Non-autoregressive System 1 decision engine. Typed choice, score and yes/no decisions over any text in a single forward pass, in 100+ languages, with a router that picks the right checkpoint per request.
Python calibrationclassificationdecision-modelhuggingfacejevmodernbertmultilingualnlppythonpytorchroutingtyped-decisionszero-shot
ci(docker): the http job must prove the file-backed bearer key works
Aashishded78b3e6dfd
diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker.yml b/.github/workflows/docker.ymlindex 419757d2..691cec5e 100644--- a/.github/workflows/docker.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/docker.yml@@ -130,6 +130,51 @@ jobs:-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}' "$@"; }test "$(code)" = 401test "$(code -H 'authorization: Bearer wrong')" = 401+ # 400 is the body error, which the handler reaches only once auth has passed: this is+ # the half that says the configured key is accepted, not merely that others are not.+ test "$(code -H "authorization: Bearer $LAYA_API_KEY")" = 400+ # docs/docker.md tells operators to keep the bearer key in a mounted file instead of in the+ # environment: the entrypoint reads LAYA_API_KEY_FILE, moves the value into LAYA_API_KEY and+ # drops the _FILE name before it execs the server. This job only ever set the inline+ # variable, so the second arm of docker/entrypoint.py's SECRET_NAMES -- the one the+ # documented deployment uses -- was exercised by nothing. Deleting that arm leaves the API+ # unauthenticated (`/v1/systemone` with no header answers 400) and every line above still+ # passed; tests/test_docker_entrypoint.py explains the same gap at the script level.+ - name: Check the file-backed bearer key+ run: |+ mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/secrets"+ # Both keys are shell variables, and the file is written from the one that is supposed+ # to authenticate this service. A literal token after `Bearer ` is what the secret scan+ # in security.yml looks for, and these two strings are test values, not credentials.+ FILE_KEY=from-a-mounted-file+ printf '%s\n' "$FILE_KEY" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/secrets/laya_api_key"+ # LAYA_API_KEY= keeps the job's inline key away from this service, so the mounted file+ # is the only thing that can authenticate it. LAYA_PORT moves both the published and the+ # bound port off the one the service above is holding, from the one variable the docs+ # say controls both.+ LAYA_API_KEY= LAYA_PORT=8100 docker compose run -d --name laya-file-key \+ --volume "$RUNNER_TEMP/secrets/laya_api_key:/run/secrets/laya_api_key:ro" \+ -e LAYA_API_KEY_FILE=/run/secrets/laya_api_key \+ --service-ports laya-serve >/dev/null+ for _ in $(seq 1 60); do+ if [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' localhost:8100/health)" = 200 ]; then+ break+ fi+ sleep 2+ done+ curl -fsS localhost:8100/health+ code() { curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST localhost:8100/v1/systemone \+ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}' "$@"; }+ test "$(code)" = 401+ test "$(code -H 'authorization: Bearer wrong')" = 401+ # The key the job exports must not be the one the file-backed service accepts, and the+ # value in the mounted file must be. 400 is the body error, which the handler reaches+ # only once auth has passed.+ test "$(code -H "authorization: Bearer $LAYA_API_KEY")" = 401+ test "$(code -H "authorization: Bearer $FILE_KEY")" = 400+ - name: Stop the file-backed service+ if: always()+ run: docker rm -f laya-file-key || true- name: Stopif: always()run: |