~95% on SimpleQA (e.g. Qwen3.6-27B on a 3090). Supports all local and cloud LLMs (llama.cpp, Ollama, Google, ...). 10+ search engines - arXiv, PubMed, your private documents. Everything Local & Encrypted.
Python academiaanthropicarxivbravedeep-researchencryptionhome-automationhomeserverlocallocal-deep-researchlocal-llmmistralollamaopenaipubmedresearchresearch-toolretrieval-augmented-generationsearxngself-hosted
"""
Security environment settings.
These settings control security-related behavior like SSRF validation
and CORS origin restrictions.
"""
import os
from ..env_settings import BooleanSetting, StringSetting
# External environment variables (set by pytest, CI systems)
# These are read directly since we don't control them
PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST = os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST")
# LDR Security settings (our application's security configuration)
SECURITY_SETTINGS = [
StringSetting(
key="security.cors.allowed_origins",
description=(
"Allowed CORS origins for API routes (comma-separated). "
"Use '*' for all origins, empty for same-origin only. "
"Example: 'https://example.com,https://app.example.com'"
),
default=None,
),
StringSetting(
key="security.websocket.allowed_origins",
description=(
"Allowed origins for WebSocket/Socket.IO connections (comma-separated). "
"Unset or empty means same-origin only (default); use '*' to allow all origins. "
"Example: 'https://example.com,https://app.example.com'"
),
default=None,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="notifications.allow_private_ips",
description=(
"Allow notification webhooks to target private/local IP addresses. "
"Environment-only to prevent SSRF bypass via the user-writable settings API. "
"Only enable this if your notification endpoints are on a trusted local network."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="security.allow_nat64",
description=(
"Allow outbound traffic to NAT64 prefixes (64:ff9b::/96 RFC 6052 "
"well-known and 64:ff9b:1::/48 RFC 8215 local-use). Disabled by "
"default to close the IPv6-wrapped SSRF bypass class — on hosts "
"configured with NAT64 routes, attacker-supplied URLs can wrap "
"cloud-metadata or RFC1918 destinations through these prefixes. "
"Enable only on IPv6-only deployments (DNS64+NAT64) where "
"outbound IPv4 traffic is synthesized through this prefix and "
"the operator has accepted the residual SSRF risk. 6to4 "
"(2002::/16), Teredo (2001::/32), the discard prefix "
"(100::/64), the deprecated IPv4-Compatible IPv6 form "
"(::/96, except ::1 loopback which follows the loopback/"
"private flags), and the IPv4-Translated/SIIT form "
"(::ffff:0:0:0/96) remain unconditionally blocked because "
"they have no live legitimate use in 2026. The cloud-metadata block "
"(ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_IPS) still applies via embedded-IPv4 "
"extraction — see SECURITY.md."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="notifications.allow_outbound",
description=(
"Master switch for outbound notification webhooks (Apprise). "
"Disabled by default so outbound delivery requires an explicit "
"operator decision. The send path uses a synchronous DNS guard "
"against rebinding and private/metadata access; see SECURITY.md "
"'Notification Webhook SSRF' for details. Distinct from the per-user "
"notifications.enabled toggle in the settings UI: this is the "
"server-level operator gate, env-only so it cannot be flipped via "
"the user-writable settings API."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="policy.allow_unprotected_egress",
description=(
"Allow users to select the UNPROTECTED egress scope. Disabled by "
"default; this is an environment-only operator gate and cannot be "
"changed through the user-writable settings API. Hard SSRF and "
"cloud-metadata protections remain active when enabled."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="search.allow_private_engine_urls",
description=(
"Allow user-editable PUBLIC search-engine URLs (e.g. the SearXNG "
"instance_url) to point at private / loopback / link-local "
"addresses. Environment-only operator gate so it cannot be flipped "
"through the user-writable settings API. Disabled by default: a "
"public-nature engine (its data source is the public internet) "
"pointed at an internal host lets any authenticated user turn a "
"research run into an internal port scan / service probe, breaking "
"the PUBLIC_ONLY egress promise. Enable only when you self-host "
"SearXNG on localhost/LAN and accept that engine fetches may reach "
"your private network. To approve only specific origins instead "
"of all private addresses, use the finer-grained "
"LDR_SEARCH_PRIVATE_ENGINE_URL_ALLOWLIST. "
"Docker deployments instead pin the URL "
"directly via LDR_SEARCH_ENGINE_WEB_SEARXNG_DEFAULT_PARAMS_"
"INSTANCE_URL, which is trusted as operator-provisioned. "
"Cloud-metadata endpoints (ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_IPS and "
"ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTNAMES) stay blocked regardless of "
"this flag."
),
default=False,
),
StringSetting(
key="search.private_engine_url_allowlist",
description=(
"Comma-separated list of exact URL origins "
"(scheme://host[:port]) that user-editable PUBLIC search-engine "
"URLs (e.g. the SearXNG instance_url) may use even though they "
"are private / loopback / link-local — e.g. "
"'http://localhost:8080,http://192.168.1.5:8888'. Finer-grained "
"alternative to LDR_SEARCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENGINE_URLS=true: "
"private egress is enabled for an engine only when its "
"configured URL matches a listed origin (the engine's request "
"chain, including redirects, then runs with private access — "
"like the blanket flag, but conditional on the match), rather "
"than for any private URL. Matching is exact scheme + host + port "
"(default ports 80/443 implied, host case-insensitive, "
"path/query ignored); no wildcards or CIDR ranges. Entries that "
"fail to parse are ignored. Environment-only operator setting "
"so it cannot be edited through the user-writable settings API. "
"Cloud-metadata endpoints (ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_IPS and "
"ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTNAMES) and non-http(s) schemes stay "
"blocked even if listed."
),
default=None,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="search.allow_private_result_fetch",
description=(
"Allow full-content fetching (search.snippets_only off) to "
"follow the RESULT URLs a PUBLIC search engine returns into "
"private / "
"loopback addresses, e.g. an internal wiki that a self-hosted "
"SearXNG instance indexes. Distinct from, and required in "
"addition to, the instance-URL approval "
"(LDR_SEARCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENGINE_URLS, "
"LDR_SEARCH_PRIVATE_ENGINE_URL_ALLOWLIST or an env-locked "
"instance URL): that approval only covers reaching the engine "
"itself, and because a public engine proxies the public web, "
"extending it to the URLs the engine returns would let a "
"poisoned index turn result fetching into a scan of the LDR "
"host's private network. Environment-only operator gate so it "
"cannot be flipped through the user-writable settings API. "
"Disabled by default and not set by the bundled "
"docker-compose.yml. Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, "
"fe80::/10) and the cloud-metadata endpoints in "
"ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_IPS and "
"ALWAYS_BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTNAMES stay blocked regardless of "
"this flag. Takes effect only under the unprotected egress scope: "
"under every other scope, the default adaptive scope included, "
"private result URLs stay blocked even with this flag set."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="research_library.allow_filesystem_pdf_storage",
description=(
"Allow users to select the UNENCRYPTED 'filesystem' PDF storage "
"mode for library-downloaded PDFs. Disabled by default; this is "
"an environment-only operator gate and cannot be changed through "
"the user-writable settings API. Filesystem mode writes fetched "
"third-party PDFs as PLAINTEXT to a shared library directory "
"(cleartext storage of sensitive information, CWE-312). When "
"off, the 'filesystem' option is withheld from the settings UI "
"and any stored or "
"environment value of 'filesystem' is coerced to the encrypted "
"'database' mode at write time. Previously-written plaintext "
"files remain readable. Enable only when the library directory "
"lives on an operator-controlled encrypted volume."
),
default=False,
),
BooleanSetting(
key="research_library.allow_shared_library",
description=(
"Allow shared-library mode, which drops the per-user library "
"directory boundary so all users' downloaded PDFs live in one "
"shared directory. Disabled by default; this is an "
"environment-only operator gate and cannot be enabled through the "
"user-writable settings API. The shared_library flag is otherwise "
"user-editable; leaving shared mode user-toggleable would let an "
"account drop its per-user directory boundary. The storage_path "
"is now operator-only, but legacy saved paths remain in place. "
"When off, the per-user subdirectory is always "
"enforced regardless of the user's shared_library setting. Enable "
"only on single-tenant or mutually-trusted deployments."
),
default=False,
),
]