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fix(security): clear prerelease-docker.yml scan alerts (#7774, #7775, #7776) (#4223)
LearningCircuitfb4755f94dfd
diff --git a/.github/SECURITY_ALERTS.md b/.github/SECURITY_ALERTS.mdindex 1a0997568d..45f9ce31a8 100644--- a/.github/SECURITY_ALERTS.md+++ b/.github/SECURITY_ALERTS.md@@ -111,6 +111,42 @@ to track technical debt and future work.---+## DS126858 - Weak/Broken Hash Algorithm++**Status:** Excluded in DevSkim workflow via `exclude-rules`++### Explanation++DevSkim flags any literal occurrence of `sha1` as a "weak/broken hash+algorithm". In this codebase the only matches are:++1. **SLSA provenance JSON keys** in `.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml` —+ the `"sha1"` key inside `digest` objects is part of the+ [SLSA in-toto provenance schema](https://slsa.dev/spec/v0.2/provenance) and+ identifies the algorithm Git itself uses for commit hashes. We are not+ choosing SHA-1 as a cryptographic primitive — Git's commit identifier+ format is fixed.++2. **SQLCipher KDF/HMAC algorithm enums** in+ `src/local_deep_research/settings/env_definitions/db_config.py`+ (`PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1`, `HMAC_SHA1`). These exist for backwards-compatibility+ with existing user databases; the default is SHA-512. Each occurrence+ carries an inline `# DevSkim: ignore DS126858` annotation with rationale.++### Why Exclusion Is Safe++1. **Not a cryptographic choice** - The `sha1` strings in SLSA provenance are+ *protocol-mandated key names*, not crypto operations we control.+2. **Git's commit hashing is SHA-1 by design** - The Linux kernel and every+ git-backed project produces SHA-1 commit IDs; SLSA records them honestly.+3. **Real SHA-1 misuse would be reviewed** - The SQLCipher backwards-compat+ uses are documented and reviewed; new uses of SHA-1 as a cryptographic+ primitive would be caught in code review and by CodeQL.+4. **No password/signature SHA-1 in this codebase** - Authentication uses+ `secrets`/Argon2-class KDFs and SQLCipher's SHA-512 default.++---+## Container Image CVEs**Status:** Documented, awaiting upstream fixes@@ -138,6 +174,10 @@ The following rules are excluded in `.github/workflows/devskim.yml`:|------|------|--------|| DS162092 | Hardcoded URL | Legitimate API endpoints for research services || DS176209 | Suspicious Comment | Standard TODO/FIXME annotations |+| DS137138 | Hardcoded Credentials | All matches are test fixtures (mock data) |+| DS148264 | Use cryptographic random | All `random` usages are non-security (ML shuffle, jitter) |+| DS172411 | setTimeout code injection | All setTimeout calls pass function refs, never strings |+| DS126858 | Weak/Broken Hash Algorithm | SLSA-schema-required `sha1` JSON key + SQLCipher backwards-compat enums |### Review Cadence@@ -146,7 +186,7 @@ These exclusions should be reviewed **quarterly** to ensure:- Exclusions remain appropriate as the codebase evolves- New DevSkim rules are evaluated for applicability-**Last reviewed:** December 2025+**Last reviewed:** May 2026---diff --git a/.github/workflows/devskim.yml b/.github/workflows/devskim.ymlindex 372472c359..4fc8379bc9 100644--- a/.github/workflows/devskim.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/devskim.yml@@ -77,7 +77,18 @@ jobs:# setTimeout(() => {...}, delay) or setTimeout(functionName, delay).# No string-based setTimeout usage exists.#- exclude-rules: 'DS176209,DS162092,DS137138,DS148264,DS172411'+ # DS126858 - "Weak/Broken Hash Algorithm"+ # Flags any occurrence of the literal string "sha1". In this codebase+ # the only matches are the JSON key name `"sha1"` inside SLSA provenance+ # attestations (.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml) — that key name+ # is *required* by the SLSA in-toto schema for git-commit digests, and+ # Git itself uses SHA-1 for commit identifiers. It is not a cryptographic+ # choice we make. Legitimate SHA-1 references elsewhere (PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1,+ # HMAC_SHA1 in db_config.py for SQLCipher backwards compatibility) carry+ # their own inline `# DevSkim: ignore DS126858` annotations explaining the+ # rationale. See .github/SECURITY_ALERTS.md for the full assessment.+ #+ exclude-rules: 'DS176209,DS162092,DS137138,DS148264,DS172411,DS126858'- name: Upload DevSkim results to GitHub Securityuses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9e0d7b8d25671d64c341c19c0152d693099fb5ba # v4.35.5diff --git a/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml b/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.ymlindex 0c648ed993..03453ea2a3 100644--- a/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml@@ -343,23 +343,32 @@ jobs:## buildInvocationId includes run_attempt so re-runs are# distinguishable in audit logs.+ #+ # Uses auto-injected GITHUB_* shell env vars (GITHUB_REPOSITORY,+ # GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_RUN_ID, GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT) instead+ # of github-context template expansion to satisfy zizmor's+ # template-injection check. The values are semantically identical+ # inside a workflow_call callee (both scope to the caller's context),+ # but shell-var expansion happens at runtime in a confined string+ # context, eliminating any theoretical injection surface from a+ # ref/branch name containing shell metacharacters.cat > provenance.json <<EOF{- "buildType": "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/docker-build@v1",+ "buildType": "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/docker-build@v1","builder": {- "id": "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml@${{ github.ref }}"+ "id": "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/.github/workflows/prerelease-docker.yml@${GITHUB_REF}"},"invocation": {"configSource": {- "uri": "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}",+ "uri": "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}","digest": {- "sha1": "${{ github.sha }}"+ "sha1": "${GITHUB_SHA}"},"entryPoint": ".github/workflows/release.yml"}},"metadata": {- "buildInvocationId": "${{ github.run_id }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}",+ "buildInvocationId": "${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}","buildStartedOn": "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)","completeness": {"parameters": false,@@ -370,9 +379,9 @@ jobs:},"materials": [{- "uri": "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}",+ "uri": "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}","digest": {- "sha1": "${{ github.sha }}"+ "sha1": "${GITHUB_SHA}"}}]@@ -397,8 +406,11 @@ jobs:RETRY_DELAY=10for i in $(seq 1 "$MAX_RETRIES"); doecho "Verification attempt $i of $MAX_RETRIES..."+ # Use GITHUB_REPOSITORY shell env var (auto-injected) instead of+ # github.repository template expansion to avoid zizmor's+ # template-injection finding.if cosign verify \- --certificate-identity-regexp="https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}" \+ --certificate-identity-regexp="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" \--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \"$IMAGE_REF"; thenecho "Signature verification successful!"