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Python academiaanthropicarxivbravedeep-researchencryptionhome-automationhomeserverlocallocal-deep-researchlocal-llmmistralollamaopenaipubmedresearchresearch-toolretrieval-augmented-generationsearxngself-hosted
security: fix path traversal in FileReportStorage, LDR_DATA_DIR, and symlink checks (#3090)
LearningCircuitaa7fa50845ae
diff --git a/src/local_deep_research/config/paths.py b/src/local_deep_research/config/paths.pyindex 627d2c006d..c48a6c7555 100644--- a/src/local_deep_research/config/paths.py+++ b/src/local_deep_research/config/paths.py@@ -27,7 +27,15 @@ def get_data_directory() -> Path:# Check for explicit override via environment variablecustom_path = os.getenv("LDR_DATA_DIR")if custom_path:- data_dir = Path(custom_path)+ if not Path(custom_path).is_absolute():+ raise ValueError("LDR_DATA_DIR must be an absolute path")+ data_dir = Path(custom_path).resolve()+ # Block SQL-unsafe characters that could be exploited in ATTACH DATABASE statements+ path_str = str(data_dir)+ if any(c in path_str for c in ("'", '"', "\0", "\n", "\r")):+ raise ValueError(+ f"LDR_DATA_DIR contains unsafe characters: {path_str!r}"+ )logger.debug(f"Using custom data directory from LDR_DATA_DIR: {data_dir}")diff --git a/src/local_deep_research/security/path_validator.py b/src/local_deep_research/security/path_validator.pyindex 11dcdf299c..3aed6ba744 100644--- a/src/local_deep_research/security/path_validator.py+++ b/src/local_deep_research/security/path_validator.py@@ -225,6 +225,12 @@ class PathValidator:if ".." in user_path:raise ValueError("Path traversal patterns not allowed")+ # Check for symlinks BEFORE resolve(), since resolve() follows symlinks+ # making a post-resolve is_symlink() check ineffective (always False)+ raw_path = Path(user_path)+ if raw_path.is_symlink():+ raise ValueError("Symlinks are not permitted for security reasons")+# Use safe_join to sanitize the path - this is recognized by static analyzers# For absolute paths, we validate against the root directoryif user_path.startswith("/"):diff --git a/src/local_deep_research/storage/file.py b/src/local_deep_research/storage/file.pyindex d00bac7411..37950358e4 100644--- a/src/local_deep_research/storage/file.py+++ b/src/local_deep_research/storage/file.py@@ -23,11 +23,21 @@ class FileReportStorage(ReportStorage):def _get_report_path(self, research_id: str) -> Path:"""Get the file path for a report."""- return self.base_dir / f"{research_id}.md"+ candidate = (self.base_dir / f"{research_id}.md").resolve()+ if not candidate.is_relative_to(self.base_dir.resolve()):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Path traversal attempt with research_id: {research_id!r}"+ )+ return candidatedef _get_metadata_path(self, research_id: str) -> Path:"""Get the file path for report metadata."""- return self.base_dir / f"{research_id}_metadata.json"+ candidate = (self.base_dir / f"{research_id}_metadata.json").resolve()+ if not candidate.is_relative_to(self.base_dir.resolve()):+ raise ValueError(+ f"Path traversal attempt with research_id: {research_id!r}"+ )+ return candidatedef save_report(self,