~95% on SimpleQA (e.g. Qwen3.6-27B on a 3090). Supports all local and cloud LLMs (llama.cpp, Ollama, Google, ...). 10+ search engines - arXiv, PubMed, your private documents. Everything Local & Encrypted.
Python academiaanthropicarxivbravedeep-researchencryptionhome-automationhomeserverlocallocal-deep-researchlocal-llmmistralollamaopenaipubmedresearchresearch-toolretrieval-augmented-generationsearxngself-hosted
docs: highlight zero-knowledge architecture and security features in README (#2817)
LearningCircuita0653495201e
diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex e80d6e7909..6c19f96472 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -154,7 +154,9 @@ flowchart LRU2[User B] --> D2[(Encrypted DB)]```-Your data stays yours. Each user gets their own isolated SQLCipher database encrypted with AES-256 (Signal-level security). No password recovery means true zero-knowledge—even server admins can't read your data. Run fully local with Ollama + SearXNG and nothing ever leaves your machine.+Your data stays yours. Each user gets their own isolated SQLCipher database encrypted with AES-256, with the key derived from your password. Your password is never stored — login works by attempting to decrypt your database, so the database files on their own are unusable to anyone who obtains them. Per-user LLM API keys live encrypted inside the same personal database rather than in a shared server-level store.++The [Docker setup](docker-compose.yml) ships with `cap_drop: ALL`, `no-new-privileges`, and a non-root runtime, with images pinned by digest. Or run fully local with Ollama + SearXNG and nothing ever leaves your machine.**In-memory credentials**: Like all applications that use secrets at runtime — including [password managers](https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/), browsers, and API clients — credentials are held in plain text in process memory during active sessions. This is an [industry-wide accepted reality](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secrets_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html), not specific to LDR: if an attacker can read process memory, they can also read any in-process decryption key. We mitigate this with session-scoped credential lifetimes and core dump exclusion. Ideas for further improvements are always welcome via [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/issues). See our [Security Policy](SECURITY.md) for details.diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.ymlindex df4845b9ca..19e8117cac 100644--- a/docker-compose.yml+++ b/docker-compose.yml@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ services:# WARNING: Removing cap_add entries will break container startup — the# entrypoint will fail with "Operation not permitted" on chown/chmod.# This is especially visible in restricted environments (Proxmox LXC).+ #+ # KEEP IN SYNC: README.md's Security section advertises this hardening+ # (cap_drop: ALL, no-new-privileges, non-root runtime, digest-pinned+ # images). If you change any of those here, update that section to match.# ============================================================================security_opt:- "no-new-privileges:true"