🪢 Open source agent evals & observability: Trace, evaluate, and improve LLM applications with one open platform.
TypeScript analyticsautogenevaluationlangchainlarge-language-modelsllama-indexllmllm-evaluationllm-observabilityllmopsmonitoringobservabilityopen-sourceopenaiplaygroundprompt-engineeringprompt-managementself-hostedycombinator
import { env } from "../../env";
import {
OutboundUrlValidationError,
parseOutboundUrl,
resolveHost,
validateOutboundUrlHost,
type OutboundUrlValidationWhitelist,
} from "../outbound-url/validation";
export type WebhookValidationWhitelist = OutboundUrlValidationWhitelist;
export { resolveHost };
export const WEBHOOK_URL_VALIDATION_LOG_CONTEXT = "Webhook";
const DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_PORTS = ["443", "80"] as const;
export type WebhookUrlValidationOptions = {
allowedPorts?: readonly string[] | "any";
};
export function whitelistFromEnv(): WebhookValidationWhitelist {
return {
hosts: env.LANGFUSE_WEBHOOK_WHITELISTED_HOST || [],
ips: env.LANGFUSE_WEBHOOK_WHITELISTED_IPS || [],
ip_ranges: env.LANGFUSE_WEBHOOK_WHITELISTED_IP_SEGMENTS || [],
};
}
/** webhookWhitelistFromEnv adds the webhook-only positive host list to the shared exemption list. */
export function webhookWhitelistFromEnv(): WebhookValidationWhitelist {
return {
...whitelistFromEnv(),
allowedHosts: env.LANGFUSE_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS,
};
}
/**
* Validates a webhook URL to prevent SSRF attacks by blocking internal/private IP addresses
* Should be called when saving webhook URLs and before sending webhooks
*
* Security Note: This validation has a Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability
* where DNS can change between validation and actual HTTP request. For maximum security,
* the HTTP client should also implement IP blocking at connection time.
*/
export async function validateWebhookURL(
urlString: string,
whitelist: WebhookValidationWhitelist = whitelistFromEnv(),
options: WebhookUrlValidationOptions = {},
): Promise<void> {
const url = parseOutboundUrl(urlString);
// Coded, not bare Error: callers classify rejections off the `code` rather
// than the message. validateBlobStorageEndpoint already does this for the
// protocol check; these two were the only outbound-URL rejections in the repo
// that reached callers uncoded, which silently excluded them from
// customer-fault classification. Messages are unchanged.
if (!["https:", "http:"].includes(url.protocol)) {
throw new OutboundUrlValidationError(
"protocol-not-allowed",
"Only HTTP and HTTPS protocols are allowed",
);
}
const allowedPorts = options.allowedPorts ?? DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_PORTS;
if (url.port && allowedPorts !== "any" && !allowedPorts.includes(url.port)) {
throw new OutboundUrlValidationError(
"port-not-allowed",
"Only ports 80 and 443 are allowed",
);
}
await validateOutboundUrlHost({
url,
whitelist,
logContext: WEBHOOK_URL_VALIDATION_LOG_CONTEXT,
// Preserve the existing webhook behavior: public IP literals must still
// pass the same DNS-resolution path as hostname destinations.
shouldSkipDnsCheckForLiteralIps: false,
});
}