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"""
Shared private/internal IP range constants for security validation.
Used by SSRF validation and notification URL validation to avoid
duplicating IP range definitions.
"""
import ipaddress
# RFC 6598 shared address space, also used by download candidate filtering.
CGNAT_NETWORK = ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")
# RFC1918 private networks + loopback + link-local + CGNAT + IPv6 equivalents
# nosec B104 - These hardcoded IPs are intentional for security validation
PRIVATE_IP_RANGES = [
ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"), # IPv4 loopback
ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"), # IPv6 loopback
ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"), # RFC1918 Class A private
ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"), # RFC1918 Class B private
ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"), # RFC1918 Class C private
CGNAT_NETWORK, # CGNAT - used by Podman/rootless containers
ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"), # Link-local
ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"), # IPv6 link-local
ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"), # IPv6 unique local
ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"), # "This" network (IPv4 unspecified)
ipaddress.ip_network(
"::/128"
), # IPv6 unspecified — Linux routes connections to local host
# IPv6 transition prefixes that can wrap private IPv4 destinations.
# On Linux hosts with kernel sit0 / NAT64 routes configured, these
# prefixes are forwarded to the embedded IPv4 (e.g. 2002:7f00:1::
# → 127.0.0.1 via 6to4). Default Linux has no such routes so they
# are not exploitable in the typical deployment, but blocking them
# closes the gap for operators who do enable transition tunnels.
ipaddress.ip_network("2002::/16"), # 6to4 (RFC 3056, deprecated RFC 7526)
ipaddress.ip_network("64:ff9b::/96"), # NAT64 well-known prefix (RFC 6052)
ipaddress.ip_network(
"64:ff9b:1::/48"
), # NAT64 local-use prefix (RFC 8215) — same SSRF threat class as the WKP
ipaddress.ip_network("2001::/32"), # Teredo (RFC 4380)
ipaddress.ip_network("100::/64"), # IPv6 discard prefix (RFC 6666)
# IPv4-Compatible IPv6 — DEPRECATED by RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1 in 2006 but
# still parseable by ipaddress and routable on hosts with ::/96 routes
# configured (rare but real). Embeds the IPv4 in the low 32 bits so
# [::169.254.169.254] would otherwise reach IMDS, identically to the
# 6to4/NAT64 wraps. Has zero legitimate live use; blocking it is the
# same defense-in-depth move as the transition prefixes above.
ipaddress.ip_network("::/96"),
# IPv4-Translated (RFC 2765 / SIIT). Same shape as the IPv4-Compatible
# prefix above — the IPv4 sits in the low 32 bits — and the same threat:
# `::ffff:0:169.254.169.254` reaches IMDS on a host with SIIT routes.
# NOT covered by the validator's `ipv4_mapped` unwrap, which only
# recognises the MAPPED form `::ffff:0:0/96` (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`);
# `ipaddress` returns None for `ipv4_mapped` on the translated form, so
# it fell through every IPv4 check and classified as public (#6408).
ipaddress.ip_network("::ffff:0:0:0/96"),
]
# NAT64 prefixes — operators on IPv6-only hosts using DNS64+NAT64 reach
# IPv4 services through these. Blocking by default protects the typical
# deployment shape (laptops / dual-stack) from the IPv6-wrapped IMDS /
# RFC1918 SSRF bypass class. Operators who actually need NAT64 reachable
# can opt in via the env-only setting ``security.allow_nat64``
# (LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true). 6to4, Teredo, discard, the
# IPv4-Compatible prefix (::/96, except ::1 loopback which follows the
# loopback/private flags), and the IPv4-Translated/SIIT prefix
# (::ffff:0:0:0/96) remain unconditionally blocked — they have no
# legitimate live use.
NAT64_PREFIXES = [
ipaddress.ip_network("64:ff9b::/96"),
ipaddress.ip_network("64:ff9b:1::/48"),
]