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fix(langchain): restrict deserialization in `langchain_classic.storage._lc_store` (#37208)
Nick Hollonc0e1d1366ea2
diff --git a/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py b/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.pyindex 00a50b15e4..1a7ca26f0f 100644--- a/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py+++ b/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ def _dump_document_as_bytes(obj: Any) -> bytes:def _load_document_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Document:"""Return a document from a bytes representation."""- obj = loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"))+ obj = loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"), allowed_objects=[Document])if not isinstance(obj, Document):msg = f"Expected a Document instance. Got {type(obj)}"raise TypeError(msg)@@ -33,7 +33,14 @@ def _load_document_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Document:def _load_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Serializable:- """Return a document from a bytes representation."""+ """Return a `Serializable` from a bytes representation."""+ # The default allowlist (`'core'`) is unsafe with untrusted input - a+ # tampered byte payload can reconstruct any core class with+ # attacker-controlled kwargs (custom `base_url`, headers, model name,+ # etc.). The byte store backing this loader must be treated as a trust+ # boundary - see the danger note on `create_lc_store`. If the store can+ # be written to by anyone you do not already trust, use+ # `create_kv_docstore` instead.return loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"))@@ -52,6 +59,27 @@ def create_lc_store() -> BaseStore[str, Serializable]:"""Create a store for LangChain serializable objects from a bytes store.+ !!! danger "Treat the underlying byte store as a trust boundary"++ Reads from this store are deserialized with+ `langchain_core.load.loads`, which instantiates Python objects from+ the stored payload. The same threat model applies: a payload can+ carry constructor kwargs (custom `base_url`, headers, model name,+ etc.) that get applied during `__init__`, so the bytes are+ effectively executable configuration rather than plain data.++ **Never back this store with anything an attacker can write to** —+ for example a shared cache that other tenants can populate, an+ S3 bucket without strict write controls, or a Redis instance reused+ across trust boundaries. A single tampered value will instantiate+ attacker-controlled classes the next time the store is read.++ If you cannot guarantee the store is write-restricted to your own+ process, use `create_kv_docstore` instead — it pins+ `allowed_objects=[Document]` so a tampered value can at worst+ produce a `Document`, never a chat model or LLM with a redirected+ endpoint.+Args:store: A bytes store to use as the underlying store.key_encoder: A function to encode keys; if `None` uses identity function.