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fix(core): restore cloud metadata IPs and link-local range in SSRF policy (#36816)
ccurme338aa8131a81
diff --git a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_policy.py b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_policy.pyindex 0440918bbc..79cf437c89 100644--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_policy.py+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_policy.py@@ -50,13 +50,23 @@ _BLOCKED_IPV6_NETWORKS: tuple[ipaddress.IPv6Network, ...] = tuple(_CLOUD_METADATA_IPS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({- "169.254.169.254",- "169.254.170.2",- "100.100.100.200",- "fd00:ec2::254",+ "169.254.169.254", # AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, Oracle Cloud+ "169.254.170.2", # AWS ECS task metadata+ "169.254.170.23", # AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent+ "100.100.100.200", # Alibaba Cloud metadata+ "fd00:ec2::254", # AWS EC2 IMDSv2 over IPv6 (Nitro instances)+ "fd00:ec2::23", # AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent (IPv6)+ "fe80::a9fe:a9fe", # OpenStack Nova metadata (IPv6 link-local)})+# Network ranges that are always blocked when block_cloud_metadata=True,+# independent of block_private_ips. The entire link-local range is used by+# cloud metadata services across providers.+_CLOUD_METADATA_NETWORKS: tuple[ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network, ...] = (+ ipaddress.IPv4Network("169.254.0.0/16"),+)+_CLOUD_METADATA_HOSTNAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"metadata.google.internal",@@ -160,9 +170,15 @@ def _ip_in_blocked_networks(if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr == _LOOPBACK_IPV6:return "localhost address"- # Cloud metadata IP check- if policy.block_cloud_metadata and str(addr) in _CLOUD_METADATA_IPS:- return "cloud metadata endpoint"+ # Cloud metadata check — IP set *and* network ranges (e.g. 169.254.0.0/16).+ # Independent of block_private_ips so that allow_private=True still blocks+ # cloud metadata endpoints.+ if policy.block_cloud_metadata:+ if str(addr) in _CLOUD_METADATA_IPS:+ return "cloud metadata endpoint"+ for net in _CLOUD_METADATA_NETWORKS: # type: ignore[assignment]+ if addr in net:+ return "cloud metadata endpoint"return None@@ -223,7 +239,7 @@ async def validate_url(url: str, policy: SSRFPolicy = SSRFPolicy()) -> None:"""Validate a URL against the SSRF policy, including DNS resolution.This is the primary entry-point for async code paths. It delegates- scheme/hostname/allowed-hosts checks to ``validate_url_sync``, then+ scheme/hostname/allowed-hosts checks to `validate_url_sync`, thenresolves DNS and validates every resolved IP.Raises:@@ -256,7 +272,7 @@ def validate_url_sync(url: str, policy: SSRFPolicy = SSRFPolicy()) -> None:"""Synchronous URL validation (no DNS resolution).Suitable for Pydantic validators and other sync contexts. Checks scheme- and hostname patterns only - use ``validate_url`` for full DNS-aware checking.+ and hostname patterns only - use `validate_url` for full DNS-aware checking.Raises:SSRFBlockedError: If the URL violates the policy.diff --git a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_ssrf_protection.py b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_ssrf_protection.pyindex e1f7b48258..0eb3cd7e11 100644--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_ssrf_protection.py+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_ssrf_protection.py@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ def validate_safe_url(Args:url: The URL to validate (string or Pydantic HttpUrl).- allow_private: If ``True``, allows private IPs and localhost (for development).+ allow_private: If `True`, allows private IPs and localhost (for development).Cloud metadata endpoints are ALWAYS blocked.- allow_http: If ``True``, allows both HTTP and HTTPS. If ``False``, only HTTPS.+ allow_http: If `True`, allows both HTTP and HTTPS. If `False`, only HTTPS.Returns:The validated URL as a string.diff --git a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_transport.py b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_transport.pyindex b6efc9ec01..2bbc8d8989 100644--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_transport.py+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/_security/_transport.py@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ class SSRFSafeTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):"""httpx async transport that validates DNS results against an SSRF policy.For every outgoing request the transport:- 1. Checks the URL scheme against ``policy.allowed_schemes``.+ 1. Checks the URL scheme against `policy.allowed_schemes`.2. Validates the hostname against blocked patterns.3. Resolves DNS and validates **all** returned IPs.4. Rewrites the request to connect to the first valid IP while- preserving the original ``Host`` header and TLS SNI hostname.+ preserving the original `Host` header and TLS SNI hostname.- Redirects are re-validated on each hop because ``follow_redirects``- is set on the *client*, causing ``handle_async_request`` to be called+ Redirects are re-validated on each hop because `follow_redirects`+ is set on the *client*, causing `handle_async_request` to be calledagain for each redirect target."""@@ -225,12 +225,12 @@ def ssrf_safe_async_client(policy: SSRFPolicy = SSRFPolicy(),**kwargs: object,) -> httpx.AsyncClient:- """Create an ``httpx.AsyncClient`` with SSRF protection.+ """Create an `httpx.AsyncClient` with SSRF protection.- Drop-in replacement for ``httpx.AsyncClient(...)`` - callers just swap- the constructor call. Transport-specific kwargs (``verify``, ``cert``,- ``retries``, etc.) are forwarded to the inner ``AsyncHTTPTransport``;- everything else goes to the ``AsyncClient``.+ Drop-in replacement for `httpx.AsyncClient(...)` - callers just swap+ the constructor call. Transport-specific kwargs (`verify`, `cert`,+ `retries`, etc.) are forwarded to the inner `AsyncHTTPTransport`;+ everything else goes to the `AsyncClient`."""transport_kwargs: dict[str, object] = {}client_kwargs: dict[str, object] = {}diff --git a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/test_ssrf_policy_transport.py b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/test_ssrf_policy_transport.pyindex 2a905c1d2b..fe174c88da 100644--- a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/test_ssrf_policy_transport.py+++ b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/test_ssrf_policy_transport.py@@ -190,6 +190,46 @@ def test_k8s_still_blocked_when_private_ips_allowed() -> None:validate_url_sync("http://myservice.default.svc.cluster.local/", policy)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# Cloud metadata: link-local range and restored IPs blocked even with+# block_private_ips=False (regression test for dropped ranges/IPs)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+++ "ip",+ [+ "169.254.169.254",+ "169.254.170.2",+ "169.254.170.23", # AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent+ "100.100.100.200",+ "fd00:ec2::254",+ "fd00:ec2::23", # AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent (IPv6)+ "fe80::a9fe:a9fe", # OpenStack Nova metadata+ ],+)+def test_cloud_metadata_ips_blocked_when_private_ips_allowed(ip: str) -> None:+ policy = SSRFPolicy(block_private_ips=False)+ with pytest.raises(SSRFBlockedError, match="cloud metadata endpoint"):+ validate_resolved_ip(ip, policy)+++ "ip",+ [+ "169.254.1.2",+ "169.254.255.254",+ "169.254.42.99",+ ],+)+def test_link_local_range_blocked_as_cloud_metadata_when_private_ips_allowed(+ ip: str,+) -> None:+ policy = SSRFPolicy(block_private_ips=False)+ with pytest.raises(SSRFBlockedError, match="cloud metadata endpoint"):+ validate_resolved_ip(ip, policy)++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------# Transport: redirect to private IP blocked# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------