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fix(core): undo jinja2 restrictions (#34072)
Eugene Yurtsev395c8d0bd4b4
diff --git a/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py b/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.pyindex 2d6f76a693..f34b2e294b 100644--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py@@ -20,65 +20,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:try:from jinja2 import meta- from jinja2.exceptions import SecurityErrorfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment- class _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):- """A more restrictive Jinja2 sandbox that blocks all attribute/method access.-- This sandbox only allows simple variable lookups, no attribute or method access.- This prevents template injection attacks via methods like parse_raw().- """-- def is_safe_attribute(self, _obj: Any, _attr: str, _value: Any) -> bool:- """Block ALL attribute access for security.-- Only allow accessing variables directly from the context dict,- no attribute access on those objects.-- Args:- _obj: The object being accessed (unused, always blocked).- _attr: The attribute name (unused, always blocked).- _value: The attribute value (unused, always blocked).-- Returns:- False - all attribute access is blocked.- """- # Block all attribute access- return False-- def is_safe_callable(self, _obj: Any) -> bool:- """Block all method calls for security.-- Args:- _obj: The object being checked (unused, always blocked).-- Returns:- False - all callables are blocked.- """- return False-- def getattr(self, obj: Any, attribute: str) -> Any:- """Override getattr to block all attribute access.-- Args:- obj: The object.- attribute: The attribute name.-- Returns:- Never returns.-- Raises:- SecurityError: Always, to block attribute access.- """- msg = (- f"Access to attributes is not allowed in templates. "- f"Attempted to access '{attribute}' on {type(obj).__name__}. "- f"Use only simple variable names like {{{{variable}}}} "- f"without dots or methods."- )- raise SecurityError(msg)-_HAS_JINJA2 = Trueexcept ImportError:_HAS_JINJA2 = False@@ -121,7 +64,7 @@ def jinja2_formatter(template: str, /, **kwargs: Any) -> str:# Use a restricted sandbox that blocks ALL attribute/method access# Only simple variable lookups like {{variable}} are allowed# Attribute access like {{variable.attr}} or {{variable.method()}} is blocked- return _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment().from_string(template).render(**kwargs)+ return SandboxedEnvironment().from_string(template).render(**kwargs)def validate_jinja2(template: str, input_variables: list[str]) -> None:@@ -156,7 +99,7 @@ def _get_jinja2_variables_from_template(template: str) -> set[str]:"Please install it with `pip install jinja2`.")raise ImportError(msg)- env = _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment()+ env = SandboxedEnvironment()ast = env.parse(template)return meta.find_undeclared_variables(ast)diff --git a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.pyindex 6d0c313f74..0e2954cf5c 100644--- a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py+++ b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py@@ -1636,68 +1636,3 @@ def test_mustache_template_attribute_access_vulnerability() -> None:)result_dict = prompt_dict.invoke({"person": {"name": "Alice"}})assert result_dict.messages[0].content == "Alice" # type: ignore[attr-defined]--[email protected]("jinja2")-def test_jinja2_template_attribute_access_is_blocked() -> None:- """Test that Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment blocks dangerous attribute access.-- This test verifies that Jinja2's sandbox successfully blocks access to- dangerous dunder attributes like __class__, unlike Mustache.-- GOOD: Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment raises SecurityError when attempting- to access __class__, __globals__, etc. This is expected behavior.- """- msg = HumanMessage("howdy")-- # Create a Jinja2 template that attempts to access __class__.__name__- prompt = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(- [("human", "{{question.__class__.__name__}}")],- template_format="jinja2",- )-- # Jinja2 sandbox should block this with SecurityError- with pytest.raises(Exception, match="attribute") as exc_info:- prompt.invoke(- {"question": msg, "question.__class__.__name__": "safe_placeholder"}- )-- # Verify it's a SecurityError from Jinja2 blocking __class__ access- error_msg = str(exc_info.value)- assert (- "SecurityError" in str(type(exc_info.value))- or "access to attribute '__class__'" in error_msg- ), f"Expected SecurityError blocking __class__, got: {error_msg}"--[email protected]("jinja2")-def test_jinja2_blocks_all_attribute_access() -> None:- """Test that Jinja2 now blocks ALL attribute/method access for security.-- After the fix, Jinja2 uses _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment which blocks- ALL attribute access, not just dunder attributes. This prevents the- parse_raw() vulnerability.- """- msg = HumanMessage("test content")-- # Test 1: Simple variable access should still work- prompt_simple = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(- [("human", "Message: {{message}}")],- template_format="jinja2",- )- result = prompt_simple.invoke({"message": "hello world"})- assert "hello world" in result.messages[0].content # type: ignore[attr-defined]-- # Test 2: Attribute access should now be blocked (including safe attributes)- prompt_attr = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(- [("human", "Content: {{msg.content}}")],- template_format="jinja2",- )- with pytest.raises(Exception, match="attribute") as exc_info:- prompt_attr.invoke({"msg": msg})-- error_msg = str(exc_info.value)- assert (- "SecurityError" in str(type(exc_info.value))- or "Access to attributes is not allowed" in error_msg- ), f"Expected SecurityError blocking attribute access, got: {error_msg}"