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import '@js/security/url-validator.js';
const { URLValidator } = window;
const baseUrl = window.location.href;
describe('URLValidator adversarial inputs', () => {
describe('scheme smuggling', () => {
it.each([
'java\tscript:alert(1)',
'java\nscript:alert(1)',
'java\rscript:alert(1)',
' \tjavascript:alert(1)',
])('rejects tab/newline-smuggled JavaScript schemes: %j', (url) => {
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url)).toBe(false);
});
it.each(['java\x01script:alert(1)', 'java\x0Bscript:alert(1)'])(
'treats non-stripped C0 lookalikes as same-origin relative paths: %j',
(url) => {
const parsed = new URL(url, baseUrl);
expect(parsed.protocol).toBe('http:');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url)).toBe(true);
}
);
});
describe('entity, fullwidth, and NUL lookalikes', () => {
it.each([
'javascript:alert(1)',
'javascript:alert(1)',
'java\x00script:alert(1)',
'%6Aavascript:alert(1)',
])('resolves %j as a relative path rather than decoding a JavaScript scheme', (url) => {
const parsed = new URL(url, baseUrl);
expect(parsed.protocol).toBe('http:');
expect(parsed.hostname).toBe('localhost');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('direct unsafe schemes', () => {
it.each([
'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'vbscript:msgbox(1)',
'file:///etc/passwd',
'about:blank',
'blob:https://example.com/uuid',
'DATA:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'VBScript:msgbox(1)',
'File:///etc/passwd',
'About:blank',
])('rejects %j', (url) => {
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('protocol-relative and backslash URLs', () => {
it('recognizes protocol-relative URLs as allowed HTTP URLs without a trusted-domain policy', () => {
expect(new URL('//evil.com', baseUrl).href).toBe('http://evil.com/');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl('//evil.com')).toBe(true);
});
it('normalizes double-backslash URLs to protocol-relative HTTP URLs', () => {
expect(new URL('\\\\evil.com', baseUrl).href).toBe('http://evil.com/');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl('\\\\evil.com')).toBe(true);
});
it('normalizes slash-backslash URLs to protocol-relative HTTP URLs', () => {
expect(new URL('/\\evil.com', baseUrl).href).toBe('http://evil.com/');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl('/\\evil.com')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('trusted-domain matching', () => {
const options = { trustedDomains: ['example.com'] };
const cyrillicHomoglyph = 'https://еxample.com';
it('rejects an IDN homoglyph rather than treating it as a trusted domain', () => {
expect(new URL(cyrillicHomoglyph).hostname).toBe('xn--xample-2of.com');
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(cyrillicHomoglyph, options)).toBe(false);
});
it.each([
'https://example.com。attacker.com',
'https://[email protected]',
'https://evil.com#@example.com',
'https://example.com.evil.com',
'https://notexample.com',
])('rejects trusted-domain confusion URL %j', (url) => {
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url, options)).toBe(false);
});
it('allows the trusted apex and a real subdomain', () => {
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl('https://example.com', options)).toBe(true);
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl('https://sub.example.com/path', options)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('benign URLs', () => {
it.each([
'settings/general',
'/news/subscriptions',
'http://example.com/path',
'https://example.com/path?q=1',
'ftp://files.example.com/pub',
'ftps://files.example.com/pub',
])('allows %j', (url) => {
expect(URLValidator.isSafeUrl(url)).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects tab-smuggled JavaScript while sanitizing', () => {
expect(URLValidator.sanitizeUrl('java\tscript:alert(1)')).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('safeAssign carve-outs', () => {
it.each([
' data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'DATA:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'da\tta:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
])('rejects a non-exact data: prefix: %j', (url) => {
const element = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', url)).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
it('applies trusted-domain validation to double-backslash URLs that miss the internal-path carve-out', () => {
const element = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', '\\\\evil.com', {
trustedDomains: ['example.com'],
})).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
it('blocks data:text/html assignment', () => {
const element = {};
const payload = 'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>';
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', payload)).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
// An SVG data: document can carry <script>/event-handler content, so
// safeAssign's data: carve-out must refuse it even for an <img src>,
// the target where a raster data: image IS accepted. That carve-out
// checks the MIME type with its own regex, not SAFE_DATA_MIME_TYPES
// (see the note above its data: branch in url-validator.js). The
// target is a real <img> so only the MIME check can reject the
// value: a plain object fails the target check first and would
// reject even an allowed PNG.
it('blocks data:image/svg+xml assignment to an img src', () => {
const element = document.createElement('img');
const payload = '';
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'src', payload)).toBe(false);
expect(element.getAttribute('src')).toBeNull();
});
it('does not allow protocol-relative URLs to bypass trustedDomains', () => {
const element = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', '//evil.com', {
trustedDomains: ['example.com'],
})).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not allow slash-backslash URLs to bypass trustedDomains', () => {
const element = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', '/\\evil.com', {
trustedDomains: ['example.com'],
})).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
// Regression: the internal-path carve-out used to compare the RAW
// string, so a C0 control character at index 1 kept `url[1]` from
// being '/' while the browser still stripped it and parsed the value
// as protocol-relative. Every one of these resolved to
// https://evil.com/ without ever reaching isSafeUrl.
it.each([
['tab', '/\t/evil.com'],
['line feed', '/\n/evil.com'],
['carriage return', '/\r/evil.com'],
['tab before a backslash', '/\t\\evil.com'],
])('does not let a %s-smuggled protocol-relative URL skip validation', (_label, url) => {
const element = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(element, 'href', url, {
trustedDomains: ['example.com'],
})).toBe(false);
expect(element.href).toBeUndefined();
});
it('still allows trusted carve-outs after the tightening', () => {
const blobElement = document.createElement('a');
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(
blobElement, 'href', 'blob:https://example.com/uuid'
)).toBe(true);
expect(blobElement.href).toBe('blob:https://example.com/uuid');
const dataElement = document.createElement('img');
const dataUrl = '';
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(dataElement, 'src', dataUrl)).toBe(true);
expect(dataElement.src).toBe(dataUrl);
const internalElement = {};
expect(URLValidator.safeAssign(internalElement, 'href', '/settings/general')).toBe(true);
expect(internalElement.href).toBe('/settings/general');
});
});
});