s or s.startswith("-"):
- continue
- path_like_suffix = s.lower().endswith((".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".py"))
- if "/" not in s and "\\" not in s and not path_like_suffix:
- continue
- candidate = Path(s).expanduser()
- if not candidate.is_absolute() and cwd_path is None:
- raise ValueError(
- "请求级 cat_cafe_mcp 使用相对脚本路径时必须提供位于受信根下的 cwd"
- )
- try:
- if cwd_path is not None and not candidate.is_absolute():
- resolved = (cwd_path / candidate).resolve()
- else:
- resolved = candidate.resolve()
- except OSError:
- continue
- if not _path_is_under_trusted_root(resolved, roots):
- raise ValueError(
- f"请求级 cat_cafe_mcp 参数路径不在受信根目录下: {resolved}"
- )
-
-
_REQUEST_REMOTE_BLOCKED_HOSTS = frozenset(
{
"localhost",
@@ -2748,8 +2634,5 @@ __all__ = [
"_optional_auth_dict",
"_pick_mcp_url",
"_check_dangerous_args",
- "_path_is_under_trusted_root",
- "_trusted_cat_cafe_stdio_roots",
- "_validate_cat_cafe_request_scoped_stdio",
"_validate_request_scoped_remote_mcp",
]
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/common/reasoning_config.py b/jiuwenswarm/common/reasoning_config.py
index f39642eeea..807faa12fb 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/common/reasoning_config.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/common/reasoning_config.py
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ SUPPORTED_DEEPSEEK_V4_MODELS = {
"deepseek-v4-pro",
"deepseek-v4-flash",
"deepseek-v4-flash-0731",
+ "deepseek-v4.1-flash",
+ "deepseek-v4.1-flash-1017",
}
LEVEL_MAPPING: dict[ReasoningLevel, ReasoningEffort] = {
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/gateway/channel_manager/web/invoke.py b/jiuwenswarm/gateway/channel_manager/web/invoke.py
index 9d4ae5b659..ee520dcd28 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/gateway/channel_manager/web/invoke.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/gateway/channel_manager/web/invoke.py
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import inspect
import logging
from typing import Any
+from jiuwenswarm.common.enterprise_methods import ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED_METHODS
from jiuwenswarm.common.request_identity import (
merge_routing_into_params,
web_routing_identity,
@@ -42,21 +43,6 @@ _ENTERPRISE_A2A_ALLOWED = frozenset({
"a2a.outbound.dispatch.list",
"a2a.outbound.dispatch.get",
})
-_ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED = frozenset({
- "skills.list",
- "skills.get",
- "skills.toggle",
- "skills.source.providers",
- "skills.source.search",
- "skills.source.install",
- "skills.updates.check",
- "skills.update",
- "skills.enterprise.list",
- "skills.enterprise.install",
- "skills.enterprise.uninstall",
- "skills.enterprise.source.providers",
- "skills.enterprise.source.search",
-})
def is_enterprise_write_forbidden(method: str) -> bool:
@@ -69,7 +55,7 @@ def is_enterprise_write_forbidden(method: str) -> bool:
return True
if method.startswith("channel.") and (method.endswith(".set_conf") or method.endswith(".unbind")):
return True
- if method.startswith("skills.") and method not in _ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED:
+ if method.startswith("skills.") and method not in ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED_METHODS:
return True
return False
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/resources/.env.template b/jiuwenswarm/resources/.env.template
index 81a709a30e..b385333bf8 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/resources/.env.template
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/resources/.env.template
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_USER_TOKEN=
TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_SYSTEM_TOKEN=
# 请求超时(秒)
TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_TIMEOUT=60
-# ZIP 下载主机白名单(逗号分隔);空则使用内置默认(含 127.0.0.1 / localhost)
+# ZIP 下载主机白名单(逗号分隔);空则使用内置默认(不含回环地址,本地 mock Hub 需显式配置 127.0.0.1)
TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS=
NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,api.openai.rnd.huawei.com
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/resources/config.yaml b/jiuwenswarm/resources/config.yaml
index be0a03b599..c643f8e1f3 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/resources/config.yaml
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/resources/config.yaml
@@ -640,14 +640,14 @@ react:
# ProgressiveToolRail: 工具延迟加载,固定 eager_tools schema,deferred 工具通过
# tools_search → invoke_tool 间接调用,最大化 prefix cache 命中率。
tool_lazy_load:
- enabled: true # 总开关,默认关闭
+ enabled: true # 总开关
eager_tools: # 常驻可见工具列表
- tools_search
- invoke_tool
- web_search
- fetch_webpage
- ask_user
- - task_tool
+ - task_tool # 常驻可见,否则 ProgressiveToolRail 会滤掉,主 agent 无法委派 subagent
- send_file_to_user
- list_files
- read_file
@@ -663,7 +663,6 @@ react:
- todo_create
- todo_list
- todo_modify
- - task_tool # 常驻可见,否则 ProgressiveToolRail 会滤掉,主 agent 无法委派 subagent
- subagent_spawn # 运行时六个工具常驻,否则主 agent 每次都要先 tools_search 再 invoke_tool
- subagent_wait
- subagent_list
@@ -676,7 +675,9 @@ react:
- write_memory
- edit_memory
- external_memory_search
- enable_for_models: # 模型白名单(空=全部启用)
+ # 模型白名单(空=全部启用),对模型名做子串匹配,大小写不敏感;未命中的模型全部工具直接可见。
+ # 懒加载依赖模型读懂 tools_search → invoke_tool,加入新模型前需先验证。
+ enable_for_models:
- glm
- deepseek
subagents: # 子 agent 延迟加载配置
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/server/agent_http_server.py b/jiuwenswarm/server/agent_http_server.py
index c8f67566a4..28d31cf2fc 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/server/agent_http_server.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/server/agent_http_server.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from typing import Any, AsyncIterator, Awaitable, Callable
from jiuwenswarm.common.e2a.constants import E2A_RESPONSE_STATUS_FAILED
from jiuwenswarm.common.e2a.models import E2AEnvelope
+from jiuwenswarm.common.enterprise_methods import ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED_METHODS
from jiuwenswarm.common.schema.message import ReqMethod
from jiuwenswarm.edition import is_enterprise
from jiuwenswarm.server.transports.sink import STREAM_DONE, SSESink, UnaryHTTPSink
@@ -26,25 +27,6 @@ API_PREFIX = "/api/v1"
PORT_SCAN_RANGE = 10
PORT_SCAN_STEP = 1000
-#: 企业版北向允许的 Skill 方法白名单(必须与 Gateway ``invoke.py`` 的
-#: ``_ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED`` 保持一致)。企业版经 SPI 开放只读列表/详情
-#: 与用户自装/卸载/更新写操作;技能卸载走 ``skills.enterprise.uninstall``。
-_ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED = frozenset({
- "skills.list",
- "skills.get",
- "skills.toggle",
- "skills.source.providers",
- "skills.source.search",
- "skills.source.install",
- "skills.updates.check",
- "skills.update",
- "skills.enterprise.list",
- "skills.enterprise.install",
- "skills.enterprise.uninstall",
- "skills.enterprise.source.providers",
- "skills.enterprise.source.search",
-})
-
def _is_enterprise_skill_forbidden(method: str) -> bool:
"""AgentServer 侧防御性校验:企业版下拒绝白名单外的 ``skills.*`` 写操作。
@@ -54,7 +36,7 @@ def _is_enterprise_skill_forbidden(method: str) -> bool:
"""
if not is_enterprise():
return False
- return method.startswith("skills.") and method not in _ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED
+ return method.startswith("skills.") and method not in ENTERPRISE_SKILL_ALLOWED_METHODS
#: HTTP 侧交给业务层的 ``RequestContext.connection_id``。
#:
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/docs/specs/S_03_market-sources-and-distribution.md b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/docs/specs/S_03_market-sources-and-distribution.md
index 03261f14ee..11678f8db4 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/docs/specs/S_03_market-sources-and-distribution.md
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/docs/specs/S_03_market-sources-and-distribution.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
| 类型 | spec |
| 编号 / slug | S_03 / market-sources-and-distribution |
| 关联模块 | jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/{source_registry.py, artifact_security.py} + skill_manager.py 市场渠道段 |
-| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-16 |
+| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-31 |
| 关联 feature | 暂无(初版建档) |
## 范围 / 边界
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ SPI 协议(`jiuwenswarm/extensions/sdk/skill_source.py`):`SkillSourceProvi
host 匹配走 `_team_skills_hub_host_matches_rule`(支持规则式匹配);`_is_http_download_target` 判定是否走 HTTP 下载;`_is_github_skill_folder_url` 识别 github 文件夹 URL(转 SkillNet 链路)。**绕过断言直接 `_download_http_archive_bytes_sync` 是违规**。
+`TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS` 为空时使用内置默认 `openjiuwen-market.obs.*.myhuaweicloud.com`,不含回环地址;本地 mock Hub 显式配置该变量。
+
### 安全解压(zip-slip 防护)
`_safe_extract_zip_members_into` / `_safe_extract_zip_bytes_to_dir` / `_safe_extract_tar_to_dir` / `_detect_archive_format`(zip / tar 识别)+ `_extract_archive_bytes_to_dir` 统一分发。所有解压必须走这组函数——成员路径先归一再验证落在 dest 内,禁止直接 `zf.extractall`。
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/skill_manager.py b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/skill_manager.py
index 617c80389c..2f8add117e 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/skill_manager.py
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill/skill_manager.py
@@ -121,8 +121,6 @@ _TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_MARKET_TIMEOUT: float = float(os.environ.get("TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_T
_TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_BASE_URL_DEFAULT = "https://teamskills.openjiuwen.com"
_TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"openjiuwen-market.obs.*.myhuaweicloud.com",
- "127.0.0.1",
- "localhost",
)
_IMPORT_LOCAL_REMOTE_TIMEOUT: float = float(os.environ.get("IMPORT_LOCAL_REMOTE_TIMEOUT", "60"))
_IMPORT_LOCAL_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS: tuple[str, ...] = ("*.obs.*.myhuaweicloud.com",)
diff --git a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill_turbo/docs/specs/S_02_skill-routing-and-registration.md b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill_turbo/docs/specs/S_02_skill-routing-and-registration.md
index 6127c476c2..ebda7149a5 100644
--- a/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill_turbo/docs/specs/S_02_skill-routing-and-registration.md
+++ b/jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill_turbo/docs/specs/S_02_skill-routing-and-registration.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
| 类型 | spec |
| 编号 / slug | S_02 / skill-routing-and-registration |
| 关联模块 | `jiuwenswarm/server/runtime/skill_turbo/`(environment.py、planner.py、skill_meta.py、turbo_package_loader.py、tools_loader.py、skill_turbo_tools.py) |
-| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-29 |
+| 最近一次修订日期 | 2026-10-31 |
| 关联 feature | F_03_multi-deliverable-todo-guide.md;F_05_enable-turbo-switch.md |
## 范围 / 边界
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ def get_tool_function(self, tool_name) -> Callable | None
| 维度 | enable_for_models | vendor_map |
|---|---|---|
| 机制 | DeepAgent 层 ProgressiveToolRail 工具**懒加载**白名单(`progressive_tool_rail.py` 构造参数,`_is_lazy_load_enabled_for_model`) | thinking 参数**注入**的模型白名单(`common/thinking/vendor_map.py`) |
-| 配置 | `config.yaml react.tool_lazy_load.enable_for_models`,当前默认 `["glm"]` | 代码内 GLM-5.x 窄正则(防误匹配 glm-4 / glm-50)+ DeepSeek keyword 全版本 |
+| 配置 | `config.yaml react.tool_lazy_load.enable_for_models`,当前默认 `["glm", "deepseek"]` | 代码内 GLM-5.x 窄正则(防误匹配 glm-4 / glm-50)+ DeepSeek keyword 全版本 |
| 匹配语义 | **空白名单 = 全部模型启用懒加载**;非空对 model_name 做小写子串匹配,不匹配 → 懒加载整体 bypass(全部工具常驻) | 白名单外模型不注入 thinking kwargs |
| 影响 | 不影响 thinking | 不影响工具加载 |
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/agents/harness/common/test_auto_memory_tool_restriction.py b/tests/unit_tests/agents/harness/common/test_auto_memory_tool_restriction.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a19a2c0d3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/agents/harness/common/test_auto_memory_tool_restriction.py
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2026. All rights reserved.
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from jiuwenswarm.agents.harness.common.auto_memory.tool_restriction_rail import (
+ AutoMemoryToolRestrictionRail,
+)
+
+
+def rail(tmp_path) -> AutoMemoryToolRestrictionRail:
+ return AutoMemoryToolRestrictionRail(memory_dir=str(tmp_path))
+
+
+ "command",
+ [
+ "ls -la",
+ "pwd",
+ "git status --porcelain",
+ "git log --oneline -5",
+ "git diff HEAD~1",
+ "find . -name '*.md'",
+ "cat MEMORY.md | grep user | wc -l",
+ "ls && pwd",
+ "ls; pwd;",
+ "head -n 5 'a b.md'",
+ "ls -la\n",
+ "git status\r\n",
+ ],
+)
+def test_read_only_commands_are_allowed(rail, command):
+ assert rail._is_read_only_bash_command({"command": command}) is True
+
+
+ "command",
+ [
+ "",
+ " ",
+ ";",
+ "rm -rf ./tools",
+ "rm -rf build; ls",
+ "ls; rm -rf build",
+ "ls && rm -rf build",
+ "ls || rm -rf build",
+ "echo x > ~/.bashrc",
+ "cat a >> b",
+ "cat < a",
+ "cat a | sh",
+ "ls | xargs rm",
+ "ls & rm -rf build",
+ "echo $(rm -rf build)",
+ "echo `rm -rf build`",
+ "ls\nrm -rf build",
+ "find . -delete",
+ "find . -exec rm {} +",
+ "find . -fprint out.txt",
+ "git push origin main",
+ "git diff --output=out.patch",
+ "git log --output out.txt",
+ "pip --list",
+ "curl https://example.test --show-error",
+ "cat 'unterminated",
+ ],
+)
+def test_write_or_unknown_commands_are_denied(rail, command):
+ assert rail._is_read_only_bash_command({"command": command}) is False
+
+
+def test_non_string_command_is_denied(rail):
+ assert rail._is_read_only_bash_command({"command": ["ls"]}) is False
+
+
+async def test_rail_skips_substring_lookalike_but_lets_read_only_pipeline_through(rail):
+ denied = SimpleNamespace(
+ inputs=SimpleNamespace(tool_name="bash", tool_args={"command": "rm -rf ./tools"}, tool_result=None),
+ extra={},
+ )
+ await rail.before_tool_call(denied)
+ assert denied.extra.get("_skip_tool") is True
+
+ allowed = SimpleNamespace(
+ inputs=SimpleNamespace(tool_name="bash", tool_args={"command": "cat a | grep b"}, tool_result=None),
+ extra={},
+ )
+ await rail.before_tool_call(allowed)
+ assert "_skip_tool" not in allowed.extra
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_mcp_server_registry.py b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_mcp_server_registry.py
index 5098e88177..8edf29f17c 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_mcp_server_registry.py
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_mcp_server_registry.py
@@ -119,11 +119,7 @@ async def test_add_duplicate_and_invalid(registry: McpServerRegistry, monkeypatc
assert again[0]["ok"] is False
assert again[0]["error"] == "already exists"
assert again[1]["ok"] is False
- assert (
- "安全拦截" in again[1]["error"]
- or "dangerous" in again[1]["error"].lower()
- or "-e" in again[1]["error"]
- )
+ assert "配置校验未通过" in again[1]["error"] and "-e" in again[1]["error"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_progressive_model_switch.py b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_progressive_model_switch.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e76e9a1f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_progressive_model_switch.py
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2026. All rights reserved.
+
+"""ProgressiveToolRail keeps tools and TOOL_NAVIGATION consistent across model switches."""
+
+# pylint: disable=protected-access
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+import pytest
+from openjiuwen.harness.prompts.builder import SystemPromptBuilder
+from openjiuwen.harness.prompts.sections import SectionName
+
+from jiuwenswarm.agents.harness.common.rails import progressive_tool_rail
+from jiuwenswarm.agents.harness.common.rails.progressive_tool_rail import ProgressiveToolRail
+
+
+def _card(name: str) -> SimpleNamespace:
+ return SimpleNamespace(name=name, id=f"id-{name}", description=f"desc-{name}", input_params={})
+
+
+class _AbilityManager:
+ def __init__(self, cards: list[SimpleNamespace]) -> None:
+ self._cards = {card.name: card for card in cards}
+
+ def list(self) -> list[SimpleNamespace]:
+ return list(self._cards.values())
+
+ def get(self, name: str) -> SimpleNamespace | None:
+ return self._cards.get(name)
+
+ def add(self, card: SimpleNamespace) -> None:
+ self._cards[card.name] = card
+
+ def remove(self, name: str) -> None:
+ self._cards.pop(name, None)
+
+
+def _build_rail() -> tuple[ProgressiveToolRail, SimpleNamespace]:
+ agent = SimpleNamespace(
+ ability_manager=_AbilityManager([_card("read_file"), _card("mcp_x")]),
+ system_prompt_builder=SystemPromptBuilder(language="cn"),
+ model_name="",
+ )
+ rail = ProgressiveToolRail(
+ eager_tools=["tools_search", "invoke_tool", "read_file"],
+ enable_for_models=["glm", "deepseek"],
+ agent_card_id=f"s2_{uuid4().hex}",
+ )
+ rail.init(agent)
+ return rail, agent
+
+
+async def _run_turn(rail: ProgressiveToolRail, agent: SimpleNamespace, model: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+ agent.model_name = model
+ ctx = SimpleNamespace(agent=agent, inputs=SimpleNamespace(tools=[]), extra={})
+ await rail.before_invoke(ctx)
+ ctx.inputs.tools = list(agent.ability_manager.list())
+ await rail.before_model_call(ctx)
+ return {
+ "tools": {tool.name for tool in ctx.inputs.tools},
+ "navigation": agent.system_prompt_builder.has_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION),
+ "prompt": agent.system_prompt_builder.build(),
+ }
+
+
+async def test_switching_out_of_whitelist_drops_navigation_and_back_restores_it():
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+
+ lazy = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+ assert lazy["navigation"] is True
+ assert "mcp_x" in lazy["prompt"]
+ assert "mcp_x" not in lazy["tools"]
+
+ bypass = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "kimi-k3")
+ assert bypass["navigation"] is False
+ assert "tools_search" not in bypass["prompt"]
+ assert {"mcp_x", "read_file"} <= bypass["tools"]
+ assert "tools_search" not in bypass["tools"]
+
+ restored = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+ assert restored["navigation"] is True
+ assert "mcp_x" in restored["prompt"]
+ assert {"tools_search", "invoke_tool"} <= restored["tools"]
+ assert "mcp_x" not in restored["tools"]
+
+
+async def test_switching_inside_whitelist_keeps_navigation_text_for_prefix_cache():
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+
+ first = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+ second = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "deepseek-v4.1-flash")
+
+ assert first["prompt"] == second["prompt"]
+ assert first["tools"] == second["tools"]
+
+
+async def test_model_outside_whitelist_from_start_never_gets_navigation():
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+
+ result = await _run_turn(rail, agent, "kimi-k3")
+
+ assert result["navigation"] is False
+ assert {"mcp_x", "read_file"} <= result["tools"]
+
+
[email protected]("inputs", [None, SimpleNamespace(tools=None)])
+async def test_bypass_drops_navigation_without_filterable_tools(inputs):
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+ await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+
+ agent.model_name = "kimi-k3"
+ await rail.before_model_call(SimpleNamespace(agent=agent, inputs=inputs, extra={}))
+
+ assert agent.system_prompt_builder.has_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION) is False
+
+
+async def test_bypass_drops_navigation_when_ctx_has_no_agent():
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+ await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+
+ rail._cached_model_name = "kimi-k3"
+ ctx = SimpleNamespace(agent=None, inputs=SimpleNamespace(tools=[]), extra={})
+ await rail.before_model_call(ctx)
+
+ assert agent.system_prompt_builder.has_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION) is False
+
+
+async def test_uninit_drops_navigation_when_rail_is_removed():
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+ await _run_turn(rail, agent, "glm-5.3")
+
+ rail.uninit(agent)
+
+ assert agent.system_prompt_builder.has_section(SectionName.TOOL_NAVIGATION) is False
+
+
+async def test_bypass_log_only_fires_when_model_changes(monkeypatch):
+ rail, agent = _build_rail()
+ logger = MagicMock()
+ monkeypatch.setattr(progressive_tool_rail, "logger", logger)
+
+ for model in ("kimi-k3", "kimi-k3", "qwen3-32b", "glm-5.3", "kimi-k3"):
+ await _run_turn(rail, agent, model)
+
+ bypassed = [call.args[2] for call in logger.info.call_args_list if "bypassed" in call.args[0]]
+ assert bypassed == ["kimi-k3", "qwen3-32b", "kimi-k3"]
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_skill_manager_team_skills_hub.py b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_skill_manager_team_skills_hub.py
index 31ea571414..42e333ff17 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_skill_manager_team_skills_hub.py
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/agentserver/test_skill_manager_team_skills_hub.py
@@ -279,6 +279,28 @@ async def test_handle_skills_team_skills_hub_install_rejects_untrusted_download_
assert payload["detail_key"] == "skills.teamskillshub.errors.installFailed"
[email protected]("url", ["http://127.0.0.1:8080/demo.zip", "http://localhost/demo.zip"])
+def test_team_skills_hub_default_hosts_reject_loopback(monkeypatch, url):
+ monkeypatch.delenv("TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS", raising=False)
+ manager = TeamSkillsHubHarnessSkillManager(workspace_dir="dummy")
+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="白名单"):
+ manager.call_assert_team_skills_hub_download_url_allowed(url)
+
+
+def test_team_skills_hub_loopback_needs_explicit_host_config(monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.setenv("TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS", "127.0.0.1")
+ manager = TeamSkillsHubHarnessSkillManager(workspace_dir="dummy")
+ manager.call_assert_team_skills_hub_download_url_allowed("http://127.0.0.1:8080/demo.zip")
+
+
+def test_team_skills_hub_default_hosts_keep_official_bucket(monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.delenv("TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS", raising=False)
+ manager = TeamSkillsHubHarnessSkillManager(workspace_dir="dummy")
+ manager.call_assert_team_skills_hub_download_url_allowed(
+ "https://openjiuwen-market.obs.cn-north-4.myhuaweicloud.com/plugins/demo.zip"
+ )
+
+
def test_team_skills_hub_allowed_download_hosts_support_suffix_rule(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("TEAM_SKILLS_HUB_ALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS", ".myhuaweicloud.com")
manager = TeamSkillsHubHarnessSkillManager(workspace_dir="dummy")
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/common/test_mcp_config_create_mcp_tool.py b/tests/unit_tests/common/test_mcp_config_create_mcp_tool.py
index 76da8f797d..9bde8f0025 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/common/test_mcp_config_create_mcp_tool.py
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/common/test_mcp_config_create_mcp_tool.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from jiuwenswarm.common.mcp_config import (
_is_blocked_host,
_loopback_mcp_allowed,
_normalize_mcp_client_type,
+ _normalize_stdio_command_kind,
_optional_auth_dict,
_pick_mcp_url,
_validate_request_scoped_remote_mcp,
@@ -17,6 +18,36 @@ from jiuwenswarm.common.mcp_config import (
create_mcp_tool,
)
+
+class TestStdioCommandKind:
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "command",
+ [
+ "python",
+ "python3",
+ "python3.11",
+ "pythonw",
+ "python.exe",
+ "python3.11.exe",
+ "python.bat",
+ "python3.cmd",
+ "python3.13t",
+ "/usr/bin/python3",
+ "C:\\Python311\\python.exe",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_python_interpreter_names_are_accepted(self, command):
+ assert _normalize_stdio_command_kind(command) == "python"
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "command",
+ ["python_backdoor.exe", "python-custom", "pythonista", "C:/evil/python3evil.exe"],
+ )
+ def test_python_prefixed_names_are_rejected(self, command):
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="不支持的 command 类型"):
+ _normalize_stdio_command_kind(command)
+
+
class TestNormalizeMcpClientType:
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"raw, expected",
@@ -263,7 +294,7 @@ class TestCreateMcpToolStdio:
def test_dangerous_eval_arg_blocked(self):
cfg = json.dumps({"name": "bad", "command": "node", "args": ["-e", "1"]})
- with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="危险"):
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="配置校验未通过"):
create_mcp_tool(cfg)
def test_enterprise_rejects_stdio(self, monkeypatch):
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/common/test_reasoning_config.py b/tests/unit_tests/common/test_reasoning_config.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c4887b5f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/common/test_reasoning_config.py
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2026. All rights reserved.
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from jiuwenswarm.common.reasoning_config import resolve_reasoning_target
+
+
[email protected]("model", ["deepseek-v4.1-flash", "deepseek-v4.1-flash-1017", "DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash"])
+def test_v4_1_models_resolve_on_direct_deepseek(model):
+ assert resolve_reasoning_target(
+ client_provider="openai",
+ api_base="https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
+ model_name=model,
+ ) == ("deepseek_official", model.lower())
+
+
+def test_v4_1_model_resolves_on_bailian():
+ assert resolve_reasoning_target(
+ client_provider="openai",
+ api_base="https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1",
+ model_name="deepseek-v4.1-flash",
+ ) == ("dashscope_bailian", "deepseek-v4.1-flash")
+
+
+def test_v4_1_model_stays_untouched_outside_direct_channels():
+ assert resolve_reasoning_target(
+ client_provider="openai",
+ api_base="https://api.modelarts-maas.com/v1",
+ model_name="deepseek-v4.1-flash",
+ ) is None
+
+
+def test_unlisted_model_stays_untouched_on_direct_channel():
+ assert resolve_reasoning_target(
+ client_provider="openai",
+ api_base="https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
+ model_name="deepseek-chat",
+ ) is None
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/test_web_plan_mode.py b/tests/unit_tests/test_web_plan_mode.py
index 4c80b5ad97..aaa2626b21 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/test_web_plan_mode.py
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/test_web_plan_mode.py
@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ def test_work_plan_whitelist_excludes_side_effect_tools():
allowed = set(WORK_PLAN_ALLOWED_TOOLS)
assert {"ask_user", "read_file", "write_file", "exit_plan_mode"} <= allowed
+ # Deep 模式实际注册的联网工具名,缺了 plan 阶段只能搜索、无法读取结果页。
+ assert {"web_search", "fetch_webpage"} <= allowed
# task_tool 不得进白名单:子 agent 有独立 session 与 plan_mode 状态,
# 父 agent 的 plan 约束不传播,委派即可绕开只读约束(评审定论)。
assert "task_tool" not in allowed