Skip to content

The agent engineering platform.

fix(langchain): restrict deserialization in `langchain_classic.storage._lc_store` (#37208)

Nick Hollonc0e1d1366ea2
diff --git a/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py b/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py
index 00a50b15e4..1a7ca26f0f 100644
--- a/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py
+++ b/libs/langchain/langchain_classic/storage/_lc_store.py
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ def _dump_document_as_bytes(obj: Any) -> bytes:
def _load_document_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Document:
"""Return a document from a bytes representation."""
- obj = loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"))
+ obj = loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"), allowed_objects=[Document])
if not isinstance(obj, Document):
msg = f"Expected a Document instance. Got {type(obj)}"
raise TypeError(msg)
@@ -33,7 +33,14 @@ def _load_document_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Document:
def _load_from_bytes(serialized: bytes) -> Serializable:
- """Return a document from a bytes representation."""
+ """Return a `Serializable` from a bytes representation."""
+ # The default allowlist (`'core'`) is unsafe with untrusted input - a
+ # tampered byte payload can reconstruct any core class with
+ # attacker-controlled kwargs (custom `base_url`, headers, model name,
+ # etc.). The byte store backing this loader must be treated as a trust
+ # boundary - see the danger note on `create_lc_store`. If the store can
+ # be written to by anyone you do not already trust, use
+ # `create_kv_docstore` instead.
return loads(serialized.decode("utf-8"))
@@ -52,6 +59,27 @@ def create_lc_store(
) -> BaseStore[str, Serializable]:
"""Create a store for LangChain serializable objects from a bytes store.
+ !!! danger "Treat the underlying byte store as a trust boundary"
+
+ Reads from this store are deserialized with
+ `langchain_core.load.loads`, which instantiates Python objects from
+ the stored payload. The same threat model applies: a payload can
+ carry constructor kwargs (custom `base_url`, headers, model name,
+ etc.) that get applied during `__init__`, so the bytes are
+ effectively executable configuration rather than plain data.
+
+ **Never back this store with anything an attacker can write to** —
+ for example a shared cache that other tenants can populate, an
+ S3 bucket without strict write controls, or a Redis instance reused
+ across trust boundaries. A single tampered value will instantiate
+ attacker-controlled classes the next time the store is read.
+
+ If you cannot guarantee the store is write-restricted to your own
+ process, use `create_kv_docstore` instead — it pins
+ `allowed_objects=[Document]` so a tampered value can at worst
+ produce a `Document`, never a chat model or LLM with a redirected
+ endpoint.
+
Args:
store: A bytes store to use as the underlying store.
key_encoder: A function to encode keys; if `None` uses identity function.