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fix(core): undo jinja2 restrictions (#34072)

Eugene Yurtsev395c8d0bd4b4
diff --git a/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py b/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py
index 2d6f76a693..f34b2e294b 100644
--- a/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py
+++ b/libs/core/langchain_core/prompts/string.py
@@ -20,65 +20,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
try:
from jinja2 import meta
- from jinja2.exceptions import SecurityError
from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment
- class _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
- """A more restrictive Jinja2 sandbox that blocks all attribute/method access.
-
- This sandbox only allows simple variable lookups, no attribute or method access.
- This prevents template injection attacks via methods like parse_raw().
- """
-
- def is_safe_attribute(self, _obj: Any, _attr: str, _value: Any) -> bool:
- """Block ALL attribute access for security.
-
- Only allow accessing variables directly from the context dict,
- no attribute access on those objects.
-
- Args:
- _obj: The object being accessed (unused, always blocked).
- _attr: The attribute name (unused, always blocked).
- _value: The attribute value (unused, always blocked).
-
- Returns:
- False - all attribute access is blocked.
- """
- # Block all attribute access
- return False
-
- def is_safe_callable(self, _obj: Any) -> bool:
- """Block all method calls for security.
-
- Args:
- _obj: The object being checked (unused, always blocked).
-
- Returns:
- False - all callables are blocked.
- """
- return False
-
- def getattr(self, obj: Any, attribute: str) -> Any:
- """Override getattr to block all attribute access.
-
- Args:
- obj: The object.
- attribute: The attribute name.
-
- Returns:
- Never returns.
-
- Raises:
- SecurityError: Always, to block attribute access.
- """
- msg = (
- f"Access to attributes is not allowed in templates. "
- f"Attempted to access '{attribute}' on {type(obj).__name__}. "
- f"Use only simple variable names like {{{{variable}}}} "
- f"without dots or methods."
- )
- raise SecurityError(msg)
-
_HAS_JINJA2 = True
except ImportError:
_HAS_JINJA2 = False
@@ -121,7 +64,7 @@ def jinja2_formatter(template: str, /, **kwargs: Any) -> str:
# Use a restricted sandbox that blocks ALL attribute/method access
# Only simple variable lookups like {{variable}} are allowed
# Attribute access like {{variable.attr}} or {{variable.method()}} is blocked
- return _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment().from_string(template).render(**kwargs)
+ return SandboxedEnvironment().from_string(template).render(**kwargs)
def validate_jinja2(template: str, input_variables: list[str]) -> None:
@@ -156,7 +99,7 @@ def _get_jinja2_variables_from_template(template: str) -> set[str]:
"Please install it with `pip install jinja2`."
)
raise ImportError(msg)
- env = _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment()
+ env = SandboxedEnvironment()
ast = env.parse(template)
return meta.find_undeclared_variables(ast)
diff --git a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py
index 6d0c313f74..0e2954cf5c 100644
--- a/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py
+++ b/libs/core/tests/unit_tests/prompts/test_chat.py
@@ -1636,68 +1636,3 @@ def test_mustache_template_attribute_access_vulnerability() -> None:
)
result_dict = prompt_dict.invoke({"person": {"name": "Alice"}})
assert result_dict.messages[0].content == "Alice" # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-
-
-def test_jinja2_template_attribute_access_is_blocked() -> None:
- """Test that Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment blocks dangerous attribute access.
-
- This test verifies that Jinja2's sandbox successfully blocks access to
- dangerous dunder attributes like __class__, unlike Mustache.
-
- GOOD: Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment raises SecurityError when attempting
- to access __class__, __globals__, etc. This is expected behavior.
- """
- msg = HumanMessage("howdy")
-
- # Create a Jinja2 template that attempts to access __class__.__name__
- prompt = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(
- [("human", "{{question.__class__.__name__}}")],
- template_format="jinja2",
- )
-
- # Jinja2 sandbox should block this with SecurityError
- with pytest.raises(Exception, match="attribute") as exc_info:
- prompt.invoke(
- {"question": msg, "question.__class__.__name__": "safe_placeholder"}
- )
-
- # Verify it's a SecurityError from Jinja2 blocking __class__ access
- error_msg = str(exc_info.value)
- assert (
- "SecurityError" in str(type(exc_info.value))
- or "access to attribute '__class__'" in error_msg
- ), f"Expected SecurityError blocking __class__, got: {error_msg}"
-
-
-def test_jinja2_blocks_all_attribute_access() -> None:
- """Test that Jinja2 now blocks ALL attribute/method access for security.
-
- After the fix, Jinja2 uses _RestrictedSandboxedEnvironment which blocks
- ALL attribute access, not just dunder attributes. This prevents the
- parse_raw() vulnerability.
- """
- msg = HumanMessage("test content")
-
- # Test 1: Simple variable access should still work
- prompt_simple = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(
- [("human", "Message: {{message}}")],
- template_format="jinja2",
- )
- result = prompt_simple.invoke({"message": "hello world"})
- assert "hello world" in result.messages[0].content # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-
- # Test 2: Attribute access should now be blocked (including safe attributes)
- prompt_attr = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages(
- [("human", "Content: {{msg.content}}")],
- template_format="jinja2",
- )
- with pytest.raises(Exception, match="attribute") as exc_info:
- prompt_attr.invoke({"msg": msg})
-
- error_msg = str(exc_info.value)
- assert (
- "SecurityError" in str(type(exc_info.value))
- or "Access to attributes is not allowed" in error_msg
- ), f"Expected SecurityError blocking attribute access, got: {error_msg}"