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"""A post-creation session failure must not leave the user half-logged-in.
FastAPI port of the Flask ``test_auth_routes`` regression from #5006 (F2
follow-up to #4934). ``create_user_database()`` succeeds (the account is
legitimately created), but a later step in the inline session setup — storing
the session password — fails. Registration returns 500, and NO auth material
may survive: the partially-set cookie would otherwise log the user in on their
next request despite the reported failure, and the server-side session +
password entry would leak.
The FastAPI branch creates sessions inline (not via Flask's shared
``_create_user_session``); the rollback lives in ``_rollback_partial_session``.
Rather than decode Starlette's signed session cookie, this asserts the
end-to-end effect (a protected route redirects to login) plus the server-side
teardown directly.
"""
import uuid
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def client():
from local_deep_research.web.fastapi_app import app
return TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
def _csrf(client):
client.get("/auth/login")
r = client.get("/auth/csrf-token")
return r.json().get("csrf_token", "") if r.status_code == 200 else ""
def test_post_creation_session_failure_does_not_leave_user_logged_in(
client, monkeypatch
):
from local_deep_research.database.session_passwords import (
session_password_store,
)
from local_deep_research.web.auth.session_manager import session_manager
username = f"sessfail_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
captured = {}
def _boom(*args, **kwargs):
# store_session_password(username, session_id, password) — capture the
# server-side session_id so we can assert it was torn down.
captured["session_id"] = (
args[1] if len(args) > 1 else kwargs.get("session_id")
)
raise RuntimeError("simulated post-creation session failure")
# Fails AFTER the inline session setup has already set session_id/username/
# temp_auth_token in the cookie AND created the server-side session —
# exactly the half-logged-in window.
monkeypatch.setattr(session_password_store, "store_session_password", _boom)
response = client.post(
"/auth/register",
data={
"username": username,
"password": "TestPass123!",
"confirm_password": "TestPass123!",
"acknowledge": "true",
"csrf_token": _csrf(client),
},
follow_redirects=False,
)
assert response.status_code == 500
assert captured.get("session_id") # the failing step actually ran
# Server-side state torn down (not just the cookie): the session and its
# password-store entry must be gone, or they leak.
assert session_manager.validate_session(captured["session_id"]) is None
assert (
session_password_store.get_session_password(
username, captured["session_id"]
)
is None
)
# End-to-end: the client carries whatever cookie the 500 set; the user must
# be genuinely unauthenticated — a protected route redirects to login.
protected = client.get("/", follow_redirects=False)
assert protected.status_code == 302
assert "/auth/login" in protected.headers.get("location", "")