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🔒 Security
Notification URL validation now rejects Apprise query options that can select an unvalidated secondary destination or resource (
template,redirect, and mail-specific SMTP/PGP/WKD options) before any hostname parsing or DNS lookup. Atemplateoption is an unrestricted Apprise attachment, sodiscord://id/token?template=/etc/passwdpreviously made the server read a local file and ship it to the user's webhook. Query-key parsing mirrors Apprise's ownparse_qsdrules (∧separators,+-as-space, percent-decoding, duplicate keys) so encoded or semicolon-separated names cannot bypass the policy, and a malformed percent escape in a key is rejected outright. The published dependency now declaresapprise>=1.12.0,<2— 1.12.0 is the reviewed parser floor — and a test diffs LDR's canonical keys against the installed Apprise parser so the contract cannot drift silently. Notification security documentation and compatibility tests now cover mode-dependent destinations and the current direct scheme-prefix gaps. (#5085)The notification test endpoint (
/api/notifications/test-url) now validates every URL in a comma/space-separated multi-URL string individually. Previously the input was validated as a single URL — commas are legal URL characters, so only the leading entry was checked while Apprise's own scheme-aware splitter still registered and notified the rest, letting an unvetted destination (e.g. a cloud-metadata address) receive the test notification. The number of parsed targets is now also capped, and the test is refused outright if Apprise registers more services than were validated. (#5120)Closed an SSRF hole in the news subscription API. A custom LLM endpoint (
custom_endpoint) supplied when creating or updating a subscription is fetched server-side, and the/news/apiblueprint — the one the app actually calls — accepted it without validation. The guard existed only on the/api/newsblueprint, which nothing routes to; it is now applied where requests actually arrive, on bothPOST /news/api/subscribeandPUT /news/api/subscriptions/<id>, before anything is written or any research thread is spawned. A wrong-typedcustom_endpoint(a number, a list) is now a 400 rather than a 500 or a silently stored value.The guard is a denylist, not an allowlist: it blocks cloud metadata, link-local addresses and non-HTTP schemes, but loopback and private-network addresses stay allowed on purpose, because that is how people point this at Ollama, LM Studio or vLLM. Other internal targets — including the app's own admin port and a Docker daemon on the bridge address — therefore remain reachable through this field by design. The check also validates the submitted URL only: it does not pin the resolved IP, and a redirect from an allowed host to a metadata address would still be followed by the LLM client, which is the one case the metadata denylist is meant to stop.
GET /news/api/feedadditionally rejects asubscription_idthat is neither a UUID nor the documentedallsentinel, andGET /news/api/subscriptions/<id>/historyrejects a path id that is not a UUID. Those are the two ids that reach a LIKE pattern rather than an equality filter. Both checks are defence in depth rather than fixes: the LIKE queries already escape%and_with an explicit escape character, so neither was exploitable. Subscription ids are generated as UUID4s, and the sibling/api/newsblueprint has always applied the same check to its history route. The remaining subscription routes match their path id by equality, so they need no such check.Reject ambiguous legacy numeric IPv4 host forms before DNS resolution in webhook and notification URL validation.