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/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-use-before-define */
const SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS = new Set([
"http:",
"https:",
"irc:",
"ircs:",
"mailto:",
"tel:",
"xmpp:",
]);
const SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS = new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
const SAME_ORIGIN_URL_BASE = "https://langfuse.local";
// Markdown image URLs intentionally stay limited to fetchable http(s) URLs and
// same-origin paths. Do not add data: here; inline base64 media needs separate
// handling from clickable/fetchable markdown URLs.
// The old DOMPurify helper used ALLOWED_TAGS: [] and ALLOWED_ATTR: [], which is
// correct for stripping HTML tags/attributes from a string. It does not validate
// URL protocols when the input is already plain text: "javascript:alert(1)" has
// no markup to remove, so URL safety has to be protocol allowlist based here.
const getSafeUrl = (
value: string | undefined | null,
{
allowedProtocols,
allowHash = false,
allowSearch = false,
allowRelativePath = true,
}: {
allowedProtocols: Set<string>;
allowHash?: boolean;
allowSearch?: boolean;
allowRelativePath?: boolean;
},
): string | null => {
if (!value || typeof value !== "string") return null;
const trimmed = value.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
try {
const parsed = new URL(trimmed);
return allowedProtocols.has(parsed.protocol) ? parsed.href : null;
} catch {
// Markdown links may point to anchors inside the rendered content.
if (allowHash && trimmed.startsWith("#")) {
return trimmed;
}
if (allowSearch && trimmed.startsWith("?")) {
return isSafeSameOriginReference(trimmed) ? trimmed : null;
}
if (allowRelativePath && isRelativePathReference(trimmed)) {
return isSafeSameOriginReference(trimmed) ? trimmed : null;
}
return null;
}
};
const isRelativePathReference = (value: string): boolean =>
value.startsWith("/") ||
value.startsWith("./") ||
value.startsWith("../") ||
/^[^/?#]/.test(value);
const isSafeSameOriginReference = (value: string): boolean => {
// Block protocol-relative and backslash-normalized URLs. Browsers can resolve
// values like "/\\attacker.example/x" to another host for http(s) documents.
if (value.startsWith("//") || value.includes("\\")) return false;
try {
const parsed = new URL(value, SAME_ORIGIN_URL_BASE);
return parsed.origin === SAME_ORIGIN_URL_BASE;
} catch {
return false;
}
};
export const getSafeLinkUrl = (
value: string | undefined | null,
): string | null =>
getSafeUrl(value, {
allowedProtocols: SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS,
allowHash: true,
allowSearch: true,
});
export const getSafeImageUrl = (
value: string | undefined | null,
): string | null =>
getSafeUrl(value, {
allowedProtocols: SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS,
});