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chore: clear changelog fragments for 1.10.4 (#5601)
github-actions[bot]cc623a579a0e
diff --git a/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.md b/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.mddeleted file mode 100644index 5b6e6f1913..0000000000--- a/changelog.d/+login-cached-connection-reverify.security.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@-Login now verifies your password even when your encrypted database is already-open. The connection cache is keyed by username alone, so a cache hit proved-only that *someone* had already opened that user's database — and login's sole-credential check is whether that open succeeds.--This only affected an account that **already existed and was currently open** —-the normal state while that user is signed in anywhere. It could **not** be used-to sign in to an account that does not exist or that has never been opened, and-the attacker needed no account of their own. The exposure also outlives an-active browser session: the database stays open after the user closes the-browser (until the idle timeout — up to 30 days with "remember me") and while a-research job is running. For any account meeting that condition, knowing only-the **username** — not the password — was enough to sign in as that user from a-different session, browser, or IP and read (and write) their data. The attempt-also counted as a successful login, so it never tripped the account lockout or-the rate limiter and left nothing in the logs that looked like an attack.--The cache now records which password opened the connection and re-checks it on-every login, falling back to a real key-validating open when it does not match.diff --git a/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md b/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.mddeleted file mode 100644index 1223e2eaf5..0000000000--- a/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1 +0,0 @@-Preserve commas inside Apprise service URLs while refusing configurations that contain scheme-less URL fragments.diff --git a/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.md b/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..6b09d90c8c--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/release_notes/1.10.4.md@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@++### 🔒 Security++- Login now verifies your password even when your encrypted database is already+ open. The connection cache is keyed by username alone, so a cache hit proved+ only that *someone* had already opened that user's database — and login's sole+ credential check is whether that open succeeds.++ This only affected an account that **already existed and was currently open** —+ the normal state while that user is signed in anywhere. It could **not** be used+ to sign in to an account that does not exist or that has never been opened, and+ the attacker needed no account of their own. The exposure also outlives an+ active browser session: the database stays open after the user closes the+ browser (until the idle timeout — up to 30 days with "remember me") and while a+ research job is running. For any account meeting that condition, knowing only+ the **username** — not the password — was enough to sign in as that user from a+ different session, browser, or IP and read (and write) their data. The attempt+ also counted as a successful login, so it never tripped the account lockout or+ the rate limiter and left nothing in the logs that looked like an attack.++ The cache now records which password opened the connection and re-checks it on+ every login, falling back to a real key-validating open when it does not match.++### 🐛 Bug Fixes++- Preserve commas inside Apprise service URLs while refusing configurations that contain scheme-less URL fragments. ([#5394](https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/pull/5394))