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fix(notifications): parse service URL boundaries safely (#5394)

Ziyang Guocf2c072a0b0e
diff --git a/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md b/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1223e2eaf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog.d/5394.bugfix.md
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Preserve commas inside Apprise service URLs while refusing configurations that contain scheme-less URL fragments.
diff --git a/src/local_deep_research/notifications/manager.py b/src/local_deep_research/notifications/manager.py
index b07a201629..a0a72482c7 100644
--- a/src/local_deep_research/notifications/manager.py
+++ b/src/local_deep_research/notifications/manager.py
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import threading
from loguru import logger
+from ..security.notification_validator import parse_notification_url_list
+from ..security.ssrf_validator import redact_url_for_log
from ..settings.env_registry import get_env_setting
from .service import NotificationService
from .templates import EventType
@@ -396,15 +398,26 @@ class NotificationManager:
return self.service.test_service(allowed)
def _filter_urls_by_egress_policy(self, service_urls: str) -> str:
- """Filter an Apprise URL string (space- or comma-separated) by
- the user's egress policy. Returns the joined string of allowed
- URLs (may be empty). When no snapshot / context is available,
- returns the input unchanged (back-compat — the snapshot-less
- path was already used in older callers).
+ """Filter an Apprise URL string by the user's egress policy.
+
+ Commas inside one service URL are preserved; commas or whitespace
+ followed by another scheme delimit URLs. When no snapshot / context is
+ available, return the input unchanged for backwards compatibility.
"""
snapshot = getattr(self, "_settings_snapshot", None)
if not snapshot:
return service_urls
+
+ url_entries, invalid_fragment = parse_notification_url_list(
+ service_urls
+ )
+ if invalid_fragment is not None:
+ logger.bind(policy_audit=True).warning(
+ "all notification URLs refused: scheme-less URL fragment",
+ fragment=redact_url_for_log(invalid_fragment),
+ )
+ return ""
+
try:
from ..security.egress.policy import (
EgressScope,
@@ -456,10 +469,7 @@ class NotificationManager:
# pass-through stands (the modeled threat there is internal-http
# SSRF via a raw webhook, not vendor APIs).
parts = []
- for url_entry in service_urls.replace(",", " ").split():
- url_entry = url_entry.strip()
- if not url_entry:
- continue
+ for url_entry in url_entries:
scheme = (
url_entry.split(":", 1)[0].lower() if ":" in url_entry else ""
)
diff --git a/src/local_deep_research/security/notification_validator.py b/src/local_deep_research/security/notification_validator.py
index 3e551b952f..780b4ed584 100644
--- a/src/local_deep_research/security/notification_validator.py
+++ b/src/local_deep_research/security/notification_validator.py
@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks and other security issues.
"""
import ipaddress
+import re
import socket
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, TimeoutError
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple, Union
from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
from loguru import logger
from urllib3.exceptions import LocationParseError
from urllib3.util import parse_url
@@ -21,6 +23,48 @@ from .ssrf_validator import RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE, redact_url_for_log
# ipaddress._BaseAddress API).
ResolvedIP = Union[ipaddress.IPv4Address, ipaddress.IPv6Address]
+_SCHEMELESS_URL_FRAGMENT_RE = re.compile(
+ r"^(?:localhost|(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}|"
+ r"(?:[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.)+[A-Za-z]{2,})"
+ r"(?::\d+)?(?:[/?#]|$)"
+)
+_URL_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,31}://")
+_URL_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(r"[,\s]+(?=[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]{0,31}://)")
+
+
+def parse_notification_url_list(
+ urls: str, separator: str = ","
+) -> tuple[list[str], Optional[str]]:
+ """Partition notification URLs without dropping malformed fragments.
+
+ A boundary is a comma or whitespace sequence followed by a URL scheme.
+ This preserves commas inside one Apprise service URL while keeping
+ whitespace a hard separator. URL-like fragments without a scheme are
+ returned separately so callers can fail closed instead of dispatching only
+ the valid subset.
+
+ Returns ``(parsed_urls, invalid_fragment)``. Custom separators retain the
+ historical split behavior.
+ """
+ if separator != ",":
+ return (
+ [entry.strip() for entry in urls.split(separator) if entry.strip()],
+ None,
+ )
+
+ parsed_urls = [
+ entry.strip(" ,\t\r\n")
+ for entry in _URL_BOUNDARY_RE.split(urls)
+ if entry.strip(" ,\t\r\n")
+ ]
+ for entry in parsed_urls:
+ if not _URL_SCHEME_RE.match(entry):
+ return parsed_urls, entry
+ for fragment in re.split(r"[,\s]+", entry)[1:]:
+ if _SCHEMELESS_URL_FRAGMENT_RE.match(fragment):
+ return parsed_urls, fragment
+ return parsed_urls, None
+
class NotificationURLValidationError(ValueError):
"""Raised when a notification service URL fails security validation."""
@@ -869,8 +913,21 @@ class NotificationURLValidator:
if not urls or not isinstance(urls, str):
return False, "Service URLs must be a non-empty string"
- # Split by separator and strip whitespace
- url_list = [url.strip() for url in urls.split(separator) if url.strip()]
+ # Match Apprise's scheme-aware partition so commas inside one service
+ # URL are preserved, while rejecting URL-like fragments it repairs
+ # away or absorbs into another entry.
+ url_list, invalid_fragment = parse_notification_url_list(
+ urls, separator
+ )
+ if invalid_fragment is not None:
+ _, error_message = NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url(
+ invalid_fragment, allow_private_ips
+ )
+ return (
+ False,
+ f"Invalid URL '{redact_url_for_log(invalid_fragment)}': "
+ f"{error_message}",
+ )
if not url_list:
return False, "No valid URLs found after parsing"
diff --git a/tests/notifications/test_manager.py b/tests/notifications/test_manager.py
index f298c1f53a..bd24d06b16 100644
--- a/tests/notifications/test_manager.py
+++ b/tests/notifications/test_manager.py
@@ -1075,6 +1075,47 @@ class TestEgressPolicyURLFilter:
assert "slack://t" in out
assert "http://127.0.0.1/h" not in out
+ def test_embedded_comma_survives_mixed_service_filtering(self, monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.setenv("LDR_POLICY_ALLOW_UNPROTECTED_EGRESS", "true")
+ mgr = self._mgr("unprotected")
+ json_url = "json://example.com/webhook?field=a,b"
+ out = mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy(
+ f"{json_url}, discord://webhook/token"
+ )
+
+ assert out == f"{json_url} discord://webhook/token"
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "service_urls",
+ [
+ "typo.example.com/x, slack://t/x/y",
+ "typo.example.com/x slack://t/x/y",
+ "discord://id/token, example.com/webhook",
+ "discord://id/token example.com/webhook",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_scheme_less_fragment_refuses_entire_configuration(
+ self, service_urls
+ ):
+ mgr = self._mgr("unprotected")
+
+ assert mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy(service_urls) == ""
+
+ def test_scheme_less_refusal_logs_only_redacted_fragment(self):
+ mgr = self._mgr("unprotected")
+ service_urls = "secret.example.com/private/token slack://t/x/y"
+
+ with patch(
+ "local_deep_research.notifications.manager.logger"
+ ) as mock_logger:
+ assert mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy(service_urls) == ""
+
+ mock_logger.bind.assert_called_once_with(policy_audit=True)
+ warning = mock_logger.bind.return_value.warning
+ warning.assert_called_once()
+ assert warning.call_args.kwargs["fragment"] == "?://secret.example.com"
+ assert "/private/token" not in warning.call_args.kwargs["fragment"]
+
def test_public_only_blocks_private_http_keeps_public(self):
mgr = self._mgr("public_only", tool="searxng")
out = mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy(
@@ -1086,3 +1127,5 @@ class TestEgressPolicyURLFilter:
mgr = NotificationManager.__new__(NotificationManager)
mgr._settings_snapshot = None
assert mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy("slack://t") == "slack://t"
+ malformed = "typo.example.com/x slack://t/x/y"
+ assert mgr._filter_urls_by_egress_policy(malformed) == malformed
diff --git a/tests/security/test_notification_validator.py b/tests/security/test_notification_validator.py
index d2cdf208e9..52290262a0 100644
--- a/tests/security/test_notification_validator.py
+++ b/tests/security/test_notification_validator.py
@@ -827,6 +827,40 @@ class TestValidateMultipleUrls:
assert is_valid is True
assert error is None
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "url",
+ [
+ "json://example.com/webhook?field=a,b",
+ (
+ "mailto://user:[email protected]"
+ ),
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_embedded_commas_remain_in_single_url(self, url):
+ """Commas inside one Apprise URL must not create invalid entries."""
+ is_valid, error = NotificationURLValidator.validate_multiple_urls(url)
+
+ assert is_valid is True
+ assert error is None
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "urls",
+ [
+ "typo.example.com/x, slack://t/x/y",
+ "typo.example.com/x slack://t/x/y",
+ "discord://id/token, example.com/webhook",
+ "discord://id/token,example.com/webhook",
+ "discord://id/token example.com/webhook",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_scheme_less_fragment_fails_closed(self, urls):
+ is_valid, error = NotificationURLValidator.validate_multiple_urls(urls)
+
+ assert is_valid is False
+ assert "must have a protocol" in error
+ assert "example.com" in error
+
def test_one_invalid_url_fails_all(self):
"""Should fail if any URL is invalid."""
urls = "https://example.com/webhook,file:///etc/passwd"