A self-hostable bookmark-everything app (links, notes and images) with AI-based automatic tagging and full text search
#!/bin/sh
# Runs the given command with the fewest privileges this container allows.
#
# - no_new_privs is set, so setuid binaries and file capabilities can't grant
# the process (or anything it spawns, e.g. yt-dlp, ghostscript or ffmpeg)
# more privileges.
# - When running as root, every Linux capability is dropped except:
# * DAC_OVERRIDE and FOWNER, so root can keep using a data directory owned
# by another user (e.g. a bind-mounted host directory), and CHOWN, which
# SQLite uses to keep its -wal/-shm files owned by the database file's
# owner. Everything else in the image is owned by root anyway, so these
# grant little beyond that.
# * NET_BIND_SERVICE, unless PORT and WORKERS_PORT are known to be at
# least 1024 (or unset).
#
# File ownership is never changed. If the runtime doesn't allow dropping
# capabilities (e.g. the container already runs without CAP_SETPCAP), it falls
# back to only setting no_new_privs, and then to running the command as is.
#
# Set KARAKEEP_DISABLE_PRIVILEGE_DROP=true to skip all of this.
if [ "${KARAKEEP_DISABLE_PRIVILEGE_DROP:-false}" = "true" ]; then
exec "$@"
fi
# Whether a port setting might end up below 1024. The app is lenient when
# parsing ports (" 80 ", "+80" and "8e1" all mean 80), so only an unset or
# zero (random) port, or a plain number of at least 1024, is known not to need
# NET_BIND_SERVICE. Anything else keeps it.
may_be_privileged_port() {
case "$1" in
"" | 0) return 1 ;;
*[!0-9]*) return 0 ;;
esac
[ "$1" -lt 1024 ]
}
if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
# Capability numbers: CHOWN=0, DAC_OVERRIDE=1, FOWNER=3, NET_BIND_SERVICE=10.
KEEP_CAPS="+chown,+dac_override,+fowner"
KEEP_MASK=$(((1 << 0) | (1 << 1) | (1 << 3)))
if may_be_privileged_port "${PORT:-}" || may_be_privileged_port "${WORKERS_PORT:-}"; then
KEEP_CAPS="${KEEP_CAPS},+net_bind_service"
KEEP_MASK=$((KEEP_MASK | (1 << 10)))
fi
SETPRIV_DROP_CAPS="setpriv --no-new-privs --inh-caps=-all --ambient-caps=-all --bounding-set=-all,${KEEP_CAPS}"
# Dry run that checks the capabilities the process actually ends up with:
# some setpriv versions skip the bounding set without failing when
# CAP_SETPCAP is missing. If the drop didn't take, fall through instead of
# failing the service.
DROPPED=false
CAPS=$(${SETPRIV_DROP_CAPS} awk '/^Cap(Bnd|Eff):/ { print $2 }' /proc/self/status 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "${CAPS}" ]; then
DROPPED=true
for CAP in ${CAPS}; do
if [ $((0x${CAP} & ~KEEP_MASK)) -ne 0 ]; then
DROPPED=false
fi
done
fi
if [ "${DROPPED}" = "true" ]; then
exec ${SETPRIV_DROP_CAPS} "$@"
fi
echo "WARNING: couldn't drop Linux capabilities, $1 keeps the container's full set." >&2
fi
if setpriv --no-new-privs true 2>/dev/null; then
exec setpriv --no-new-privs "$@"
fi
echo "WARNING: couldn't set no_new_privs for $1." >&2
exec "$@"