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chore: clear changelog fragments for 1.10.4 (#5601)

github-actions[bot]cc623a579a0e
diff --git a/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.md b/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b6e6f1913..0000000000
--- a/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-Login now verifies your password even when your encrypted database is already
-open. The connection cache is keyed by username alone, so a cache hit proved
-only that *someone* had already opened that user's database — and login's sole
-credential check is whether that open succeeds.
-
-This only affected an account that **already existed and was currently open** —
-the normal state while that user is signed in anywhere. It could **not** be used
-to sign in to an account that does not exist or that has never been opened, and
-the attacker needed no account of their own. The exposure also outlives an
-active browser session: the database stays open after the user closes the
-browser (until the idle timeout — up to 30 days with "remember me") and while a
-research job is running. For any account meeting that condition, knowing only
-the **username** — not the password — was enough to sign in as that user from a
-different session, browser, or IP and read (and write) their data. The attempt
-also counted as a successful login, so it never tripped the account lockout or
-the rate limiter and left nothing in the logs that looked like an attack.
-
-The cache now records which password opened the connection and re-checks it on
-every login, falling back to a real key-validating open when it does not match.
diff --git a/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md b/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1223e2eaf5..0000000000
--- a/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Preserve commas inside Apprise service URLs while refusing configurations that contain scheme-less URL fragments.
diff --git a/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.md b/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b09d90c8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+
+### 🔒 Security
+
+- Login now verifies your password even when your encrypted database is already
+ open. The connection cache is keyed by username alone, so a cache hit proved
+ only that *someone* had already opened that user's database — and login's sole
+ credential check is whether that open succeeds.
+
+ This only affected an account that **already existed and was currently open** —
+ the normal state while that user is signed in anywhere. It could **not** be used
+ to sign in to an account that does not exist or that has never been opened, and
+ the attacker needed no account of their own. The exposure also outlives an
+ active browser session: the database stays open after the user closes the
+ browser (until the idle timeout — up to 30 days with "remember me") and while a
+ research job is running. For any account meeting that condition, knowing only
+ the **username** — not the password — was enough to sign in as that user from a
+ different session, browser, or IP and read (and write) their data. The attempt
+ also counted as a successful login, so it never tripped the account lockout or
+ the rate limiter and left nothing in the logs that looked like an attack.
+
+ The cache now records which password opened the connection and re-checks it on
+ every login, falling back to a real key-validating open when it does not match.
+
+### 🐛 Bug Fixes
+
+- Preserve commas inside Apprise service URLs while refusing configurations that contain scheme-less URL fragments. ([#5394](https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/pull/5394))