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fix(security): correct CVE-2026-6653 rationale (lxml bundles patched libxml2) + build guard (#4785)
LearningCircuite30bf6aae0f7
diff --git a/.grype.yaml b/.grype.yamlindex 9bb5fc9919..38ec0f5955 100644--- a/.grype.yaml+++ b/.grype.yaml@@ -255,16 +255,18 @@ ignore:# --- libxml2 ---# CVE-2026-6653 (high): UAF in xmlParseInternalSubset (XML internal-DTD- # parameter entities), affects 2.9.11-2.11.0. Trixie's 2.9.14 base is- # vulnerable with no backport (fixed only in sid/forky 2.15.x) — nothing to- # apt-upgrade to. The vulnerable XML parser is reached only by authenticated- # per-user document uploads: .xml via unstructured/lxml and Office formats- # (.docx/.odt/.pptx/.xlsx) via python-docx/python-pptx/openpyxl/lxml.- # Untrusted scraped web HTML uses libxml2's HTML parser, which never calls- # xmlParseInternalSubset; arXiv/PubMed XML is TLS-fetched from trusted- # upstreams. DoS-primary (crash), CVSS 4.0 7.0, AC:H.+ # parameter entities), affects 2.9.11-2.11.0; Trixie's 2.9.14 base is+ # vulnerable with no backport (fixed only in sid/forky 2.15.x). NOT REACHABLE+ # in this image: the flagged system libxml2 (2.9.14) is present but UNUSED.+ # All XML/HTML parsing goes through lxml, which statically bundles its own+ # libxml2 2.14.x — past the 2.11.0 fix (verified: etree.LIBXML_VERSION is+ # (2,14,6) and lxml's etree.so has no libxml2.so in `ldd`; pdm.lock pins+ # manylinux lxml wheels). The Python stdlib XML uses expat, not libxml2.+ # A build-time assertion in the Dockerfile (after `pdm install`) fails the+ # build if lxml ever ends up linked against a pre-2.11 libxml2 (e.g. an sdist+ # fallback against the system lib), so a vulnerable parser can never ship.- vulnerability: CVE-2026-6653- reason: "High UAF in xmlParseInternalSubset (XML internal-DTD param entities); affects 2.9.11-2.11.0. Trixie 2.9.14-base vulnerable, no backport (fixed only in sid/forky 2.15.x). libxml2's XML parser is reached only by authenticated per-user uploads (.xml + Office .docx/.odt/.pptx/.xlsx via lxml); scraped HTML uses the HTML parser, not xmlParseInternalSubset. DoS-primary, CVSS 4.0 7.0, AC:H."+ reason: "High UAF in xmlParseInternalSubset (libxml2 2.9.11-2.11.0); Trixie 2.9.14 vulnerable, no backport (fixed in sid/forky 2.15.x). NOT reachable: system libxml2 present but unused — all XML parsing uses lxml's bundled libxml2 2.14.x (verified; manylinux wheels), stdlib uses expat. A Dockerfile assertion blocks any pre-2.11 lxml. DoS-primary, CVSS 4.0 7.0."- vulnerability: CVE-2026-1757reason: "Memory leak in xmllint CLI shell. Negligible impact. Debian: unimportant. No xmllint usage."- vulnerability: CVE-2025-8732diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfileindex 2bde00f32d..25929f6909 100644--- a/Dockerfile+++ b/Dockerfile@@ -115,6 +115,15 @@ RUN for i in 1 2 3; do \fi; \done+# Fail the build if lxml is not using a patched libxml2. lxml's manylinux+# wheels statically bundle their own libxml2 (>= 2.14), so the document loaders+# never touch the system libxml2 (Trixie's 2.9.14, vulnerable to CVE-2026-6653).+# If a future Python ever outruns lxml's wheel coverage, `pdm install` could+# build lxml from an sdist linked against that system libxml2 — this assertion+# makes such a build fail loudly instead of shipping a vulnerable parser.+# See .grype.yaml (CVE-2026-6653).+RUN /install/.venv/bin/python -c "from lxml import etree; v = etree.LIBXML_VERSION; assert v >= (2, 11, 0), f'lxml is linked against vulnerable libxml2 {v} (the CVE-2026-6653 fix is in 2.11.0); expected a wheel-bundled libxml2'; print(f'lxml uses libxml2 {v} (>= 2.11.0 CVE-2026-6653 fix) OK')"+##### Container for running tests.