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fix(auth): close account enumeration oracles in login and password reset

Mohamed Bassem036da4c0a1b7
diff --git a/packages/trpc/auth.ts b/packages/trpc/auth.ts
index 3a4c2c9b..5525edb8 100644
--- a/packages/trpc/auth.ts
+++ b/packages/trpc/auth.ts
@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ const BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS = 10;
const API_KEY_PREFIX_V1 = "ak1";
const API_KEY_PREFIX_V2 = "ak2";
+// A *real* bcrypt hash of a random secret, used to burn the same amount of CPU
+// on login paths that have no password to check against. It must be a valid
+// hash at the same cost factor as real passwords: bcrypt parses the hash to
+// recover the cost and salt, so handing it an arbitrary string makes it bail
+// out immediately without deriving anything, which is exactly the timing leak
+// these comparisons exist to close. Nothing can match it -- the input is
+// random and thrown away.
+const DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = bcrypt.hashSync(
+ randomBytes(32).toString("hex"),
+ BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS,
+);
+
function generateApiKeySecret() {
const secret = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
return {
@@ -181,15 +193,14 @@ export async function validatePassword(
if (!user) {
// Run a bcrypt comparison anyways to hide the fact of whether the user exists or not (protecting against timing attacks)
- await bcrypt.compare(
- password +
- "b6bfd1e907eb40462e73986f6cd628c036dc079b101186d36d53b824af3c9d2e",
- "a-dummy-password-that-should-never-match",
- );
+ await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH);
throw new Error("User not found");
}
if (!user.password) {
+ // Same reasoning: returning early here would make accounts without a
+ // password (OAuth-only) measurably faster to probe than password accounts.
+ await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH);
throw new Error("This user doesn't have a password defined");
}
diff --git a/packages/trpc/models/users.ts b/packages/trpc/models/users.ts
index a5d8327d..b47433f4 100644
--- a/packages/trpc/models/users.ts
+++ b/packages/trpc/models/users.ts
@@ -305,9 +305,16 @@ export class User {
});
});
- await sendPasswordResetEmail(email, user.name, token);
+ // Deliberately not awaited. Delivery latency is only incurred for real
+ // accounts, so awaiting it makes this endpoint a timing oracle for which
+ // emails are registered -- and a hard oracle whenever SMTP is unhealthy,
+ // since only real accounts could reach the throw below (500 for a user
+ // that exists, 200 for one that doesn't).
+ void sendPasswordResetEmail(email, user.name, token).catch((error) => {
+ console.error("Failed to send password reset email:", error);
+ });
} catch (error) {
- console.error("Failed to send password reset email:", error);
+ console.error("Failed to create password reset token:", error);
throw new TRPCError({
code: "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR",
message: "Failed to send password reset email",